Rights, emergencies and judicial review by Omar, Kazi Imtiaz Nazr
RIGHTS, EMERGENCIES AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Kazi Imtiaz Nazr Omar
A Thesis submitted for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
of The Australian National University
March 1992
Copyright 1992, K. Imtiaz Omar
STATEMENT
I declare this Thesis to be my original work. 
Kazi Imtiaz Nazr Omar
3 March 1992
ii
ABSTRACT
Recurrent periods of Emergency rule in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
provide the background for a comparative examination of constitutional 
emergency powers, individual rights, and judicial review. The basic premise of 
this study is that the invocation of a state of emergency can never justify an 
abrogation of constitutional government and, in this regard, the role of the 
Court is crucial. This work examines the extent to which the Court has 
performed its expected role, identifies problems in the approaches to 
interpretation which have been adopted, and explores alternative approaches 
to constitutional interpretation and judicial review.
The first part of the thesis examines the operation of constitutional rights, 
their derogations during an Emergency, and the mechanisms of Emergency 
rule. Following this, three chapters examine, in detail, the approaches of the 
Courts in adjudicating issues of rights during states of emergency. The last part 
subjects conventional jurisprudence to a critical inquiry and explores 
alternative judicial techniques. An approach to constitutional adjudication 
based on a radical exposition of "law", the nature of citizens’ rights, and a 
proper theory of judicial review is advocated in the concluding chapter.
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1INTRODUCTION
A great many of those Constitutions promulgated over the past forty years 
were produced in the wake of the hectic constitution-making activity which 
accompanied the process of decolonisation and the emergence of new States. 
In the great majority of these new States’ Constitutions, a catalogue of citizens’ 
rights are entrenched. In corformity with the exhaustive quality of post-colonial 
constitutional documents, the entrenched Bills of Rights are also detailed, not 
so much in the sense of clarifying these rights, as for the purpose to reducing in 
writing the myriad exceptions to the articulated rights. The constitution-makers 
strived to allow for measures to meet all kinds of contingencies.
In addition to those clauses which restrict the entrenched rights, many of the 
Constitutions of the post-colonial states entrench powers of preventive 
detention. On its face, this seems anomalous. It might have been thought that, 
on the attainment of independent status, the constitution-makers in the 
emergent states would be committed to guarantee rights to the citizens, and 
not to sanction the making of laws to deprive them of their rights through 
preventive detention.
Yet another, and by far the major potential obstacle to the protection of rights 
in the new States is the constitutional sanction of an ability in the executive to 
invoke emergency powers. Experience has shown that during a constitutional 
emergency, individual rights are virtually negated. Preventive detention 
powers, which are available at all times, are used extensively during states of 
emergency.
The practical working of the newer constitutional orders, and the challenges 
thereby posed to the basic notions of constitutionalism, are best perceived in 
observing the operation of emergency powers and preventive detention under 
these new Constitutions. In a large number of post-colonial states, states of 
emergency have tended to become more the norm than the exception. 1
 ^ In States Of Emergency: Their Impact on Human Rights, A Study prepared by the 
International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, 1983, it has been commented that:
[sjtates of emergency are encountered with surprising frequency throughout the 
world. The chapters [in this Study] on states of emergency in India, Malaysia 
and Thailand might have been followed by chapters on states of emergency in 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, The Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka and 
Taiwan. In Africa, states of emergency have been reported recently in Kenya,
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Emergency regimes are, however, not confined to countries of the Third 
World. A recent study of emergency powers in fifteen countries by the 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) observed that:
[i]t is probably no exaggeration to say that at any given time in 
recent history a considerable part of humanity has been living 
under a state of emergency
The ICJ study also noted:
the disturbing tendency observed in many ... [countries] for a 
state of emergency to become perpetual or to effect far-reaching 
authoritarian changes in the ordinary legal norm st
Experience in the new polities has shown that the detailed constitutional rules 
and norms have been manipulated over the years by political authorities to 
incrementally enhance governmental powers to the detriment of the rights of 
the citizens. The vague restrictive clauses qualifying the constitutional 
guarantees of individual rights have allowed governments of the day to 
encroach upon citizens’ liberties. Instead of ensuring workable legal restraints 
on the government, the elaborate provisions of the new constitutions have 
frequently facilitated the assumption of unbridled power on the part of the 
ruling government. The result has been an absence of constitutionalism and 
the negation of effective individual rights.
This thesis is a study of emergency powers, constitutional rights, and judicial 
review in three countries - Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The 
Constitutions of all three countries entrench both individual rights and 
emergency powers. Powers of preventive detention are also available under 
these Constitutions. These powers of preventive detention are available not 
only during states of emergency, but in normal times as well. A Proclamation 
of Emergency under the Constitution of each of these countries enables the
Liberia, Madagascar, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, The Sudan, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and parts of South Africa, in addition to Ghana and Zaire ....
Ibid., at 413.
2
 ^ Ibid. The countries surveyed were, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Eastern Europe, Ghana, 
Greece, India, Malaysia, Northern Ireland, Peru, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Zaire.
3 Ibid., at 415.
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promulgation of extra-ordinary executive decrees and legislative enactments. 
Emergency executive action and legislative measures provide not only for 
preventive detention, but also enable the exercise of other extraordinary 
powers encroaching on almost all aspects of the constitutional rights of citizens.
The justification for the use of extra-ordinary state powers during an 
Emergency is provided by the maxim, salus populi suprema lex - the welfare of 
the people is the paramount law. It is generally assumed that the rights which 
citizens in normal times enjoy should, in times of crisis yield to the maxim salus 
populi suprema lex. Relying on the principle of necessity, encompassed by this 
maxim, Courts in common law countries have consistently been prepared to 
condone draconic executive action during times of national emergency.^ 
Although constitutional systems of the common law world have long 
recognised the maxim salus populi suprema lex, the tendency to entrench 
emergency powers in a constitution is recent.
One of the primary reasons for the incorporation of emergency powers in 
Constitutions such as those of Malaysia, Sri Lanka, or Bangladesh is to offset 
the operation of constitutional rights during an Emergency. The thrust of the 
argument in this regard has been that, "the existence of fundamental rights ... 
ought [not] to be permitted to imperil the safety of the State".^ A second 
reason for detailed provisions on emergency powers is a concern to restrict 
judicial creativity in the determination of the extent to which such powers can 
be exercised. The general objective of constitutional emergency powers is to 
bring about a re-allocation of state power in a manner inconsistent with the 
constitutional limitations which ordinarily prevail.
While it can be accepted that constitutional emergency provisions might 
modify the limitations on state power, the invocation of a state of emergency 
should not wholly suspend or abrogate constitutional government. In countries 
which do not have entrenched emergency powers, any law designed to deal 
with an emergency must be clearly related to the circumstances said to 
constitute the emergency, and it would be only in a very extreme case that a
^ Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206; the US Japanese internment cases - Hirabayashi v 
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), Korematsu v United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), Ex Parte Endo, 
323 U.S. 283 (1944).
~ Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1957, Colonial Office, 
London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957, at 74.
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complete abrogation of constitutional limitations would be justified.^ Yet in 
countries such as Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, this fundamental 
premise often appear to be forgotten.
This situation results in part from the fact that included within the scope of the 
explicit emergency powers is provision for all manner of situations which might 
conceivably justify the temporary re-distribution of constitutional power. Thus 
in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the constitutionally prescribed legal 
consequences of an Emergency, designed to enable the State to cope with crisis 
situations, take effect irrespective of the actual nature of the crisis. There thus 
appears an irreconcilable conflict between the constitutionally conferred, and 
apparently unfettered, emergency powers of the State and the concept of 
constitutionalism on the other. This gives rise to a number of basic problems 
regarding the nature of constitutional rights, the permissible encroachments on 
such rights during an Emergency and the power of the courts to enforce the 
rights in emergency situations.
The basic premise of this thesis is that the invocation of a state of emergency 
can never justify a complete abrogation of constitutional government, or a 
complete suspension of constitutional rights. This proposition derives from the 
very existence and nature of a written constitution and the significance of 
entrenched rights. The principal function of a written constitution is to ensure 
limited government by articulating limitations to the exercise of state power. 
This is the essence of constitutionalism. That being so, an inquiry into the 
exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of citizens’ rights must be 
concerned with whether government is in this sense constitutional. Ultimately, 
the courts are called to make this inquiry, and the constitutional power of the 
court must be invoked to enforce compliance with the requirements of 
constitutionalism. The entrenched powers of judicial review under the 
Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh do facilitate the 
assumption of this kind of judicial power. This judicial power must remain 
available even during an Emergency, for otherwise there is no means to ensure 
that governmental action is constitutional.
The objective of this study is to examine the operation of emergency powers, 
the derogations from constitutional rights and the role of the Courts in
 ^Cf Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth, (1951) 83 C.L.R. 1.
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Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Its thrust is directed to examine the 
reaction of the Courts when they are confronted with the issues presented by a 
Proclamation of Emergency and its constitutionally predefined legal 
consequences. The techniques of judicial inquiry into infringements of 
const utional rights during an Emergency are investigated and alternate 
theories of judicial review are explored. In examining derogations from rights 
during an Emergency and the responses of the Courts, the right to personal 
liberty is highlighted and discussed in detail. The question of rights during an 
Emergency is discussed in the broader context of the political-moral rights of 
citizens against the State.
It is not the purpose of this study to undertake an exhaustive examination of all 
the legal aspects of constitutional emergency powers in Malaysia, Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh. The principal focus will be on those aspects of the law of 
constitutional emergency which have determined the manner in which the 
Courts in these countries have perceived their own constitutional role. In this 
regard, the curtailment of rights during an Emergency and the Courts’ 
techniques of interpretation will be discussed in detail. The evaluation of the 
role of the Courts will then form the basis of suggesting alternate premises of 
articulating rights and explicating the function of judicial review.
The thesis is divided into three parts and a conclusion. The first part, Chapters 
I to V, is concerned with an examination of constitutional rights, the 
mechanisms of preventive detention, and the framework of constitutional 
emergency powers. Chapter I examines briefly the colonial context of the rights 
of citizens, and follows the transition to guaranteed constitutional rights in the 
post-colonial Constitutions. Selective judicial decisions on citizens’ rights are 
included to highlight the approaches of the Courts in adjudicating 
constitutional rights. Preventive detention during the colonial period, and 
peace-time detention without trial since Independence is the subject of 
Chapter II. Colonial instruments of preventive detention, and decisions of the 
Court during this period are discussed. This is followed by an examination of 
constitutional provisions of preventive detention since Independence, as well 
as the provisions of preventive detention statutes. Case-law on preventive 
detention of the latter period are also discussed.
Chapter III examines the colonial background of emergency powers, and the 
emergence of emergency powers as a constitutional norm in the post-colonial
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state. The mechanisms for the invocation of a state of emergency, the executive 
and legislative powers available under a Proclamation of Emergency, and the 
other legal consequences of a Proclamation are discussed. A Proclamation of 
Martial Law as an instance of extra-constitutional emergency is also discussed 
briefly in Chapter III. The power to proclaim an Emergency and its 
justiciability is considered in Chapter IV. Chapter V is devoted exclusively to 
the effect of a Proclamation of Emergency on constitutional rights. Two 
techniques of curtailment of rights during an Emergency are discussed in some 
detail in this Chapter.
The second part - Chapters VI, VII and VIII - discuss the jurisprudence of the 
Courts of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh with regard to the right of 
personal liberty during an Emergency. The difference in the approaches of the 
Courts is significant enough to justify a classification according to the modes of 
inquiry and the conclusions reached.
The subject of the third part of the thesis - Chapters IX and X is an evaluation 
of the judicial techniques employed by the Courts in the three countries, and 
alternative approaches to interpretation. In this part, it is argued that the 
problems of emergency powers, constitutional rights and judicial review cannot 
be resolved by a formal style of constitutional interpretation.^ These issues, it 
is suggested, must be addressed in the context of the basic premises which 
underlie the constitutional system, and the implications of the rights of citizens. 
Chapter IX concentrates on techniques of legal interpretation in general. The 
trends of constitutional interpretation pursued by the Courts in Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh are identified as inadequate, and alternative 
approaches are discussed. Chapter X focuses entirely on the Courts’ 
interpretation of constitutional rights. Judicial review of constitutional rights by 
the Courts in the three countries are portrayed as inappropriate. In this regard, 
two contemporary theories of judicial review and constitutional rights are 
discussed, and a new approach to the interpretation of rights and judicial 
review is suggested.
The conclusion - Chapter XI - examines the implications of recurrent states of 
emergency in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, reviews the requirements 
of constitutionalism, and re-appraises the function of the Court under the
This stlye is discussed below.7
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Constitution. On the basis of some of the conclusions reached in Chapters IX 
and X, a new jurisprudence of rights, emergency powers and judicial review is 
suggested.
The Formal Style of Interpretation
Throughout the analysis in the succeeding Chapters, the comment will recur 
that the dominant judicial technique of the Courts in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh reflects a formal style of interpretation. This formal style may also 
be characterised as Legal Formalism or Legalism.^
At the heart of the word formalism in many of its numerous uses, 
lies the concept of decisionmaking according to rule. Formalism 
is the way in which rules achieve their ruleness precisely by doing 
what is supposed to be the failing of formalism: screening off 
from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker 
would otherwise take into account. Moreover it appears that this 
screening off takes place largely through the force of the 
language in which rules are written.^
The underlying characteristics of the formal style of legal reasoning are:
[a] conception of law as an autonomous discipline with its own 
methodology, rationality and history. Typical devices of the 
discipline to control cognition are legal logic, a system of 
heirarchical rules ...
and
8 Formalism as a technique of interpretation has been the subject much critical comment. See 
e.g., H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961, Chapter VII; K. 
Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory and Practice, University of Chicago Press, 1962, 
183-188; R.M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 563, 
564-565; M. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, (1985) 83 Michigan Law 
Review 1502, 1506-1507.
In a recent essay, Formalism, (1988) 97 Yale Law Journal 509, F. Schauer notes the "widely 
divergent uses of the term [Formalism]", id. at 510, and concludes that the formal style, as he 
comprehends it, "ought to be seen as a tool to be used in some parts of the legal system and not 
in others", id. at 547. Schauer however, does not specify the areas of the law in which the formal 
style could be meaningfully applied.
o
F. Schauer, op. cit., at 510.
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[a] precise and narrow demarcation of the legal from the non- 
legal, requiring limited appraisal of the social, political and 
economic realities, and a striking inability to theorise about 
purposes and effects of law. ^
The Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia has said that:
[i]n its most extreme form legalism required a complete 
separation of law from policy, partly on the ground that the law 
is a self-contained discipline and partly on the ground that 
exposure to politics and policy would subject the law to 
controversy. H
Advocates of legal formalism would argue that this approach ensures:
continuity, objectivity and absence of controversy, attributes 
calculated to induce confidence in the administration of justice 
and respect for the law .^
But, as the Chief Justice puts it:
[ljegalism, when coupled with the doctrine of stare decisis, has a 
subtle and formidable conservative influence. When judges fail 
to discuss the underlying values influencing a judgement, it is 
difficult to debate the appropriateness of those values. As judges 
who are unaware of the original underlying values, subsequently 
apply that precedent in accordance with the doctrine of stare 
decisis, those hidden values are reproduced in the new judgement 
- even though community values may have changed.^
^  Jude Wallace and John Fiocco, Recent Criticisms of Formalism in Legal Theory and Legal 
Education, (1980 - 1981) 7 Adelaide Law Review 309.
^  Sir Anthony Mason, Future Directions in Australian Law, (1987) 13 Monash Law Review 149, 
156.
12 Sir Anthony Mason, op. cit., at 156. The writer here is summing up the position of the 
proponents of legal formalism.
13 Sir Anthony Mason, The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A Comparison of the 
Australian and the United States Experience, (1986) 16 Federal Law Review 1, 5.
Cf F. Schauer, op. cit., at 542:
Because rule-bound decisionmaking is inherently stabilising, it is inherently 
conservative, in the non-political sense of the word ... Yet this conservatism, 
suboptimization , and inflexibility in the face of a changing future need not be 
universally condemned. We achieve stability ... by relinquishing some part of 
our ability to improve on yesterday.
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From the point of view of legal technique, what then are the more specific 
components of the formal style? Firstly, an adherence to precedent without 
regard to the values underlying them, which therefore avoids the question of 
which of the precedents are of continuing relevance. This is especially 
problematic where the precedents are from a colonial era or from another 
jurisdiction. Secondly, in the interpretation of statutes, one finds the isloation 
of legal questions from questions of value by techniques which (a) read in 
common law values, and (b) focuses close attention on the words of the 
relevant statute read in the light of maxims of interpretation which emphasize 
semantic and syntactical considerations.^
Understood in this way, Legal Formalism is a broader category than 
Interpretivism.^ Interpretivism as a judicial technique means that:
judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves 
to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the 
written Constitution ...
14 E.g. expressio unius est exclusio alterius, ejusdem generis.
^  Recent debates in the U.SA. on theories of judicial review have identified two distinct 
techniques of judicial interpretation, interpretivism and noninterpretivism. See for example, John 
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1981, at 1; 
Thomas Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, (1975) 27 Stanford Law Review 703; R. 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, (1971) 47 Indiana Law Journal 1; 
Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into the 
Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary, Yale University Press, 1982; Paul 
Brest, The Misconceived Quest For The Original Understanding, (1980) 60 Boston University Law 
Review 204, 204-205. Through interpretivism and noninterpretivism are the terms commonly used, 
other expressions like interpretive and noninterpretive, orginalism and nonoriginalism, have also 
been used. Ronald Dworkin argues that the interpretivist/non-interpretivist debate is misleading, 
for it:
suggests] a distinction between judges who believe constitutional decisions 
should be made only or mainly by interpreting the Constitution itself and others 
who think they should be based on extraconstitutional grounds. This is an 
academic form of the crude popular mistake that some judges obey the 
Constitution and others disregard it. It ignores the philosophical character of 
law as interpretive.
(Law’s Empire, London, Fontana Press, 1986, 359-360). See also Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of
Principle, Cambridge, Mass., 1985, at 57.
16 John Ely, op. cit., at 1.
INTRODUCTION 10
Noninterpretivism, or a noninterpretive technique of judicial interpretation, 
connotes that the explication of constitutional provisions:
presupposes a prior commitment to certain principles of political 
justice which ... m ust... be reflected in the way the Constitution is 
read and enforced.^
This thesis will not attempt to evaluate the case-law from Malaysia, Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh in terms of the interpretivism/noninterpretivism debate in the 
U.S.A. Firstly, that debate is cast in historical references, a dimension that is 
absent in countries which were former British jurisdictions. Secondly, the 
language of the American debate is not found in the case-law of the countries 
examined in this thesis. It is now necessary to make some references to the 
styles of interpretation adopted by the Privy Council.
There has been a debate in Privy Council decisions regarding the formal style 
of interpretation. A survey shows that the dominant technique of interpretation 
of the Privy Council has been the formal style. In contruing constitutional 
provisions, the Privy Council has tended "to approach the question of 
interpretation as if the document in question were an ordinary statute and 
therefore subject to the same literal construction."^
In Herman King v The Q ueen,^  an appeal from Jamaica, the issue to be 
decided was whether a common law discretion of the courts to admit or 
exclude illegally obtained evidence prevailed over the constitutional guarantee 
against search of persons or property without consent. In this regard, the Privy 
Council observed:
This constitutional right may or may not be enshrined in a 
written constitution, but it seems to their Lordships that it 
matters not whether it depends on such enshrinement or simply 
upon the common law as it would do in this country. In either 
event the discretion of the court must be exercised and has not
17 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, op. cit., at 35.
^  K.D. Ewing, A Bill of Rights: Lessons from the Privy Council, in W. Finnie, C.M.G. 
Himsworth, and N. Walker (Eds), Edinburgh Essays in Public Law, Edinburgh University Press, 
1991, 231-249, at 237.
19 [1969] 1 A.C. 304.
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been taken away by the declaration of the right in written
form .^0
In a later case, Riley v Attorney General of J a m a i c a the Privy Council 
declined to examine whether a delay of three years in the execution of the 
death sentences of the five applicants infringed the right against cruel and 
degrading punishment guaranteed by section 17 (1) of the Jamaican 
Constitution. Instead, the majority decision based their finding only on the 
language of section 17(2) of the Constitution which was directed to legalize 
certain descriptions of punishment under the law. The majority was not 
concerned with the question of treatment which was impugned as inhuman 
because of the long delay in execution of the sentence of death.
[Wjhatever the reasons for or length of delay in executing a 
sentence of death lawfully imposed, the delay can afford no 
ground for holding the execution to be a contravention of section 
17(1).22
In other cases, some judges who have sat on the Privy Council have also 
suggested a "generous interpretation" avoiding the "austerity of tabulated 
legalism".^ However, despite this kind of assertion, the Privy Council has not 
been able to develop any realistic and consistent principle of interpretation as 
an alternative to the formal style. It is to this task of evolving approaches to 
interpretation other than the formal style that this thesis is principally directed.
It has been suggested that the "formalism [of the Privy Council] is ... consistent 
with the policy perspective which underpins the work of the Privy Council ...
20 Ibid., at 319.
21 [1983] 1 A.C. 719.
22 Ibid., at 726, per Lord Bridge.
Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher, [1980] A.C. 319, at 328, per Lord Wilberforce. The minority 
in Riley v Attorney General of Jamaica, [1983] 1 A.C. 719, Lords Scarman and Brighton was also 
critical of the majority’s formal style of interpretation. See also Attorney General of St 
Christophen Nevis and Anguilla v Reynolds, [1980] A.C. 637, OngAh Chuan v Public Prosecutor, 
[1981] A.C. 648, and Attorney General v Momodou Jobe, [1984] 1 A.C. 689, where statements 
were made that a principle of "generous and purposive interpretation" was to be preferred.
For a New Zealand analogue see Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong, [1991] 1 NZLR 439 
where some members of the Court advocated a purposive interpretation which would seek out 
those values which underpinned the rights now stated in the Bill of Rights Act, 1990, of New 
Zealand.
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".^4 Two possible reasons for the Privy Council’s policy of deference to the 
executive and legislative branches of government are firstly, cultural ignorance 
of the place from which the appeal arose and secondly, perceptions about the 
proper role of the judiciary in a Constitution under a Westminister system of 
government.^ Neither of these factors are relevant to the national courts of 
the countries under study in this thesis. These courts need not therefore be as 
restrained as the Privy Council. To what extent this assertion is, however 
bourne out in practice will be seen in the discussion of the jurisprudence of the 
Courts in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in later Chapters of this thesis.
^4 K.D. Ewing, op. cit., at 236. See also at 241:
for the most part the Privy Council has adopted principles of constitutional 
interpretation in such a way as to implement its policy of deference. The 
practical result ... is that the constitutional rights themselves are often puny and 
insubstantial, offering the bare minimum of protection, if even that, from 
oppressive governmental action. Given the choice between a narrow and wide 
reading of constitutional guarantees, the Privy Council, it seems will almost 
always choose the former.
25 Ibid., at 231-236.
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CHAPTER I
THE OPERATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS - 
A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE THREE SYSTEMS
An examination of emergency powers, the impact of such powers on the 
operation of constitutional rights and the role of the Court in this regard 
should appropriately begin with a discussion of the context of the 
entrenchment of rights in the Constitution and the nature and operation of 
these constitutional rights.
The purpose of this Chapter is to describe briefly the situation in pre- 
Independence Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as regards liberties of the 
people, the background to the entrenchment of constitutional rights in these 
post-colonial States, the general parameters of these rights, and the prevailing 
trend of interpretation by the Court. In order to identify, in general terms, the 
judicial techniques of interpretation of constitutional rights in each of the 
countries, some selected cases are discussed. While the cases examined in this 
Chapter relate primarily to those constitutional rights which are of significance 
to states of emergency, others are of relevance to the interpretation of the 
rights in general.
Pre-Independence Period
During the colonial phase of the evolution of these countries, rights of the 
colonial people against the colonial State were not recognized as such. 
"Colonial territories were administered on the basis that the indigenous 
inhabitants did not enjoy equality of legal rights with the colonisers".! While in 
the Metropolitan State, government and administration were sought to be 
modelled on the basic principles of the Rule of Law, there was a complete 
negation of these principles in the colonies.
The colonial administrative authorities, supported by the
Colonial Office, were primarily responsible for the exclusion of
 ^C.G. Weeramantry, Equality and Freedom: Some Third World Perspectives, Colombo, Hansa 
Publishers, 1976, at 43.
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political liberties from the received English law ... [in the 
colonial territories].^
The attitude of the colonial administrators and the broad powers of discretion 
of the colonial judge entailed arbitrariness in deciding questions of liberties of 
the colonial subjects. Whatever little effort might have been directed towards 
ensuring a semblance of justice and fairness in the colonial State was done by 
seeking to impose a rigid and artificial rule of law in situations which were 
primarily out of context.^ It is sometimes suggested, in an obscure and subtle 
way, that the colonial power introduced Rule of Law in the colonial 
territories.^ It has, however, been pointed out that:
[djespite constant rhetoric ... of the Rule of Law, in fact the 
essential political and judicial protections which made viable the 
Rule of Law - whatever that vague term may mean - were 
eviscerated by the activities of the Colonial administrators.^
It is true that occasionally there were some declarations made by the 
metropolitan government pledging such rights as "non-discrimination" and 
"equal protection of laws" in the colonial territories. Thus, with respect to 
British India, the Crown, acting under the Charter Act, 1833, declared a right
2
~ Robert B. Seidman, The Reception of English Law in Colonial Africa in Y. Ghai, R. Luckham, 
F.Synder (Eds), The Political Economy of Law, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1987,107-116, at 
114. See also Peter Bayne, Legal Development in Papua New Guinea: The Place of the Common 
Law, (1975) 3 Melanesian Law Journal 9, at 21:
The law and practice of colonial administration showed little respect for the 
personal integrity of the colonised.
3
Weeramantry, op. cit., at 41-42:
Many of the colonial judges and administrators were ... inexperienced officials, 
who in their own societies, would scarcely have had the responsibility of 
deciding matters of the importance or complexity of the cases before them.
It is not surprising that several generations of this kind of rule tended to 
obscure the customs which, within those societies, preserved the means of 
achieving just and acceptable solutions to disputes.
 ^Weeramantry, op. cit., for example, despite his observations quoted above, suggests that:
on the credit side [of colonial rule, is] the introduction of a system of justice 
which has left behind a legacy of the rule-of-law concepts ....
Ibid at 66.
 ^Robert B. Seidman, op. cit., at 114.
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to private property, religious freedom, and equal protection of law. But these 
were mere declarations, not enforceable in Courts. The Government of India 
Act, 1935, placed some restrictions on executive and legislative action 
forbidding discrimination, but no remedies were provided to enforce such 
rights.^
There were some rights accorded by colonial legislation to accused persons 
under the criminal law. The most important of these was the writ of habeas 
corpus. The British Indian Code o f Criminal Procedure, 1898, by section 491 
provided for this remedy.
Any High Court may, whenever it thinks fit, direct...that a 
person illegally or improperly detained in public or private 
custody within such limits be set at liberty.^
The Criminal Procedure Code of British Malaya and the Courts Ordinance of 
colonial Ceylon (Sri Lanka) provided for similar remedies.^ In the absence of 
other comparable remedies, political and other detainees had to rely on this 
remedy. Unlike the subsequent post-colonial constitutional orders where the 
remedy of habeas corpus came to be available under constitutional provisions 
as a writ o f right, the statutory writ of habeas corpus was discretionary. This
^ F.K.MA. Munim, Rights of the Citizen under the Constitution and Law, Dacca, Bangladesh 
Institute of Law and International Affairs, 1975, 8-9. The Government of India Act, 1935, 26 
Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8, c. 2, was the governing instrument of British India immediately before 
Pakistan and India became independent in 1947. The British Joint Parliamentary Committee, on 
whose recommendations the Government of India Act, 1935 was based, refused the Indian 
request to include a list of rights in the Act. The Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee, 
1934, H.C. 5 (1 Part 1) observed at para 366 of the Report:
[Tjhere are ... strong political arguments against the proposal, which may be 
put in the form of a dilemma: for either the declaration of rights is of so 
abstract a nature that it has no legal effect of any kind or its legal effect will be 
to impose an embarrassing restriction on the powers of the legislature and to 
create a grave risk that a number of laws may be declared invalid by the Courts 
because inconsistent with one or other of the rights so declared.
(Quoted in Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1966, at 58).
 ^Section 491 (1) (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Act No 5 of 1898.
 ^Section 365, Federated Malay States (F.M.S.) Criminal Procedure Code, 1927 (The Laws of the 
Federated Malay States, Vol I, Cap 6); Section 45, Courts Ordinance, 1889, Ordinance No. 1 of 
1889 (Legislative Enactments of Ceylon, Cap. 6). In addition to the FMS Criminal Procedure 
Code, there were separate Codes in the Settlements of Penang and Malacca, Sabah, and 
Sarawak. In 1976, the Codes were consolidated into a single one.
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statutory remedy which survives in the post-colonial states of Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh has been explained by the Court in Bangladesh in this 
way.
The expression "whenever it thinks fit" [in Section 491 of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure] confers an absolute discretion on 
the court to exercise its power thereunder or not to do so, having 
regard to the circumstances of each case.^
The negation of civil, political and economic rights during the colonial era 
moulded the desire of the nationalist leaders and the informed sections of 
people in the emergent polities to have rights entrenched in the Constitutions 
of the new States. With the beginnings of the process of decolonisation since 
the late 1940s, constitution-makers and public opinion were informed by 
international instruments such as the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights^ 
and the European Convention o f Human Rights.^ There were also the 
precedents of Bills of Rights in older Constitutions like those of the U.S.A. 
and the Republic of Ireland. The remainder of this Chapter is taken up in 
presenting the provisions on citizens’ rights under the Constitutions of 
independent Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, as well as in discussing, in 
outline, the trends of the Courts in these countries in adjudicating 
constitutional rights.
Post-Independence Period
A. Malaysia
Fundamental Liberties^
9 Kripa Shindu Hazra v The State, (1978) 30 D.L.R. 103, at 114.
^  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on December 10, 1948.
^  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed 
by members of the Council of Europe in 1950, in force since September 3,1953.
12 Part II of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, providing for constitutional rights, is titled, 
"Fundamental Liberties".
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During the process of framing of the Independence Constitution for Malaya 
(Malaysia since 1963)^ by an appointed Commission, the Reid 
Commission,^ there was some controversy as to whether guarantees of 
individual liberties should be included in the proposed Constitution.^ The 
Commission’s recommendation for inclusion of entrenched rights was 
rationalised in the following way.
A federal constitution defines and guarantees the rights of the 
Federation and the States: it is usual and in our opinion right 
that it should also define and guarantee certain fundamental 
individual rights which are generally regarded as essential 
conditions for a free and democratic way of life.
The Commission allayed the fears of those objecting to the inclusion of 
justiciable rights in the Constitution with the following observations.
We believe such apprehensions to be unfounded, but there can 
be no objection to guaranteeing these rights subject to limited 
exceptions in conditions of emergency and we recommend that 
this should be done.^
The Constitution of the newly independent Federation of Malaya was drawn 
up principally in accordance with the recommendations of the Reid
13 In 1963, the British colonial territories of Singapore, North Borneo (Sabah), and Sarawak 
joined the Federation of Malaya under the Malaysia Agreement, 1963, (Agreement Between the 
United Kingdom, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore Concerning the 
Establishment of the Federation of Malaysia). The Malaysia Act, 1963, Act No. 26 of 1963, 
amending the Constitution, was drawn up accordingly, and the Federation of Malaya was 
renamed Malaysia. In 1965, Singapore separated from Malaysia to become an independent 
republic. See Constitution and Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Act, 1965.
^  The Commission was headed by Lord Reid; hence the reference to the Commission as the 
Reid Commission. Other members were Sir Ivor Jennings, Sir William McKell, former 
Governor-General of Australia, Mr Justice Abdul Hamid of the West Pakistan High Court, and 
Mr B. Malik, a former High Court judge from India, see Report of the Federation of Malaya 
Constitutional Commission, London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957.
^  LA. Sheridan and H.E. Groves, The Constitution of Malaya, Singapore, Malayan Law 
Journal (Pte) Ltd., 3rd Ed., 1979, at 11.
^  Report, op. cit., at 69.
17 Ibid., at 70.
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Com m ission^ and was promulgated on August 31, 1957, the day when the 
independent Federation of Malaya came into being.^
Part II of the Constitution of Malaysia contains a catalogue of Fundamental 
Liberties. The rights include:
(a) right to life and personal liberty;^
71(b) freedom from slavery and forced labour, 1 2
(c) protection against retrospective criminal laws and double
jeopardy;^
(d) equality;^
(e) freedom of movement and prohibition of "banishment" from the 
Federation;^
25(f) freedom of speech, assembly and association,
(g) freedom of religion;^
1 o
0 A Working Committee comprising of Malaysian and British lawyers and politicians amended 
and adapted the Draft of the Reid Commission. Members of this Working Committee was 
appointed in conjunction by the British Government, the "Conference of Rulers" of the various 
Malay States and the Government of the pre-independence Federation of Malaya. See Tun 
Mohamed Suffian, Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Government 
Printer, 2nd Ed., 1976, 11-13; R.H. Hickling, An Overview of Constitutional Changes in Malaysia: 
1957-1977 in Tun Mohamed Suffian, H.P. Lee, and FA. Trindade (Eds), The Constitution of 
Malaysia, Its Development: 1957-1977, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1978, 1-26, at 3.
^  The relevant instruments in this regard were the Federation of Malaya Agreement, 1957, 
Agreement Between Her Majesty and Their Highnesses the Rulars), the Federation of Malaya 
Independence Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 60, the Federation of Malaya Independence Order in 
Council, 1957, and the Federal Constitution Ordinance, Ordinance No. LV of 1957.
20 Article 5, Constitution of Malaysia. See Appendix I.
21 Article 6, ibid.
22 Article 7, ibid.
2^ Article 8, ibid.
2<* Article 9, ibid.
25 Article 10, ibid.
26 Article 11, ibid.
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(h) non-discrimination and other rights in respect of education;^
(i) rights of property.^
Suggestions made to the Reid Commission that a set of principles of state 
policy be provided in the Constitution were not accepted. The Commission 
said:
Any guarantee with regard to such matters would be illusory 
because it would be unenforceable in law and would have to be 
in such general terms as to give no real security. Moreover, we 
do not think that it is either right or practicable to attempt to 
limit developments of public opinion on political, social or 
economic policy.^
The entrenched liberties in the Constitution of Malaysia are variously 
expressed to be limitations on executive acts and/or legislative action. Some of 
these rights are expressed in absolute terms, while others are framed in 
qualified terms. The prohibition of slavery^ and the prohibition of 
expropriation of property without adequate compensation,^ for example, are 
"unrestricted" rights. Most of the other Fundamental Liberties in the 
Constitution of Malaysia enumerate a host of qualifying and restrictive clauses. 
These restrictive clauses refer to such considerations as "public order", 
"security of the Federation", "public health" or "morality".
The Malaysian Court and Constitutional Rights
The High Courts in Malaysia have been empowered to issue to any person or 
authority, orders or writs, including writs of the nature of habeas corpus, 
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any others, for the
27 Article 12, ibid.
28 Article 13, ibid.
29 Report, op.cit., at 70.
30
Article 6, Constitution of Malaysia.
31 Article 13(2), ibid.
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enforcement of any of the fundamental liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution.^
Decisions of the Malaysian Court display a marked tendency to interpret the 
entrenched rights in a way that is focussed on the mere language of the 
constitutional provisions, rather than on the philosophical basis of the rights in 
the post-colonial constitutional system. The result has been a restrictive 
interpretation with the effect that constitutional rights in post-colonial 
Malaysia have proved illusory to citizens’ perceptions.
( a ) Right to Life & Liberty
The most important individual right under the Constitution of Malaysia for the 
purposes of this study is the right to "life" and "liberty". Article 5(1) provides:
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in 
accordance with law.
Tne exact phrase "save in accordance with law" in Article 5(1) of the 
Malaysian Constitution appears in the Constitutions of Pakistan, 1956, 
1 9 6 2 , and 1973,*^ and in the Constitution of Bangladesh.^ The 
corresponding provision in the Indian Constitution contains the clause "except 
according to procedure established by law".^ This difference in phraseology 
between the provisions of the right to life and personal liberty in the
^  Section 1, First Schedule, read with Section 25, Courts of Judicature Act, 1964, Act No. 7 of 
1964. Article 5 (2) of the Constitution reiterates this position in respect of the right to personal 
liberty.
By Article 121 (1) of the Constitution, there are two High Courts in Malaysia - the High Court 
in Malaya and the High Court in Borneo.
' i ' i
Article 5(2), Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1956.
^  Para. 1, Fundamental Rights, Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan, 1962.
Article 8, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.
^  Article 32, Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (henceforth Constitution of 
Bangladesh).
37 Article 21, Constitution of India.
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Constitutions of Malaysia and India led the Malaysian Federal Court, ° in 
Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri,^9 to assert that Article 5(1) 
of the Malaysian Constitution refers only to the substantive provisions of law 
without regard to the procedural aspects. That being the case, the Court found 
that an order of detention was valid even though there were procedural 
defects in the order of detention. After noting that Article 5(1) of the 
Malaysian Constitution made "no mention of the word procedure ... Suffian 
F.J., (as he was then), in his concurring opinion in Karam Singh, observed that:
[in Malaysia,] ... detention, in order to be lawful, must be in 
accordance with law, not as in India where it must be in 
accordance with procedure established by law .^
It has been pointed out that:
the Malaysian courts have interpreted ‘law’ to mean enacted 
law, and therefore, ... Articles 5 and 13 impose restrictions only 
on the executive and not on the legislature ...
(b ) Right to counsel
The right of an arrested person in Malaysia to consult and be defended by a 
legal practitioner as provided by the Constitution,^ has been interpreted in 
this way:
A balance has to be struck between the right of the arrested 
person to consult his lawyer on the one hand and on the other 
the duty of the police to protect the public from wrongdoing by
1 0  .
3^ The Federal Court has since been renamed the "Supreme Court" (Mahkamah Agung) by 
Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1983, Act No. A566 of 1983, in force from 1-1-1985.
39 [1969] 2 M.L.J. 129.
40 Ibid., at 148.
41 Ibid., at 150.
4^ Tun Mohamed Suffian, The Malaysian Constitution and the United States Constitution in L. 
Beer (Ed.), Constitutionalism in Asia, University of California Press, 1979, 129-139, at 135.
43 Article 5(3), Constitution of Malaysia.
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apprehending them and collecting whatever evidence exists 
against them .^
( c ) Right to equality
A fundamental qualification to the right to equality under the Constitution of 
Malaysia^ is the protective discrimination in favour of the Malays and the 
natives of the states of Sabah and Sarawak.^ In elaborating on the principles 
of "equality" under the Constitution of Malaysia, Suffian L.P. observed:
The equality provision is qualified. Specifically, discrimination is 
permitted within clause (5) of Article 8 and within Article 153.3 
... In considering Article 8 there is a presumption that an 
impugned law is constitutional, a presumption stemming from 
the wide power of classification which the legislature must have 
in making laws operating differently as regards different groups 
of persons to give effect to its policy ... .
The central fact of the Merdeka University case^  was that the Minister for 
Education rejected a petition to incorporate a private university in Malaysia, 
Merdeka University Berhad, which would principally use Chinese as the 
medium of instruction for entrants from Chinese independent secondary 
schools. The petitioners asked the High Court of Malaya for a declaration that 
the refusal of their petition by the Minister was an unreasonable and improper 
exercise of the discretion conferred by section 6 of the Universities and 
University Colleges Act, 1971.^ The petitioners contended that under Article 
152 of the Malaysian Constitution, using, teaching or learning any language 
other than the national Malay language was perm itted.^ Abdoolcader J.,
^  Ooi Ah Phua v Officer-in-Charge, Criminal Investigation, Kedah/Perlis, [19751 2 M.LJ. 198, at 
200 (per Suffian L.P.) quoting with approval Ramli bin Salleh v Inspector Yahya bin Hashim, 
[19731 1 M.LJ. 54.
4  ^Article 8, Constitution of Malaysia.
46 Article 153, ibid.
4  ^Datuk Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v Public Prosecutor, [1977] 2 M.LJ. 155,165.
^  Merdeka University Berhad v Government of Malaysia, [1981] 2 M .LJ. 356.
49 Act No. A30 of 1971.
^  Article 152(l)(a) excludes the use of other languages from "official purposes".
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giving the opinion of the High Court, came to the finding that the proposed 
university would be a "public authority" within the meaning of the 
Constitution^1 and its purpose would be a "official purpose". The learned 
Judge concluded:
I am of the view that "using" [other languages as contemplated 
by Article 152(l)(a) of the Constitution] is in fact confined to 
use as a medium of expression or communication within the 
language or ethnic groups concerned and cannot extend as a 
medium of instruction as such.^
In deciding the appeal from the High Court decision in the Merdeka University 
case, the majority of the Federal Court Judges (Seah J. dissenting) upheld the 
decision of Abdoolcader J . ^  Suffian L.P. concluded:
As there is no right to use the Chinese language for an official 
purpose ... it was not unconstitutional and unlawful of 
Government to reject the plaintiffs petition to establish 
[Merdeka University].*^
(d ) Right to free speech
The rights to free speech, assembly and association in the Constitution of 
Malaysia are qualified by the right of Parliament to impose restrictions for 
considerations of "security of the Federation", "public order or morality" and 
other interests of s ta te d  The validity of such laws imposing restrictions 
cannot be questioned.^ Under a pre-Independence Ordinance^ a "licence" 
from the local police is required for holding a procession or meeting in public
^  Article 160, Constitution of Malaysia.
^  Merdeka University Berhad v Government of Malaysia, [1981] 2 M.LJ. 356, at 362.
^  Merdeka University Bhd. v Government of Malaysia, [1982] 2 M.LJ. 243.
54 Ibid., at 252.
^  Article 10, Constitution of Malaysia.
56 Article 4(2)(b), ibid.
^  Police Ordinance, 1952, Ordinance No. XIV of 1952.
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places. In Madhavan Nair v Public P r o s e c u t o r the issue was the 
contravention, during a public speech of the applicant, of a condition of the 
police licence which proscribed speaking on the status of the official Malay 
language. The High Court, while agreeing that a police officer, acting under 
statutory powers, could not impose such conditions as would contravene a 
constitutional right, held that the circumstances in that case, under which the 
proscription was made, did not contravene the constitutional right of free 
speech.
Like Madhavan Nair, the issue in Lau Dak Kee v Public Prosecutor^  was the 
restrictive condition, imposed by the police, in the matter of public speech . In 
deciding this case along the lines of the previous decision, Mohamed Azmi J. 
remarked that:
[t]hese rights [to free speech, assembly and association] are,
however, subject to any law passed by Parliament.^
(e ) Right to property
Although the Constitution of Malaysia prohibits the expropriation of property 
without adequate compensation,^1 the "deprivation" of property by 
"legislation"^ has been held to be unchallengable. In Arumugan Pillai v 
Government of M a l a y s ia which involved taxation assessment and recovery 
by the government, the Federal Court of Malaysia went so far as to say that:
whenever a competent legislature enacts a law in the exercise of 
any of its legislative powers, destroying or otherwise depriving a 
man of his property, the latter is precluded from questioning its
58 [1975] 2 M.LJ. 264.
59 [1976] 2 M.LJ. 229.
^  Ibid., at 230, emphasis added.
^  Article 23, Constitution of Malaysia.
^  Article 13(1), ibid. Article 13(1) is framed in the following way:
No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with the law.
63 [1975] 2 M.L.J. 29.
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reasonableness by invoking Article 13(1) of the Constitution, 
however arbitrary the law might palpably b e .^
In an earlier decision, it was held that Article 13(1) does not restrict legislative 
powers but declares unconstitutional or prohibits executive acts of unlawful 
deprivation of property.6^ However, it has been observed that Article 13(1) is 
unlikely to be a ground for a decision of a court even in respect of executive 
acts. ^
B. Sri Lanka
Constitutional evolution since Independence and the question of Rights
Sri Lanka’s Independence Constitution was an adaptation of the colonial 
Constitution Order-in Council, 1946, based on the recommendations of a 
British Constitutional Commission of Inquiry, the Soulbury Commission.6^ 
This Commission had been appointed in 1943 pursuant to a Declaration of the 
British Government pledging the establishment in Sri Lanka, then known as 
Ceylon, of full responsible government under the British Crown in matters of 
civil administration, with defence and external relations continuing to remain 
under the control of the British government. The Declaration had invited 
proposals for a new Constitution from the Board of Ministers in Ceylon for 
examination by the Constitutional Commission.6^
In 1944, the Ceylonese Board of Ministers presented to the British government 
a draft constitutional scheme along the lines of a Dominion status for Ceylon. 
The draft scheme was later withdrawn because of differences with the British 
government on the scope of the terms of the proposed Constitutional
64 Ibid., at 30, per Gill C J .
^  Philip Hoalim v State Commissioner, Penang, [1974] 2 M.LJ. 100, at 103, per Ali FJ.
66 LA. Sheridan and H.E. Groves, The Constitution of Malaysia, Singapore, Malayan Law 
Journal (Pte.) Ltd., 3rd Ed., 1979, at 76.
67 The Commission was headed by Lord Soulbury; hence the reference to the Commission as 
the Soulbury Commission. The other members of the Commission were Sir Frederick Rees and 
Sir Federick Burrows.
68 See JA.L. Cooray, Constitutional and Administrative Law of Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Sri
Lanka, Hansa Publishers, 1973, at 54.
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Commission. Despite the withdrawal of the draft scheme, the Soulbury 
Commission was appointed to examine the ministerial and any other 
constitutional scheme, consult various interests in Ceylon, and submit its 
recommendations. The Commission recommended, inter alia, that certain 
powers be reserved for the Governor-General in the proposed constitutional 
scheme. The concept of reserve powers of the Governor-General proposed by 
the Soulbury Commission was, however, not acceptable to politicians and the 
public in Ceylon.^
The unfavourable reaction in Ceylon prompted the British government to 
modify the recommendations of the Commission through a White Paper in 
October 1945, incorporating a modified Constitution. In presenting the White 
Paper, modifying the Commission’s recommendations, the British Government 
expressed the hope that the proposed constitutional scheme of the Soulbury 
Commission would be acceptable to Ceylon as the basis for attaining 
Dominion status. In November 1945, the State Council in Ceylon accepted this 
Constitution as an interim scheme, and accordingly an Order in Council 
embodying the new Constitution was issued in May 1946. Upon attainment 
of Independence in February 1948, the 1946 Order in Council was modified by 
the Ceylon Independence Order in Council, 1947, and the Ceylon Independence 
Act, 1947.71
Rights of citizens were not entrenched in Ceylon’s Independence Constitution. 
During the process of drawing up a draft constitutional scheme by the Board 
of Ministers in Ceylon, for consideration by the Constitutional Commission of 
Inquiry, there was general agreement among the Board Ministers that there 
was to be a comprehensive Bill of Rights in the proposed scheme. Sir Ivor 
Jennings, who at that time was the principal constitutional adviser (unofficial) 
to the Ministers had "strong views" against the incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights in the proposals. It was his views that prevailed and the draft scheme of 
the Ministers, which was presented to the British government and considered
69 See ibid., at 55-56.
^  Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946.
71 . .11 & 12 G. 6, c.7. For a brief account of this period see J. A. L. Cooray, op. cit., at 56-59.
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by the Soulbury Commission did not contain proposals for entrenched rights in 
the future Constitution.^
After the initial problems of transition in the new Dominion of Ceylon, a 
Parliamentary Committee, headed by the then Prime Minister, S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike, was formed in 1957 to consider, inter alia, the revision of the 
Independence Constitution to establish a Republic and to provide for 
guaranteed rights. The Committee, in 1959, approved the inclusion of a 
catalogue of justiciable rights in the Constitution. The death by assassination of 
Prime Minister Bandaranaike soon after the decision of the Committee 
hindered the implementation of the Committee’s recommendations. In 1965 
there was an attempt by the ruling government to re-establish the 1957 
Parliamentary Committee, but by then political opinion was in favour of a new 
Constitution.^
In 1970, the Parliament of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) elected in the May 1970 
national elections, constituted themselves the Constituent Assembly of the 
people of Sri Lanka, and in May, 1972 adopted an autochtonous Constitution 
for the Republic of Sri L anka.^ It has been observed that the framers of the 
(1972) Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka were not inclined to incorporate 
a Bill of Rights in the proposed Constitution.7-* Rights w ere,. however, 
provided in the 1972 Constitution under pressure of public and political 
opinion. But although a number of constitutional rights were declared, there 
was no reference in the Constitution as to the specific machinery for the 
enforcement of these rights. The guaranteed rights were thus non-justiciable in 
a court of law .^
72
J. A. L. Cooray, op. cit., at 508-509.
73 See ibid., at 66-71.
74 See ibid., at 72-89.
75 L.J.M. Cooray-Peiris, Fundamental Rights, Judicial Review and the Constitutional Court of Sri 
Lanka, (1979-1981) 1 LAWASIA, 24, at 26.
76 The rationale for this position was that:
the protection of Fundamental rights could not ... be allowed to ‘prevail 
absolutely5; ... in other words, fundamental rights could constitutionally be 
safeguarded only in so far as the supremacy of the National State Assembly 
was not unduly curtailed thereby.
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Under the scheme of the 1972 Constitution, repugnancy of legislative 
measures to provisions of the declared rights could be raised before a specially- 
constituted Constitutional Court, but only before the legislation in question was 
passed by the National State Assembly (Parliament).^ A number of Bills 
were challenged before the Constitutional Court during its six odd years of 
existence, for inconsistency with the rights under the 1972 Constitution.^
The "Fundamental Rights and Freedoms" in the Constitution of 1972 included 
equality, non-discrimination, right to life and liberty, freedom of thought, 
conscience, religion and culture, freedom of speech and expression, and 
freedom of movement.^ These rights were made subject to restrictions in the 
interests of, inter alia, of "national unity and integrity", "national security", 
"public safety" and "public order", or for considerations of "Principles of State 
Policy" declared in the Constitution.^
In the manner of the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland,^ * the Sri Lankan 
Constitution of 1972 had set down certain "Principles of State Policy" for 
guiding the State in the making of law s.^ These State Principles related in 
general to the social, economic and general welfare of the p e o p le d  In 
addition the Principles declared, inter alia, that the objectives of the state
(M.JA. Cooray, Judicial Role under the Constitutions of Ceylon/Sri Lanka, Colombo, Lake 
House Investments Ltd., 1982, 227-228, quoting Constituent Assembly Debates.
For more details on this point, see JA.L. Cooray, op. cit., at 193-200.
77 Section 54, Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972. The "Constitutional Court" of Sri Lanka under 
the 1972 Constitution was modelled on the Constitutional Council of France. It consisted of five 
members appointed for four-year terms. For a description of the composition and operation of 
Sri Lanka’s Constitutional Court, see JA.L. Cooray, op.cit., 191-196; also M JA . Cooray, op.cit., 
239-267.
78 See L.W. Athulathmudali, Constitutional Interpretation: The Sri Lanka Experiment, in G.W. 
Bartholomew (Ed), Malaya Law Review Legal Essays, Singapore, Malaya Law Review, 1975, 
188-219, at 217-219; see also M JjA Cooray, op. cit., at 255.
7Q
Section 18(1), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972.
80 Section 18(2), ibid.
81
Article 45, "Directive Principles of Social Policy", Constitution of the Republic of Ireland.
8“ Section 16(1), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972.
88 Section 16(2), ibid.
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included national unity, elimination of economic and social disparities, 
democratization of the administration, and the guaranteeing of social 
security.^
The 1972 Constitution of Sri Lanka was superseded in 1978 by a new 
Constitution, the Constitution of the Democratic, Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka adopted in 1978 by a "Constituent Assembly" elected as a Parliament in 
1977.85
"Fundamental Rights”
The 1978 Constitution contains a catalogue of justiciable rights. The rights in 
the present Constitution are more elaborate and comprehensive than those 
declared in the previous Constitution. The "Fundamental Rights" include:
(a) freedom of thought, conscience and religion;*^
(b) equality;^
(c) right to life and liberty;^
(d) freedom of speech, expression, assembly, association, movement.^
While some rights under the Constitution of 1978, such as the freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion have been expressed in absolute terms, most 
of the other rights have been qualified by restrictions in the interests of 
"national security", "public security", "public order", "public health or morality", 
"racial and religious harmony" and "national economy".^
8^ Section 16(3) to Section 16(10), ibid.
85 See generally, A.J. Wilson, The Guallist System in Asia, London, Macmillian Press, 1980, 23- 
42.
Article 10, Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978; Appendix II.
87 Article 12, ibid.
88 Article 13, ibid.
89 Article 14, ibid.
^  Article 15, clauses (1) to (8), ibid.
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Principles of State Policy
Like the previous Constitution of 1972, the present Constitution of Sri Lanka
(1978) declares some "Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental
Duties" which are expressed to be a guide "in the enactment of laws and the
governance of Sri Lanka for the establishment of a just and free society".^ *
The Constitution mentions that these Principles "do not confer or impose legal
92rights or obligations, and are not enforceable in any court or tribunal"/
The Sri Lankan Court and Rights
Under Article 17 of the present Constitution of Sri Lanka, there is a guarantee 
of the right to petition the Supreme Court for any infringement, or even 
imminent infringement of a "fundamental right" by executive or administrative 
action. An affected person must, however, petition the Supreme Court for 
redress, within a period of one month of the act of infringement or threatened 
infringement of the right.^  The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has held this 
one-month rule is mandatory, and in a good number of cases alleging violation 
of rights, the Court has rejected the petitions because they were out of tim e.^
The present Constitution, like its predecessor Constitution of 1972, excludes 
judicial review of any legislation which may be inconsistent with any provision 
of the Constitution, including the entrenched rights.^ However, like the 
defunct Constitutional Court in the previous constitutional scheme, the
91 Article 27, ibid.
9^ Article 29, ibid.
9^ Article 126, ibid.
9^ See for example, K.S.S.E. Ranatunga \A.R.M . Jayawardena, Supreme Court Application No. 
27 of 1979, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 1, Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri 
Lanka, (April 1979 to December, 1981), Sri Lanka, Lake House Investments, 1984, 77-80; 
Aiyathurai Thadchanamoorthi v Attorney-General, Supreme Court Application No. 63 of 1980, 
reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 1, op. cit.,129-142; B.M. Jayawardena \  Attorney-General, 
Supreme Court Application No. 4 of 1981, reported in ibid., 175-177; A.K.TJ. Gunawardena v 
E.L. Senanayake, Supreme Court Application No. 12 of 1981, reported in ibid., 178-179.
9  ^Article 124, Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
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Supreme Court has been vested with the power to determine whether a 
legislative Bill is inconsistent with any constitutional provision.^ The 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in this regard can be invoked by the 
President or any citizen.^
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka relating to constitutional rights 
do not display a consistent approach. On the one hand, there are decisions 
which interpret the provisions on constitutional rights in a formal style, without 
regard to the ethical and moral dimensions of citizens’ rights. On the other 
hand, there are decisions of the Supreme Court which indicate that the Court 
has, on occasion, risen above that trend. The decisions of the Sri Lankan 
Supreme Court discussed here are from the early years of the operation of the 
Constitution of 1978 which contained Sri Lanka’s first justiciable Bill of Rights. 
The cases were decided in normal times before the declaration of the 1982 
state of emergency. While some of the decisions during this period are 
praiseworthy, several among these like Vivienne Goonewardene^  were 
decided on technical grounds.
(a ) Right to equality
Initially, the "equality" and "equal protection" clauses of the 1978 Constitution 
of Sri Lanka were interpreted in broad terms by the Supreme Court. For 
example, where the University Grants Commission adopted a certain basis for 
admission of students in the University, the Court found that the policy 
infringed an entrant’s fundamental right of equality of opportunity.^ The 
Court interpreted the equality provisions of the Constitution to mean that:
96 Article 120, ibid.
97
Article 121(1), ibid. The various clauses of Articles 120-123 contain elaborate provisions of 
procedure, exemptions of certain categories of legislation, and the scheme of referendum to be 
approved by the Court for purposes of amendment of any provision of the Constitution. For a 
brief interpretation of these various provisions, see M JA . Cooray, op. cit., at 276 - 279.
98 Vivienne Goonewardene v Hector Perera, Supreme Court Application No. 20 of 1983, reported 
in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, (April 1982 to 
December, 1982), Sri Lanka, Lake House Investments, 1986, 426-440.
99 Perara v University Grants Commission, Supreme Court Application No. 57 of 1980, reported 
in Fundamental Rights, Vol 1, Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, (April 1979 to 
December, 1981), Sri Lanka, Lake House Investments, 1984, 103-128.
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[w]here ... discrimination is not based on any rational ground 
bearing upon the subject dealt with, ... [the action in this regard] 
will offend the principle of equality and will be v o id .^
In the case before it, the Supreme Court found that:
[t]he application of any ratio [by the University Grants 
commission] based on any consideration other than merit [merit 
of the candidates] ... would infringe the rule of ‘equality of 
treatment’ protected as a fundamental right in the Constitution. 
...The policy decision of the [UGC would further infringe] ... the 
petitioner’s fundamental right of equality of opportunity. ^
(b) Right to liberty
The arrest and detention of the petitioner in Vivienne Goonewardene v Hector 
P e r e r a in connection with procession and demonstrations before the 
Embassy of the U.S.A. in Colombo on International Women’s’ Day, was set 
aside by the Supreme Court, because the arrest was conducted by an 
unauthorized junior police officer, and thus did not conform to the 
requirement that an arrest must be "according to procedure establishment by 
law", enjoined by the constitutional right to l ib e r ty .^
While in Vivienne Goonewardene, the constitutional right to liberty of the 
petitioner was vindicated by the Court on a formalistic interpretation of the 
relevant statute, ^  a similar approach by the Supreme Court denied any 
relief to the applicant in M.A. Dayananda v Weerasinghe & Others. The 
petitioner in M. A. Dayananda contended that his constitutional right to liberty
100 Ibid., at 114.
101 Ibid., at 127.
i ryy
Supreme Court Application No. 20 of 1983, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, op. cit., 
426-440.
^  Ibid., at 436; the right to liberty is guaranteed by Article 13(1), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 
1978.
^  Code o f Criminal Procedure Act, 1979, Act No 15 of 1979.
^  Supreme Court Application No. 97 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, op. cit., 
292-299.
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was violated by successive remand orders of the Magistrate. The Supreme 
Court adopted a formal style of interpretation of Article 126 of the 
Constitution under which the petitioner sought relief.
The fact remains that the remand orders were made by the 
Magistrate in the exercise of his judicial discretion. Even if such 
orders were made on false or misleading reports it does not help 
the petitioner in this case because orders made by a Judge in the 
exercise of his judicial discretion do not come within the purview 
of the special jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 
126 of the Constitution, even though such orders may be the 
result of a wrongful exercise of the Judge’s judicial discretion. In 
such an event an aggrieved person’s remedy is to invoke the 
appellate or revisionary powers of the Appellate Courts.
(c) Right to free speech
In Darmitipola Ratnesara Thero v P. Udugampola & O thers}^  a member of a 
clergy association was awarded damages for confiscation by the police of 
copies of pamphlets opposing the 1982 Sri Lankan referendum for extension 
of the life of Parliament beyond the usual term. The Supreme Court held that 
the act of the police in seizing the pamphlets from the printing press was:
a serious violation of the fundamental rights [of speech, 
expression and publication] ... which calls for the award of 
substantial damages. ^
C. Bangladesh
Bangladesh, formerly the province of East Pakistan in united Pakistan, became 
an independent state on December 16, 1971. The task of framing a
106 Ibid., at 298.
107 Supreme Court Application No. 125 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, op. 
cit., 364-372.
108 Ibid., at 372.
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constitution for the new state was entrusted to a Constituent Assembly 
established by a Presidential decree. ^ 9
The process of Constitution-making in Bangladesh was very hurried. ^  The 
Constituent Assembly was called to session on April 10, 1972, and on the next 
day, a 34-member Constitution Drafting Committee was formed.133 The 
Committee was required to submit its Report to the Constituent Assembly by 
June of the same y e a r .3 3^  The Drafting Committee invited proposals from 
members of the public, but only three weeks’ time was allowed to send in 
proposals. 33^ The Constitution Bill was finally approved by the Committee on 
October 12, 1972, and placed before the Constituent Assembly on October 19 
of the same year.33^ General discussion on the Bill was held in the Assembly 
between October 19 and October 31, 1972, and the Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of Bangladesh was adopted by the Assembly on November 
4, 1972.115
Principles of State Policy
The Constitution of Bangladesh, like the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions in the 
predecessor state of Pakistan, declared some "Fundamental Principles of State 
Policy". 33^ Among the Principles of State Policy are:
(a) Nationalism;33^
3^  Constituent Assembly of Bangladesh Order, President’s Order No. 22 of 1972, Bangladesh 
Gazette Extraordinary, March 23, 1972. The Assembly was to be comprised of elected 
representatives at elections held in united Pakistan before the civil war.
^  A general account of the constitution-making process in Bangladesh is given in Abul Fazl 
Huq, Constitution-making in Bangladesh, (1973) 46 Pacific Affairs 59.
113 Abul Fazl Huq, op. cit., at 60.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid., at 61.
114 Ibid., at 61, 67.
115 Ibid., at 68-69.
^  Part II, Articles 8-25, Constitution of Bangladesh. See Appendix III.
117 Article 8, Constitution of Bangladesh.
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(b) Democracy, meaning the guarantee of "fundamental human rights 
and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of the human 
person and
(c) Socialism, meaning economic and social justice. ^
The Principles of State Policy in the Constitution of Bangladesh are to be "a 
guide in the interpretation of the Constitution and of the other laws of 
Bangladesh" but are not "judicially enforceable".^  "In case of conflict 
between [the entrenched] Fundamental Rights and [the] Fundamental 
Principles of State Policy, the Fundamental Rights shall prevail... ".^1
"Fundamental Rights"
The basic principles of the chapter on Fundamental Rights in the Constitution
199of B a n g l a d e s h h a v e  been described in the following way.
The chapter ... begins by adopting [in Article 26], the doctrine of 
ultra vires, for it expressly declares that all existing law 
inconsistent with those rights as enumerated therein shall be 
void to the extent of inconsistency; it incorporates a prohibition 
to the effect that the State shall not make any laws inconsistent 
with those rights, and if so made they would also be void. It is 
clear that an order made by the State, if challenged, has to be 
referable to some law of the land, and if there is no law 
supporting the executive order, or even if there is one and that 
law is inconsistent with fundamental law, the law must be 
declared void, and the executive order set a s id e .^
^  Articles 8 and 11, ibid.
119 Article 8, ibid.
120 Article 8(2), ibid.
191
1 Hamidul Huq Chowdhury v Bangladesh, (1982) 34 D.L.R. 190, at 200.
19?
z Part III, Constitution of Bangladesh.
123 Justice Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, The Bangladesh Constitution in American Perspective, in L. 
Beer (Ed), Constitutionalism in Asia, University of California Press, 1979, 24-34, at 30.
Cf. Article 16(1), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978, which provides:
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By an Amendment, ^  made soon after the adoption of the Constitution, the 
overriding effect of Article 26 has been qualified so that the powers of 
Parliament to amend provisions of the C onstitu tion^  included the provisions 
of the entrenched rights as well.
Among the rights incorporated in the Constitution of Bangladesh are the 
following:
(a) equality; ^
(b) non-discrimination;-^
(c) right to life and liberty; ^
(d) right to protection of the law; ^ 9
i  -2n
(e) safeguards as to arrest and detention, u
(f) prohibition of forced lab o u r;^ *
(f) freedom of m ov em en t;^
All existing written law and unwritten law shall be valid and operative 
notwithstanding any inconsistency with the ... provisions of ... [fundamental 
rights].
^  Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, Act No. 24 of 1973. The newly introduced 
provision, inserted as Clause (3) to Article 26 read:
Nothing in ... [Article 26] shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution 
made under Article 142.
1?S Article 142, Constitution of Bangladesh.
12  ^Articles 27 and 29, Constitution of Bangladesh.
127 Article 28, ibid.
128 Article 32, ibid.
129 Article 31, ibid.
^  Article 33, ibid.
131 Article 34, ibid.
132 Article 36, ibid.
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(g) freedom of s p e e c h , a s s e m b l y , ^  and association;^  and the
(h) right to p ro p e rty .^
In addition to these rights, the Constitution of Bangladesh also provides for 
the following guarantee.
To enjoy the protection of the law, and to be treated in 
accordance with law, and only in accordance with law, is the 
inalienable right of every person for the time being within 
Bangladesh, and in particular no action detrimental to the life, 
liberty, body, reputation or property of any person shall be taken 
except in accordance with law. ^
The Bangladesh Court and Constitutional Rights
The right to move the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh for enforcement of the constitutional rights has been guaranteed 
by the Constitution. ^  In its task of interpreting the rights of citizens under 
the Constitution, the Court in Bangladesh has endeavoured to lay down 
expansive parameters for the functioning of the rights. The Bangladesh Court 
has not sought to restrict itself to a formal style of interpretation of the 
constitutional rights. On the contrary, the Court has taken upon itself the task 
of explicating the rights in the context of the political, moral and ethical 
standards posed by the relationship between the citizen and state.
( a ) Right to equality
133 Article 39, ibid.
134 Article 37, ibid.
3^3 Article 38, ibid.
136 Article 42, ibid.
^  Article 31, ibid. 
138 Article 44, ibid.
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The Constitution of Bangladesh declares equality of citizens before the law 
and equal protection of law. ^ 9  citizens are also ensured "equality of 
opportunity in respect of employment or office in the service of the 
Republic". These constitutional guarantees were relied upon by the 
majority of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, in Dr. 
Nurul Islam v B an g la d esh }- to hold that certain provisions of the Bangladesh 
Public Servants Retirement were ultra vires the Constitution as being
violative of the guaranteed equality rights. ^  One of the majority, Ruhul 
Islam J., while holding section 9(2) of the Act unconstitutional, offered the 
following reasons, amongst others.
In view of the protections under ... [Articles 27 and 29 of the 
Constitution] a law vesting an arbitrary discretion in ... [a 
governmental authority] without prescribing ... [a] uniform rule 
of action or laying down a guideline or standard by which the 
exercise of discretion may be measured, offends against the 
equality of law doctrine. A law without being controlled or 
guided by any defined rule or specified conditions to which all 
similarly situated persons may conform is unconstitutional and 
v o id .^
(b ) Right to liberty
On an application alleging infringement of the constitutional right to liberty by 
an aggrieved person, the High Court Division in Bangladesh has been 
enjoined to "satisfy itself that [the person] ... is not being held in custody
139 Article 27, ibid.
140 Article 29, ibid.
^  (1981) 33 D.L.R. (A.D.) 201. See also Hamidul Huq Chowdhury v Bangladesh, (1982) 34 
D.L.R. 190, where the singling out of the petitioner-companies for taking over by the 
government was held to be a violation of the equality rights under the Constitution of 
Bangladesh.
14?
Public Servants (Retirement) Act, 1974, Act No. 12 of 1974.
*43 Section 9(2) of the Public Servants Retirement Act provided that:
[t]he Government may, at any time, retire from service a public servant who 
has completed twenty years of service without assigning any reason.
144 Dr Nurul Islam, op. cit., at 242.
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without lawful authority or in an unlawful m a n n e r The phrases without 
lawful authority and in an unlawful manner, though seemingly tautologous, 
have been interpreted by the Appellate Division of the Bangladesh Supreme 
Court as having separate connotations.
The expression ‘without lawful authority’ comprehends all 
questions of the competency or the vires of an enactment ...[This 
means that] there must be a ... [valid] law empowering an 
authority to detain a person, and the empowered authority 
acting under the conferred powers must be vested with that 
power by law. ... [The latter phrase, ‘in an unlawful manner’] 
refers to acts of an authority acting under statutory powers. ...
[The phrase embodies the cardinal principles of ‘due process’ 
understood in the American Constitution. ^
The right to personal liberty has been articulated and reiterated under two 
different heads in the chapter on "Fundamental Rights" in the Constitution of 
Bangladesh. ^  In a major decision setting aside an order of detention, the 
High Court Division in Bangladesh emphasized that:
personal liberty being the subject of more than one fundamental 
right ... guaranteed by the Constitution, a heavy onus is cast by 
the Constitution ... upon ... [any] authority seeking to ... [infringe 
upon the personal liberty of a citizen] to justify such action 
strictly according to law and the Constitution. **
The safeguards concerning arrest and detention as articulated in the 
Constitution of Bangladesh relate to procedural safeguards in matters of 
"preventive detention". ^  These will be discussed in Chapter 2 infra.
( c ) Right to freedom o f assembly
^  Article 102(2)(b), Constitution of Bangladesh, Appendix III, emphasis added. 
^  Abdul Latif Mirza v Government of Bangladesh, (1979) D.L.R. (A.D.) 1, at 8. 
^  Articles 31 and 32, Constitution of Bangladesh.
^  Anina Sen v Government of Bangladesh, (1975) 27 D.L.R. 122, at 134.
^  Article 33, Constitution of Bangladesh.
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As in the Constitutions of Malaysia and Sri Lanka, most of the entrenched 
rights in the Constitution of Bangladesh are qualified by such considerations as 
"public interest", "public order" "security of state" and "morality". Unlike the 
position in Malaysia, however, the restrictions to citizens’ rights under the 
Constitution of Bangladesh, for purposes of these considerations, must be 
reasonable. For example, freedom of assembly is expressed in this way.
Every person shall have the right to assemble and to participate 
in public meetings and processions peacefully and without arms, 
subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the 
interests of public order and public health. ™
The use of the expression reasonable ensures that the restrictions to the 
constitutional rights, as may be sought to be imposed by the State, are 
justiciable. ^  The permissible restriction of the constitutional right to 
freedom of assembly has interpreted by the Court in Bangladesh to require an 
objective standard.
What is a reasonable restriction shall depend upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case ... It must however be an objective 
standard which, in ... given circumstances, an average prudent 
man will employ. ^
The reasonableness of any statutory classification relating to all the other 
rights entrenched in the Constitution is justiciable before the superior courts in 
Bangladesh. ^
The Code o f Criminal Procedure in B ang ladesh^  empowers the Executive, by 
order, and for two months at a time, to prohibit public meetings,
150 Article 37. ibid., emphasis added.
^  In the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions of Pakistan and the Constitution of India, restrictive 
clauses to the entrenched rights are similarly preceded by the word "reasonable". An 
examination of the proceedings of the Indian Constituent Assembly reveal that the expression 
"reasonable" was accepted by amendment to ensure justiciability of the restrictions. See P.K. 
Tripathi, Perspectives on the American Constitutional Influence on the Constitution of India in 
L.W. Beer (Ed), Constitutionalism in Asia, University of California Press, 1979, 56-98, at 86-87.
^  OaliAhad v Government of Bangladesh, (1974) 26 D.L.R. 376, at 387.
^  Hamidul Huq Chowdhury v Bangladesh, (1982) 34 D.L.R. 190, at 200.
Code o f Criminal Procedure, 1898, Act No. 5 of 1898.
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demonstrations, rallies or processions so as to prevent disturbance of public 
tranquility, riot or affray.^^ In OaliAhad v Government o f Bangladeshi^  the 
plaintiff, who was an executive member of a political parties’ combine, asked 
the High Court Division for a declaration that the successive orders of the 
executive magistrate banning political meetings were made mala fide. The 
Court declared that the successive orders banning political meetings infringed 
the constitutional right to freedom of assembly. The Court observed that:
the total ban on holding any meeting for ... an indefinite period 
seems to be completely unreasonable. ... [T]he impugned order 
[prohibiting the holding of meetings] is violative of the 
fundamental right [of freedom of assembly] and as such liable to 
be struck down. ^ 7
(d ) Right to property
Certain presidential decrees promulgated soon after the independence of 
BangladeshiJO brought about changes in the law of real property (which was 
contained principally in the pre-independence State Acquisition and Tenancy 
A ct^ ) .  A large number of petitions challenging certain provisions of these 
executive decrees were heard by the High Court Division in Ali Ekabbar Farazi 
v Bangladesh. ® One of the provisions in one of the decrees under challenge 
was declared unconstitutional by the Court. According to the Court:
a vested right to property cannot be extinguished except in the 
manner ... [provided in the Constitution by] Article 42(1) and 
Article 47(1) ... [The retrospective operation of the provision in 
the presidential decree under challenge] is likely to extinguish or
^  Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
156 (1974) 26 D.L.R. 376.
157 Ibid., at 392.
1 CO
President’s Order No. 88 of 1972, President’s Order No. 136 of 1972, and President’s Order 
No. 24 of 1973.
1 5Q
v East Bengal Act No. 28 of 1951.
160 (1974) 26 D.L.R. 394.
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affect certain vested rights to property, and to that extent, the 
said President’s Order will be unconstitutional.^!
The Judiciary, Rights and Interpretative Methods
This brief review of the performance of the Courts in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh, in adjudicating issues of constitutional rights, reveals different 
styles of judicial interpretation in the three countries. The Malaysian Court 
has been identified as pursuing a formal style of interpretation of the 
constitutional provisions on the rights of citizens. The judicial style of the Sri 
Lankan Court on the other hand indicates a somewhat inconsistent approach. 
While some decisions of the Court in Sri Lanka are characterized by a 
somewhat broad-based approach towards constitutional rights, other decisions 
display a formal style of interpretation. In contrast to the judicial techniques in 
Malaysia and Sri Lanka, the Court in Bangladesh has attempted to explicate 
constitutional rights in the broader context of a constitutional system and 
limited government. The same trends of judicial interpretation identified here 
will be discernable in the review, in later Chapters, of the Courts’ roles in 
matters relating to preventive detention and the use of emergency powers.
161 Ibid., at 418.
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CHAPTER II
PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN THE 
LEGAL-CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS OF THE THREE COUNTRIES
The entrenchment of citizens’ rights in the Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh has been accompanied by explicit provision for 
preventive detention. Such provision is either in the texts of the Constitutions, 
as in the case of Malaysia and Bangladesh, or in statutes, as in Sri Lanka. An 
examination of these powers of detention without trial in the constitutional- 
legal systems of these countries reveals a close identity with similar powers of 
executive detention in the colonial stages of the evolution of these States. The 
mechanisms of preventive detention in the constitutional-legal systems of 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh afford opportunities for wide ranging 
encroachments by state authorities on the operation of the constitutionally 
entrenched rights of the citizens.
Beginning with some general remarks about the nature of preventive 
detention, this Chapter discusses briefly the powers of detention without trial 
available during colonial times, and where applicable, the interpretation of 
these powers by the Court. This provides the background for a discussion of 
the powers of preventive detention since Independence and their exercise in 
non-emergency times. Selected case-law on the general parameters of the 
interpretation, by the superior courts, of the exercise of peace-time preventive 
detention powers is also discussed. Later, in Chapter V, the issues of 
preventive detention during states of emergency will be examined in the 
broader context of the deprivation of personal liberty and derogations from 
rights. Case-law on suspension of constitutional rights and preventive 
detention during states of emergency will be examined and analysed, in detail, 
in Chapters VI to VIII.
The Nature of Preventive Detention
The principal object of preventive detention is not to inflict punishment upon 
a person for any act done but rather to prevent him from doing it. In Halliday,1 
Lord Atkinson characterised preventive justice as that:
1 Vie King v Halliday, [19171 A.C. 260.
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which consists in restraining a man from committing a crime he 
may commit but has not yet committed, or doing some act 
injurious to members of the community which he may do but has 
not yet done.^
In the same case Lord Finlay described preventive detention in the following 
terms.
One of the most obvious means of taking precautions against 
dangers such as are enumerated is to impose some restriction on 
the freedom of movement of persons whom there may be reason 
to suspect of being disposed to help the enemy ... The measure is 
not punitive but precautionary.^
With regard to the nature of preventive detention, it is a fiction to designate a 
person as being "detained", rather than being charged and imprisoned. It has 
been pointed out that:
"[cjontrol" which may go on indefinitely without accusation or 
defence, is a far worse experience than imprisonment of defined 
duration, and suspicion is often more damaging than 
indictment.^
Referring to the pernicious effects of preventive detention on society and 
politics, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania has observed that:
[i]t means that you are imprisoning a man when he has not 
broken any written law, when you cannot be sure of proving 
beyond reasonable doubt that he has done so. You are 
restricting his liberty, and making him suffer materially and 
spiritually, for what you think he intends to do, or is trying to do, 
or for what you believe he has done. Few things are more 
dangerous to the freedom of a society than that.-*
2 Ibid., at 273.
3 Ibid., at 269.
^ C.K. Allen, Law and Orders, London, Stevens & Sons, 3rd Ed., 1965, at 367.
~ Quoted in T.M. Franck, Comparative Constitutional Process: Cases and Materials, London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1968, at 231.
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Origins of institutionalized Preventive Detention in colonial 
South and South-East Asia
In the British colonial territories in South and South-East Asia, detention by 
executive action, without trial, was first given statutory sanction in the 
Presidency of Bengal^ by the promulgation of the Bengal State Prisoners' 
Regulation in 18187 The Bengal Regulation together with Regulations of a 
similar nature in the other Presidencies of British India empowered the 
Governor-General or State Governors to order the detention of any person for 
reasons such as security of state or maintenance of public order. Though the 
promulgation of these various Regulations was no doubt motivated by the 
common law principle that no one is to be deprived of his liberty without the 
sanction of law, the instruments granted an uncontrolled discretionary power 
to the head of government. Moreover, no provision was made for any advisory 
panels, nor were the detained persons given any right to be heard or even 
informed of the grounds for the detention.
Regulations for preventive detention during colonial times formally 
legitimized incarceration by executive fiat and inaugurated a legal policy which 
proved itself an efficient instrument for the suppression of political dissent 
during the colonial era. In the metropolitan state, recourse to detention 
without trial was taken only during periods of national crisis. By contrast, in 
the colonial state, the phenomenon of preventive detention became a 
permanent feature of the constitutional-legal system.^
The greater part of the colonial Presidency of Bengal now forms Bangladesh. Penang and 
Malacca in Malaysia, together with Singapore were originally part of the Bengal Presidency and 
administered by the British Governor of Bengal.
7 Regulation III of 1818. The regulation provided for detention for "reasons of state, embracing 
the due maintenance of the alliances formed by the British Government with foreign powers, the 
preservation of tranquility in the territories entitled to its protection and the security of the 
security of the British dominions from foreign hostility and from internal commotion." The 
Regulations did not specify any time-limit for the continuation of the detention.
Regarding the legal nature of "legislative regulations" like Regulation III of 1818, see H. Cowell, 
The History and Constitution of the Courts and Legislative Authorities in India, Calcutta, 
Thaker, Spink and Co., 2nd Ed., 1884, Lecture IV.
o
See K.I. Omar, Emergency, Personal Liberty and the Courts in India and Pakistan,
Unpublished LL.M. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 1985, at 14, for similar 
comments with regard to British India.
CHAPTER II 4 6
The basic design of preventive detention enactments in the closing phases of 
colonial rule in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh was inspired by the war­
time Regulations promulgated in Britain.^
Preventive Detention in the Colonial Period
A. Malaysia
In the period immediately preceding independence,^ detention without trial 
was principally sanctioned by the Emergency Regulations Ordinance, 1948.^ 
Under this Ordinance, the High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya 
was empowered, during an Emergency, to make Regulations, which were 
"desirable in the public interest".^ Among the classes of subjects on which 
Regulations could be made included, "arrest, detention, exclusion and 
d e p o rta tio n " .T h e  Ordinance declared that detention under Emergency 
Regulations was not to exceed two years, but could be extended by further 
order. ^  Regulations were also to provide for "periodic review" of individual 
cases of detention. ^  Although an individual person might have been detained 
under Emergency Regulations, the detention would not be terminated 
automatically upon the expiry of the Emergency.^
9
Regulations made under the Defence of the Realm Act, 1914-15, and under the Emergency 
Powers (Defence) Act, 1939-40.
^  In the nin-year period prior to Independence (1948-1957), Malaysia was under Emergency 
rule. The state of emergency was continued after Independence.
Federation of Malaya Ordinance No. X of 1948, Malayan Union and Federal Ordinances, 
1948, 211-216.
^  Section 4(1), ibid; also s. 4(2)(v).
13 Section 4(2)(b), ibid.
^  Section 4(3)(a), ibid.
^  Section 4(3)(b), ibid.
16 Proviso to s. 4(3), ibid.
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Regulation 17 of the Emergency Regulations 1948,^ made under the 
Emergency Regulations Ordinance, decreed that the Chief Secretary of the 
Federation of Malaya:
may by order ... direct that any person named in such order shall 
be detained for any period not exceeding one year in such place 
of detention as may be specified by the Chief Secretary in the 
order.
Provisions were made in the 1948 Regulations for the constitution, by the High 
Commissioner, of one or more "Advisory Committees" to consider objections 
made by detainees against their detention orders.10 The Advisory Committee 
was to make recommendations to the High Commissioner with respect to 
these objections of the detained persons and the Committee’s considerations 
in this regard.^
Initially the Emergency Regulations did not specify the number of persons 
who would constitute an Advisory Committee, nor the effect of a finding by it 
against an order of detention. By amendment of the principal Regulations 
soon after their promulgation,^ a chairman and two other members 
constituted a quorum of an Advisory Committee. By the same Amendment, 
a body superior to the Advisory Committee, called a Commission, had powers
to vary the period of detention or order the discharge of a detainee, after
22consideration the recommendations of the Advisory Committee.
B. Sri Lanka
^  Emergency Regulations 1948, Malayan Union and Federation of Malaya Subsidiary 
Legislation, 1948, Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1956, 279-293.
18 Paragraphs 2 and 4 of Regulation 17, ibid.
^  Paragraph 3, ibid.
Emergency (Amendment No. 11) Regulations 1948, Gazette Notification No. 3868, December 
18, 1948, No. 23, Vol. I, reprinted in Malaya Subsidiary Legislation, op. cit., at 305-306.
^  Clause (a), ibid.
^  Clause (b), ibid.
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Provisions granting powers of preventive detention in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 
the period immediately before Independence in 1948 were contained in the 
Public Security Ordinance, 1947.^ Prior to the promulgation of this Ordinance, 
powers of detention without trial were exercised under the Ceylon Defence 
(Miscellaneous) Regulations 1940. These Regulations were made pursuant to 
Imperial Order in Council by which the British Emergency Powers (Defence) 
Act, 1 9 3 9 , were made applicable to Sri Lanka.^ Regulation 1(1) of the 
Ceylon Regulations provided:
If the Governor [of Ceylon] has reasonable cause to believe any 
person to be of hostile origin or associations or to have been 
recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the 
defence of the Island or in the preparation or instigation of such 
acts and that by reason thereof it is necessary to exercise control 
over him, he may make an order against that person directing 
that he be detained.^
In Gunawardena v Kandy P o liced  the appellant, who had escaped from 
custody while undergoing detention under the Ceylon Regulations, contended 
that the custody from which he escaped was not lawful. The appellant, a 
Member of the State Council of Ceylon, maintained that the Governor’s order 
of detention did not contain a recital to the effect that the detention was 
necessary for one or more objects of the Regulation in question. The Supreme 
Court of Ceylon rejected the appellant’s contention on these grounds.
[Smarting from the hypothesis that the appellant knew that the 
Governor thought it necessary to exercise control over him, the 
reference to the regulation under which the order was made 
would convey to the appellant that the Governor had reasonable 
cause to believe that he was of hostile origin or associations or 
had recently been concerned in acts prejudicial to the public
23 Ordinance No. XXV of 1947.
24 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 62.
See J. Minattur, Emergency Powers in Sri Lanka, (1982) 24 Journal of the Indian Law 
Institute 57, at 61.
2^ Quoted in Gunawardena v Kandy Police, (1944) 45 N.L.R. 399, at 400.
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safety or the defence of the Island or in the preparation or 
instigation of such acts.^
The Court concluded that "omission of such a statement ... [was not] fatal to 
the validity of the [Governor’s] order [of detention]".^
The Public Security Ordinance, 1947,*^ which contained provisions for 
preventive detention during an Emergency, was promulgated a year before the 
British colony of Ceylon became an independent Dominion. Under the 
Ordinance, the Governor of Ceylon was empowered to make Emergency 
Regulations during a state of public emergency.^ ^  In addition to other heads 
of competence, the Governor could make regulations for preventive 
detention. By section 8 of the Ordinance, no Emergency Regulation or 
orders, rules or directions under the Regulations could be called into question 
in any court.
C. Bangladesh
Bangladesh was a part of British India till 1947, forming the greater part of the 
province of Bengal. In the period immediately preceding independence of the 
predecessor state of Pakistan, of which Bangladesh then formed the province 
of East Pakistan, the governing document was the Government of India Act, 
1935.^ Under this Act, which transformed British India into a Federal 
Dominion, power to make laws with respect to preventive detention was 
specifically granted to both the Federal and the Provincial Legislatures.-^ The 
Act restricted the subject-matter in relation to which the Federal and 
Provincial Legislatures were respectively competent to enact preventive
^  Ibid., at 401-402, emphasis added.
29 Ibid., at 402-403.
30 Ordinance No. XXV of 1947.
31 Section 2, Public Security Ordinance, 1947.
32 Section 5(2)(a), ibid.
33 Government of India Act, 1935, 26 Geo. 5 & Edw. 8, c. 2 (2-8-1935).
3  ^ Government of India Act, 1935, Seventh Schedule, List I, Entry 1 and List II, Entry 1, read 
with Part V.
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detention laws. The Provincial Legislatures were empowered to make 
provision for preventive detention only in respect to the maintenance of public
-2 C
order, while the Federal Legislature was specifically granted the power 
solely in relation to reasons of State connected with defence or external 
affairs.^
Subsequent to the Proclamation of Emergency by the Governor-General of 
colonial India in 1939, the Federal Legislature of India, acting under Section 
102 of the Government of India Act, enacted the Defence of India Act, 1939.^ 
Under the Defence of India Act, the Central Government of British India could 
make "Rules" for the purposes of:
securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the 
maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of war, 
or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of 
the community.*^
Rule 26(1) of the Defence o f India Rules made under the Defence of India Act 
provided that:
The Central Government or the Provincial Government, if it is 
satisfied with respect to any particular person that with a view to 
preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to ... it is 
necessary so to do, may make an order ... (b) directing that he be 
detained...
Rule 129(1) empowered any police officer or any other central or provincial 
government officer to arrest without warrant. The Rule was to the following 
effect:
35
Ibid., Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 1: "preventive detention for reasons connected with the 
maintenance of public order; persons subjected to such detention."
° Ibid., Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 1: "preventive detention in British India for reasons of 
State connected with defence, external affairs, or the discharge of the functions of the Crown in 
its relations with Indian States."
^  Act No. 35 of 1939. The Act is reproduced in [1939] A.I.R. (Acts Section), 125-132.
^  Section 2(1), Defence of India Act, 1939.
^  The Rule is quoted in Keshav Talpade v Emperor, [1943] A.I.R. (F.C.) 1, at 2. For the full text 
of the Defence of India Rules 1939, see Gazette of India Extraordinary, September 3, 1939.
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Any police officer or any other officer of government 
empowered in this behalf ... may arrest without warrant any 
person whom he reasonably suspects of having acted, of acting, 
or of being about to act, - (a) ... in a manner prejudicial to the 
public safety or to the efficient prosecution of war ...
Comparing the power of detention accorded by Rule 26 made under the 
Defence of India Act, 1939, and Regulation 18B made under the British 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, Gwyer C.J. of the Indian Federal Court 
made the following observations.
There is in the Indian Act no trace of an intention that any 
particular person or authority should exercise the power of 
detention. ... [T]he wholly different problems of Government ...
[in colonial India] made it a more difficult task to select in 
advance an individual or individuals in whom these powers 
might be vested, as was done in the United Kingdom ... It is one 
thing to confer a power to make a regulation empowering the 
Home Secretary [in the U.K.] to detain any person if he thinks it 
expedient to do so for a number of specified reasons; it is 
another thing altogether to confer a similar power on any person 
whom the Central Government [of India] may by rule choose to 
select, or to whom the Central Government may by rule give 
powers for the purpose.^
In Emperor v Sibnath B anerjee^  it was held that the Court was not competent 
to investigate the sufficiency of the materials or the reasonableness of the 
grounds of satisfaction of the Government for detaining a person under Rule 
26(1) of the Defence o f India Rules.^  In the appeal to the Privy Council in the 
same case ,^  it was held that:
the orders of detention ... must be taken as ex facie regular and 
proper...
40 See Keshav Talpade, op. cit., at 3.
41 Ibid, at 6-7.
42 [1943] A.I.R. (F.C.) 75.
42 Ibid., at 84.
44 Emperor v Sibnath Banerjee, [1945] A.I.R. (P.C.) 156.
45 Ibid., at 163.
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Rule 26(1) of the Defence o f India Rules permitted the exercise of powers of 
preventive detention, if the Government was satisfied with regard to a number 
of matters. Interpreting this power the Privy Council, in Emperor v Vimlabai 
D eshpande^  agreed that for a detention under this Rule to be valid, the 
Government must be satisfied and that mere suspicion was not enough^. But 
at the same time the Privy Council noted that:
ithere is no qualifying adverb such as reasonably or honestly 
attached to the word satisfied
This obiter remark of the Privy Council suggests that the expression satisfied in 
Rule 26(1) of the Defence of India Rules "must receive a subjective 
interpretation and the discretion of the ... [Government] making the detention 
order could not be questioned in a court of law".49 in connection with the 
Privy Council observation, it has been pointed out that:
the presence or absence of the adverbs reasonably and honestly 
in this context are of little importance, for the legislature 
assumes that powers of this kind will be reasonably and honestly 
used. The question is whether the legislature intended the 
exercise of such powers to be subject to judicial control.^
#  *  *
Preventive detention had been a potent and effective mechanism to contain 
political dissent in the colonial State. Far from doing away with the scheme of 
detention by executive process, the constitutional systems of the post-colonial 
states have expressly recognized and legitimized powers of preventive 
detention. Further, as in the colonial State, powers of detention without trial in 
independent Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are available both during 
states of emergency and in normal times.
[1946] A.I.R. (P.C.) 123.
Ibid., at 126.
48 Ibid.
v F.K.M A. Munim, Rights of the Citizen under the Constitution and Law, Dacca, Bangladesh 
Institute of law and International Affairs, 1975, at 126.
Ibid.
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Preventive Detention since Independence
There are provisions enabling the exercise of preventive detention powers in 
the Constitutions of both Malaysia and Bangladesh. These Constitutions also 
contain a number of safeguards^ for the detainee, but these safeguards, 
which are repeated in the preventive detention statutes, are essentially 
procedural in nature and it is left to the legislatures to determine the 
substantive content of the exercise of these powers. The legislatures have 
responded to this by enacting enabling statutes which define the purpose of 
the power in broad categories such as "maintenance of public order", "security 
of the State", and such like. The Sri Lankan Constitution of 1978 has 
entrenched the pre-Independence Public Security Ordinance, 1947,^ which 
provides for powers of preventive detention.
A. Malaysia
Constitutional provisions on Preventive Detention
The Constitutional Commission-^ which drew up proposals for the 
Constitution of independent Malaya (Malaysia) recommended specific 
provisions with regard to preventive detention. The Emergency proclaimed in 
1948 was still in force when the Constitutional Commission began work in 
1957, and it was the understanding of the Commission that the Emergency 
would still be in force when the Constitution was adopted. These 
circumstances motivated the Commission to recommend the inclusion of 
powers of preventive detention in the Independence Constitution of M alaya.^
^  Some of the safeguards, discussed infra, include the communication to the detainee of the 
grounds of detention, opportunity of representation to an advisory committee, and periodic 
review of the length of detention.
52 Ordinance No. XXV of 1947.
5 3
The Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission appointed by the British Government. 
See Chapter I supra, for the composition of the Commission. For the proposals of the 
Commission, see Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, London, Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957.
54 Report, op. cit., at 75.
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The Commission designated as "wholly unsatisfactory" the then existing 
Emergency Regulations, which, among other things provided for exercise of 
the powers of preventive detention.^ In accordance with the 
recommendations of the Constitutional Commission, powers of preventive 
detention were sanctioned by the Constitution of independent M alaya,^ 
accompanied by the enumeration of some procedural safeguards for detainees.
The few safeguards have, however, been successively whittled away by 
constitutional amendments. A person detained without trial in Malaysia has 
the right to be informed of the grounds and allegations of fact on which s/he 
has been detained,^ subject to the right of the detaining authority to refuse to 
disclose facts when disclosure would be contrary to national interests.-^ An 
Advisory Board, comprised of persons appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong (King), has been entrusted with the responsibility to review cases of 
preventive detention.-^ The chairman of the Advisory Board must be a 
serving or retired judge of a superior court or a person qualified for that 
position.*^ In the original Constitution, the determination of the Board with 
regard to the continuation or discontinuation of the detention was final and 
conclusive. By the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1960,^ the role of the 
Advisory Board, in matters of review of detention, was reduced only to the 
making of "recommendations" to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.^
Prior to 1976, no person could be detained beyond three months unless 
his/her representations were considered and the Advisory Board had made its
^  Article 151, Constitution of Malaysia, Appendix I.
^  Article 151(l)(a), ibid.
58 Article 151(3), ibid.
59 Article 151(l)(b), ibid.
60
Article 151(2), ibid. Previously, members of the Board other than the chairman were 
appointed after consultation with the Lord President of the Federal/Supreme Court of 
Malaysia. Since the Constitution (Amendment Act, 1990, Act No. A767 of 1990, appointment of 
the other members are made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agaong without consultation with the 
Lord President.
61 Act 10 of 1960.
Article 151(l)(b), Constitution of Malaysia, as amended by s. 30, Act 10 of 1960.
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recommendations.*^ By the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1976,*^ the three- 
month period no longer referred to the duration of detention, but to the time 
period within which representations by the detainee must be considered by the 
Advisory Board, counting from the date of submission of the representation.*^ 
The same Amendment provided that this period of three months could be 
extended.*^ it has been suggested that this change was dictated by practical 
considerations.
Obviously, it would be unrealistic to expect the [Advisory] Board 
to conduct any meaningful enquiry and make suitable 
recommendations within three months of the detention, if the 
detainee were to choose to make his representations, say, only 
two weeks before the expiry of his detention.*^
The Constitutional Commission of Malaya’s recommendation to provide for 
powers of preventive detention in the proposed Constitution of independent 
Malaya were made in the context of the colonial Emergency Regulations 
Ordinance, 1948, which authorized preventive detention. In the Draft 
Constitution presented by the Commission, the provisions for preventive 
detention were bracketed with the provisions for Emergency and other Special 
Powers of the Government, an arrangement which was unchanged in the final 
form of the Constitution. These factors initially led to some assertions that 
preventive detention could only be lawful under emergency legislation.*^ In 
this regard, it has been pointed out that:
63 This was in conformity with the recommendations of the Constitutional Commission, see 
Report, op. cit., at 76.
64 Act No A354 of 1976.
Article 151(l)(b), Constitution of Malaysia as amended by Section 40, Act No. A354 of 1976.
66 Ibid.
67 Tan Sri Dato Haji Mohamed Salleh bin Abas, Amendment of the Malaysian Constitution, 
[1977] 2 M.L.J. (Supplement) msxxxiv, at xl.
At the time of writing, Salleh bin Abas was Solicitor General of Malaysia. He was elevated to 
the bench afterwards and subsequently became Lord President of the Federal Court/Supreme 
Court. He was dismissed from office in 1988.
68 See LA. Sheridan, The Federation of Malaya Constitution, Singapore, University of Malaya 
Law Review, 1961, at 139, n. 1.
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[tjhere is no express provision of the Constitution which states 
that preventive detention is permissible only when enacted 
under Part XI [of the Constitution] on Emergency Powers. 
Article 151 [of the Constitution] purports to apply Vhere any 
law or ordinance made or promulgated in pursuance of this Part 
provides for preventive detention’ but does not state that 
preventive detention outside Part XI is prohibited.^
Internal Security Act, 1960
The Emergency Regulations Ordinance, 1948, which sanctioned preventive 
detention in Malaysia in the period prior to Independence in 1957, was 
continued under the provisions of the Independence Constitution for several 
years.^  In 1960, the Malaysian Parliament passed the Internal Security Act, 
1 9 6 0 , which provided for powers relating to "internal security", preventive 
detention and related m atters.^ The Act was enacted under Article 149 of the 
Constitution of Malaysia which provides for extraordinary legislation against
7 -2
"subversion" and other related activities.
^  S. Jayakumar, Emergency Powers in Malaysia, in Tun Mohamed Suffian, H.P. Lee, and FA. 
Trindade (Eds), The Constitution of Malaysia, Its Development: 1957-1977, Kuala Lumpur, 
Oxford University Press, 1978, 328-368, at 349. Emphasis in original.
^  Article 163 of the Constitution, which was repealed by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 
1963, Act No. No 25 of 1963, provided in clause (1) that:
The Emergency Regulations Ordinance, 1948, and all subsidiary legislation 
made thereunder shall, if not sooner ended by a Proclamation ... cease to have 
effect on the expiration of one year beginning with ... [Independence Day] or, if 
continued under this Article, on the expiration of a period of one year from the 
date on which it would ceased to have effect but for the continuation or last 
continuation.
From 1957 to 1963, Article 163 was kept in force by annual resolutions of the Federal Legislative 
Assembly of Malaya.
^  Originally enacted as Federation of Malaya Act No. 18 of 1960. Revised in 1972 as Laws of 
Malaysia Act No. 82. See Malaysia: Internal Security Laws, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Law 
Publishers Sdn. Bhd., 1983, 1-60.
See the recital to the Act.
^  Article 149, Constitution of Malaysia, Appendix I. The powers under Article 149 will be 
discussed in Chapter III infra.
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The Malaysian Internal Security Act, and the parallel legislation in Sri Lanka^ 
and Bangladesh^ providing for preventive detention have been modelled 
along the lines of the colonial instruments for preventive detention/0 The 
condition precedent for the issue of a detention order is the subjective 
satisfaction of an executive officer or authority that the incarceration of the 
detainee is necessary in order to achieve the objects of the enabling legislation. 
In the Chapter on the "Powers of Preventive Detention"^ in the Malaysian 
Internal Security Act, 1960, s. 8(1), as amended, provides:
If the Minister is satisfied that the detention of any person is 
necessary with a view to preventing him from acting in any 
manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part 
thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to 
the economic life thereof, he may make an order ... directing 
that person be detained for any period not exceeding two 
y ears/0
The constitutional safeguards relating to preventive detention are repeated in 
the Act. The major safeguard in this regard is the requirement that, 
ordinarily, no preventive detention may extend beyond a specified period 
unless an Advisory Board (consisting of members with prescribed 
qualifications) determines or recommends that there is sufficient cause for a 
detention beyond that period. The Act provides that a determination on an 
order of detention reached after consideration of the recommendations of the 
Advisory Board "shall not be called into question in any court".00
The Malaysian Court’s approach to Preventive Detention
^  The Prevention o f Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1979, Act No. 48 of 1979, discussed 
infra.
The Special Powers Act, 1974, Act No. 4 of 1974, discussed infra.
° Discussed supra.
77 Chapter II, Internal Security Act, 1960.
7 0
By s. 8 (7) of the Act, however, the length of detention can be successively extended beyond 
the initial period of two years.
^  Sections 11 to 15, Internal Security Act, 1960.
^  Section 12(b), ibid.
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In deciding cases arising out of preventive detention, the Federal Court of 
Malaysia has customarily relied upon British war-time decisions on preventive 
detention.^
(a) Judicial review of "subjective satisfaction"
In Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari, M a la y s ia the appellant, 
a lawyer detained under the Internal Security Act, 1960, challenged his 
detention on several grounds. The position of the Malaysian Federal Court 
with regard to judicial review of the executive power of preventive detention 
was summed up in Karam Singh in categorical terms.
The discretion whether or not the appellant should be detained 
is placed in the hands of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acting on 
Cabinet advice. Whether or not the facts on which the order of 
detention is to be based are sufficient or relevant, is a matter to 
be decided solely by the executive. In making their decision, they 
have complete discretion and it is not for a court of law to 
question the sufficiency or relevance of these allegations of 
fact.^3
This position was reiterated in the concurring opinion of Ali F.J.
81 Some of the important decisions relied upon are, Greene v Secretary of State for Home Affairs, 
[1942] A.C. 284, Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, The King v Secretary of State for Home 
Affairs, Ex Parte Lees, [1941] 1 K.B. 72. All of these cases were quoted with approval by the 
Malaysian Court in Karam Singh, infra. Decisions of the Indian Court on preventive detention 
are also cited and considered by the Court in Malaysia. In this regard Suffian F.J. (as he was 
then) observed:
Judgements of the Indian Supreme Court are of great persuasive here, 
particularly on the Constitution because to a great extent the Indian 
Constitution was the model for our own Constitution. But having given the 
matter anxious consideration, I have come to the conclusion that with deep 
respect the Indian Supreme Court should not in this matter be followed.
Karam Singh, infra, at 147.
82 [1969] 2 M.L.J. 129.
83 Ibid., at 151, per Suffian F.J. (as he was then), emphasis.
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[T]he question [as to] whether it is necessary that a person be 
detained under section 8(l)(a) of the Internal Security Act is a 
matter for the personal or subjective satisfaction of the executive 
authority.*^
The rule of subjective satisfaction laid down in Karam Singh has been 
consistently followed in later cases. In Minister for Home Affairs v Karpal 
Singlfi5 (henceforth Karpal Singh 2), the respondent, a well-known defence 
lawyer, was arrested and detained under the Internal Security Act, on 
allegations of promoting racial disharmony. In the first instance, the High 
Court at Ipoh had found some of the allegations of fact on which the detention 
order was based to be erroneous, and had ordered the release of the 
d e t a in e e .^  The Minister for Home Affairs appealed to the Supreme C ourt^  
against the decision of the High Court.
The Supreme Court in Karpal Singh 2 distinguished between the grounds for 
detention and the allegations of fact on which the detention order was based. 
According to the Supreme Court, the High Court was in error for basing its 
decision on a scrutiny of the allegations of fact on which the detention order 
was based.
[W]hilst the grounds o f detention stated in the detention order 
are open to challenge or judicial review if alleged to be not 
within the scope of the enabling legislation, the allegations of fact 
upon which the subjective satisfaction of the Minister was based 
are n o t.^
84 Ibid., at 159; Ong Hock Thye C.J. observed:
Once we accept that the Cabinet did satisfy themselves as to the propriety of 
the [detention] order that is the end of the matter.
Ibid., at 142.
85 [1988] 3 M.L.J. 29.
8  ^Karpal Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari, Malaysia, [1988] 1 M.L.J. 468.
8  ^ The Federal Court has been remaned the "Supreme Court” (Mahkamah Agung) by the 
Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1983, Act No. A566 of 1983, in force from 1-1-1985.
Karpal Singh 2, op. cit., at 31. Emphasis added.88
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The Supreme Court emphasized that "reasonable cause", which was the basis 
of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, was beyond judicial 
review.
[Reasonable cause is something which exists solely in the mind 
of the Minister of Home Affairs and that he alone can decide 
and it is not subject to challenge or judicial review unless it can 
be shown that he does not hold the opinion which he professes 
to hold.
In Theresa Lim Chin Chin v Inspector General of P o l i c e Salleh Abas L.P. 
justified the rule of subjective satisfaction by relying on the "clear words" of the 
Constitution and the Internal Security Act, 1960. Citing relevant provisions, 
Salleh Abas L.P. observed that:
[i]t is clear from these provisions of the Constitution, and the 
ISA [Internal Security Act], that the intention of the framers of 
the Constitution is that the judges in the matter of preventive 
detention relating to the security of the Federation are the 
executive.^ *
(b) Detention & procedural irregularities
The principal ground of challenge in Karam Singh was that the detention was 
not "in accordance with law" as enjoined under Article 5(1) of the Malaysian 
Constitution, and was consequently illegal and mala fide. The appellant 
contended that there were procedural irregularities in the manner in which his 
detention was brought about. The order of detention enumerated several 
alternate reasons for the arrest and detention of the appellant, whereas the 
particulars of his grounds of detention supplied to him afterwards, to enable 
him to make a representation to the Advisory Board, listed only one 
classification of "prejudicial activities".
89 Ibid., at 32, emphasis added.
90 [19881 1 M.L.J. 293.
Ibid., at 295. The reference here was to Articles 149 and 151 of the Constitution, and ss. 8 and 
73 of the Internal Security Act, 1960.
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Azmi L.P., Ong Hock Thye C.J. (Malaya) and Gill F.J. were of the opinion 
that the discrepancy between the order of detention and the grounds of 
detention was a "technical defect" of "form" or "procedure" and not of 
"substance".^ In this regard, Suffian F J . (as he was then) pointed out that in 
Malaysia, the constitutional guarantee of the right to personal liberty referred 
only to substantive law and not to procedural law, implying thereby that 
procedural irregularities were not to be taken into account in deciding cases 
on preventive detention. The learned judge compared the relevant provisions 
of the Indian and Malaysian Constitutions relating to personal liberty^ and 
observed that:
[in Malaysia,] ... detention, in order to be lawful, must be in 
accordance with law, not as in India where it must be in 
accordance with procedure established by law .^
In Karam Singh, the appellant also contended that the grounds of detention 
containing the allegations of fact supplied to him were vague and indefinite, 
thereby prejudicing his representation before the Advisory Board. The Court
92“ Karam Singh, op. cit., at 140 (per Azmi L.P.), at 142 (per Ong Hock Thye CJ. (Malaya)), at 
154 (per Gill F.J.). Instead of treating the discrepancy as a defect, Suffian F.J. felt that:
there is no need for the grounds to be identical with any or all of the purposes 
of detention. The grounds supplied could be in words totally different from the 
statement of the purposes of detention.
Ibid., at 147.
93 Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides:
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law.
Emphasis added.
The Malaysian Constitution provides in Article 5(1):
No person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty save in accordance 
with law.
Emphasis added.
The comparison was made in view of a number of decisions of the Indian Supreme Court relied 
upon by the appellant.
94
Karpal Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari, Malaysia, [1988] 1 M.LJ. 468, at 150, 
emphasis in original. See also at 153.
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adopted the position that vague, insufficient or irrelevant grounds did not 
vitiate the detention order. Suffian F.J. explained:
I do not see any justification for reading into the Constitution or 
into the [Internal Security Act] any provision to the effect that 
any imperfection in the allegations of fact supplied to the 
detainee relates, as it were, to the original order of detention, 
and goes to its root, so as to render illegal the detention.^
(c) Inviolability o f detention order
The inviolability of an executive order of detention as asserted in Karam Singh 
was reiterated even when the order in question could not be enforced. In 
Minister o f Home Affairs v Chu Choon Yong and A n o th e r^  the respondents, 
originally detained under the Internal Security Act, were subsequently issued 
with orders under the Banishment Ordinance, 1959,^ banishing them from 
Malaysia forever. When no country was found to accept the banished persons, 
even after the elapsing of three years in one case and six years in another, the 
High Court of Malaya ordered their release. In so doing, the High Court 
agreed with the contention of the respondents that although their detention 
under the Banishment Ordinance was originally lawful, it subsequently became 
unlawful because it could not be enforced. The Federal Court of Malaysia 
allowed the appeal of the State against the High Court’s decision. Suffian L.P. 
offered the following reason for allowing the appeal.
A valid detention order under the Banishment Order remains 
valid until revoked. It is true that the Minister may suspend that 
order or may instead make an expulsion order so that the 
banishee may make his own arrangements to leave the country, 
b u t ... the making of these orders is a matter of discretion for the
95 Ibid., at 150.
96 [1977] 2 M.L.J. 20.
97 Revised as the Banishment Act, 1972, Act No. 79 of 1972. The Act provides for the 
banishment or expulsion from Malaysia, inter alia, of persons who are not citizens. In the instant 
case, one of the respondents, a citizen of Malaysia and a local politician in Johor Bahru, was 
deprived of his citizenship while in detention. It was alleged that the other respondent, who was 
born and had lived in Malaysia all his life, had failed to prove that he was a citizen.
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Minister, and his refusal to do so does not affect the validity of
Q O
the orders of detention that are impugned. °
A. Sri Lanka
The Constitution, Public Security Ordinance, and Preventive Detention
The Constitutions of Malaysia and Bangladesh expressly provide for general 
powers of preventive detention which are not restricted to emergency 
situations only. In Sri Lanka, powers of detention without trial are sanctioned 
by the 1978 Constitution in a somewhat less direct way. By Article 155(1) of 
the Sri Lankan Constitution, the pre-Independence Public Security Ordinance, 
1947,^ which provides, inter alia, for the making of preventive detention and 
enabling other measures during an Emergency, has been continued. ^  Article 
155(1) of the Constitution reads:
The Public Security Ordinance as amended and in force 
immediately prior to the commencement of the Constitution 
shall be deemed to be a law enacted by Parliament.
The Constitution specifies that Emergency Regulations under the Public 
Security Ordinance, which includes Regulations for preventive detention, are to 
be operative only during an Emergency. ^  These Emergency Regulations 
have an over-riding effect on other laws "except the provisions of the 
Constitution".^ But by Article 15(7) of the Constitution, the guaranteed
98 [1977] 2 M.LJ. 20, at 21.
qq
Ordinance No. XXV of 1947, enacted by the colonial Governor of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), "with 
the advice and consent of the State Council" of Ceylon.
100 The 1972 Constitution, by Section 134(1) had similarly provided for the continuation of the 
Public Security Ordinance.
^  Article 155(3), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978. This is a reiteration of the basic provision in 
the Public Security Ordinance that preventive detention and other Regulations could only be 
enacted upon a Proclamation of Emergency. See ss. 2 and 5 of the Ordinance.
Article 155(2), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978:
The power to make emergency regulations under the Public Security 
Ordinance or the law for the time being in force relating to public security shall 
include the power to make regulations having the legal effect of over-riding, 
amending or suspending the operation of any law, except the provisions of the 
Constitution.
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right to personal liberty, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention may 
be restricted by Emergency Regulations under the Public Security Ordinance 
providing for preventive detention.1^
The indirect and obscure way in which the Constitution of Sri Lanka has 
sanctioned the exercise of powers of preventive detention has been confusing. 
In Wijaya Kumaranatunga v G.V.P. Samarasinghe and O t h e r s E m ergency  
R e g u la t io n s  for preventive detention, promulgated under the Public 
Security Ordinance were challenged as being ultra vires the Constitution.
The applicant before before the Court in Wijaya Kumaranatunga was arrested 
and detained under Emergency Regulation 17 (1) of the Emergency 
Regulations 1982.105 On behalf of the applicant, it was pointed out that 
Article 13(1) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka enjoined that no person could be 
arrested except according to procedure established by l a w .^  It was further 
argued that by Article 13(2) of the Constitution, every arrested or detained 
person was to be produced before a competent court, and that detention or 
other deprivation of personal liberty must be on judicial authority. ^  Those
^  Article 15(7) provides:
The exercise and operation of ... the fundamental rights [to equality, personal 
liberty, and of freedom of speech, expression and assembly] declared and 
recognized by ... [the Constitution] shall be subject to such restrictions as may 
be prescribed by law in the interests of national security, public order ... [etc.]
...‘[Ljaw5 includes regulations made under the law for the time being relating to 
public security.
104 Supreme Court Application No. 121 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, 
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, (April 1982 to December 1982), Sri Lanka, Lake 
House Investments, 1986, 347-363.
^  Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations of 1982, promulgated by the 
President pursuant to a Proclamation of Emergency on 20 October 1982. See Chapter VII infra.
^  Article 13(1), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978:
No person shall be arrested except according to procedure established by law.
Any person arrested shall be informed of the reason of his arrest.
107 Article 13(2), ibid:
Every person held in custody, detained or otherwise deprived of personal 
liberty shall be brought before the judge of the nearest competent court 
according to procedure established by law, and shall not be held in custody, 
detained or deprived of personal liberty except upon and in terms of the order 
of such judge made in accordance with procedure established by law.
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being the constitutional imperatives, the applicant claimed that the 
Regulations under which he was detained were ultra vires the Constitution, 
being in conflict with the provisions of the constitutional right to personal 
liberty.
With respect to these contentions, the Supreme Court noted the diversity of 
the relevant constitutional provisions at issue.
Under Article 155(2) [of the Constitution,] no regulations can be 
made which have the legal effect of overriding, amending or 
suspending the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution 
itself, however, by Article 15(7) provides that the exercise and 
operation of the fundamental rights declared and recognized by 
Articles 13(1), and 13(2) shall be subject to such restrictions as 
may be prescribed by law in the interest, inter alia, of national 
security and public order.10**
The Court concluded:
Preventive detention ... can be used to restrict the fundamental 
rights [of personal liberty and freedom from arrest and 
detention] guaranteed by Articles 13(1) and (2) [of the 
Constitution] ... Regulation 17 (1) is not ultra vires the 
Constitution.
The result of the Court’s decision was that, although the right to freedom from 
arrest and detention was guaranteed by the Constitution, the guarantee was 
subject to restrictions. Among those restrictions was the privilege to the State 
to resort to the use of powers of preventive detention to derogate from this 
constitutional right.
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1979
Until 1979, powers of preventive detention in Sri Lanka could only be 
exercised in except during an Eergency.110 Under the provisions of the 
108 Wijaya Kumaranatunga, op. cit, at 350, per Soza J.
10Q Ibid., at 352, per Soza J.
110 It is to be noted that the long periods of emergency rule in Sri Lanka afforded quite 
intensive use of preventive detention powers. Until 1982, states of emergency had been declared 
in 1953, 1958, 1959, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1966, 1971-77. See J. Jupp, Constitutional Developments in
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Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1979,111 powers of 
preventive detention are now available in non-emergency situations as well. 
The provisions of the Act were expressed to have effect notwithstanding 
anything contained in any other law .11^ By s> 29, this newsier was to operate 
for a period of three years only.11^ But by an amendment to the Act in 1982, 
the Act was given unlimited duration. 1 ^
Section 9(1) of the Prevention o f Terrorism Act provides:
Where the Minister has reason to believe or suspect that any 
person is connected with or concerned in any unlawful activity 
the Minister may order that such person be detained ....
The Malaysian Internal Security Act, 1960, as amended, permits preventive 
detention for up to two years in the first instance, and its continuation for 
periods of two years by subsequent orders, without reference to the maximum 
cumulative period of d e te n tio n .^  The Sri Lankan Prevention of Terrorism 
Act, on the other hand provides for detention for three months at a time, and 
limits the aggregate period of such detention to a total of eighteen months.1 ^
Unlike the provisions of the Malaysian Internal Security Act, 1960, where a 
detainee is supplied with the grounds of detention, the allegations of fact and 
other particulars,11^ the Sri Lankan Act requires only that the detainee be 
informed of the "unlawful activity" for which s/he is detained.11  ^There is also
Ceylon since Independence, (1968) 41 Pacific Affairs, 169-183, at 182, n 27; J. Jupp, Sri Lanka: 
Third World Democracy, London, Frank Cass & Co., 1978, at 7, 9-10,13-14, 19-20.
111 Act No. 48 of 1979.
112 Section 28, ibid.
11^ Section 29, ibid:
The provisions of this Act shall be in operation for a period of three years from 
the date of its commencement.
11<1 Section 4, Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Act, 1982, Act No. 
10 of 1982.
11^ Sections 8(1) and 8(7), Internal Security Act, 1960.
11^ Section 9(1) and Proviso, ibid.
117 Section 11, Internal Security Act, 1960.
1IQ
° Section 13(2), Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1979.
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no stipulation as to the qualifications of the members of the Advisory Board 
which considers representations by d e t a in ee s .A l t h o u g h  provisions for an 
Advisory Board have been made in the Sri Lankan Act, the powers of the 
Board with regard to the review of orders of detention have not been provided 
in the Act itself. It is only enacted that:
[t]he Minister may make rules in relation to the hearing and 
disposal of any representations that may be made by any person 
in respect of any such order.
An order of detention under the Prevention o f Terrorism Act has been 
expressed to be non-justiciable. The Act declares that:
[a]n order [of preventive detention] made by the Minister ... 
shall be final and shall not be called into question in any court 
or tribunal by way of writ or otherwise. ^
The Sri Lankan Court’s approach to Preventive Detention
In matters arising out of preventive detention under the Prevention o f 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1979, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka 
has tended to require an objective basis for detention. Thus, in Senthilnayagam 
and Others v Seneviratne and Another, the Court proposed that the 
reasonableness of the belief of the Eecutive as to the necessity of detaining a 
person must be based on objective facts. The initial detention orders in 
Senthilnayagam had stated "terrorist activity" as the ground for detention. 
During the pendency of the detention, new orders were served on the
119 Section 13, ibid. It is only provided that the chairman and other members of the Advisory 
Board are to be appointed by the President. Under the Constitution of Malaysia, the chairmen 
of the Advisory Board must be, or have been, or qualified to be a judge of the superior courts.
120 Section 13(4), Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1979.
121 Section 11(5), ibid. Cf. Section 12(2) of the Malaysian Internal Security Act, 1960, where an 
order of detention has been made non-justiciable only after a determination on the order of 
detention has been reached after consideration of the recommendations of the Advisory Board.
122 [1981] 2 Sri L.R. 187.
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detainees which specified some facts on which the detention orders were 
based.
In the process of deciding Senthilnayagam, the Sri Lankan Supreme Court 
noted with approval the dissenting opinion of Lord Atkin in the Liversidge 
case, ^ advocating the test of reasonableness in the exercise of powers of 
detention. It also reviewed several recent decisions of the House of Lords and 
the Court of Appeal in England in which the Liversidge doctrine of non­
justiciability of the rule of subjective satisfaction was rejected. ^  On these 
bases, the Supreme Court held:
It is accepted now that expressions like - ‘has reasonable cause 
to believe’ impose an objective condition precedent of fact on 
which a person detained would be entitled to challenge the 
grounds of the executive’s honest belief. There is no unfettered 
power vested in the Minister and no unconditional authority to 
detain a person. ^
Since the initial detention orders in Senthilanayagam mentioned only "terrorist 
activity" as the ground for detention, the Court found "the detention orders ... 
invalid ab initio".126 However, at the same time, the Court found the 
subsequent orders of detention, which rectified the defects of the initial orders, 
"valid ex f a c i e " As to the question whether infirmities in detention orders 
can be overcome by fresh orders, the Sri Lankan Court quoted several 
precedents of the Indian Supreme Court to come to the following conclusion.
[I]n the instant applications the [fresh] detention orders ... rectify 
the defects in the earlier detention orders ... made by the 
Minister of Internal Security. ^ 8
12  ^Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206.
^  Ridge v Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; Reg. v I.R.C., Ex Parte Rossminster, [1980] 2 W.L.R. 1; 
Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1968] A.C. 997; Regina v Governor 
Pentonville, Ex Parte Azam, [1973] 2 W.L.R. 949.
125 Senthilanayagam, op. cit., at 208.
126 Ibid., at 205.
127 Ibid., at 206.
128 ibid., at 210.
CHAPTER II 6 9
As the decision in Senthilanayagam suggests, the approach of the Court in Sri 
Lanka, in matters of detention without trial in normal times, has been 
inconsistent, superficial and ineffective. In later Chapters, it will be seen that 
the Sri Lankan Court has decided questions of preventive detention during an 
Emergency in a similarly inconsistent way.
C. Bangladesh
The Pakistan period
Since the withdrawal of colonial authority from South Asia in 1947, 
Bangladesh passed through the intermediate state of Pakistan. In united 
Pakistan, Bangladesh formed the province of East Pakistan until 1971, when it 
became an independent state following a civil war. In the predecessor state of 
Pakistan, there were several preventive non-emergency detention statutes, in 
addition to the Defence o f Pakistan Ordinance, 1 9 6 5 ,^  which provided for 
powers of detention without trial during an Emergency. These were the 
Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1949,^^ Pakistan Public Safety
(Amendment) Act, 1 9 5 0 ,^  Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1 9 5 2 ,^  and the 
Security of Pakistan Act, 1952. ^ 33 Besides these Central statutes, there were 
also enactments which had application in the respective Provinces in Pakistan. 
Of these, the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1 9 5 8 ,^  had application 
in what is now Bangladesh.
The Pakistan Court and Preventive Detention: 
Government of East Pakistan v R. B. S. A. Khan
129 Ordinance No. XXIII of 1965.
130 Ordinance No. XIV of 1949.
131 Act No. 36 of 1950.
132 Ordinance No. VI of 1952.
133 Act No. 35 of 1952.
134 Ordinance No. LXXVIII of 1958.
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In the major decision of Government of East Pakistan v Rowshan Bijay a 
Shaukat Ali K h a n } ^  the Government of East Pakistan appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan against an order of the High Court of East 
Pakistan which had invalidated the detention order of the respondent. The 
order had been made under the provisions of the East Pakistan Public Safety 
Ordinance. There was close similarity between this Ordinance and the colonial 
Defence of India Rules 1 9 4 0 .^  Under s. 41 of the Ordinance, a police officer 
was empowered to arrest without warrant any person whom he reasonably 
suspected of activities prejudicial to public safety. An arrest under the 
Ordinance was to be reported to the Provincial Government of East Pakistan, 
and pending receipt of final orders, the arresting officer could detain a person 
for up to thirty days. Upon the passing of final orders by the Government, a 
detained person could be held in detention for up to two months. The 
Ordinance was enacted in the interregnum after the abrogation of the 1956 
Constitution of Pakistan and the adoption of the 1962 Constitution, and did 
not contain any provision for the communication of the grounds of detention 
to a detainee or provide for other safeguards.
In Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat Ali Khan, the Supreme Court discussed the general 
issues of preventive detention and the validity of the detention order under the 
East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, in terms of the constitutional safeguards 
as to arrest and detention. Among the safeguards to preventive detention 
under the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan were the requirement that the 
grounds of detention be communicated to the detainee. This was not 
provided for in the Ordinance. The detainee in this case was not supplied with 
any grounds for detention until five days after the event. In his leading 
judgement, S.A. Rahman J. observed that:
[t]he determination of grounds had to precede the order of 
detention and ex hypothesi no such determination had taken 
place before the Government had applied its mind to the report 
of the [Police] Inspector. This would ... be sufficient to invalidate
135 [1966] P.L.D. (S.C.) 286.
See the observations of SA . Rahman J. in Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat Ali Khan, op. cit., 311-
312.
13  ^ Para 2, Fundamental Rights, "Safeguards as to arrest and detention", Constitution of 
Pakistan, 1962.
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the first arrest and detention in custody, in the circumstances of 
this case.1*^
The appellant, the Government of East Pakistan claimed that the subsequent 
order was independent of the previous detention. This contention was not 
acceptable to the Court.
[T]here is a substantial distinction between a fresh order of 
detention and one extending a previous illegal order of 
detention ... On the face of it the order of detention [in question] 
purports merely to extend the previous detention which has 
been found to be illegal and consequently the subsequent order 
of detention must also be held to be vitiated. The detaining 
authority must be held bound by its own expressly avowed 
purpose in passing the order. ^ 9
The appellant also relied on British war-time decisions on preventive 
detention ^  [n SUpp0rt of the claim that grounds of detention communicated 
to the detainee in the case were not exceptionable. In this regard, it was 
pointed out by the Court:
We are here dealing with peace-time legislation and though 
questions of the security of the State or public order may involve 
at times, considerations of a confidential character and of the 
greatest urgency, yet it would be difficult to uphold a 
construction which jeopardises the precious right of personal 
liberty of a citizen during peace-time on the mere ipse dixit of a 
police officer.
The appeal was dismissed by majority opinion. ^ 2  One of the majority, 
Hamoodur Rahman J. (as he was then), further found the relevant provisions 
in the Ordinance permitting arrest and detention without the constitutional 
safeguards to be void.
138 Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat Ali Khan, op. cit., at 313.
139 Ibid., at 316, per S A.. Rahman, J. Cf. Senthilnayagam and Others v Seneviratne and Another, 
[1981] 2 Sri L.R. 187.
140 Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206; Greene v Secretary of State for Home Affairs, [1942] 
A.C. 284.
141 Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat Ali Khan, op. cit., at 312.
^  Cornelius, C.J. dissenting.
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The 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh
At adoption in 1972, the Constitution of Bangladesh did not provide for 
powers of preventive detention. The non-inclusion of these powers was not 
deliberate but a case of omission by m istake.^  However, despite the absence 
of powers of detention without trial in the unamended Constitution of 
Bangladesh, preventive detention laws of the predecessor state of Pakistan like 
the Security of Pakistan Act, 1 9 5 2 ,^  and the East Pakistan Public Safety 
Ordinance, 1 9 5 8 ,^  were continued in the new state of Bangladesh by Article
149 of the C onstitu tion .^  in addition, the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special 
Tribunals) Order 1972, a pre-Constitution executive ordinance, ^  continued 
by the Constitution,^ provided for summary detention of persons suspected 
of collaborating with the Pakistani government during the civil w a r .^
Provisions for preventive detention were introduced in the Constitution of 
Bangladesh by the Constitution (Second Amendment) A c t passed within a 
year of the adoption of the Constitution. ^  During debate in Parliament on
143 See Moudud Ahmed, Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Dhaka, University Press Ltd., 1983, 
at 103.
i / | / |
Act No. 35 of 1952, referred to as the Security Act, 1952, by convention.
^  East Pakistan Ordinance No. LXXVIII of 1958, referred to variously as the Public Safety 
Ordinance, 1958, or the Bangladesh Public Safety Ordinance, 1958.
* Article 149, Constitution of Bangladesh:
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution all existing laws shall continue to 
have effect but may be amended or repealed by law made under this 
Constitution.
^  President’s Order No. 8 of 1972. The Collaborators Order was repealed in 1975 by a decree 
of the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator, the Second Proclamation Order No. Ill, 
1975, reproduced in Appendix X, Constitution of Bangladesh.
148 Article 47 and First Schedule, Constitution of Bangladesh.
^  For a court decision on the Collaborators Order, see Maimunnessa v The State, (1974) 26 
D.L.R. 241.
150 j k e Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, Act No. 24 of 1973.
^  The Constitution was adopted on November 4, 1972, and the Second Amendment was 
passed on September 22, 1973.
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the Bill for this Amendment, there was some resistance to the introduction of 
preventive detention powers in the Constitution. It was pointed out by 
Opposition in Parliament that in the past the Pakistani government had used 
preventive detention powers to stifle political opposition, and it was 
apprehended that the same will be done in Bangladesh if the Constitution 
sanctioned such powers. ^  The provisions for preventive detention were 
justified, on behalf of the ruling government, on the basis that democratic
1 C-3
countries provide for similar powers either in express form or impliedly.
Under the Constitution of Bangladesh, as amended, preventive detention is 
authorized for an initial period of six months. ^  The detainee is to be 
furnished with the grounds of detention "as soon as may be", subject to the 
claim of the State that the disclosure of facts would be "against the public 
interest to disclose". ^  The Constitution provides for an Advisory Board for 
considering representations by the detainees. Of the three members of the 
Board, two must be, or have been, or qualified to be Judges of the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh. No detention can continue for a period exceeding six 
months, unless the Advisory Board reports its "opinion" on the matter. ^
The Special Powers Act 1974
The Special Powers Act, 1 9 7 4 ,^  was passed by the Bangladesh Parliament 
soon after the Second Amendment to the Constitution. By section 3(1) of the 
Act:
[t]he Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person 
that with a view to preventing him from doing any prejudicial act
^  Debates of the Parliament of Bangladesh, Vol III, 1973 (Third Session), Dacca, 
Government Printing Press, 1973, at 175 (Translated).
153 Ibid., at 177.
Article 33(4), Constitution of Bangladesh.
155 Article 33(5), ibid.
156 Article 33(4), ibid.
1 5 7
Act No. 14 of 1974. The Act has been amended over the years.
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it is necessary to do so , make an order ... directing that such 
person be detained ....
Some of the constitutional provisions relating to the communication of 
grounds of detention to a detainee and the powers of the Advisory Board have 
been made more specific in the Act. A person who has been served with a 
detention order must be informed of the allegations against him within fifteen 
days.^^ The Special Powers Act provides for reference, by the Government, to 
the Advisory Board of detention orders and related information within one 
hundred and twenty days of the d e te n tio n s .^  The Advisory Board is enjoined 
to submit its report to the Government within one hundred and seventy days 
"from the date of detention". ^ 0  The report of the Advisory Board is not just 
advisory, for if the Board reports that the detention of a particular person is 
unjustified, the Government must revoke the detention order.i0 i In case of 
continuation of detention beyond the initial six months, the Advisory Board is 
to review the detention every six months.^ 2
The attitude of the judiciary
In deciding cases on preventive detention, the Court in Bangladesh continued 
the jurisprudence of the predecessor Supreme Court of Pakistan in this regard. 
The decision in Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat Ali Khan discussed above, and several 
other precedents of the Supreme Court of P a k is ta n ^  under the emergency 
Defence o f Pakistan Ordinance, 1965,^^ assisted the Court in Bangladesh to 
lay the framework of a jurisprudence of legality in the early years of its 
operation. Two early decisions of the High Court Division have been
158 Section 8(2), ibid.
Section 10, ibid.
160 Section 11, ibid.
161 Section 12(1), ibid.
162 Section 12(1).
^  Ghulam Jilani v Government of West Pakistan, (1967) 19 D.L.R. (S.C.) 403; Abdul Baqi 
Baluch v Government of Pakistan, (1968) 20 D.L.R. (S.C.) 249; Government of West Pakistan v 
AA..K.S. Kashmiri, (1969) 21 D.L.R. (S.C.) 1.
164 Ordinance No. XXIII of 1965.
CHAPTER II 75
significant in this regard. ^  Both of these cases involved detention under the 
East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1 9 5 8 ,^  which after Bangladesh’s 
Independence, continued to be used for preventive detention.
In Tafur Uddin v The S t a t e d  the applicant, who was initially arrested on 
suspicion of criminal activities, was afterwards served with a detention order 
under the East Pakistan Public Safety Ordinance, 1958. The Court found that 
the successive orders of detention passed while the applicant was incarcerated 
were not based on fresh materials and there was no reasonable satisfaction as 
to the need for detention. With regard to the reasonableness of satisfaction of 
the detaining authority and the justiciability of a detention order, Justice 
F.K.M.A. Munim, later Chief Justice, observed that:
[i]f ... an order of detention is challenged as illegal, mala fide or 
without any basis, the authority who has passed the order must 
produce before the court the materials which led to the 
satisfaction necessary for exercising the power of detaining a 
person. It will be the duty of the Court to examine such 
materials upon which the grounds are based and see whether the 
detaining authority could, upon such materials, be reasonably 
satisfied. ^ 8
The major case on preventive detention to come before the High Court 
Division of Bangladesh, after the entrenchment of preventive detention 
powers in the Constitution, and soon after the passing of the Special Powers 
Act, 1974, was Aruna Sen v Government of Bangladesh}^ In Aruna Sen, the 
Court discussed some comparative decisional law on preventive detention, 
preferring the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, rather than the
^  Tafur Uddin v The State, (1975) 27 D.L.R.18 , and Habibur Rahman v Government of 
Bangladesh, (1974) 26 D.L.R. 201. The same principles that had guided the Court in Tafur 
Uddin were reiterated in Habibur Rahman decided very soon thereafter.
^  Ordinance No. LXXVIII of 1958. The Ordinance was continued under the provisions of the 
Constitution with some cosmetic changes principally in the nomenclature.
167 (1975) 27 D.L.R. 18.
1681bid at 24.
169 (1975) 27 D.L.R. 122.
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case-law from India. ^  Applying the precedents, the High Court Division 
concluded that:
under the settled principles of law ... any person charged with 
the authority of taking decisions affecting the rights and liberties 
of the citizens ... has the corresponding duty of acting judicially 
... [T]he superior courts have the power to see whether the said 
person has conformed to the judicial norms applicable to the 
case.^1
From these general premises, the Court co-related its judicial power under the 
Constitution of Bangladesh to the requirement of an objective basis for the 
deprivation of personal liberty by way of detention without trial.
[T]he constitutional obligation imposed upon the High 
Court Division under Article 102(2)(b) of the 
Constitution ... is clearly to make an objective assessment 
of the materials on which the necessary satisfaction of the 
detaining authority has been based and to be satisfied 
that an average prudent man could reasonably be so 
satisfied. ^
Referring to the procedural rights of the detainees under the Special Powers 
Act, 1974, the Court in a subsequent decision pointed out that:
[tjhese statutory rights ... which give expression to the 
fundamental rights of the citizen, cannot be defeated or 
reduced to [a] meaningless [facade] ... by the 
communication of [vague and indefinite] grounds ....
[which would preclude the detainee from getting] any 
reasonable opportunity of making ... effective 
representation against his detention order. ^
^  See F.K.MA. Munim, Rights of the Citizen under the Constitution and Law, Dacca, 
Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs, 1975, at 337:
[T]he Supreme Court [of Bangladesh] did not, as it might well have done, 
reproduce the prepositions of the Indian Supreme Court in several decisions ...
[I]t rather preferred to accept the principles stated by the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan ... which set admirable examples of judicial statesmanship, particularly 
in a regime which could by no means be called democratic.
171 Aruna Sen, op. cit., at 147.
172 Ibid., emphasis added.
^  Humayun Kabir v The State (1976) 28 D.L.R. 259, at 276.
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In the same decision, the Court stressed that:
[t]he right given to the detainee to make representation 
makes [it] all the more necessary to make detention 
order on reasonable and valid grounds [that would be] 
sufficient to satisfy the judicial conscience. ^
In Abdul Latif Mirza v Government o f Bangladesh,^ the appellant before the 
Court was detained under the Special Powers Act, 1974, on political grounds. 
The detention was continued for several years by successive detention orders, 
although the political situation in the country had changed in the meantime 
and the initial grounds of detention were not subsequently valid. In allowing 
the appeal, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court emphasized the 
judicial power under the Constitution to examine the legality of action of the 
detaining authority, notwithstanding any provision of the detaining statute to 
the contrary.
The Special Powers Act standing by itself emphasises that the 
opinion of the detaining authority to act is purely subjective, but 
the Constitution has given a mandate to the High Court to 
satisfy itself, as a judicial authority, that the detention is a lawful 
detention.
These decisions indicate that the Bangladesh Court has consistently demanded 
that there must be an objective basis for detention without trial. This contrasts 
to judicial sanctioning of preventive detention on the subjective satisfaction of 
the Executive in Malaysia, and the inconsistent approach of the Sri Lankan 
Court on this matter. It will be seen in later Chapters that the approach of the 
Court in Bangladesh with regard to questions of the rights of the citizens vis-a- 
vis preventive detention powers during normal times was continued during 
periods of Emergency.
^  Ibid., at 279, emphasis added.
175 (1979) 31 D.L.R. (A.D.) 1.
176 Ibid., at 9.
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The most widespread use of powers of detention without trial occurs during 
periods of Emergency. A Proclamation of Emergency, under each of the 
Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, enables the 
promulgation of special executive decrees and legislative enactments, 
providing not only for preventive detention, but also other extraordinary 
powers encroaching on almost all aspects of the constitutional rights of 
citizens. Since by a Proclamation of Emergency under the Constitutions of 
these countries the Executive and the Legislature are freed from the 
restrictions by way of the constitutional rights, even the slender constitutional 
safeguards as to preventive detention are liable to be removed. 1 Before 
discussing these dimensions of preventive detention during an Emergency, it is 
necessary to examine the nature and operation of emergency powers under the 
Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.
The framework of constitutional emergency powers under the Constitutions of 
the three countries is presented in this Chapter and the next. The issues 
examined in these two Chapters are the doctrinal basis of emergency powers 
in the colonial period, the constitutional provisions enabling resort to 
emergency powers in the post-colonial phase, the consequences of a 
Proclamation of Emergency, the question of legislative control over executive 
emergency powers, and the revocation of a state of emergency. Chapter V 
then takes up the provisions of emergency laws relating to preventive 
detention and other derogations from constitutional rights, the use of these 
laws, and the Court’s role in regard to some of the basic issues of suspension of 
rights.
Constitutional and Statutory Emergency Powers
Legislation which confers emergency powers on the executive may be enacted 
as a temporary measure intended to deal with a specific crisis. The special 
defence legislation enacted by the British Parliament during the two World
* This occurs as a result of the suspension, during an Emergency, of the constitutional 
safeguards relating to preventive detention. See Chapter V, infra.
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Wars provides an example of this type of legislation. Emergency legislation
may also be passed in the form of a permanent statute, authorising the
executive to assume special powers in order to cope with a special class of
2crisis situation. Thus in Britain, for instance, the Emergency Powers A ct, 1920, 
as amended by the Emergency Powers A ct, 1964,^ empowers the Executive to 
proclaim an emergency in situations of serious social or economic conflict.^-
The British Emergency Powers Acts  have their counterpart in Northern 
Ireland:^ the Emergency Powers A ct (N.I.) ,  1926,^ as amended by the 
Emergency Powers (Amendment) A ct (TV ./.), 1964.^ In addition to these Acts, 
emergency powers to combat terrorism in Northern Ireland are available
o
under the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, and the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) A ct, 1984.^ The British
2 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 55.
3 c. 38.
^ For a review of the provisions of the Emergency Powers Act, 1920 and 1964, and the use of the 
powers available under the Acts, see G.S. Morris, 77ie Emergency Powers Act 1920, [1979] Public 
Law 317.
The Canadian War Measures Act, first enacted in 1914, is another example of a permanent 
statute which authorises the Executive to declare an Emergency.
Since its promulgation in 1947, the Public Security Ordinance of Sri Lanka has been a permanent 
emergency statute like the British Emergency Powers Act, 1920, and the Canadian War Measures 
Act. The Ordinance was continued by the Independence (1948) and the 1972 Constitution. The 
1978 Constitution entrenched the Public Security Ordinance and elaborated major provisions of 
the Ordinance, relating to its applicability and parliamentary control. Under the present 
constitutional framework therefore, Emergency in Sri Lanka is no longer a statutory norm.
3 See David Bonner, Emergency Powers in Peacetime, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1985, at 13, n. 
41:
In substance, there is no real difference between the Northern Ireland 
legislation and its mainland counterpart. However, the proclamation of 
emergency continues in force, without time limit or periodic Parliamentary 
scrutiny, until revoked by the Secretary of State ....
6 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 8.
7 C. 34.
8 C. 5.
 ^C. 8. For a discussion on the provisions of these Acts see David Bonner, op. cit., Chapter 3.
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Emergency Powers Act, 1920 has been a model for emergency statutes in some 
of the Australian States. ^
When compared to the temporary emergency legislation, such as was enacted 
in wartime Britain, the permanent enabling statutes reveal one distinctive 
feature. Where the power to proclaim an Emergency has been conferred on 
the Executive, it is not Parliament which determines the actual existence of the 
factual circumstances which justify the assumption of special powers. The 
initiative for identifying a given crisis as an Emergency has been surrendered to 
the Executive. In consequence various safeguards have been devised to 
prevent the abuse of this delegated power, the most important of which is the 
requirement that a declaration of emergency and, in most instances, the 
specific measures taken under it, be subjected to parliamentary control.
In the absence of constitutional limitations on the exercise of legislative power, 
the Courts cannot question the competence of Parliament to enact emergency 
legislation; hence the judicial review of executive action taken under 
emergency powers is confined to ascertaining the scope of the power conferred 
by the enabling legislation.* 11 Thus the judicial control of emergency power is 
not, in essence, an issue of constitutional law, but rather a matter of statutory 
interpretation.12
"The Victorian Public Safety Preservation Act, 1958, for instance, is largely patterned on the 
1920 United Kingdom Act." - H.P. Lee, Emergency Powers, Australia, Law Book Company, 
1984, at 130. Other similar statutes in Australia include the Emergency Powers Act, 1949 
(N.S.W.), the Emergency Powers Act, 1974 (SA.). "The Commonwealth does not have a 
comprehensive ‘umbrella-type’ emergency powers legislation." - H.P. Lee, op. cit., at 166.
11 During the continuance of the (1948) Independence Constitution of Sri Lanka, the authority 
of the Governor-General to promulgate emergency regulations under the Public Security 
Ordinance, 1947, and to delegate powers of detention under those regulations to the Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Defence, was challenged in S. Weerasinghe v G. V. P. Samarasinghe, 
(1966) 68 N.L.R. 361, as being ultra vires the Constitution. It was contended in Weerasinghe that 
under s. 45 of the Constitution, the Governor-General had only executive functions, not 
"legislative" function like the making of emergency regulations. The Supreme Court held that:
it is perfectly constitutional for the Governor-General to make Emergency 
Regulations when he is empowered to do so by an Act of Parliament, [i.e. the 
Public Security Ordinance, which under the provisions of the Independence 
Constitution, was to be deemed to be a law passed by Parliament] for such a 
power does not conflict with the exercise of his executive power.
Ibid., at 366.
12 In Chapters IV and V it will be observed that despite the elaborate scheme of constitutional 
emergency powers and the articulated restrictions, the Courts in Malaysia and Sri Lanka have
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Emergency Powers in the Colonial Period
In the colonial era, the entrenchment of explicit emergency powers in 
constitutional documents provided a convenient solution to the doctrinal 
inconsistency between the notions of local representative government 
patterned on the British model, and the needs of centralised imperial control. 
Thus the statutory instruments which structured the system of government in 
British colonial territories regularly linked the establishment of representative 
institutions with the reservation of special "emergency" powers to the 
Representative of the Crown. ^
A. Malaysia
The governing instrument of Malaysia prior to Independence in 1957 was the 
Federation o f Malaya Order in Council, 1948.^ The Federation comprised of 
the Malay S tates^ and the "Settlements".^ The Order was based on the 
Federation o f Malaya Agreement of 1948 between the Crown and the Rulers of 
the nine Malay States jointly, and upon a series of State Agreements between 
the Crown and the Rulers individually. Under the Federation of Malaya Order, 
the executive authority of the Federation was vested in the High 
Commissioner.
continued to employ rules of interpretation with regard to the use of emergency powers which 
are more suited to a statute than to a Constitution.
13 A comparable situation is brought about, for instance, in Britain under the Emergency Powers 
Act, 1920, or in Canada under the War Measures Act. Both statutes contemplate the assumption 
of extraordinary executive power, contingent upon a formal declaration as required under the 
respective statutes. Although with respect to both enactments, provision is made for 
(subsequent) parliamentary control, the invocation of the special powers is a matter solely for 
the Executive.
14 Federation of Malaya Order in Council, 1948, G.N. 5 of 1948 promulgated by the British 
Crown.
^  These were the nine "protected" Malay Sultanates: Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Selangor, Negri 
Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, Perlis and Trengannu.
^  The "Settlements" of Malacca and Penang, which, together with Singapore and other British 
possessions in South-East Asia, previously formed the Straits Settlements.
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The Emergency Regulations Ordinance, 1948,^ enacted by the High 
Commissioner,^ under the Federation of Malaya Order in Council, 1948, 
provided:
The High Commissioner in Council, whenever it appears to him 
that an occasion of emergency or public danger has arisen, or 
that any action has been taken or is immediately threatened by 
any persons or body of persons of such a nature or on so 
extensive a scale as to be calculated, by interfering with the 
supply and distribution of food, water, fuel or light, or with the 
means of locomotion, to deprive the community, or any 
substantial portion of the community, of the essentials of life, 
may, by proclamation, declare that a state of emergency exists.
A Proclamation of Emergency could be made for the whole or any part of the
Federation, and the Proclamation was to remain in force either for a specified
period or until revoked by the High Commissioner in Council. During the
continuance of Emergency, the High Commissioner could make "any
regulations whatsoever" which were considered desirable by him "in the public
interest".^ The powers of the High Commissioner to make Emergency
Regulations included the powers to make Regulations for "arrest, detention,
22exclusion and deportation".
B. Sri Lanka
The 1931 Order-in-Council
12 Ordinance No. 10 of 1948, Malayan Union and Federal Ordinances of 1948, 211-216.
^  The exact source of legislative power for enacting this Ordinance is not specified. The 
Ordinance was expressed to be "enacted by the High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya 
and Their Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States with the advice and consent of the 
Legislative Council...".
^  Section 3(1), Emergency Regulations Ordinance, 1948.
20 Section 3(2), ibid.
21 Section 4(1), ibid.
22 Section 4(2)(b), ibid.
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The colonial Governor of Ceylon/Sri Lanka under the Ceylon (State Council) 
Order in Council, 1931,^ had certain reserve pow ers.^ Special legislative 
powers were accorded to the Governor in matters of "paramount importance 
to the public interest, or [in matters which were] essential to give effect to any 
of the provisions of ... [the Order in Council]".^ In respect of these matters 
the Governor could declare Bills or other legislative instruments passed by the 
State Council, notwithstanding any provisions of the Order in Council itself.^
The emergency powers of the Governor were pervasive. It was provided in the 
Order that:
whenever the Governor shall consider that a state of emergency 
has arisen or is imminent, whether from the danger of enemy 
action or of civil disorder, or from any grave cause, he may by 
Proclamation assume control of any Government department 
and issue such orders to that department as he may see f i t ... 7^
23 This Order in Council is popularly referred to as the Donoughmore Constitution after the 
Earl of Donoughmore who headed the "Special Commission on the Constitution of Ceylon"' that 
recommended the provisions of the 1931 Order in Council. The Donoughmore Constitution 
preceded the 1946 Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council which, with suitable amendments was 
adopted as the Independence Constitution in 1948.
Under the Donoughmore Constitution, the State Council of Ceylon was concerned with 
Administration as well as Legislation. The Council sat in Executive and Legislative Sessions. The 
Council was constituted with 65 elected members, 3 ex-officio and 12 (maximum) members. 
There were a number of Executive Committees in the Council, in charge of the various heads of 
administration. The Board of Ministers was formed with the Chairmen of the Executive 
Committees and three Officers of State.
^  In its Report, the Donoughmore Commission rationalised its proposals for reserve powers 
for the Governor in this way:
[Wjith every transference of responsibility to representative organs the 
Governor must be given additional reserve powers as will enable him to see 
that this responsibility is not wrongly exercised.
Ceylon: Report of the Special Commission on the Constitution, London, Stationery Office,
1928, at 72.
The Report characterised the functions of the Governor as being, "in general ... negative rather 
than positive". (Ibid., at 78).
2^ Section 22(1), Ceylon (State Council) Order in Council, 1931.
26 Section 22(l)(b), ibid.
^  Section 49(1), ibid.
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By a Declaration in 1943, the British government pledged internal self- 
government in Ceylon.^ The Constitutional Commission^ appointed by the 
British Government in 1943 to draw up proposals for a new Constitution for 
Ceylon along the lines of self-government recommended the reservation of 
emergency powers to the Crown. After proposing the exercise of ordinance­
making power in matters relating to Defence by the Governor-General,^ the 
Commission said:
We refer to the emergency of war or a grave national emergency 
in which normal constitutional machinery has either broken 
down or become ineffective. In order to deal with either of these 
contingencies it may be necessary for His Majesty in Council to 
legislate by Order in Council. We recommend, therefore, that 
this power be reserved to His Majesty in Council and that an 
express provision to this effect be inserted in the Constitution.^
The 1946 Order-in-Council and the 1947 Public Security Ordinance
The recommendations of the Soulbury Commission relating to the reservation 
of defence, external affairs, emergency powers and constitutional amendments
28 See Chapter I, supra.
29 The Soulbury Commission., see Chapter I.
30 The proposal of the Soulbury Commission relating to the ordinance-making power of the 
Governor-General was omitted in the Ceylon Constitution Order in Council, 1946, in accordance 
with the suggestion of the Board of Ministers of Ceylon. Instead the Crown was given the power 
to legislate with respect to defence and external affairs by order in council.
Although the power to legislate by Order in Council in respect of these matters 
was retained, this power was quite a different matter from the Governor’s 
powers of enactment, for the former was a distant power wielded after 
considerable delay by a burdened institution, while the latter was a power 
readily exercisable and close at hand.
(S. Namasivayam, The Legislatures of Ceylon: 1928-1948, London, Faber & Faber Ltd., 1950, at 
130).
The change from "Governor" to "Governor-General" was in accordance of the Ceylonese Board 
of Ministers. See Report, infra, at 93 and Appendix I.
31 See Ceylon: Report of the Commission on Constitutional Reform, London, Stationery 
Office, 1945, at 93.
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in the proposed Constitution of Ceylon, to the British Crowir^ were inserted 
as Section 30 of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council, 1946. Before the 
coming into force of s. 30 of this Order in C o u n c i l the Public Security 
Ordinance, 1947,^ empowering the Governor of Ceylon to promulgate 
Emergency Regulations, was "enacted by the Governor of Ceylon, with the aid 
and advice of the State Council". This Ordinance was continued by the 
Independence (1948) Constitution of Ceylon/Sri Lanka, the 1972 Republican 
Constitution and the present (1978) Constitution of Sri Lanka.
The reserve powers of the British Crown, relating to emergency powers, 
defence and external affairs in the 1946 Order in Council were in operation for 
only three months between the time of coming into operation of these 
provisions and Ceylon’s Independence.^
C. Bangladesh
The last governing instrument of colonial mainland South Asia, of which 
Bangladesh was a part, was the Government of India Act, 1935.*^ This Act was 
designed to transform the British Empire of India into a Dominion with 
responsible government. But consistent with the colonial tradition of reserving 
special emergency powers to the Representative of the Crown, certain 
discretionary powers, including the power to proclaim a state of emergency, 
were reserved for the Governor-General of British India. The incorporation of 
the notion of a formal state of emergency was primarily motivated by the 
federal structure of the system of government. The principal object of the 
emergency provisions was to subordinate, in times of crisis, the legislative and 
executive competence of the provinces to that of the federal government.
^  See Report, op. cit., at 90-91 and at 93-95.
w Part III of the Order in Council, 1946, which included Section 30 came into force in July, 1947, 
while Parts I, IV and IX became operative in May, 1946. Parts II, V, VI and VII came into 
operation in September, 1947. See Sir Ivor Jennings, The Constitution of Ceylon, London, 
Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 1953, at 161.
^  Ordinance No. XXV of 1947; date of commencement June 16, 1947.
35 Section 30 was revoked by s. 4 of the Ceylon Independence Order, 1947.
^  Government of India Act, 1935, 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8, c. 2 (2-8-1935).
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Under the Government of India Act the Governor-General was authorised, at
his discretion, to issue a Proclamation that "a grave emergency exists whereby
M 37the security of India is threatened, whether by war or internal disturbance".
As a direct legal consequence of such a Proclamation the federal legislature 
acquired the power to legislate with respect to any matter, even if it was a 
subject otherwise falling within exclusive provincial legislative competence.
Emergency as a Constitutional Norm in the Post-Colonial State
Both the Independence Constitution of Malaysia, and the Constitution of 
Bangladesh entrench emergency powers which in many respects are modelled 
on similar provisions in the colonial governing instruments discussed in the 
previous section.^ In Sri Lanka, the pre-Independence Public Security 
Ordinance, 1947,^ has been continued as an "Act of Parliament" by the 
Constitution of 1972 and by the present (1978) Constitution/**
A. Malaysia
The Constitutional Commission^ which drew up proposals for the 
Independence Constitution of Malaysia was of the opinion that:
37 Section 102 (1) Ibid.
3  ^ The Governor-General had also extensive powers of intervention at either the federal or 
provincial level where he "is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government cannot 
be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Act". (Section 45, Government of India 
Act, 1935).
3  ^ Part XI, Constitution of Malaysia; Part IXA, Constitution of Bangladesh. In the case of 
Bangladesh, the "intermediate" State of Pakistan, had similar emergency powers under the 
Constitutions of 1956 and 1962.
40 Ordinance No. XXV of 1947.
4  ^ Section 134, Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972; Article 155(1), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978. 
Article 155(1) provides:
The Public Security Ordinance as amended and in force immediately prior to 
the commencement of the Constitution shall be deemed to be a law enacted by 
Parliament.
47 See Chapter I for the constitution of this Commission.
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[n]either the existence of fundamental rights nor the division of 
powers between the Federation and the States ought to be 
permitted to imperil the safety of the State or the preservation 
of a democratic way of life .^
The Commission recommended that the proposed Constitution should 
authorize the use of emergency powers in situations:
such as war, or internal disturbance, which constitute an 
immediate threat to the security or economic life of the country 
or any part of i t ...
In addition to emergency powers, it was proposed that the Constitution of 
Malaysia also grant certain other special powers to Parliament to deal with 
"subversion" and other related activities.^ These non-emergency special 
powers were to enable Parliament to enact legislation during normal times in 
derogation of the guaranteed rights in the Constitution. No proclamation of 
emergency would be necessary for recourse to the proposed special powers; 
instead Parliament would be authorized to make a declaration that 
extraordinary legislative measures are required to deal with serious situations. 
The recommendations of the Constitutional Commission with respect to these 
provisions were not unanimous. One of the Commissioners, Justice Abdul 
Hamid of the High Court of West Pakistan in Pakistan disagreed with these 
proposals. Justice Hamid’s note of dissent in this regard also touched upon the 
scheme of entrenched emergency powers generally. He pointed out that:
no request has been made from any quarter for inserting a part 
relating to Emergency provisions of this nature in the 
Constitution and no constitution of the Commonwealth 
countries except India and Pakistan has a chapter of this kind. In 
other countries where the constitution is bare of fundamental 
guarantees ... if a serious situation arises for which ordinary law 
of the land is found to be inadequate special legislation for the 
suppression of those extraordinary conditions is enacted by 
Parliament. As this Constitution contains constitutional
^  Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1957, London, Stationery 
Office, 1957, at 74.
44 Report, op. cit., at 75.
^  Adopted as Article 149, Constitution of Malaysia, see Appendix I.
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guarantees ordinary legislation in contravention of those 
guarantees would no doubt be ultra vires. But the object can be 
achieved if power is conferred on Parliament by engrafting 
exceptions to the relevant guarantees. ... Under that device it 
would not be necessary to have an Emergency Part in the 
Constitution at a ll.^
With reference specifically to the proposed special powers of legislation in 
non-emergency times to suppress "subversion" and related problems, Justice 
Hamid felt that it would be:
unsafe to leave in the hands of Parliament power to suspend 
constitutional guarantees only by making a recital in the 
Preamble [of the special Act] that conditions in the country are 
beyond the reach of the ordinary law .^
The proposals of the Constitutional Commission, with regard to emergency 
powers of the State, were adopted almost entirely by Malaysia’s Independence 
Constitution. The provisions of the original Constitution have, however, been 
amended several times since Independence to give more extensive emergency 
powers to the executive and the legislature. These powers will be discussed in 
the next three sections of this Chapter, together with similar powers available 
under the Constitutions of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
B. Sri Lanka
The present Constitution of Sri Lanka, in addition to entrenching the Public 
Security Ordinance, 1947, in the Constitution,^ has added other provisions 
relating to the operation of an Emergency and action during the pendency of 
it. These will be discussed below along with similar provisions in the 
Constitutions of Malaysia and Bangladesh.
C. Bangladesh
4A
Report, op. cit., at 103-104.
47 Ibid.
48 Article 155(1), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
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At adoption in 1972, the Constitution of Bangladesh did not provide for 
entrenched emergency powers like those of the Constitution of Malaysia. The 
State was not, however, without the possession of extraordinary powers. The 
ultima ratio of the nascent Bangladeshi nation was expressed in the "Defence 
Power" under the Constitution. Articles 63(2) and (3) of the original 
Constitution provided:
(2) In case of actual or imminent invasion of Bangladesh by 
land, sea or air, the President may take whatever steps he 
considers necessary for the protection and defence of 
Bangladesh, and Parliament if not sitting shall be summoned 
forthwith.
(3) Nothing in this Constitution shall invalidate any law enacted 
by Parliament which is expressed to be for the purpose of 
securing the public safety and preservation of the State in times 
of war, invasion or armed rebellion ^
Barely a year after the Constitution was adopted, elaborate emergency 
provisions, like those in the Malaysian Constitution, were inserted in the 
Constitution of Bangladesh by the Second Am endment.^ Defending the 
Second Amendment Bill, the government pointed out that:
during a state of emergency, ... fundamental rights will be 
compromised. There is no other way. The Constitutions of all 
countries have similar provisions.^ ^
It was, however, pointed out by the Opposition that the proposed emergency
• S2provisions were redundant in view of the "Defence Power" under Article 63. 
The government rebutted that the categories of emergency situations in the 
Bill were not analogous to those covered by the "Defence Power".
^  Emphasis added.
Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, Act No. 24 of 1973.
^  Debates of the Parliament of Bangladesh, Vol III, 1973 (Third Session), Dacca, Government 
Printing Press, 1973, at 175 (Translated). Emphasis added.
^  Debates, op. cit., 173-174.
Ibid., 179-180. The references here were to the expressions, "armed rebellion" in the "Defence 
Power" and "internal disturbance" in the emergency provisions which were sought to be 
introduced in the Constitution.
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The emergency powers of the amended Constitution of Bangladesh will be 
discussed in the following three sections, together with the analogous 
provisions of the Malaysian and Sri Lankan Constitutions.^
Emergency Powers and the Executive
Grounds for a Proclamation of Emergency^
In Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, a declaration of a state of emergency 
may be made on the grounds of security or economic life of the s ta te d  
"Public order" is an additional ground for a declaration of Emergency in 
Malaysia and Sri Lanka.^ The Constitution of Bangladesh specifies that the 
threat to the security or economic life of the State must be one arising out of 
"war or external aggression" or "internal disturbance".^
The Executive authority empowered to declare an Emergency
The Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) in Malaysia, and the President in Sri
CO
Lanka and Bangladesh can declare a constitutional Emergency. ° In this 
respect this kind of Emergency bears some resemblance to the permanent sub­
constitutional emergency statutes frequently encountered in Commonwealth 
countries.-^ Like such permanent emergency statutes, the constitutional
^  The issues relating to the justiciability of the power of the Executive to declare an Emergency 
will be examined critically in the next Chapter.
Article 150 (1), Constitution of Malaysia; Section 2 (1), Public Security Ordinance, 1947, Sri 
Lanka; Article 141A (1), Constitution of Bangladesh. The Sri Lankan Public Security Ordinance 
mentions the categories as "public security and the preservation of public order", and 
"maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community".
^  Article 150 (1), Constitution of Malaysia; Section 2(1), Public Security Ordinance, 1947, Sri 
Lanka. The expression "public order" was inserted in the Malaysian Constitution by Constitution 
Amendment Act, 1981, Act No. A514 of 1981, s. 15.
S7 Article 141A (1), Constitution of Bangladesh. A similar provision in the original Constitution 
of Malaysia was omitted by Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1963, Act No. 25 of 1963, s. 39(1).
^  Article 150(1), Constitution of Malaysia; Section 2(1) Public Security Ordinance, 1947, Sri 
Lanka; Article 141A(1), Constitution of Bangladesh.
^  E.g., the Canadian War Measures Act, the British Emergency Powers Act, 1920. The Sri 
Lankan Public Security Ordinance, 1947, does not strictly fall into this category since the
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emergency provisions in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are essentially 
designed to empower the Executive to react promptly to a sudden national 
crisis, without the need for intervention by the Legislature. There is, however, 
one crucial distinction. Where the emergency powers of the executive are 
derived exclusively from statute, the competence of the legislative branch to 
control the abuse of such powers extends not only to the exercise of the 
emergency powers by the Executive but also to their very existence, since the 
scope of executive power can easily be redefined by amending or repealing the 
relevant legislation. Where, however, as in these countries, the emergency 
powers are derived wholly or substantially from the Constitution, the ability of 
the Legislature to effectively control the use of the emergency power is 
seriously curtailed.^
The time at which a Proclamation may be made
The significance of the grounds which are expressly recognized by the 
Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, as justifying a 
Proclamation of Emergency, is weakened by the fact that the King or 
President (as the case may be) is authorised to issue a Proclamation before the 
actual occurrence of the circumstances constituting a threat to national life, if 
he is satisfied that there is an imminent danger of these circumstances.^ In 
Malaysia, additionally, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong can issue different 
Proclamations of Emergency on different grounds or in different 
circumstances regardless of whether a Proclamation or Proclamations are 
already in operation.*^
provisions relating to the operation of an Emergency have been substantially modified by the 
provisions of the present (1978) Constitution of Sri Lanka.
^  The implications of constitutional emergency powers of the Executive under the 
Constitutions of India and Pakistan are the same. See K.I. Omar, Emergency, Personal Liberty 
and the Courts in India and Pakistan, Unpublished LL.M. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 
Canada, 1985, at 30-31.
^  Article 150(2), Constitution of Malaysia; Section 2(1) Public Security Ordinance 1947, Sri 
Lanka; Article 141A(3), Constitution of Bangladesh.
Article 150(2A), Constitution of Malaysia. This is a new provision, introduced by the 
Constitution Amendment Act, 1981, Act No. A514 of 1981.
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Emergency Powers and the Legislature
All three Constitutions make provisions for the communication of a 
Proclamation of Emergency to the Legislature. A Proclamation of Emergency 
under the Constitutions of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh must be approved by the 
Legislature before the expiration of a specified period.^  The Constitution of 
Malaysia originally stipulated approval of a Proclamation by the Legislature, 
but since 1960, it is merely required that the Proclamation of Emergency be 
"laid before both Houses of Parliament".^ A Proclamation of Emergency 
made under the Constitution of Malaysia continues to be in operation until 
revoked or annulled by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament.^
Although the Constitution of Bangladesh stipulates parliamentary approval of 
a Proclamation of Emergency as a condition for the operation of a 
Proclamation for a period longer than one hundred and twenty days, there is 
no provision as to the effect of a parliamentary disapproval of a Proclamation. 
Thus, under the Constitution of Bangladesh, parliamentary disapproval would 
clearly not affect the operation of a Proclamation until after the expiration of 
a period of one hundred and twenty days. The Sri Lankan Constitution gives 
immediate effect to a resolution of Parliament disapproving a Proclamation.^^
A more serious problem arises in Bangladesh from the fact that, once a 
Proclamation receives the requisite parliamentary approval it can only be 
revoked by a subsequent Proclamation issued by the Executive.0 In Sri 
Lanka, a Proclamation of Emergency is in force for one month at a time and is 
renewable successively.^ An innovative feature of the present Sri Lankan
^  Article 155(6), Constitution of Sri Lanka, and Section 2 (4), Public Security Ordinance, 1947, 
inserted by Public Security (Amendment) Law, 1978, Act No. 6 of 1978 (within fourteen days); 
Article 141A (2) (c), Constitution of Bangladesh.
^  Article 150 (3), Constitution of Malaysia. Prior to the Constitution Amendment Act, 1960, Act 
10 of 1960, a Proclamation of Emergency was to be approved within two months.
^  Article 155 (10), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
^  Article 141A (2) (a),Constitution of Bangladesh.
^  Article 155(5), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978. This provision is reiterated in s. 2 of the 
Public Security Ordinance, 1947 as amended by the Public Security (Amendment) Law, 1978.
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Constitution is the inclusion of a stipulation that a two-third majority vote in 
Parliament will be required for continuance of Emergency if a Proclamation 
had already been in existence for ninety days within a six-month period.^
Legal Consequences of a Proclamation of Emergency
Legislative powers of the Executive
The Yang di-Pertuan in Malaysia has been authorised to promulgate necessary 
Emergency Ordinances if at any time during a state of emergency, the Houses 
of Parliament are not sitting concurrently.^ These executive Emergency 
Ordinances may be with respect to any matter on which Parliament has 
legislative authority and the Ordinances continue in force until revoked or 
annulled.^ *
In Sri Lanka, the President is empowered to make Emergency Regulations 
under the Public Security Ordinance, 1947. The Regulation-making power of 
the President during an Emergency can be exercised "in the interests of public 
security and the preservation of public order and the suppression of mutiny, 
riot or civil commotion, or for the maintenance of supplies and services 
essential to the life of the community".^ These Emergency Regulations have 
the legal effect of overriding, amending or suspending the operation of any 
law, but not the provisions of the Constitution.^
Although the monthly renewal of Emergency appears to be cumbersome, it had been possible in 
the past to keep a proclamation of emergency in operation for years together.
^  Article 155 (8), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
70 •Article 150 (2B), Constitution of Malaysia. The original provision which empowered the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong to promulgate ordinances only until Parliament convened after a 
Proclamation [original Article 150(2)], was amended to this effect by the Constitution 
Amendment Act, 1981, Act No. A514 of 1981. The Amendment was a reaction to the decision of 
the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor, [1979] 1 M.L.J. 50, discussed infra in 
Chapter IV.
72 Public Security Ordinance, 1947, as amended by Public Security (Amendment) Law, 1978, Act 
No. 6 of 1978.
Article 155 (2), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978. This is a little misleading, since by Article 15 
(7) of the Constitution, most of the important constitutional rights could be restricted by 
"regulations ... relating to public security".
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No specific powers are granted to the President under the Constitution of 
Bangladesh to promulgate Emergency Ordinances, although under the general 
constitutional power of Ordinance-making,^ the President can make 
Emergency Ordinances when Parliament is either dissolved or not in session 
during the operation of an Emergency
Derogations of constitutional guarantees76
Under the Constitutions of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh the Legislatures may, 
during the operation of an Emergency, enact laws and the Executive may 
undertake action, which would otherwise be inconsistent with specified 
constitutional rights. Under the Sri Lankan Constitution, the rights which may 
be derogated from are, equality, right to liberty and protection of the law, and 
the rights of speech, assembly, association, profession and movement.^ In 
Bangladesh, the Constitution permits derogations from the rights to freedom 
of speech, movement, assembly, association, profession and the right to 
property/ 0  During an Emergency, the Constitution of Malaysia permits 
derogations not only from all constitutional rights, but also from any other 
provision of the Constitution.^
In Bangladesh, the emergency power which probably has the most drastic 
impact on the lives of ordinary citizens, is the power of the President to 
suspend, by Order, the right of any person to move any court for the 
enforcement of the constitutional rights which are guaranteed by such Articles
^  Article 93, Constitution of Bangladesh.
75 The Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1974, Ordinance No. XXVII of 1974, was promulgated by 
the President under Article 93 of the Constitution of Bangladesh on the same day that 
Emergency was proclaimed on December 28, 1974.
Derogations of constitutional guarantees during an Emergency is examined in detail in 
Chapter V.
Articles 15 (1) and 15 (7), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
78 Article 141B, Constitution of Bangladesh.
7Q
Article 150 (6), Constitution of Malaysia. The original provisions in the Constitution of 
Malaysia in this regard were similar to those of the Constitutions of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 
The power was broadened by the Constitution Amendment Act, 1963, Act No. 26 of 1963.
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as may be specified in the Order.8^ The Constitution does not subject the 
exercise of this power to the control of the Parliament. It is merely required 
that the Order suspending the enforcement of constitutional rights "be laid 
before Parliament".8^
Distinctive nature of the legal consequences
The distinctive feature of the constitutional emergency provisions in Malaysia, 
Sri Lanka and Bangladesh is that the legal effect of the Proclamation with 
respect to legislative and executive competence is not expressly confined to 
matters which have any nexus to the Emergency. Nor are the legal 
consequences which arise from a Proclamation of Emergency dependent on 
the nature of the crisis, but are predefined results which directly flow from the 
Proclamation itself. In the case of Malaysia, the federal structure of the State 
is also affected by an Emergency.8^
Martial Law as Extra-Constitutional Emergency
Common Law
According to Dicey, Martial Law is the common law right of the Crown and its 
servants to deal with extraordinary situations.
Martial Law is sometimes employed as a name for the common 
law right of the Crown and its servants to repel force by force in 
the case of invasion, insurrection, riot or generally of any violent 
resistance to the law. This right or power is essential to the very
^  Article 141C (1), Constitution of Bangladesh.
81 Article 141C (3), ibid.
0 During the operation of an Emergency in Malaysia, the Federal Parliament has the power to 
legislate with respect to matters which are otherwise within the competence of the state 
legislatures - Article 150 (5), Constitution of Malaysia. In Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Government 
of Malaysia, [1986] 2 M.LJ. 238, the Privy Council held that this power could be extended to 
amendments of a State Constitution, in this case, the State Constitution of Sarawak, ibid., 243- 
244. Moreover the executive authority of the federal government is vastly enhanced, permitting 
that Government to interfere with almost all aspects of the internal administration of a state - 
Article 150(4), Constitution of Malaysia.
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existence of orderly government, and is most assuredly 
recognized in the most ample manner by the law of England.^
In this sense, Martial Law "is a state of affairs, not a settled body of rules, 
though rules and orders will be promulgated and enforced by the military 
authorities as they see fit".^
The consequences of a common law declaration of Martial Law have been 
summed up in the following way:
Martial law is the assumption by officers of the Crown of 
absolute power, exercised by military force, for the suppression 
of an insurrection, and the restoration of order and lawful 
authority...
The officers of the Crown are justified in any exertion of 
physical force, extending to the destruction of life and property 
to any extent, and in any manner that may be required for the 
purpose. They are not justified in the use of cruel and excessive 
means, but are liable civilly and criminally for such excess. They 
are not justified in inflicting punishment after resistance is 
suppressed, and after the ordinary courts can be reopened.^
Sri Lanka: the 1947 Public Security Ordinance
Under Sri Lanka’s Public Security Ordinance, 1947, the President is 
empowered to call out the armed forces in any part of Sri Lanka where the
o r
police are inadequate to deal with the maintenance of public order.
^  A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, London, Macmillan & 
Co. Ltd., 10th Ed., 1960, at 288.
^  Harry Street & Rodney Brazier (Eds), De Smith’s Constitutional and Administrative Law,
Pelican Books, 5th Ed., 1985, at 523.
^  Sir James Stephen, History of the Criminal Laws of England, New York, Burt Franklin, 
1883, Vol I, at 215, quoted in F.K.MA. Munim, Legal Aspects of Martial Law, Dhaka, 
Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs, 1989, at 35.
Stephen’s views on Martial Law were formulated in the context of excesses committed by the 
colonial Governor in dealing with black plantation workers in Jamaica, subsequent to a 
Proclamation of Martial Law in accordance with the provisions of a local Act. See Munim, 
op.cit., at 35.
^  Section 12 (1), Part III, Public Security Ordinance, 1947. Part III was added by the Public 
Security (Amendment) Act, 1959, Act No. 8 of 1959.
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Members of the armed forces so called out have powers of search and
on
a r re s t .7 The kind of emergency situation contemplated by some of the 
provisions in Part III of this Ordinance bears similarity with the common law 
doctrine of Martial Law and may thus displace i t .^
Bangladesh: Coup d’ Etat and Martial Law
The common law doctrine of Martial Law is invoked by a government in a 
"legal" constitutional order. A Martial Law of a different kind was invoked in 
several common law countries (including Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria and 
Ghana) when military personnel took over state power through a coup d ’ Etat 
and proclaimed a "state of Martial Law".^ A state of Martial Law of this kind 
was given judicial sanction in Pakistan by relying on the doctrine of 
necessity.^ The Supreme Court of Pakistan classified the Proclamation of 
Martial Law in 1977 as an "extra-constitutional measure", and as a temporary 
constitutional deviation. It was said to be justified on the principle of state 
necessity, and by reference in the circumstances to the breakdown of the 
normal constitutional machinery. Describing the situation, Chief Justice 
Anwarul Huq observed that:
[tjhere was ... a serious political crisis in the country leading to a 
breakdown of the constitutional machinery in so far as the 
executive and legislative organs of the State were concerned. A 
situation had arisen for which the Constitution provided no 
solution.^ *
Bangladesh has in the past witnessed two states of Martial Law. Both periods 
of Martial Law was initiated by coups d ’ Etat. The first was proclaimed in 1975 
and continued till 1979. The second was from 1982 to 1986. The imposition of
^  Section 12 (2), ibid.
^  See Attorney-General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd, [1920] A. C. 508. 
89 See Harry Street & Rodney Brazier, op.cit., at 524.
^  Begum Nusrat Bhutto v Chief of Army Staff, [1977] P.L.D. (S.C.) 657. 
91 Ibid., at 703.
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a state of Martial Law in 1982 was expressly sought to be justified on grounds 
of state necessity. The Proclamation of Martial Law stated that:
in the greater national interest and also in the interest of 
national security it has become necessary to place ... [the] 
country under Martial Law ...
In neither of the two instances was the Constitution abrogated as had 
previously been the custom with Martial Law regimes in the predecessor state 
of P a k is ta n i During the 1975-1979 Martial Law, the Constitution was kept 
"operative", subject to the Proclamation and other Martial Law decrees. The 
Proclamation provided that:
the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh shall, 
subject to this Proclamation and the Martial Law Regulations 
and Orders ... continue to remain in force ... P^
The 1975 Proclamation emphasised that:
[the] Proclamations and the Martial Law Regulations and 
Orders ... shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained 
in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh or in 
any law for the time being in force ....
The 1982 Proclamation fully suspended the operation of the Constitution.*^ 
Like the previous Proclamation, that of 1982 gave an overriding effect to the 
Proclamation and to all other decrees under it. Both Proclamations expressly
92 Proclamation of Martial Law, 1982, The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, March 24,1982. 
91
In united Pakistan, The Constitutions of 1956 and 1962 were abrogated in 1958 and 1968 
respectively by Martial Law regimes.
94 Proclamation, August 20, 1975, clause (e). The Proclamation is reproduced in the decision of 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in Halima Khatun v Bangladesh, 
(1978) 30 D.L.R. (S.C.) 207, at 213-214. Martial Law in 1975 was proclaimed by a civilian figure 
who assumed the office of President of Bangladesh after a coup d ’ Etat by a section of the armed 
forces. The provisions of the Constitution of Bangladesh relating to the election of the President 
were suspended by the incumbent President.
^  Ibid., clause (d).
Qz:
Proclamation of Martial Law, 1982, op. cit., clause (f). Prior to the withdrawal of this state of 
Martial Law, the Constitution was "revived" in phases. See for example, the Constitution (Partial 
Revival) (Second) Order, 1985, The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, January 15, 1985, 
selectively "reviving" some of the constitutional rights.
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forbade the Supreme Court and other courts to question the Proclamation or 
any action taken under i t .^
Under both the 1975 and 1982 Proclamations, special Martial Law tribunals 
were created, primarily for the trial and punishment of offences under Martial 
Law decrees, but also for offences under other laws.^
The states of Martial Law in Bangladesh can be categorized as incidents of 
extra-constitutional Emergency. Like the invocation of a state of emergency 
under the Constitution, a state of Martial Law is brought about by a 
Proclamation and revoked in a manner similar to the ending of a 
constitutional emergency. The Proclamation of Martial Law embodies and 
describes in legal form the extra-constitutional actions which the extraordinary 
regime seeks to justify on grounds of necessity. The challenges to Martial Law 
decrees and the justiciability of orders of Martial Law tribunals will be 
discussed in the following Chapter.
97 Proclamation of 1975, clause (g); Proclamation of 1982, clause (h).
98 Proclamation of 1975, clause (b); Proclamation of 1982, clause (c).
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EMERGENCY POWERS, THE EXECUTIVE AND THE COURT
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This Chapter examines critically the constitutional power of the Executive to 
proclaim an Emergency, the consequences of such a Proclamation and the 
Court’s role in this regard. This evaluation of the emergency powers of the 
Executive in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh provides the parameters for 
examining, in the next Chapter, the techniques of suspension of constitutional 
rights during an Emergency.
The responsibility for the declaration of an Emergency in Malaysia, Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh is expressly vested in the Executive: the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong (King) in Malaysia, and the President in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.! 
Since a limited power of control by the Legislature comes into operation only 
after the legal consequences of a Proclamation have already taken effect, the 
question as to the scope of judicial review in relation to the emergency powers 
of the Executive acquires a special significance.
The Power to Proclaim an Emergency
The Constitution of Malaysia permit the issue of a Proclamation of Emergency 
when the Yang di-Pertuan is satisfied, first, that there is a grave emergency and, 
second, that the gravity of the emergency is such as to threaten the security or 
the economic life or public order in the Federation or any part of it .2 The Yang
! Chapter III, supra.
2
Article 150 (1), Constitution of Malaysia. The clause "public order" was inserted in Article 150 
(1) by the Constitution Amendment Act, 1981, Act No. A514 of 1981.
By the Constitution Amendment Act, 1983, Act No. A566, the provisions of the Malaysian 
Constitution relating to the "satisfaction" of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in declaring an 
emergency were changed so that it was the Prime Minister who was to be "satisfied" about the 
necessity of proclaiming an emergency. The amended Article 150 (1) read:
If the Prime Minister is satisfied that a grave emergency exists ... , he shall 
advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong accordingly and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
shall then issue a Proclamation of Emergency making therein a declaration to 
that effect.
This change, together with other changes touching upon the prerogatives of the Malaysian King 
precipitated a constitutional crisis in Malaysia. The crisis was resolved when these changes were 
retracted by the Constitution Amendment Act, 1984, Act No. A584.
CHAPTER IV 101
di-Pertuan Agong is also authorized to issue multiple Proclamations of 
Emergency, at different times and on different grounds, to operate 
simultaneously. In Sri Lanka, a Proclamation may be made if the President is 
of the opinion that there is a public emergency where the interests of public 
security, public order or maintenance of supplies and services is endangered.^ 
Under the Constitution of Bangladesh, the President is empowered to make a 
Proclamation of Emergency if s/he is satisfied that a grave emergency exists, in 
which the security or economic life of the nation or any part of it is imperilled.^ 
In the Constitution of Bangladesh, the kinds of emergency which would justify a
For commentaries of events during this period, see H.F. Rawlings, The Malaysian Constitutional 
Crisis of 1983, (1986) 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 237; H.P. Lee, The 
Malaysian Constitutional Crisis: King, Rulers and Royal Assent in FA. Trindade & H.P. Lee 
(Eds), The Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives and Developments, Singapore, 
Oxford University Press, 1986, 237-261.
Interesting to note in this context are the provisions of the 1972 Constitution of Sri Lanka and 
the original Constitution of Bangladesh (before the change of the form of government from 
"parliamentary" to "presidential", by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution in 1975) when 
parliamentary forms of government existed in both countries. Article 134 (2) of the 1972 
Constitution of Sri Lanka provided:
Upon the Prime Minister advising the President of the existence or the 
imminence of a state of public emergency, the President shall declare a state of 
public emergency. The President shall act on the advice of the Prime Minister 
in all matters legally required or authorised to be done by the President in 
relation to a state of emergency.
A Proclamation of Emergency in Bangladesh previously required the counter-signature of the 
Prime Minister for its validity. [Proviso to Article 141A (1) Constitution of Bangladesh, deleted 
by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 19751.
Cf. Article 352 (3), Constitution of India, which prohibits the President from proclaiming an 
Emergency unless a decision of the Central Cabinet to this effect has been communicated to 
him in writing.
^ Article 150 (2A), Constitution of Malaysia:
The power conferred on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by this article shall 
include the power to issue different Proclamations on different grounds or in 
different circumstances, whether or not there is a Proclamation or 
Proclamations already issued by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under Clause (1) 
and such Proclamation or Proclamations are in operation.
See infra for comments on multiple proclamations of emergency.
^ Section 2 (1), Public Security Ordinance, 1947, Ordinance No. XXV of 1947.
 ^Article 141A, Constitution of Bangladesh.
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Proclamation are further specified to be crises arising from war or external 
aggression or internal disturbance
It is not, however, the factual circumstances which threaten the security or 
economic life of the nation that, by itself, bring about a state of emergency in 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, or Bangladesh. The only legal condition precedent for a 
proclamation of emergency is the satisfaction of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or 
the President in Malaysia and Bangladesh respectively, or the opinion of the 
President in Sri Lanka, as to the gravity of the threat to the security of the 
nation. There may be wars and armed insurrections but if the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong or the President is not satisfied or of the positive opinion as to the 
gravity of the threat and does not issue the requisite proclamation, there will 
be no Emergency.
On the other hand of course, even though the expressions, security or economic 
life or public order are explicit, their relevance as substantive criteria for the 
purpose of evaluating the limitations on the power of the Executive in these 
countries to proclaim an Emergency is largely negated by the fact that the 
apprehension of an imminent threat is expressly mentioned as sufficient to 
permit the issue of a Proclamation.^ Thus, even a mild disturbance may, in the 
subjective opinion of the Yang di-Pertuan or President, be reasonably 
regarded as constituting an imminent threat to the security of the state and 
justify the imposition of an emergency regime.
In Malaysia, the question had arisen as to the whether in declaring Emergency, 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acts in his personal discretion. One commentator 
has argued that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong possesses a range of prerogative 
powers, the power to proclaim an emergency being one of them.^ These views 
have, in turn, been disputed by another commentator who has forcefully
^ Article 141A (1), Constitution of Bangladesh. Similar provisions in the Malaysian Constitution 
were deleted by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1963, Act No. A26 of 1963.
7
Article 150 (2), Constitution of Malaysia, as amended; Section 2 (1), Public Security Ordinance, 
1947; Article 141A (3), Constitution of Bangladesh.
 ^R.H. Hickling, The Prerogative in Malaysia, (1975) 17 Malaya Law Review 207, at 222-223, 232. 
Hickling’s views has been influenced by the majority views of the Federal Court decision in 
Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Government of Malaysia, [1968] 1 M.L.J. 119, where the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong was held to be the sole judge of deciding whether to issue a Proclamation of 
Emergency. See infra.
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argued on the basis of constitutional and statutory principles of interpretation, 
the views of the Constitutional Commission, and precedents that the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong acts on Cabinet advice in proclaiming an Emergency.^ In Teh 
Cheng Poh v Public P r o s e c u to r the Privy Coucil sought to determine this 
controversy conclusively.
Although ... [emergency ordinance-making power] like other 
powers under the Constitution [of Malaysia], is conferred 
nominally upon the Yang di-Pertuan Agong ... and is expressed 
to be exercisable if he is satisfied of a particular matter, his 
functions are those of a constitutional monarch and except on 
certain matters ... he does not exercise any of his functions under 
the Constitution on his own initiative but is required by ... [the 
Constitution] to act in accordance with the advice of the 
Cabinet. ^
Subsequent to the Privy Council’s decision in Teh Cheng Poh, an Amendment 
to the Malaysian Constitution in 1983, substituted the satisfaction of the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong as to the necessity of proclaiming an Emergency with that of 
the Prime Minister. This Amendment was in turn superseded a year later, and 
the original provisions of the Constitution in this regard were restored. The 
sequence of events seems to suggest that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong does 
have a residual discretionary power of declaring Emergency in extraordinary 
circumstances.
Reviewability/Justiciability of a Proclamation of Emergency
Challenges to a Proclamation of Emergency or Martial Law before the Courts 
in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh have been unsuccessful. Of the three 
countries, the question of the justiciability of a Proclamation of Emergency has 
in the past arisen recurrently in Malaysia. In recent years the controversies in 
Malaysia relating to a Proclamation’s justiciability have been sought to be put
 ^ S. Jayakumar, Emergency Powers in Malaysia: Can the Yang di-Pertuan Agong Act in His 
Personal Discretion and Capacity?, (1976) 18 Malaya Law Review 149.
10 [1979] 1 M.L.J. 50.
11 Ibid., at 52.
12 See n. 2, supra.
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to rest by an Amendment to the Constitution.^ This Amendment declares 
that the satisfaction of the Yang di-Pertuan in proclaiming an emergency to be 
"final and conclusive" and not challengable "in any court on any ground".^ By 
the same Amendment, it was also declared that the Courts did not have any 
jurisdiction to determine questions relating to the continued operation of a 
Proclamation of Emergency.^
Even before this Amendment, Courts in Malaysia did not entertain challenges 
to a Proclamation of Emergency. The question of justiciability of a 
Proclamation featured prominently in the series of cases that ensured 
following the controversial dismissal of the Chief Minister of Sarawak, 
Stephen Kalong Ningkan, by the State Governor in September, 1966, and the 
Proclamation of Emergency in that State by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in the 
same month. The Governor of Sarawak had initially called upon Chief 
Minister Ningkan to resign on the dubious ground that a majority of the 
members of the State Legislature had represented to the Governor that the 
Chief Minister had lost the confidence of the House. The Chief Minister 
refused to resign, asking instead that the Governor reconvene the State 
Legislature so that the question of confidence could be constitutionally tested. 
The Governor thereupon dismissed the Chief Minister and his Cabinet. The 
Chief Minister then resorted to the Court to challenge the action of the 
Governor.
In the first of the cases, Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Tun Abang Haji Openg & 
Tam Sli (No. 2 )}^  before the High Court in Borneo, the dismissed Chief
13 Constitution Amendment Act, 1981, Act No. A514 of 1981, inserting several new provisions in 
Article 150, including Clause (8). The Amendment also provided for the making of a 
"declaration" by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong relating to the emergency. The new constitutional 
rule in the Malaysian Constitution relating to the non-justiciability of a Proclamation was a 
reaction to the Privy Council decision in Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor, [1979] 1 M.LJ. 50, 
discussed infra.
In India, a similar rule was inserted in the Constitution by the Constitution (Thirty-Eighth 
Amendment) Act, 1975, with retrospective effect, during a period of "internal" emergency (1975- 
1977). The provision was omitted by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, 
which brought about extensive changes in the emergency provisions of the Indian Constitution.
^  Article 150 (8), Constitution of Malaysia.
15
16 [1967] 1 M.LJ. 46.
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Minister sought certain declarations relating to his dismissal from office. 
Among the grounds relied upon for these declarations by the plaintiff was the 
contention that the Proclamation of Emergency in Sarawak had not been 
made bona fide but was made in fraudem legis. Chief Justice Pike referred to 
the Privy Council decision in King Emperor v Benoari Lai Sarma and others 
an appeal from British India, to hold that:
it is not open to a court to enquire into the sufficiency of the 
reasons for a declaration of emergency provided it was made 
bona fide. If, therefore, the declaration appears ex facie to have 
been made in the manner required ... and the bona fides of the 
making of the declaration is not impugned, it is not open to the 
Court to inquire into it .^
On appeal before the Federal Court of M alaysia,^ the non-justiciability of a 
Proclamation of Emergency was re-affirmed by majority. Lord President 
Barakbah decided that:
17 [1945] A.I.R. (P.C.) 48; [1945] A.C. 14.
18 Stephen Kalong Ningkan, op. cit., at 47.
In addition to Benoari Lai Sarma, the other precedents referred to by the Chief Justice were 
Bhagat Singh and others v King Emperor, [1931] A.I.R. (P.C.) I l l ;  [1931] L.R. 58 Ind. App. 169, 
another appeal from British India, and the English decisions of Regina v Governor o f Brixton 
Prison [1962] 2 Q. B. 243, and Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206. The equation of the 
"subjective satisfaction" relating to deportation and detention orders, which were the subject of 
the Court’s findings in the English cases, with the "satisfaction" of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in 
Malaysia in declaring an Emergency is erroneous.
In Benoari Lai Sarma, The Crown appealed to the Privy Council against the decision of the 
Federal Court of India which had held invalid an emergency ordinance promulgated by the 
Governor General pursuant to a Proclamation of Emergency by him under the Government of 
India Act, 1935, 26 Geo. 5 & Edw. 8, c.2. The Privy Council held that the Governor General’s 
decision was Fmal as to whether an Emergency existed and whether an ordinance issued was 
conducive to the "peace and good government of British India". Referring to Para 72 of Schedule 
IX of the Government o f India Act, 1935, under which the Governor General exercised his 
emergency ordinance-making power, the Privy Council held that the provision did not require:
the Governor General to state that there is an emergency, or what the 
emergency is, either in the text of the Ordinance or at all, and assuming that he 
acts bona fide and in accordance with his statutory powers, it cannot rest with 
the Courts to challenge his view that the emergency exists.
Ibid., at 50. Emphasis added.
^  Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Government o f Malaysia, [1968] 1 M.L.J. 119.
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the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is the sole judge and once His 
Majesty is satisfied that a state of emergency exists it is not for 
the court to enquire as to whether or not he should have been
satisfied.^
Azmi C J . (Malaya), the other majority judge, agreed with the Lord President 
that a Proclamation was non-justiciable.“  ^ Referring to the discretion of the 
Governor General of British India in proclaiming an Emergency, Azmi C.J. 
(Malaya) concluded that the same discretion should apply to the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong.  ^For the learned judge:
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in exercise of his [emergency] power 
... must be regarded as the sole judge of that [power]
In his perceptive dissenting judgem ent^ in the Federal Court stage of the 
Stephen Kalong Ningkan cases, Ong Hock Thye F.J. pointed out that the 
constitutional position of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in Malaysia was not 
comparable to that of the position of the Governor General of British India 
under the Government of India Act, 1935.^ Neither, according to Thye F.J, 
could the emergency powers of the British Indian Governor-General be 
equated to the controlled emergency powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 
For Thye F.J. therefore:
it ... [was] quite erroneous to argue by analogy from the 
Government of India Act to ...[the Malaysian] Constitution as if 
those authorities were unquestionably conclusive.-^
Justice Thye strongly asserted that the invocation of a state of emergency in 
Malaysia could be justified only on genuine circumstances.
20 Ibid., at 122.
21 Ibid., at 124.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., emphasis added.
2  ^The dissent was on the question of reviewability of a Proclamation of Emergency. The final 
conclusion reached by Thye F.J. was similar to those of the other judges, i.e. the Proclamation in 
the instant case was not in fraudem legis as alleged by the petitioner.
2  ^26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8, c. 2.
26 Ibid., at 126.
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[T]he inbuilt safeguards against indiscriminate or frivolous 
recourse to emergency legislation contained in article 150 [of the 
Constitution] provide that the emergency must be one \vhereby 
the security or economic life of the Federation or any part 
thereof is threatened.’ If those words of limitation are not 
meaningless verbiage, they must be taken to mean exactly what 
they say ... [AJrticle 150 does not confer on the cabinet an 
untrammelled discretion to cause an emergency to be declared 
at their mere whim and fancy
In the Privy Council appeal of Stephen Kalong N i n g k a n the question of the 
justiciability of a Proclamation of Emergency was left undecided. The 
importance of the issue was highlighted in the following observation of the 
Privy Council:
[The question as to the justiciability of a Proclamation of 
Emergency] is a constitutional question of far-reaching 
importance which, on the present state of authorities, remains 
unsettled and debatable.^
Since the Federal Court decision in Stephen Kalong Ningkan, Courts in 
Malaysia have continued to invoke the precedents from British India to hold
arj
that a Proclamation of Emergency was non-justiciable.
In Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, a Proclamation of Emergency or Martial Law 
has not been impugned in Court as often as it has been in Malaysia. The 
primary factor discouraging challenges to a Proclamation in Sri Lanka is the 
provision of the Public Security Ordinance, 1947^ which, like the present 
Malaysian position, makes a declaration of emergency non-justiciable. Section 
3 of the Ordinance provides that:
^  Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Government of Malaysia, [1968] 2 M.L.J. 238.
29 Ibid., at 242.
^  See for example, Public Prosecutor v Ooi Kee Saik, [1971] 2 M.L.J. 108, at 113, where the 
precedents of Bhagat Singh and Benoari Lai Sarma are cited to hold the Proclamation of 
Emergency non-justiciable.
31 Ordinance No. XXV of 1947.
CHAPTER IV 108
the fact of the existence or imminence ... of a state of public 
emergency shall not be called in question in any court.
Tnis rule was reiterated by the Supreme Court of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) in 5. 
Weerasinghe v G.VP. Samarasinghe^ where the Sri Lankan Court, like the 
Federal Court of Malaysia, described the Governor-General to be the sole 
judge as to the necessity for a declaration of emergency. Of the two conditions 
laid down by the Public Security Ordinance for the exercise of emergency 
powers by the Governor-General, the Court said:
One is ‘the existence or imminence of a state of public 
emergency’ of which the Governor-General is the sole judge’, and 
the other is that the Regulations he makes must be such as 
appear to him to be necessary or expedient.*^
Under the present Constitution of Sri Lanka, it is the President who is the sole 
judge as to the necessity of a Proclamation of Emergency. In J^4. Yasapala v 
Ranil Wickremesinghe & O t h e r s Sharvananda J., delivering the opinion of 
the Court pointed out that:
[t]he language of section 2 of the Public Security Ordinance 
shows clearly that the President is the sole judge of the existence 
or imminence of a state of Emergency and of the expediency of 
declaring by Proclamation that the provisions of Part II of the 
Ordinance shall come into operation .... The existence of a state 
of Emergency is not a ... [justiciable] matter which the Court 
could be called upon to determine by applying an objective test.
... The President is not bound as a matter of law to disclose the 
reasons for the Proclamation. Proclamation of Emergency is 
thus conclusive and is not assailable on any ground.*^
32 (1966) 68 N.L.R. 361.
33 Ibid., at 362, emphasis added.
34 Supreme Court Application No. 103 of 1980, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 1, 
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, Vol 1 (April 1979 to December 1981), Sri Lanka, 
Lake House Investments, 1984,143-163.
35 JA. Yasapala, op. cit., 154-155, emphasis added. See also Janatha Finance and Investments v 
DJ.F.D.L. Liyanage, Supreme Court Application No. 127 of 1982, reported in Fundamental 
Rights, Vol 2, Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, Vol 2 (April 1982 to December 
1982), Sri Lanka, Lake House Investments, 1984, 373-396, at 382.
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States of Emergency in Bangladesh had not been as extensive as in Malaysia 
or Sri Lanka, but the country was under states of Martial Law for a total of 
nearly ten years. During the continuance of the first state of Martial Law 
(1975-1979), the Constitution was allowed to operate subject to the 
Proclamation of Martial Law and other Martial Law decrees. In Mrs Halima 
Khatun v Bangladesh,3^ the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh described the inviolability of the Proclamation of Martial Law and 
other Martial Law decrees in the following way.
On reference to Clause (g) of the Proclamation of August 24,
1975, it is seen that no Court including the Supreme Court has 
any power to call in question in any manner whatsoever or 
declare illegal or void the Proclamation or any Regulation or 
Order. Further Clause (g) also gives immunity from challenge in 
a Court of law to any declaration made or action taken by or 
under the Proclamation. There is no vagueness or ambiguity in 
the meaning of the words used in this clause as regards the total 
ouster of jurisdiction of this C ourt.^
Justiciability of the continuance of a State of Emergency
Taking together the number of occasions in the past on which Proclamations 
of Emergency had been issued in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, it is 
seen that in a majority of those instances, the initial Proclamations had been 
made on constitutionally valid grounds. Hence challenges to the initial 
Proclamations of Emergency were not seriously entertained by the Court. 
However, the continuance of a state of emergency long after the crisis which 
had originally justified the Proclamation of Emergency exposes the continued 
operation of a Proclamation to serious challenges as to its justification. But 
even in such circumstances, Courts in these countries have been reluctant to 
question the validity of the continued operation of an Emergency.
A typical example of the Court’s reluctance to the question the continuance of 
a state of emergency is the observation of the Sri Lankan Supreme Court in
36 (1978) 30 D.L.R. (S.C.) 207.
37 Ibid., at 219.
38 See for example the Stephen Kalong Ningkan cases in Malaysia, op. cit.
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Gunasekera v Ratnavale?^ Referring to the provision for monthly renewals of 
the Proclamation of Emergency as required by the Public Security Ordinance, 
1947,^ and later also by the Constitution of 1978,^ the Court held that:
[t]he very fact that the Emergency has been continued from 
month to month is indicative of the fact that conditions have not 
returned to norm al...
The long continuance of the 1969 Emergency in Malaysia^ was challenged 
before the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor^ Since the 
principal ground of appeal in that case was the validity of the subsidiary 
emergency legislative power of the Executive, which were held invalid by the 
Privy Council,'^ the question of invalidity of the Proclamation by effluxion of 
time was not decided. Referring to its invalidation of the Essential (Security 
Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975,^ the Privy Council held that:
it is unnecessary to decide whether or not ... [the Essential 
Regulations 1975] were invalid on the alternative and more far- 
reaching ground advanced by the appellant: namely, that by the 
time the Regulation was made the emergency proclaimed on 
May 15, 1969 was over and the Emergency Proclamation of that 
date had ceased to be in fo rc e d
39 (1973) 76 N.L.R. 316.
^  Section 2 (2).
4  ^Article 155 (5), Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978.
4  ^Gunasekera, op. cit., at 326.
43 See infra n. 47.
44 [1979] 1 M.L.J. 50.
43 The decision of the Privy Council on this ground is discussed in the next section of this 
Chapter.
46 The Essential (Security Cases) Regulations 1975 and the Essential (Security 
Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975 were made under the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) Ordinance, 1969, Ordinance No I of 1969. The nature of these Regulations is discussed 
infra.
47 Teh Cheng Poh, op. cit., at 54.
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Since none of the Proclamations of Emergency in Malaysia had been 
revoked, the question arose in Teh Cheng Poh, whether a later Proclamation 
operated to revoke a previous one. The Privy Council decided this question in 
the affirmative.
[A] proclamation of a new emergency declared to be threatening 
the security of the Federation as a whole must by necessary 
implication be intended to operate as a revocation of a previous 
Proclamation, if one is still in fo r c e d
In Teh Cheng Poh, the continued operation of a Security Area Proclamation 
throughout the whole of Malaysia, by virtue of a Proclamation of the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong under Section 47 of the Internal Security Act, 1960,^  was also
48 Since Independence there has been four Proclamations of Emergency in Malaysia of which 
none has been revoked so far. Of these four, two had been proclaimed locally, one in the State 
of Sarawak in 1966 and the other in the State of Kelantan in 1977. States of Emergency were 
proclaimed throughout Malaysia in 1964, on account of the Malaysia-Indonesia ‘Confrontation’, 
and in 1969 in the wake of ethnic violence.
In the case of the two nationwide states of emergency, the question as to the necessity of 
proclaiming the 1969 Emergency, when the 1964 Emergency was still in force, has not been 
answered by commentators. It could perhaps be said that the previous emergency was an 
"external emergency" occasioned by an external threat, while the latter one was an "internal 
emergency". The original Constitution [Article 150 (1)] had specified the types of emergency as 
those arising from "war or external aggression or internal disturbance". It is to be noted, 
however, that the consequences of a Proclamation of Emergency are the same, regardless of 
whether the Proclamation was based on "internal" or "external" circumstances.
49 Teh Cheng Poh, op. cit., at 53. The Privy Council’s findings in this regard prompted the 
insertion of a new constitutional provision by the Constitution Amendment Act, 1981, Act No. 
A514 of 1981. Under the new provision, Article 150 (2A), different Proclamations of Emergency 
may be issued on different grounds or circumstances, regardless of whether a Proclamation is 
already in force.
Federation of Malaya Act No. 18 of 1960, revised in 1972 as Malaysia Act No. 82 of 1972. The 
Act was passed under Article 149 of the Constitution for "the prevention of subversion, the 
suppression of organised violence ...". Section 47 of the Internal Security Act, 1960 provides:
(1) If in the opinion of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong public security in any area 
in the Federation is seriously disturbed or threatened by reason of any action 
taken or threatened by any substantial body of persons, whether inside or 
outside the Federation, to cause or to cause a substantial number of citizens, to 
fear organized violence against persons or property, he may, if he considers it 
to be necessary for the purpose of suppressing such organised violence, 
proclaim such area as a security area ....
(2) Every proclamation ... shall remain in force until it is revoked by the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong or is annulled by resolutions passed by both Houses of 
Parliament...".
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challenged. It was contended that since the causes which gave rise to the 
Proclamation of Security Area had long subsided, the Proclamation must be 
treated in law as having lapsed. The Privy Council denied that the Security 
Area Proclamation could lapse ipso facto without express revocation by the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong or its annulment by Parliament. But in obiter remarks, 
the Privy Council suggested that courts could grant a remedy in cases:
in which it can be established that a failure to exercise ... [the 
Yang di-Pertuan’s] power of revocation would be an abuse of his 
discretion.5 *
The Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s constitutional immunity from proceedings in 
Court52 prompted the Privy Council to suggest that:
since ... [the Yang di-Pertuan Agong] is required in all executive 
functions to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet, 
mandamus could ... be sought against the members of the 
Cabinet requiring them to advise the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to 
revoke the Proclamation.55
If, as is suggested in the dictum of the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh, it is 
possible to institute mandamus proceedings against the Executive to compel it 
to revoke a Security Area Proclamation, then by analogy, the same course 
could be taken for bringing an end to a Proclamation of Emergency. Remote 
though the possibilities of success in such proceedings may have been, the 
potential effect of the holding of the Privy Council in this regard has been 
sought to be foreclosed by amending the emergency provisions of the 
Malaysian Constitution so that a Proclamation of Emergency and its continued 
operation is non-justiciable 5^
Malaysia was declared to be a "Security Area" under the provisions of this Act, on the same day 
that Emergency was proclaimed on May 15, 1969. Both of those Proclamations had been 
continuing since then.
^  Teh Cheng Poh, op. cit., at 55.
Article 32 (1), Constitution of Malaysia.
^  Teh Cheng Poh, op. cit., at 55.
^  Article 150 (8), Constitution of Malaysia, inserted by Constitution Amendment Act, 1981, Act 
No. A514 of 1981.
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Emergency Legislative Powers of the Executive
Extensive legislative powers are afforded to the Executive under the 
Constitutions of Malaysia and Sri Lanka during a state of emergency.^ The 
Constitution of Malaysia and Sri Lanka’s Public Security Ordinance, 1947, 
expressly declare that emergency ordinances and regulations are non- 
justiciable.*^ in the Constitution of Bangladesh, there is no separate head for 
legislative powers of the Executive during Emergency but the general 
legislative powers of the President under the Constitution of Bangladesh*^ are 
applicable to emergency situations as w ell.^
In Malaysia, an Emergency Ordinance promulgated by the Yang di-Pertuan, 
like a Proclamation of Emergency, is merely required to be "laid before" 
Parliament, without any stipulation for Parliament’s "approval" for the 
ordinance’s continued operation. An Emergency Ordinance in Malaysia can, 
however, be annulled by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament.^ In the 
event that an Emergency Ordinance is annulled at any time by resolutions of 
Parliament, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is empowered to issue fresh 
ordinances. The power of the Yang di-Pertuan to promulgate emergency 
ordinances is not only co-extensive with the powers of the Malaysian 
Parliament, but in a sense even more pervasive for this power is declared to be 
unencumbered by any extraordinary legislative procedures that may be 
required.^ *
^  Article 150 (2B), Constitution of Malaysia; Article 155 (2), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978, 
and Section 5, Public Security Ordinance, 1947, as amended.
^  Article 150 (8),Constitution of Malaysia; Section 8, Public Security Ordinance, 1947.
57 Article 93, Constitution of Bangladesh.
58 The Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1974, Ordinance No. XXVII of 1974, and the Emergency 
Powers Ordinance, 1987, Ordinance No. XXII of 1987, were promulgated under this general 
power.
SQ
Article 150 (3), Constitution of Malaysia.
60
Ibid. The phrase used in Article 150 (3) is "any ordinance". This implies that the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong is authorized to issue a fresh emergency ordinance on the same topic as that 
annulled by Parliament, and in the same way as the annulled ordinance was promulgated.
^  Article 150 (2C), Constitution of Malaysia. This amended (1981) provision seems to imply 
that the Executive’s emergency legislative powers extends to constitutional amendments as well.
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Under the Sri Lankan Constitution, no parliamentary approval is required for 
the validity and operation of Emergency Regulations made by the President. 
But these Regulations may be added to, or altered, or revoked by 
Parliament.^
Ordinances promulgated by the President of Bangladesh, which includes 
Emergency Ordinances, must be approved by Parliament within thirty days. 
The legislative powers of the Executive in Bangladesh extends to all matters 
on which Parliament has competence, but no authority is given to the 
Executive for altering or repealing any provision of the Constitution, or for 
continuing any provision of a previous ordinance^
In the remainder of this section, selected case-law on the emergency legislative 
powers of the executive will be examined with reference to each of the 
countries.
A. Malaysia
Under the original provisions of the Constitution of Malaysia, the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong was competent to promulgate Emergency Ordinances on 
grounds of necessity until Parliament reconvened.*^ Courts in Malaysia have 
interpretated this emergency legislative power of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
in expansive terms. In Johnson Tan Han Seng v Public Prosecutor,**** the 
Federal Court of Malaysia observed that:
[the Yang di-Pertuan Agong] has, and is intended to have, 
plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the same nature, 
as those of Parliament itself.... I f ... [the emergency ordinance] is 
legislation, within the ambit of the affirmative words [of the 
Constitution] which gives the power, and if it does not violate
*  ^Section 5 (3), Public Security Ordinance, 1947.
^  Article 93(2), Constitution of Bangladesh.
^  Proviso to Article 93(1), Ibid.
^  Original Article 150 (2), Constitution of Malaysia.
^  [1977] 2 M.L.J. 66; sub nom. Soon Seng Sia Heng v Public Prosecutor, Public Prosecutor v 
Che a Soon Hoong, Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor.
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any express condition or restriction by which that power is 
limited, it is not for this court, or for that matter any court, to 
inquire further, or to enlarge constructively those conditions or 
restrictions.^
The Courts have been prepared to uphold, in similar terms, delegated 
regulation-making authority under an emergency ordinance.*^ Since under the 
original provisions of the Malaysian Constitution, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
could promulgate Emergency Ordinances only until Parliament resumes 
sitting, the defence in Public Prosecutor v Khong Teng Khen & Anothefö  
challenged the continued emergency regulation-making authority of the 
Executive even after Parliament had reconvened. In this regard, Suffian L.P., 
giving the majority opinion of the Federal Court asserted that:
[the emergency regulations in question] were made ... not under 
clause (2) of Article 150 [of the Constitution] but under section 
2 of the ... [Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1969,] and 
in my judgement the fact whether or not at the time they were 
made Parliament was in existence or was sitting is irrelevant. His 
Majesty has power to make Ordinances under clause (2) of 
Article 150 only when Parliament is not sitting. In the case of 
regulations under section 2 of the Ordinance they may be made 
by His Majesty whether or not Parliament is sitting.^
Under the Malaysian Constitution, emergency laws and ordinances are valid 
notwithstanding any inconsistency with the guaranteed constitutional rights or 
with any other provision of the Constitution.^ Another question for
^7 Ibid., at 75, per Raja Azlan Shah F.J.
68 The emergency regulation-making power was delegated to himself by the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong. By Section 2(1) of the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1969:
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may make any regulations whatsoever (in this 
Ordinance referred to as "Essential Regulations") which he considers desirable 
or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Malaysia, the 
maintenance of public order and of supplies and services essential to the life of 
the community.
69 [1976] 2 M.L.J. 166.
70 Ibid., at 169.
71 Article 150 (6), Constitution of Malaysia, as amended by the Constitution Amendment Act, 
1963, Act No. 26 of 1963. The original provision exempted only inconsistencies with the 
constitutional rights. By Article 150 (6A) Emergency Acts of Parliament may not derogate from 
Islamic Law, Malay custom, and the native law or custom of the States of Sabah and Sarawak.
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determination in Khong Teng Khen was whether the Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s 
power to promulgate an Emergency Ordinance, inconsistent with the 
Constitution could be delegated so that Rules/Regulations made under an 
Emergency Ordinance could also derogate from constitutional provisions. The 
defence in Khong Teng Khen contended that it was only the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1969,^ and not the Essential (Security Cases) 
Regulations, 1975, made under the Ordinance, that may be inconsistent with 
the Constitution. Suffian L.P., giving the majority opinion, rejected the 
contention on the grounds that the provisions of the Ordinance itself enabled 
the making of Emergency Regulations which could be inconsistent with the 
Constitution. The learned Judge concluded that:
[bjecause of ... [Section 2 (4) of the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) Ordinance, 1969,] it is lawful in my view for His Majesty 
to make essential regulations that are inconsistent with the 
Federal Constitution.
The question of the continued exercise of delegated emergency regulation­
making power by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong assumed far-reaching 
significance in the landmark decision of the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh v 
Public Prosecutor The significance of this question was foreshadowed, albeit 
in an ambiguous m a n n e r , i n  the dissenting opinion of Ong Hock Sim F.J. in 
Public Prosecutor v Khong Teng Khen & A n o t h e r Referring pointedly to the 
subversion of parliamentary process and constitutional rule that was entailed 
by the continued operation of the emergency rule-making power of the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong, the learned Judge had observed that:
Further, neither emergency laws nor ordinances may be inconsistent with the constitutional 
provisions on religion, citizenship, or language.
72 Delegation in this context meant the Yang di-Pertuan Agong "delegating" the power to 
himself.
7  ^Ordinance I of 1969, published as P.U. (A) 146/69.
7<* Khong Teng Khen, op. cit., at 170.
75 [1979] 1 M.L.J. 50.
The ambiguity was because of the learned Judge’s reference to the termination of the 
emergency because of resumption of Parliament’s sitting.
77 [1976] 2 M.LJ. 166.
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[i]f these regulations are held valid, there appears no control as 
to the regulations the Executive may issue under the guise of an 
Emergency which had ceased to exist when Parliament was 
reconvened....
In Teh Cheng Poh, the Privy Council examined the implications of the two 
alternative sources of the Executive’s emergency law-making power. Of the 
constitutional source, the Privy Council observed that:
[s]o far as ... [the Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s] power to make 
written laws is derived from Article 150 (2) of the Constitution 
itself, in which they are described as ‘ordinances’, it comes to an 
end as soon as Parliament first sits after the Proclamation of an 
Emergency; ... [the Yang di-Pertuan Agong] cannot prolong it, 
of his own volition, by purporting to empower himself to go on 
making written laws, whatever description he may apply to them.
That would be tantamount to the Cabinet’s lifting itself up by its 
own boot straps.^
The claim by the State that the Executive’s emergency regulation-making 
power may be derived from the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1969, 
was similarly unacceptable to the Privy Council.
To the extent ... that the ... Ordinance purports to authorise the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong to continue to make instruments having 
the force of law notwithstanding that Parliament had sat, it 
suffers from the fatal constitutional flaw that such exercise of 
legislative power by the ... [Yang di-Pertuan Agong] after 
Parliament has sat, is not authorised by the Constitution itself 
nor has it been delegated to him by Parliament in whom the 
legislative authority of the Federation is vested.^
The decision of the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh meant that all subsidiary 
emergency regulations made by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong since Parliament
o i
reconvened in 1971, after the Proclamation of Emergency in 1969,°1 were
78 Ibid., at 175.
7Q Teh Cheng Poh, op. cit., at 53.
80 Ibid.
81 The state of emergency in question was declared on May 15, 1969, as a result of ethnic 
rioting. The Proclamation of Emergency is published as P.U. (A) 145/69. After this 
Proclamation, Parliament first reconvened about two years later, on 20 February 1971.
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invalid and void^ . In order to overcome the far-reaching legal consequences 
of the Privy Council decision, the Malaysian Parliament re-enacted the 
controversial Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1969, as the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) A ct, 1979,^ with retrospective effect from 1971.^  By s. 9 
(1) of the new Act, all subsidiary legislation made under the previous 
Ordinance were to have effect as if they were made under the Act.
Every subsidiary legislation whatsoever made or purporting to 
have been made under the Emergency (Essential Powers) 
Ordinance, 1969, ... on or after the 20th February 1971, shall be 
valid and have effect as if the said subsidiary legislation has been 
made under the appropriate provision of this A c t ...
82 Writing extra-judicially, Tun Suffian F.J. has remarked that:
it meant not only that the trial of Teh Cheng Poh was a nullity. There were 
hundreds of other trials held under the regulations. They too were a nullity. In 
some of them persons had been sentenced to imprisonment or even death, 
though fortunately nobody had yet been executed.
(Tun Mohamed Suffian, Malaysia and India - Shared Experiences in the Law, V.V. Chitaley 
Memorial Lectures, Nagpur, All India Reporter Ltd., 1980, 88, quoted in H.P. Lee, Emergency 
Powers in Malaysia, in FA. Trindade & H.P. Lee (Eds), The Constitution of Malaysia: Further 
Perspectives and Developments, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1986, 135-156, at 145.
83 Act No. 216 of 1979.
84 .In their decision in Teh Cheng Poh, the Privy Council indicated that such a course was 
possible.
If it be thought expedient that after Parliament has first sat the Yang di- 
Pertuan agong should continue to exercise a power to make written laws 
equivalent to that to which he was entitled during the ... period [when 
Parliament was not sitting] to exercise under Article 150(2) of the Constitution, 
the only source from which he could derive such powers would be an Act of 
Parliament delegating them to him.
Teh Cheng Poh, op. cit., at 53.
The Long Title to the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1979, stated:
An Act under Clause (5) of Article 150 of the Federal Constitution to enact as 
an Act of Parliament the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1969, and 
to provide for the validation of all subsidiary legislation made or purporting to 
have been made under the said Ordinance on or before the 20th February 
1971, and for the validation of all acts and things done under the said 
Ordinance or any subsidiary legislation made or purported to have been made 
thereunder, and to provide for matters connected therewith.
83 Section 9 (1), Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1979.
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The Teh Cheng Poh decision also prompted substantial changes in the 
emergency provisions of the Malaysian Constitution.^ Some of the changes 
which have been referred to above, include:
(a) the authority of the Yang di-Pertuan agong to issue different 
Proclamations at different times, irrespective of whether a 
Proclamation of Emergency is already in existence
(b) the emergency legislative power of the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong to operate at all times when Houses of Parliament are 
not sitting concurrently;^
(c) the satisfaction of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in proclaiming 
Emergency and in promulgating emergency ordinances is final, 
conclusive and non-justiciable.
(d) the continued operation of the state of emergency and of 
emergency ordinances are likewise non-justiciable.
B. Sri Lanka
Unlike the position under the Malaysian Constitution where the Executive has 
emergency legislative powers only when Parliament is not in session, the 
President in Sri Lanka can promulgate Emergency Regulations at all times 
during the operation of a state of emergency. The power of the Sri Lankan 
President to make Emergency Regulations pursuant to a Proclamation of 
Emergency ^  1 includes the making of such Regulation:
as appear to him to be necessary or expedient in the interests of 
public security and the preservation of public order and the 
suppression of mutiny, riot or civil commotion, or for the
^  The Constiäition (Amendment) Act, 1981, Act No. A514 of 1981.
^  Article 150(2A), Constitution of Malaysia.
88 Article 150 (2B), Ibid.
89 Article 150 (8), Ibid.
90 Ibid.
9* Article 155(3), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978; Section 2, Public Security Ordinance, 1947.
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maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the 
community.^
In addition to these general enabling categories, Emergency Regulations are 
also sanctioned for the purposes, inter alia, of preventive detention, search and 
entry, and special courts.*^ Emergency Regulations may also provide for the 
making of subsidiary legislation in the form of orders and rules by subordinate 
authorities.^
Under the Constitution of Sri Lanka, executive emergency regulations have 
the legal effect of:
over-riding, amending or suspending the operation of the 
provisions of any law, except the provisions of the 
Constitution.^
However, by Article 15(7) of the Constitution, Emergency Regulations can 
derogate from most of the guaranteed constitutional rights. Like the amended 
emergency provisions of the Malaysian Constitution,^ Emergency 
Regulations in Sri Lanka have been declared to be non-justiciable.
No emergency regulation, and no order, rule or direction made 
or given thereunder shall be called in question in any court.^
The delegation, to the Executive in Sri Lanka, of emergency legislative powers 
under the provisions of the Public Security Ordinance, 1947, was challenged, in 
a number of cases, as being ultra vires the powers of Parliament. In Gunasekera 
v R a tn a v a le decided during the operation of the Independence Constitution 
of 1948, the Supreme Court of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) examined the origins of the 
Public Security Ordinance as an Ordinance promulgated by the colonial
92 Section 5(1), Public Security Ordinance, 1947, emphasis added.
^  Section 5(2), Ibid.
^  Section 6, Ibid.
^  Article 155(2), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
^  Article 150(8), Constitution of Malaysia.
^  Section 8, Public Security Ordinance, 1947.
98 (1973) 76 N.L.R. 316.
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Governor "with the advice and consent" of the State Council of Ceylon, and its 
continuation by the Independence Constitution. Without any further 
deliberations with respect to the constitutional position of a sovereign 
legislature, the Court concluded that:
[the] preamble to the ... [Ordinance] states that it was passed 
with the advice and consent of the [State] Council. This ... 
[Ordinance] which had been passed by the Council is therefore 
good law and continues to operate as such by virtue of Section 
91 of the present Constitution.^
This decision re-affirmed the findings of the same Court in an earlier decision 
where the question of delegation of emergency legislative powers was 
discussed at some length. In that decision, S. Weerasinghe v G. VP. 
Samarasinghe}^ Sansoni C.J. undertook a comparative survey of several 
cases on delegated legislation from Canada, Australia and India and 
concluded that:
the Public Security Ordinance is intra vires, and the Regulations, 
as well as the orders and rules made under the authority of such 
Regulations, are also v a l id .^
The delegation of emergency legislative powers to the Executive by s. 5 of the 
Public Security Ordinance, 1947, has been reiterated by Article 155(2) of the 
present (1978) Constitution. Explaining this constitutional source of the 
President’s emergency legislative power, the Sri Lankan Court has observed 
that:
[t]he President’s power of making Emergency Regulations is ... 
co-extensive with that of Parliament, except for the limitation as
99 Ibid., at 329.
100 (1966) 68 N.L.R. 361.
^  Ibid., at 365. Among the cases discussed by the Chief Justice were, Reference as to the 
Validity of Certain Chemical Regulations [1943] S.C.R. 1, Victorian Stevedoring and General 
Contracting Co. Pty. Ltd and Meakes v Dignan, (1931) 46 C.L.R. 73, Attorney-General 
(Commonwealth) v The Queen; Ex Parte The Boilermakers Society of Australia, [1957] A.C. 228, 
(1957) C.L.R. (P.C.) 529, and In Re Art. 143, Constitution of India and Delhi Laws Act, [1951] 
A.I.R. (S.C.) 332.
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to the period during which the Regulations made by him can 
operate. ^ 2
The breadth of the Sri Lankan President’s emergency legislative powers, and 
issues as to the justiciability of such powers were summed up by the Court in 
this way.
Part II [of the Public Security Ordinance] vests the President 
with wide and extensive powers [for promulgating regulations] to 
deal with the emergency situation. The President’s view of the 
necessity and expediency of the regulations needed to combat 
the situation is conclusive of their necessity; and, in formulating 
them for the purposes of Sec. 5 [of the Ordinance, that is, for the 
purposes, amongst others, of "public security", and "public 
order"], he is bound only by the provisions of Article 155(2) of 
the Constitution. He is the sole judge of the necessity for the 
regulations. It is the subjective opinion of the President that 
matters; and in the absence of bad faith or ulterior motive, the 
jurisdiction of the Court is excluded. ^ 3
Despite the Sri Lankan Supreme Court’s virtual moratorium on challenges to 
Emergency Regulations promulgated by the Executive, the Court had, in some 
instances, appeared to assert its right to review executive orders made under 
Emergency Regulations which infringed upon constitutional rights. These will 
be discussed in the next Chapter.
C. Bangladesh
Like the amended emergency provisions of the Malaysian C onstitu tion ,^  the 
ordinance-making power of the President of Bangladesh is operative "at any 
time" when Parliament is not in session or is dissolved. Article 93 (1) of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh provides:
102 JA. Yasapala v Ranil Wickremesinghe & Others, Supreme Court Application No. 103 of 
1980, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 1, Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, Vol 
1 (April 1979 to December 1981), Sri Lanka, Lake House Investments, 1984,143-163, at 158.
3 Janatha Finance and Investments v DJ.F.D.L. Liyanage, Supreme Court Application No. 127 
of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, 
(April 1982 to December 1982), Sri Lanka, Lake House Investments, 1986, 373-3%, at 382-383, 
emphasis added. See also JA. Yasapala, op. cit., at 155,157.
^  Article 150 (2B), Constitution of Malaysia.
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At any time when Parliament stands dissolved or is not in 
session, if the President is satisfied that circumstances exist 
which render immediate action necessary, he may make and 
promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him 
to require, and any Ordinance so made shall, as from its 
promulgation have the like force of law as an Act of Parliament
In addition, Emergency Ordinances in Bangladesh have granted subsidiary 
legislative powers to the Executive in a way similar to those granted to the 
Malaysian Executive in emergency situations. Section 2 (1) of the Emergency 
Powers Ordinance, 1974,^5 for example, afforded extensive powers to the 
Executive to make subsidiary emergency rules.
The Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, 
make such rules as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for 
ensuring the security, the public safety and interest and for 
protecting the economic life of Bangladesh, or for securing the 
maintenance of public order, or for maintaining supplies and 
services essential to the life of the community. ^
In Bangladesh, the thrust of litigation concerning executive emergency powers 
has been in relation to actions taken under Executive emergency ordinances 
and rules, not in relation to the vires to the ordinances or rules themselves, as 
have been the case in Malaysia and Sri Lanka. Since, in Bangladesh, most of 
the decided cases on emergency powers relate to infringements of rights by 
executive emergency orders taken under emergency ordinances and rules, these 
will be considered in the next Chapter.
Revocation/Termination of a State of Emergency
A Proclamation of Emergency in Malaysia, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh continues 
in force until revoked by the Executive or annulled or disapproved by 
Parliament. ^  Executive actions taken during an Emergency are protected,
105 Ordinance No. XXVII of 1974.
^  Similar powers were accorded to the Executive by Section 3 of the Emergency Powers 
Ordinance, 1987, Ordinance No. XXII of 1987.
^  Article 150 (3), Constitution of Malaysia; Section 2 (2), Public Security Ordinance, 1947, and 
Articles 155 (6) & (8), Constitution of Sri Lanka; Article 141A (2), Constitution of Bangladesh.
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upon the expiry of a state of emergency, by indemnifying provisions in the 
Constitutions of Malaysia and B ang ladesh^  and in Sri Lanka’s Public 
Security O r d i n a n c e In Malaysia, the indemnity continues for a further 
period of six months after the termination of a Proclamation of Emergency, 
during which time, emergency laws are declared to be o p e ra tiv e .^
*  *  *
The discussion in the previous sections of this Chapter, on the justiciability of a 
Proclamation of Emergency and its continued operation, has indicated that it 
may be theoretically possible to challenge the validity of a Proclamation of 
Emergency. However, the procedural difficulties of demonstrating in a 
manner, which can be judicially determined, that the power of declaring an 
Emergency has been exercised in bad faith, deprive this proposition of 
practical importance. The more important dimension in the examination and 
interpretation of emergency powers is the manner and extent to which these 
powers may be permissibly applied. It is to these aspects that the discussion in 
the Chapters following this one will be directed.
^  Article 150 (7), Constitution of Malaysia; Article 141B, Constitution of Bangladesh. 
^  Section 4, Public Security Ordinance, 1947.
^  Article 150 (7), Constitution of Malaysia.
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND EMERGENCY: 
SOME BASIC ISSUES
The kind of legislative or executive action that is required to deal with the 
exigencies of a national crisis often involves some degree of interference with 
the normal civil and political rights. In countries where the Constitution 
restricts the power of the State to infringe on the constitutional rights of the 
individual, an Emergency presupposes a curtailment of these rights. Even in 
the absence of express restrictions, the courts have responded by limiting the 
scope of individual rights in times of national crisis. 1 While generally 
upholding state restrictions on the rights of citizens in emergency situations, 
the courts have been careful to retain some power to limit the scope of 
remedial state action. This position is predicated on the premise that the 
nature of the crisis may be a relevant factor in a judicial determination of the 
reasonableness of the restrictions resulting from state action.^
Even in the absence of express restrictions on the constitutional rights, the United States 
courts have frequently imposed them during wartime as a matter of necessary implication. See, 
for example United States v McIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1930), especially at 622. For an extreme 
position see Miller v United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870), where the Supreme Court 
categorically stated that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not apply to action resulting from 
an exercise of the war power (ibid., at 304-05).
In Britain, the prerogative writ of habeas corpus which safeguards the liberty of the subject had 
not been suspended in either the first or second world wars. However, executive power of 
detention in wartime was so broadly interpreted by the Court that challenges to preventive 
detention by habeas corpus or otherwise were almost wholly excluded. See The King v Halliday, 
[1917] A.C. 260; Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] A.C. 201; Greene v Home Secretary, [1942] A.C. 
284.
In Australia, the High Court has upheld derogation from the constitutional guarantee of 
religious freedom in times of war. See Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc. v 
Commonwealth, (1943) 67 C.L.R. 116.
2 The High Court of Australia, for example, has held that the exercise of emergency powers 
(under the defence power as conferred by Section 51 (vi) of the Australian Constitution) must 
"be really, not fancifully, colourably, or ostensibly, referrable to the defence of the 
Commonwealth.... [T]here must be a nexus between the object of the particular regulation and 
the subject of defence." - Shimpton v Commonwealth, (1944) 69 C.L.R. 613, at 623-24, per Rich 
J. See also Victoria v Commonwealth, (1942) 66 C.L.R. 488.
The "defence power" under the Australian Constitution has a variable scope of application - it 
expands during wartime and permits preventive detention. See for example, Lloyd v Wallach, 
(1915) 20 C.L.R. 299; Little v The Commonwealth, (1947) 75 C.L.R. 94.
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In apparent distrust of the judiciary, and in order to protect the executive and 
the legislative organs of the state against judicial interference in times of crisis, 
Constitutions like those of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, which include 
a catalogue of entrenched rights, often make express provisions for restricting 
the operative effect of these rights during times of Emergency.^
From the perspective of legal effect, the curtailment of constitutionally 
entrenched rights during an Emergency may be effectuated either by 
suspending all or some of the rights themselves, or by suspending the judicial 
remedies for the enforcement of the rights. The former technique has the 
effect of legalizing emergency measures which, in normal times, would 
constitute an infringement of the constitutional rights/* The latter approach 
which suspends only the remedy, does not purport to legalize governmental 
action but rather has the effect that the citizen’s access to a judicial forum (in 
which he could normally challenge the legality of the governmental action) is 
barred.^
Technique 1: The Suspension of Constitutional Rights
The impact of a Proclamation of Emergency on the operation of the 
constitutional rights of citizens in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh has 
been briefly outlined in Chapters III and IV. This Chapter examines critically 
the techniques of the suspension of these rights during an Emergency. The
3
The two techniques of curtailment of constitutional rights have been discussed in the context 
of the Constitutions of India and Pakistan in K.I. Omar, Emergency Personal Liberty and the 
Courts in India and Pakistan, Unpublished LL.M. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 
1985, at 65-85.
4
An example of this technique is represented by the Canadian Bill o f Rights, 1960, a statutory 
Bill of Rights, which provides that anything done under the War Measures Act, 1914, shall be 
deemed not to be an infringement of the Bill. The Bill has now been superseded by the Charter 
of Rights and Freedom, which is contained in the Constitution Act, 1982. The Charter does not 
contain any comparable restriction. Nevertheless the same result may be achieved by amending 
the War Measures Act in accordance with Section 33 of the Charter.
The most notable example of this in common law countries is the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus, as was done by the British Parliament on several occasions during the 17th and 
18th centuries and as is explicitly contemplated by the United States Constitution. Modern and 
less obtrusive methods of curtailing the civil liberties of citizens in countries which do not 
provide for constitutionally entrenched rights, include express privative clauses, the careful 
statutory formulation of executive discretionary powers and the enactment of conclusive rules of 
evidence.
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inquiry begins with a review of the relevant provisions in the Constitutions of 
the three countries. Two fundamental issues relating to the implications of 
suspension of constitutional rights during an Emergency are then examined.
The constitutional provisions on suspension of rights
As a consequence of a Proclamation of Emergency, certain entrenched rights 
under the Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are wholly 
suspended.
A. Malaysia
Under the original provisions of the Malaysian Constitution, emergency laws 
and executive ordinances could derogate from any of the guaranteed rights 
contained in Part II of the Constitution.
No provision of any law or ordinance made or promulgated in 
pursuance of ... Article [150] shall be invalid on the ground of 
any inconsistency with the provisions of Part II ... [relating to 
Fundamental Liberties].^
Since 1963, emergency laws and ordinances in Malaysia can be inconsistent, 
not only with the constitutional rights, but with any other provision of the 
Constitution.
[N]o provision of any ordinance promulgated under ... Article 
[150], and no provision of any Act of Parliament which is passed 
while a Proclamation of Emergency is in force and which 
declares that the law appears to Parliament to be required by 
reason of the emergency, shall be invalid on the ground of any 
inconsistency with any provision of this Constitution... J
 ^Original Article 150 (6), Constitution of Malaysia.
 ^Article 150 (6), Constitution of Malaysia, as amended by Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1963, 
Act No. 26 of 1963. This means that the constitutional safeguards in respect of preventive 
detention [Article 151] can also be overridden by emergency laws.
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The overriding effect of emergency laws and ordinances on constitutional
Q
provisions do not, however, extend to the right to freedom of religion. The 
constitutional rights and other safeguards relating to personal liberty, which 
stand suspended as a result of a Proclamation of Emergency are:
(a) liberty of the person;^
(b) safeguards in relation to preventive detention, 0
(c) freedom from slavery and forced labour;^
I ' j
(d) protection against retrospective criminal laws;
(e) right to equality; ^
(f) freedom of m ovem ent;^
(g) freedom of speech, assembly and association;^
(h) rights in respect of education;^ and
(i) right to property.^
o
Article 150 (6A), ibid., inserted by Constitution Amendment Act, 1963, Act No. 26 of 1963; 
further amended by Constitution Amendment Act, 1976, Act No. A354 of 1976. By Article 150 
(3), the constitutional provisions relating to citizenship and language are also excluded from the 
overriding effect of emergency legislation.
Q
Article 5, Constitution of Malaysia.
^  Article 151, ibid. The provisions of Article 151 enact some safeguards in respect of preventive 
detention in the form of certain procedural rights of a detainee. Article 151 is not, however, 
categorized as one of the "Fundamental Liberties" under the Constitution of Malaysia; rather it 
appears in the Part on Special and Emergency Powers.
^  Article 6, ibid.
12 Article 7, ibid.
^  Article 8, ibid.
^  Article 9, ibid.
15 Article 10, ibid.
^  Article 12, ibid.
17 Article 13, ibid.
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B .Sri Lanka
In Sri Lanka emergency laws can derogate from almost all of the entrenched 
constitutional rights including the safeguards in respect of preventive 
detention. Articles 15 (1) and 15 (7) of the 1978 Constitution specifies the 
rights which are suspended during a state of emergency:
(1) The exercise and operation of the fundamental rights 
declared and recognized by Articles 13 (5) and 13 (6) [relating 
to the protection in respect of trial and punishment] shall be 
subject only to such restrictions as may be prescribed by law in 
the interests of national security. For the purposes of this 
paragraph "law" includes regulations made under the law for the 
time being relating to public security.
(7) The exercise and operation of all the fundamental rights 
declared and recognized by Articles 12 [right to equality], 13 (1),
13 (2) [right to liberty, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
detention] and 14 [rights to free speech, association and 
movement] shall be subject to such restrictions as may be 
prescribed by law in the interests of national security, public 
order and the protection of public health and morality ... For 
the purposes of this paragraph "law" includes regulations made 
under the law for the time being relating to public security.
The following guaranteed rights are thus overridden during an Emergency in 
Sri Lanka:
1 o
(a) equality and equal protection of the law;10
(b) right to liberty, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
detention;^
• • 20(c) right to freedom of speech, expression and association; 
and the
18 Article 12, ibid.
19 Article 13 (1), (2), (5) and (6), ibid.
20 Article 14 (1), ibid.
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(d) right to freedom of movement.21
C. Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, the suspension of rights is sanctioned by Article 14 IB of the 
Constitution:
While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, nothing in 
articles 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 42 [all relating to citizens’ rights] 
shall restrict the power of the State to make any law or to take 
any executive action which the State would, but for the 
provisions contained in Part III of this Constitution, be 
competent to make or to take, but any law so made shall, to the 
extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect as soon as the 
Proclamation ceases to operate, except as respects things done 
or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to have effect.
As a consequence of the operation of Article 14IB, the following rights are 
suspended during an Emergency in Bangladesh:
(a) right to freedom of movement;
(b) right to freedom of assembly;^
(c) right to freedom of association;^
(d) right to freedom of speech, expression, thought and 
conscience;^
(e) right to freedom of profession and occupation, ° and
22 Article 36, ibid.
2  ^Article 37, ibid.
24 Article 38, ibid.
2  ^Article 39, ibid. 
26 Article 40, ibid.
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(f) right to property7^
Two basic issues relating to the suspension of constitutional rights
(a) "Suspension" or "restriction" o f rights ?
In Janatha Finance and Investments v D.J.F.D. L iyanage^  it was contended 
before the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka that executive Emergency Regulations 
can only restrict the operation of constitutional rights, but not suspend the 
rights altogether. The case arose out of the closure of the applicants’ printing 
press by the government, acting under the provisions of Emergency Regulation
7 0
14 (7). The owners of the press, who belonged to the political opposition, 
challenged the order of closure as violating the constitutional rights to 
equality. u It was contended by the applicants that Article 15 (7) of the 
Constitution of Sri Lanka only sanctions restrictions on constitutional rights, 
but the Emergency Regulation in question went beyond restriction to 
suspending the rights themselves.
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka in Janatha Finance did not discuss the 
implications of the suspension of constitutional rights as raised by the 
applicants. The Court observed only that action under Emergency Regulation 
14 (7) "would not amount to a total denial of any of the rights set out in Article 
12 (1) and [/]or (2) [of the Sri Lankan Constitution]".^
Like the Sri Lankan Court in Janatha Finance, the Courts in Bangladesh and 
Malaysia do not appear to have had the occasion to deliberate on the
27 Article 42, ibid.
28 Supreme Court Application No. 127 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, 
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, (April 1982 to December 1982), Sri Lanka, Lake 
House Investments, 1986, 373-396.
29 Emergency Regulation 14 (7) was directed to ordering the closure of any printing press, the 
operation of which the government considered to be prejudicial to the interests of national 
security, public order etc. The Regulation is quoted in full in the judgement of the Court in 
Janatha Finance, op. cit., at 381.
an
u Articles 12 (1) and (2), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
Janatha Finance, op. cit., at 381.31
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restriction/suspension issue. This issue also arose in Pakistan where the 
Constitution entrench rights and emergency powers in a way similar to the 
Constitutions under study in this thesis. With regard to suspension of rights, 
the Lahore High Court of Pakistan, in Province of Punjab v Gulzar Hassan, 
held that Article 233 (1) of the Constitution of Pakistan did not provide for the 
suspension of constitutional rights, but permitted only the Legislature, during 
an Emergency, to make laws inconsistent with the specified fundamental 
rights.^
(b) Does "suspension" o f rights revive invalid laws 7  ^^
Another important question that arises in the context of suspension of rights is 
whether pre-existing laws, which were void for conflicting with the entrenched 
rights, revive on account of the suspension of constitutional rights during an 
Emergency. This question was not addressed by the Court in any of the 
countries under study. The issue is discussed with reference to India and 
Pakistan.
In State of Madhya Pradesh v Thakur Bharat Singh,^  the question arose 
whether a preventive detention statute, which was void for restricting the 
constitutional right to freedom of movement before the declaration of an 
Emergency, became operative, when, after the Proclamation of Emergency, 
the State acquired the right to legislate contrary to entrenched rights.*^ The 
Supreme Court of India observed that:
32 [1978] P.L.D. (Lah.) (D.B.) 1298, affg [1975] P.L.D. (Lah.) 1219, sub nom, Gulzar Hassan v 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
33 For a discussion of this case, see K.I. Omar, Emergency, Personal Liberty and the Courts in 
India and Pakistan, Unpublished LL.M. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 1985, at 
70-71.
3^ The discussion is based on K.I. Omar, op. cit., at 68-74.
35 [1967] A.I.R. (S.C.) 1170.
36 The legislation in question was a state preventive detention statute, the Madhya Pradesh 
Public Security Act, passed in 1959, three years before India’s first Proclamation of Emergency in 
1962. The freedom of movement of the petitioner was restricted by an order under s. 3 (1) (b) of 
the Act after the Proclamation of Emergency in 1962. The High Court held this section of the 
Act void under Article 13 (2) of the Indian Constitution as an unreasonable restriction on the 
freedom of movement guaranteed by Article 19. On appeal to the Supreme Court the decision 
was affirmed.
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Article 358 [of the Indian Constitution] which suspends the 
provisions of [the constitutional rights enumerated in] Art. 19 
during an emergency declared by the President under Art. 352 is 
in terms prospective: after the proclamation of emergency 
nothing in Article 19 restricts the power of the State to make 
laws or to take any executive action which the State but for the 
provisions [of fundamental rights] contained in part III [of the 
Constitution] was competent to make or take. Article 358, 
however, does not operate to validate a legislative provision 
which was invalid because of the constitutional inihibition 
before the proclamation of emergency
In Gulzar H a s s a n the Lahore High Court of Pakistan was confronted with 
the question whether an invalid law revived when those constitutional rights 
which it contravened were suspended under a Proclamation of Emergency. 
The Divisional Bench of the High Court, affirming the conclusion of the single 
Judge of the same Court, held that a suspension of constitutional, rights during 
the operation of a Proclamation of Emergency, would not revive pre-existing 
laws which were void under Article 8 (1) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, 
for conflicting with the entrenched rights.
Technique 2: The Suspension of Means 
for the enforcement of Constitutional Rights
In addition to the suspension of most of the entrenched rights during an 
Emergency in Bangladesh, an emergency Presidential Order can suspend the 
means for the enforcement of specified constitutional rights.
Constitutional provision
^  Thakur Bharat Singh, op. cit., at 1173.
^  Province of Punjab v Gulzar Hassan, [1978] P.L.D. (Lah.) (D.B.) 1298.
The case arose in connection with the declaring the Freemasons an unlawful association 
under the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908. The Act had previously been 
declared void, as conflicting with the entrenched constitutional rights, and the question in Gulzar 
Hassan was whether the effect of suspension of guaranteed rights during an Emergency would 
be the revival of the Act.
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The issuing of such a Presidential Order is sanctioned by Article 141C of the 
Constitution:
While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the 
President may, by order, declare that the right to move any court 
for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III of 
this Constitution as may be specified in the order, and all 
proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the 
rights so specified, shall remain suspended for the period during 
which the Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as 
may be specified in the order ....
After the first Proclamation of Emergency in Bangladesh in 1 9 7 4 , ^  for 
example, the Presidential Order issued simultaneously with the
Proclamation,* 4 ^  suspended the means for the enforcement of almost all of the 
guaranteed rights. The 1974 Order stated:
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 141C 
of the Constitution ... the President is pleased hereby to declare 
the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of 
the rights conferred by articles 27, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, 42, 43 of that Constitution, and all proceedings pending in 
any court for the enforcement of the said rights, shall remain 
suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of 
Emergency ... is in fo rc e d
Among those constitutional rights, the means for the enforcement of which 
were suspended by the 1974 emergency Presidential Order were, the right to 
life and liberty,4*^ right to protection of the law 44 safeguards as to preventive 
detention,'4  ^ right to equality,'4^ freedom of speech and expression, ' ^  and the
^  Proclamation of Emergency, Notification No. 3 (50)/74-CD (CS), dated December 28, 1974, 
reprinted in (1975) 27 D.L.R. 76 (Statutes Section).
4  ^Order, Notification No. 3 (51)/74-CD (CS), dated December 28, 1974, reprinted in (1975) 27 
D.L.R. 76 (Statutes Section).
42 Ibid.
4  ^Article 32, Constitution of Bangladesh.
44 Article 31, ibid.
4  ^Article 33, ibid.
46 Article 27, ibid.
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freedom of movement, assembly and association.^ Emergency Presidential 
Orders suspending the means for the enforcement of constitutional rights were 
not issued during the Emergencies of 1 9 8 1^  and 1987.^
During states of emergencies under the 1948 and 1972 Constitutions of Sri 
Lanka, a similar suspending effect, with regard to the means for enforcing the 
right to personal liberty, was brought about by promulgation of emergency 
regulations which barred the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus
The basic issues arising from the suspension of means for the enforcement of 
rights
Two crucial questions arise with regard to this technique of curtailing citizens’ 
rights. First, is the Court’s power under the Constitution to issue writs in the 
nature of habeas corpus affected by the suspension of means for the 
enforcement of constitutional rights ? Second, does suspension of means for 
the enforcement of rights also suspend the rights themselves ?
The Court in Bangladesh has not, in any decision, attempted to examine the 
issues raised by the exercise of the power of the Executive to suspend by Order 
the means for the enforcement of constitutional rights during an Emergency. 
Because of the significance of these questions, it is instructive to consider the 
judicial interpretation of almost similar constitutional provisions relating to
^  Article 39, ibid.
48 Articles 36, 37 and 38, ibid.
49 Proclamation of Emergency, July 9, 1981, Notification No. F. 38-2/81-Legis, Bangladesh 
Gazette Extraordinary, July 10, 1981, reprinted in (1981) 33 D.L.R. 119-120, (Statutes Section).
^  Proclamation of Emergency, 27 November 1987, Notification No. 1222-M.H. (Pol - 4), 
Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, November 27, 1987.
 ^The remedy of the writ of habeas corpus was provided by s. 45 of the Courts Ordinance, 1889, 
Ordinance No. I of 1889, Legislative Enactments of Ceylon, Cap. 6, and later by the 
Administration of Justice Law, 1973, Act No. 44 of 1973.
Regulation 55 of the 1971 Emergency Regulations was in the following terms:
Section 45 of the Courts Ordinance shall not apply in regard to any person 
detained or held in custody under any emergency regulation.
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the suspension of enforcement of rights during an Emergency in Pakistan and
India.~^
(a) Suspension of Means for enforcement o f rights and the Court's 
power
C-2
In Mohan Chowdhury v Chief Commissioner; Union Territory o f Tripura, the 
Supreme Court of India held that:
the [Supreme] Court’s power [under Article 32 of the Indian 
Constitution] to issue a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus has 
not been ... [affected] by the President’s Order [under Article 
359, suspending the enforcement of specified fundamental 
rights.]... [T]he petitioner’s right to move this Court, but not this 
Court’s power ... has been suspended during the operation of the 
Emergency, with the result that the petitioner has no locus standi 
to enforce his right, if any, during the Emergency.^
The Indian Supreme Court concluded that, due to the right to move the Court 
being suspended, it was "manifest" that the petitioner could not question the 
vires of the emergency preventive detention legislation under which he was 
detained.
(b) Suspension of rights and Suspension o f Means for enforcement 
of rights
The Court in Pakistan had originally taken a stance similar to that of the 
Indian Supreme Court, in Mohan Chowdhury, with regard to the suspension of 
means for the enforcement of constitutional rights during an Emergency.^
52 The discussion is based on K. I. Omar, Emergency, Personal Liberty and the Courts in India 
and Pakistan, Unpublished LL.M. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 1985, 75-82.
53 [1964] A.I.R. (S.C.) 173.
^  Ibid., at 177, per Sinha C.J., delivering the judgement of the Court.
33 See Abdul Baqi Baluch v Government of Pakistan, [1968] P.L.D. (S.C.) 313, where the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan held that:
so long as the Fundamental Rights remain suspended, this question cannot be 
agitated in the Courts. For to declare the Ordinance invalid would be 
tantamount to enforcing a Fundamental Right, which cannot be done as long 
as the ... [Presidential Order suspending the enforcement of Fundamental
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But in later decisions, the Court drew a distinction between the constitutional 
rights which were suspended during an Emergency, and those rights which 
were either not suspended at all, or in respect to which only the means for 
enforcement was suspended. In Manzoor Elahi v Federation of P a k i s t a n the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan, by a majority, held that the State did not have the 
competence to enact laws which were in contravention of those constitutional 
rights which were not suspended during an Emergency. Justice Yakub Ali (as 
he was then), stressed that:
[t]his result will follow even if the President has by Order 
declared [under Article 233 (2)] that the right to move any Court 
for the enjoyment of these Fundamental Rights shall remain 
suspended while the Proclamation of Emergency is in force ...
[This is because] Article 233 [(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan,
1973] does not permit the State to make laws which are 
inconsistent with the Fundamental Rights other than ... [those]
Rights specified ... [for suspension under Article 233 (1)]. '
Justice Salahuddin Ahmed who concurred with this view observed that:
[a] Fundamental Right not suspended under Article 233 of the 
Constitution remains fully operative, and everybody ... is under 
an obligation to respect it. The mere fact that an aggrieved 
person is temporarily prevented from moving any Court for the 
enforcement of a Fundamental Right does not relieve an 
authority of its obligation to comply with it.~^
The majority of the Court in Pakistan in Manzoor Elahi concluded that a 
Presidential Order during an Emergency,59 suspending the means for the 
enforcement of rights, would only be effective if such rights themselves were 
already suspended by virtue of Article 233 (1).
Rights] ... are in force. Therefore what cannot be done directly cannot be 
allowed to be done indirectly.
Ibid., at 329
56 [1975] P.L.D. (S.C.) 66.
57 Ibid., at 84.
58 Ibid., at 126.
SQ Under Article 233 (2) of the Constitution of Pakistan.
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Suspension of Rights and the legislative power of the Executive
What now falls for consideration is the scope of the Executive to make laws in 
derogation of constitutional rights.^ The enabling circumstances in which the 
Executive can promulgate emergency legislation is different in each of the 
countries under study.
As noted in Chapter IV, the President in Sri Lanka can promulgate 
Emergency Regulations at all times during a state of emergency, regardless of 
whether Parliament is in session or n o t.^  These Emergency Regulations can 
be in derogation of most of the constitutional rights.^ The ordinance-making 
power of the President in Bangladesh, which includes emergency legislative 
powers, is operative "at any time" when Parliament is not in session or is 
dissolved. The picture in Malaysia is more complicated. It is necessary to 
distinguish the situation before and after the 1981 amendment to the 
Constitution. Prior to 1981, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in Malaysia was 
empowered to make Emergency Ordinances "until both Houses of Parliament 
are sitting".^ By the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1981, the emergency 
legislative power of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong was given operative effect "at 
any time ... except when both Houses of Parliament are sitting concurrently".^ 
The change meant that the executive power of emergency ordinance-making 
revived every time Parliament was adjourned.
The emergency ordinance-making power of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, in 
derogation of citizens’ rights, was the subject of challenge in a number of
^  In Chapter IV, the emergency legislative powers of the Executive in each of the three 
countries were examined in general terms. Here, some issues arising from the resort to 
emergency legislative powers of the Executive in Malaysia, relating to matters affecting citizens’ 
liberties are highlighted.
^  Section 5 (1), Public Security Ordinance, 1947, Ordinance No. XXV of 1947.
^  Articles 15 (1) and 15 (7), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
^  Article 93 (1), Constitution of Bangladesh.
64 Original Article 150 (2), Constitution of Malaysia.
^  Article 150 (2) as amended, ibid.
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cases. In order to better understand the range of issues involved, it is helpful to 
summarize the sequence of events giving rise to the court proceedings.
The 1969 Proclamation of Emergency
On May 15, 1969, in the face of ethnic riots in Malaysia, the Yang di-Pertuan 
issued a Proclamation of Emergency under Article 150 (1) of the Malaysian 
Constitution.^ He also simultaneously promulgated the Emergency (Essential 
Powers) Ordinance, 1969 (henceforth Emergency Ordinance, 1969),^ under 
Article 150 (2) of the Constitution. Section 2 of the Ordinance provided:
Section 2 (1): " ... [T]he Yang di-Pertuan may make any 
regulations whatsoever (in this Ordinance referred to as 
‘Essential Regulations’) which he considers desirable or 
expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Malaysia, 
the maintenance of public order and of supplies and services 
essential to the life of the community."
Section 2 (2):"... Essential Regulations may, so far as appear to 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to be necessary or expedient for any 
of the purposes mentioned ... [in Section 2 (1)]
(c) provide for the trial by such courts as 
may be specified in such regulations, of 
persons guilty of any offence against the 
regulations;
By Section 2 (4) of the Ordinance:
[a]n Essential Regulation, and any order, rule, or by-law duly 
made in pursuance of such a regulation shall have effect 
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in 
any written law, including the Constitution ....
Proclamation of Security Area
66 Proclamation of Emergency, published as P.U. (A) 145/69. 
67 Ordinance No. I of 1969.
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On the same day as the Proclamation of Emergency was made, the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong declared the whole of Malaysia to be a "Security A rea"^ in 
accordance with the provisions of s. 47 of the Internal Security Act, 1960.^ 
Enacted under the provisions of Article 149 of the Malaysian Constitution,^ 
the Internal Security Act, provided for the Proclamation of "Security Areas" by 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in places where "public security" could be 
threatened by "organised violence".^ The Act also provided for death 
sentences in arms-related offences in "Security Areas''.^
The Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975: 
Extraordinary powers affecting citizens’ rights
Several years after the Proclamation of Emergency in May, 1969, but while the 
Emergency was still continuing, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong promulgated the 
Essential (Security Cases) (Amendment) Regulations 1975^ (henceforth the 
Security Cases Regulations 1975), under the authority of the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1969. The Security Cases Regulations 1975, 
provided for special rules of procedure in court for arms-related offences in 
"Security Areas" under the Internal Security Act, 1960. The Security Cases 
Regulations 1975, provided, inter alia, for the trial of these offences by a single 
High Court judge, not preceded by preliminary inquiry before a magistrate. 
Regulations 6(1) and 7 of the Security Cases Regulations 1975, provided:
Regulation 6 (1): "Where a security case is triable by the High 
Court, no preliminary inquiry shall be held in respect thereof 
and the Magistrate before whom the accused is produced shall 
forthwith commit the accused for trial by the High Court at such 
place (whether within the same State or one as the Public
^  The Proclamation of Security Area is published as P.U. (A) 148/69.
69 Federation of Malaya Act No. 18 of 1960, revised in 1972 as Laws of Malaysia Act No. 82.
70
Article 149, Constitution of Malaysia, "Legislation against subversion, action prejudicial to 
public order ...".
^  Section 47, Internal Security Act, 1960.
Section 57, ibid.
^  Published as P.U. (A) 320, amended by P.U. (A) 362, 1975.
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Prosecutor may specify) and upon such charges as the Public 
Prosecutor may prefer."
Regulation 7:"A person who has been committed for trial under 
regulation 6 shall not be tried by a jury or by a Judge with the 
aid of assessors but shall be tried by a Judge sitting alone in 
accordance with the provisions of these Regulations."
The extraordinary procedure of trial detailed by the provisions of the Security 
Cases Regulations 1975, was in derogation of the constitutional rights of liberty 
and equality under Articles 5 and 8 of the Malaysian Constitution. The 
procedure of trial under the Regulations was also contrary to the statutory 
rights of an accused person under the Malaysian Criminal Procedure CodeJ^
Court challenges to the continued operation of emergency executive legislation 
affecting rights
In Johnson Tan Seng v Public Prosecutor one of the appellants, Teh Cheng 
Poh had been sentenced to death by a single Judge of the High Court 
(Malaya), in accordance with the provisions of the Security Cases Regulations 
1975, for offences under the Internal Security Act, 1960. On appeal before the 
Federal Court, it was argued on behalf of the appellant that the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1969, had lapsed and ceased to be law by 
effluxion of time and by force of changed circumstances. It was contended that 
as a result of this, the Security Cases Regulations 1975, made under the 
authority of the Emergency Ordinance, 1969, were void. The challenge, in 
Johnson Tan Han Seng, to the continuing use of the Emergency Ordinance, 
1969, was made in this way because the decision in a previous appeal before 
the same Court, in Public Prosecutor v Khong Teng KJien & Another, had 
made it impossible to argue otherwise about the validity of the Security Cases 
Regulations 1975.^
7  ^ Section 365, Federated Malay States (F.M.S.) Criminal Procedure Code, 1927, revised and 
consolidated by the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment and Extension) Act, 1976.
7~* [1977] 2 M.L.J. 66, sub nom. Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor.
76 [1976] 2 M.L.J. 166.
77 See Chapter IV for discussion on this case. In Khong TengKhen, Suffian L.P. had held that:
CHAPTER V 142
Refuting the contentions of the appellants in Johnson Tan Han Seng, Suffian 
L.P., in his leading opinion observed that an Emergency Ordinance could not 
lapse automatically. The Lord President pointed out that according to the 
provisions of the Malaysian Constitution, such an Ordinance could only be 
revoked by the Executive or annulled by Parliament.^ Otherwise, an 
Emergency Ordinance ceased to have effect six months after the termination 
of an Emergency.^ In his concurring opinion, Raja Azlan Shah F.J. explained 
the nature of the Security Cases Regulations 1975:
The ... [Security Cases Regulations 1975,] derive their force from 
... [Emergency Ordinance, 1969] by which the legislative power is 
given and not from the authority by which the power is 
exercised. Within the limits prescribed by Article 150 (2),... [the 
Yang di-Pertuan] has promulgated ... [the Emergency Ordinance,
1969], which by its essential nature is an enabling instrument 
giving to himself power to make ... [the Security Cases 
Regulations, 1975]...
Erroneous premises of the Federal Court decisions
The Federal Court of Malaysia in Johnson Tan Han Seng and in Khong Teng 
KJien appear not to have fully appreciated the limitations on the emergency
[the Security Cases Regulations, 1975] were made by the ... [Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong] not under clause (2) of Article 150 but under section 2 of the 
[Emergency Ordinance, 1975] and in my judgement the fact whether or not at 
the time they were made Parliament was in existence or was sitting is 
irrelevant.
Ibid., at 169.
7 0
Johnson Tan Han Seng, op. cit., at 68. Suffian L.P. was citing Article 150 (3) of the Malaysian 
Constitution, as it then was. It provided that:
[a] Proclamation and any [emergency] ordinance ... if not sooner revoked, shall 
cease to have effect if resolutions are passed by both Houses annulling such 
Proclamation or [emergency] ordinance ....
Since the adoption of the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1981, Act No. A514 of 1981, similar 
provisions are contained in Article 150 (2C).
79 The reference here is to Article 150 (7), Constitution of Malaysia.
80 Johnson Tan Han Seng, op. cit., at 75.
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legislative powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. In terms of Article 150 (2) of 
the Malaysian Constitution as then subsisting, the emergency legislative 
powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong were available only until Parliament 
reconvened.^ In the present case, the Emergency was proclaimed on May 15, 
1969, and Parliament reconvened on February 20, 1971. The Security Cases 
Regulations were promulgated in 1975 under the authority of the Emergency 
(Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1969. The Regulations were therefore made long 
after the Parliament resumed sitting, when the Yang di-Pertuan Agong had no 
further legislative authority. Writing extra-judicially about this omission, and 
comparing the past statutory emergency powers of the Executive with those 
provided by the Constitution, Tun Suffian has observed that:
I must confess that when I sat in the Federal Court in Teh Cheng 
Poh and in the earlier case, P.P. v Khong Teng Khen and Another 
... in which the same argument was advanced and rejected, I had 
not given sufficient attention to the significance of the word 
‘until’ in the phrase ‘until both Houses of Parliament are sitting’, 
and that I should have drawn a distinction between it and the 
word ‘when’; and that perhaps I have been influenced by my 
memory of the fact that during the first emergency (1948-1960)
[a carry-over from pre-Independence days,] the Executive had 
ample power to make, and frequently made, emergency 
regulations whether or not the legislature was sitting. I should 
have realized of course that the Executive was then using its 
power of making regulations delegated to it by the [pre­
independence] Emergency Powers Ordinance, No. 10 of 1948,
81 Article 150 (2), Constitution of Malaysia, previously provided:
If a Proclamation of Emergency is issued when Parliament is not sitting, the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall summon Parliament as soon as practicable, and 
may, until both Houses of Parliament are sitting, promulgate ordinances having 
the force of law, if satisfied that immediate action is required.
Emphasis added
By the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1981, Act No. A514 of 1981, the ordinance-making power 
of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong was expanded. The new Article 150 (2A) provided:
If at any time while a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, except when 
both Houses of Parliament are sitting concurrently, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
is satisfied that certain circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to 
take immediate action, he may promulgate such ordinances as circumstances 
appear to him to require.
Emphasis added.
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which [unlike the present constitutional provisions] did not 
restrict its power of making delegated legislation to any 
particular period.^
The Privy Council decision in Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor
This flawed decisions of the Federal Court in Khong Teng Khen and Johnson 
Tan Han Seng were rectified by the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh v Public 
Prosecutor,**3 an appeal by one of the parties to the Federal Court decision in 
Johnson Tan Han Seng. The decision of the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh 
has been discussed in Chapter IV.
The 1981 amendment of the Malaysian Constitution
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the emergency legislative power 
of the Executive in Malaysia, to promulgate Ordinances and Regulations, 
derogatory of constitutional and statutory rights, was at the time of the 
decisions in Khong Teng Khen, Johnson Tan Han Seng and Teh Cheng Poh 
limited to the period between the Proclamation of Emergency and the 
reconvening of Parliament. But as pointed out in the earlier Chapter, the 
Constitution was amended in 1981 and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong was 
accorded emergency legislative powers to be exercised "at any time while a 
Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, except when both Houses of 
Parliament are sitting concurrently".*^ The new constitutional provision would 
mean that the emergency legislative power of the Executive in Malaysia 
potentially revives even during a weekend recess of Parliament.*^
82 Tun Mohamed Suffian, Malaysia and India - Shared Experiences in the Law, V.V. Chitaley 
Memorial Lectures, Nagpur, All India Reporter Ltd., 1980, at 87, quoted in FA. Trindade H.P. 
Lee, Suffian ’s Contribution to Malaysian Constitutional Law, in FA. Trindade & H.P. Lee (Eds), 
The Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives and Developments, Singapore, Oxford 
University Press, 1986, 190-211, at 204.
83 [1979] 1 M.L.J. 50.
8<* Article 150 (2B), Constitution of Malaysia, introduced by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 
1981, Act No. A514 of 1981.
85
"This would mean that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong’s power to promulgate Ordinances revives 
during a week-end recess of Parliament." (H.P.Lee, Emergency Powers in Malaysia, in FA.
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*  *  *
The exanination, in this Chapter, of the techniques of curtailing constitutional 
rights during an Emergency leads to a critical appraisal of the role of the 
Courts in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh on issues arising from the 
operation of these techniques. Chapters VI, VII, and VIII will be directed to 
examine how each of the Courts in the three countries has endeavoured to 
adjudicate on issues of derogation of rights, which flow as a consequence of 
the suspension, and the suspension of means for the enforcement of 
constitutional rights during an Emergency.
Trindade & H.P. Lee (Eds), The Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives and 
Developments, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1986, 133-156, at 153, n. 44).
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CHAPTER VI
MALAYSIA:
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FORMAL STYLE
In this Chapter, the trend of interpretation of the Malaysian Court, on 
questions of the rights of citizens during states of emergency, is characterized 
as the Formal Style. 1 The discussion of the case-law in Malaysia reveals a 
propensity on the part of the Court to be bound to the text of the Constitution 
and the emergency legislation considered in isolation from questions of value. 
It is also found that the Court has applied precedents, including those from 
other jurisdictions, in a rigid and mechanical manner, without considering the 
relevance of those in the context of the decisions. The Malaysian Court’s 
approach is therefore found to adhere to the elements of the formal style of 
interpretation.
States of Emergency in Malaysia
Malaysia achieved Independence in 1957^ during the pendency of an 
Emergency imposed in 1948 by the British Administration in the face of armed 
Communist movement.^ This state of emergency continued until 1960.4
 ^The formal style of interpretation, or formalism is discussed in the Introduction, supra.
2 The name of the country at Independence was the Federation of Malaya. In 1963, the British 
colonial territories of Sarawak, Sabah (North Borneo), and Singapore was transferred to the 
Federation of Malaya. The Federation has since then been called Malaysia. Singapore left the 
Federation in 1965 to become an independent republic.
3
Emergency was declared on July 12, 1948, by a Proclamation under the Emergency Regulations 
Ordinance, 1948. The Proclamation by the British "Officer Administering the Government" of 
Malaya, and published as Gazette Notification No. 1921, July 13, 1948, No. 12, Vol. I, read:
Whereas section 3 of the Emergency Regulations Ordinance, 1948, provides 
inter alia, that the High Commissioner in Council, whenever it appears to him 
that an occasion of emergency or public danger had arisen, may, by 
proclamation, declare that a state of emergency exists, and that such 
proclamation may apply to the whole or any specified part of the Federation:
Now therefore, I, being satisfied that an occasion of emergency had arisen, do 
hereby declare that a state of emergency exists, and that this Proclamation 
shall apply to the whole of the Federation.
4 The twelve-year old Emergency was terminated on July 31, 1960, per Legal Notice 185 of 1960. 
Most of the Regulations made under the Emergency Regulations Ordinance, 1948, which were
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Malaysia’s first Proclamation of Emergency after Independence, made in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution,^ was in September, 1964^ 
on account of the ‘Confrontation’ with Indonesia.^ The Emergency was made 
applicable throughout the whole country. Two years later, in September, 1966, 
an Emergency was proclaimed in the State of Sarawak on account of 
irreconcilable conflict of interests between the Federal Government and the 
State Government of Sarawak.^ A second country-wide Emergency was 
proclaimed on May 15, 1969, in the face of ethnic rioting on controversial 
issues of electioneering in the federal and state elections. Yet another 
localised Emergency was declared in the State of Kelantan in 1977 owing to 
ruptures in the Federal-State relationship.^
Although the Constitution of Malaysia explicitly provides for the revocation of 
a Proclamatiom of Emergency, none of the four Proclamations of Emergency 
made in Malaysia since Independence have to date been terminated.^ Faced 
with issues arising out of the multiplicity of Proclamations of Emergency, the 
Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh v Public P r o s e c u to r observed that:
continued after Independence of Malaysia would have been unconstitutional if they were made 
after the Independence Constitution had come into force.
Article 150, Constitution of Malaysia.
^ The Proclamation of Emergency is published as L.N. 271/3.9.64.
7 The Confrontation with Indonesia was occasioned by Indonesia’s opposition to the transfer of 
the colonial territories of Sabah and Sarawak to Malaysia.
8 The Proclamation imposing the Emergency in the State of Sarawak is published as P.U. 
339A/14.9.1966. The political and constitutional issues of the Sarawak crisis which led to the 
imposition of emergency rule in that state are discussed in the Stephen Kalong Ningkan cases: 
Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Tun Abang Haji Openg and Tawi Sli, [1966] 2 M.L.J. 187; Stephen 
Kalong Ningkan v Tun Abang Haji Openg and Tawi Sli (No. 2), [1967] 1 M.L.J. 46; Stephen 
Kalong Ningkan v Government of Malaysia, [1968] 1 M.L.J. (F.C.) 119; Stephen Kalong Ningkan v 
Government of Malaysia, [1968] 2 M.L.J. (P.C.) 238.
9
The 1977 Proclamation, applicable only to the State of Kelantan, is published as P.U. (A) 
358/8.11.1977.
^  Article 150 (3), Constitution of Malaysia. Article 150 (3) provides for the revocation of a 
Proclamation of Emergency by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the annulment of a Proclamation 
by the Parliament. There is, however, no reference to a definite time-frame for the revocation of 
a Proclamation.
11 [1979] 1 M.L.J. 50.
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a proclamation of a new emergency declared to be threatening 
the security of the Federation as a whole must by necessary 
implication be intended to operate as a revocation of a previous 
Proclamation, if one is still in force. ^
But to overcome any effect of the implied revocation of an existing 
Proclamation of Emergency by a later Proclamation, as proposed by the Privy 
Council in Teh Cheng Poh, the Malaysian Constitution was amended in 1981 
so that different Proclamations of Emergency can operate concurrently.^
The 1969 Emergency
Of the two country-wide states of emergency proclaimed in 1964 and 1969, the 
latter Proclamation is more important in a study of the effects of emergency 
powers on citizens’ rights. This is because of the wide-ranging emergency 
legislation, restrictive of rights, adopted subsequent to the Proclamation of 
Emergency in 1969, and the constitutional amendments precipitated in the 
process.
The Proclamation
The Proclamation of Emergency issued by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on May 
15, 1969, amidst violent ethnic clashes, cited the danger to the security of the 
country as being the reason for the declaration of Emergency. The 
Proclamation was in the following terms:
Whereas We are satisfied that a grave Emergency exists 
whereby the security of the Federation is threatened;
And Whereas Article 150 of the Constitution provides that in 
the said circumstances We may issue a Proclamation of 
Emergency:
Now Therefore, We, ... Yang di-Pertuan Agong in exercise of 
the powers aforesaid do hereby proclaim that a State of
12 Ibid., at 53.
13 Article 150 (2A), Constitution of Malaysia, added by Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1981, 
Act No. A514 of 1981.
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Emergency exists, and that this Proclamation shall extend 
throughout the Federation...
Emergency Ordinances
On the same day as the Proclamation of Emergency was made, the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong promulgated the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, 
1969. In terms of this Ordinance, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong could make 
Essential Regulations aimed at "securing the public safety, the defence of 
Malaysia, the maintenance of public order and of supplies and services 
essential to the life of the community".^ More specifically, the Essential 
Regulations could provide for "the detention, exclusion and deportation of 
persons whose detention, exclusion and deportation ... [appeared] to the 
Minister for Home affairs to be expedient in the interests of the public safety 
or the defence of Malaysia ...
On May 16, 1969, a day after the Proclamation of Emergency, the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong also promulgated the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention 
of Crime) Ordinance, 1969.^ Section 4 (1) of the Ordinance stated:
If the Minister is satisfied that with a view to preventing any 
person from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order it is 
necessary that that person should be detained, or that it is 
necessary for the suppression of violence or the prevention of 
crimes involving violence that that person should be detained, 
the Minister shall make an order ... directing that that person be 
detained for any period not exceeding two years. ^
^  The Proclamation is published as P.U. (A) 145/69.
^  Ordinance No. I of 1969, published as P.U. (A) 146/69. Since its promulgation in 1969, the 
Ordinance had been amended a number of times. In 1979, in the wake of the Privy Council 
decision in Teh Chang Poll v Public Prosecutor, [1979] 1 M.L.J. 50, the Ordinance was re-enacted 
as the Emergency (Essential Powers) Act, 1979, Act No. 216 of 1979. The reasons for the 
conversion of the Ordinance into an Act are discussed in Chapter IV, supra.
^  Section 2 (1), Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1969.
^  Section 2 (2) (a), ibid.
I Q
Ordinance No. V of 1969, published as P.U. (A) 187/1969, subsequently amended a number 
of times.
19 Cf. Section 3 of the Ordinance under which any police officer may without warrant arrest and 
detain a person for upto sixty days without an order of detention for purposes of inquiry.
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In addition to the sweeping emergency powers available under these two 
Ordinances, powers under the permanent Internal Security Act, 1960,^ were 
also available to the Executive during the Emergency. An exhaustive piece of 
legislation passed under Article 149 of the Constitution of Malaysia, for the 
security of Malaysia, the long title to the Internal Security Act states:
An Act to provide for the internal security of Malaysia, 
preventive detention, the prevention of subversion, the 
suppression of organised violence against persons and property 
in specified areas of Malaysia, and for matters incidental 
thereto.
Judicial Review of Emergency Powers affecting 
Citizens’ Liberties
General Approach of the Court
In the face of this vast array of emergency powers in the hands of the 
Executive in Malaysia, one would have expected that the Court in Malaysia 
would ensure proper exercise of these powers, especially when the Emergency 
has been continuing for a extended period of time, long after the 
circumstances which had initially justified the Proclamation had ceased. On 
the contrary, as will be presently seen, the Court in Malaysia has persisted in a 
formal style of interpretation of the constitutional and statutory provisions 
relating to citizens’ rights and liberties.
As will be noticed in the following discussion, the Malaysian Court in reaching 
decisions on questions of liberty of the citizen during an Emergency, has relied 
on decisions of the English Courts given in circumstances of active war, as well 
as on decisions of the Privy Council on appeals from British India, pertaining 
to the emergency powers of the colonial Governor-General.
It will be remembered^ ^  that in Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam 
N e g e r i Suffian F.J. (as he was then), pointed out that the Constitution of
70
u Federation of Malaya Act No. 18 of 1960, revised in 1972 as Laws of Malaysia Act No. 82. 
21 See Chapter 3, supra.
22 [1969] 2 M.L.J. 129.
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Malaysia did not lay down any procedural requirement for the deprivation of 
life or personal liberty guaranteed in Article 5 of the Malaysian Constitution. In 
that decision, the learned Judge had contrasted the clause, "except according 
to procedure established by law", occuring in Article 22 of the Indian 
Constitution with the clause, "save in accordance with law" in Article 5 of the 
Malaysian Constitution.^ On the basis of this linguistic technicality, Suffian 
F.J. had held that technical errors in a detention order did not render a 
detention order inva lid .-^  This kind of formal interpretation on technical and 
narrow grounds, as exemplified by the Karam Singh decision, has permeated in 
the overhelmingly majority of the decisions of the Malaysian Court on 
questions of the liberty of citizens during times of Emergency.
Successive orders of detention
2 c
In Chu Su Bind Shafie v Superintendent o f Prisons, Pulau Jerejak, Penang, the
applicant, who had previously been detained under a technically defective 
order, was served with a fresh order of detention under Section 4 (1) of the
23 Ibid., at 148.
24 Ibid., at 153-54.
In his concurring judgement in Re: Tan Boon Liat (a Allen & Another Et Al., [1977] 2 M.LJ. 
108, Lee Hun Hoe C.J. (Borneo) observed that:
[i]f the expression ‘in accordance with law’ [in Article 5 of the Malaysian 
Constitution] were to be construed as to exclude procedure then it would make 
nonsense of Article 5.
Ibid., at 114.
In saying this, Lee Hun Hoe C.J. (Borneo) tried to give a different interpretation of Suffian 
FJ.’s holding in this regard in Karam Singh. But Suffian L.P. in the instant case of Tan Boon 
Liat reiterated his stand in Karam Singh saying that:
the courts will take a serious view of failure to comply with substantive law but 
not of failure to comply with procedural law.
Ibid., at 109.
Lee Hun Hoe C.J.’s interpretation of Article 5 of the Malaysian Constitution does not appear to 
have any other support.
25 [1974] 2 M.L.J. 194.
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Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969. In support 
of her application for habeas corpus, the applicant in Chu Su Binte Shafie 
raised three issues. The first related to the detainee taking advantage of any 
technical defect in the detention order. This meant that if the relevant 
authority was responsible for any irregularities in exercising the powers of 
detention, the detainee was entitled to capitalize on those lapses, even though 
the detention may have been justified on valid grounds.
The second issue raised by the applicant was the implication of mala fides in 
successive orders of detention. It was the position of the applicant that if a 
detention order was found defective, the order should be rescinded. A second 
detention order issued to overcome the defects of the first order showed, 
according to the applicant, that the authorities wanted her detained at any 
cost. The third issue was the non-observance of Section 5 (2) (b) of the 
detaining Ordinance relating to the furnishing of the grounds of detention to 
the detainee. In as much as this was a technical defect, the first and the third 
issues were similar.
In support of the first contention, the applicant in Chu Su Binte Shafie relied 
on a dictum of Suffian L.P. in Musa bin Salleh v Public Prosecutofä which 
concerned a detention under the Internal Security Act, 1960. In that case, the 
Lord President had observed that:
if there is any ambiguity in the law the court should lean in 
favour of the liberty of the subject which should in no way be 
diminished except by the clearest of language in the law
In Chu Su Binte Shafie, the Court felt that whatever defect might have been 
present in the earlier detention order, the subsequent order was valid and, as 
such, the implications of Suffian L.P.’s dictum in the earlier case was 
inapplicable.^
As to the contention of mala fides on the part of the Minister in passing 
successive orders of detention, the Court found:
26 [1973] 1 M.L.J. 167.
27 Ibid., at 169.
28 Chu Su Binte Shafie, op. cit., at 194.
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The relevant authorities now concede that the original order 
might well be defective but for the same reasons as moved the 
then Minister to make the first order, the present incumbent has 
made another similar order ... It is always open to the authorities 
to cure a defective order in the proceedings.^
Concerning the third issue, the Court refused to examine whether the 
requirements of Section 5 (2) (b) of the Emergency (Public Order and 
Prevention of Crime) Ordinance , 1969, relating to the grounds of detention, 
were properly met in the case. For the Court:
the failure, if any, to observe in full ... [the requirements of s. 5 
(2) (b) of the Ordinance] cannot ... invalidate the order [of 
detention] made by the Minister under section 4 (1) [of the 
Ordinance].
In support of the conclusions reached in Chu Su Binte Shafie, the Court quoted 
with approval Lord Macmillan’s observations relating to the authencity of a 
detention order in the English war-time case of Greene v Secretary of State for 
Home Affairs?^ In this regard, Lord Macmillan had observed that:
the production of the Secretary of State’s order, the authencity 
and good faith of which is in no way impugned, constitutes a 
complete and peremptory answer to the appellant’s application.
It justifies in law his detention in the absence of any relevant 
challenge of its validity, and there is no such challenge.
Yeap Hock Seng v Minister for Home Affairs
Several important issues relating to preventive detention were discussed in 
Yeap Hock Seng v Minister for Home A f f a i r s concerning a habeas corpus 
application in respect of a detention under the Emergency (Public Order and 
Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969. The applicant had denied the
29 Ibid., at 195.
30 Ibid.
31 [1942] A.C. 248.
32 Ibid., at 297, quoted in Chu Su Binte Shape, op. cit., at 195.
33 [1975] 2 M.L.J. 279.
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allegations against him contained in the statement of the grounds for his 
detention and the allegations of fact on which the detention order was made. 
This denial gave rise to a number of issues for determination by the Court. If 
the allegations were unfounded, as the applicant asserted they were, could the 
subjective determination of the Minister, to have the petitioner detained, be 
successfully challenged?
(a) Judicial review of "subjective satisfaction"
The Court in Yeap Hock Seng categorically stated its premises for the 
determination of this issue in the following terms.
It is, of course, settled law that the subjective determination of 
the Minister is not justiciable ... The courts have consistently 
declined to review the exercise of ministerial discretion when its 
validity is impugned in habeas corpus proceedings ...
The Court admitted that it could examine the grounds of detention as 
disclosed by the Minister to determine their relevance to the objects of the 
Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance under which the 
applicant was detained. But while saying this, the Court added that:
[t]he court cannot be invited to undertake an investigation into 
the sufficiency of the matters upon which the satisfaction of the 
Minister purports to be grounded ... The court does not examine 
the adequacy or truth of these materials and cannot interfere 
with the [executive] decision on the ground that if the court had 
examined them it would have come to a different conclusion.^
The rule of subjective satisfaction laid down in the non-emergency preventive 
detention case of Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari, Malaysia,
Ibid., at 282. In articulating these premises, the Court relied upon the non-emergency 
preventive detention case, Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia, [1969] 2 
M.L.J. 129, and two well-known English war-time preventive detention decisions, Liversidge v 
Anderson [1942] A.C. 206, and Greene v Secretary of State for Home Affairs, [1942] A.C. 284. An 
Indian Supreme Court decision on this point, Sadhu Singh v The Delhi Administration, [1966] 
A.I.R. (S.C.) 91, was also cited.
33 Yeap Hock Seng, op. cit., at 282.
36 [1969] 2 M.L.J. 129.
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and upheld by the Court in Yeap Hock Seng has ocassionally been the subject 
of critical obiter remarks by some Judges of the Court in Malaysia. In Yit Hon 
Kit v Minister of Home A ffa irs^  for example, Justice Edgar Joseph Jr., of the 
High Court at Penang felt that:
time is now ripe for the Supreme Court to consider if the 
statement of the law in Karam Singh that the subjective 
satisfaction of the Minister in cases of preventive detention is 
not justiciable, is, after all good law regard being had to recent 
English decisions of the highest authority ... ,3^
The learned Judge’s observation does not seem to have had any impact on the 
prevailing trend of judicial interpretation of the Court in Malaysia. In 
decisions of the Supreme Court subsequent to Yit Hon Kit, the non­
justiciability of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority laid down 
in Karam Singh has been reiterated and re-inforced.^
(b) Emergency law and the circumvention o f the ordinary criminal process
The allegations of mala fides on the part of the detaining authority, as imputed 
by the applicant in Yeap Hock Seng, related to the use of the mechanism of 
preventive detention under the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of 
Crime) Ordinance, 1969, in circumvention of the ordinary criminal law in the 
country. The petitioner contended that he was discharged at committal 
hearing on alleged charges of murder on the advice of the prosecution, but 
that he was re-arrested and detained under the Emergency (Public Order and 
Prevention o f Crime) Ordinance, 1969. This circumvention of the ordinary 
criminal process, the applicant contended, showed mala fide intention on the 
part of the detaining authority.
37 [1988] 2 M.L.J. 638.
38 Ibid., at 647. Some of the English decisions cited were, R. v Inland Revenue Commissioners; 
Ex Parte Rossminster, [1980] A.C. 952; Ridge v Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40; and Reg. v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department; Ex Parte KJiawaja, [1984] A.C. 74.
39 See for example, the non-emergency preventive detention cases of Minister for Home Affairs v 
Karpal Singh, [1988] 3 M.L.J. 29, and Theresa Lim Chin Chin v Inspector General of Police, 
[1988] 1 M.L.J. 293.
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To resolve the allegation of mala fides in the circumstances of the issues 
presented in Yeap Hock Seng, the Malaysian Court invoked a large number of 
Indian precedents, mainly of the Supreme Court of Ind ia,^  as there did not 
"seem to be any local authority" on the disputed question. Powers of 
preventive detention were exercised in all of the Indian cases cited, despite the 
fact that provisions of the ordinary criminal law would ordinarily have been 
applicable. In several instances, the Indian Supreme Court condoned the 
exercise of preventive detention powers in the midst of pending criminal 
proceedings, or by way of dropping criminal charges and then passing 
detention orders. In addition to the Indian case-law, the Malaysian Court also 
cited the Irish case of The State (Walsh and Others) v Lennon and O thers^  
where the Irish Supreme Court upheld detention orders passed against the 
appellants after nolle prosequi was entered in respect of them by the State. 
With these precedents to support its conclusion, the Malaysian Court in Yeap 
Hock Seng held that:
[m]ere circumvention of the ordinary process of law cannot by 
itself amount to mala fides as otherwise this would in most cases 
virtually result in rendering moribund and impotent the laws 
legally enacted to provide for preventive detention for specified
purposes.^
Statutory rights of a detainee
The formal style of interpretation of the Malaysian Court with regard to the 
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, and on questions of the 
sufficiency of the grounds of detention supplied to the detainee, is apparent 
even when statutory and constitutional rights of a detainee are infringed. The 
applicant for habeas corpus, before the High Court in Subramaniam v Menteri 
Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari & Orthers^ was detained for a period of two years
^  These precedents included Ashutosh Lahiry v State o f Delhi, [1953] A.I.R. (S.C.) 451; Thakur 
Prasad Bania v State of Bihar, [1955] A.I.R. (S.C.) 631; Sahib Singh Dugal v Union of India, 
[1966] A.I.R. (S.C.) 340; Debit Ghose v State o f West Bengal, [1972] A.I.R. (S.C.) 530; Borjahan 
Gorey v State of West Bengal [1972] A.I.R. (S.C.) 2256; and Abdul Aziz v District Magistrate, 
Bardwan, [1973] A.I.R. (S.C.) 770.
41 [1942] I.R. 112.
42 Yeap Hock Seng, op. cit., at 284.
43 [1977] 2 M.L.J. 82.
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under the provisions of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) 
Ordinance, 1969. Under the original provisions of Article 151 (1) (b) of the 
Constitution of Malaysia, which were in operation when the application in 
Subramanium was heard, no citizen could have been detained beyond a period 
of three months unless an Advisory Board had considered representations 
made by the detainee and recommended further detention.^ The Emergency 
(Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969 provided for this 
safeguard in similar term s.^ Although written representations were made by 
the applicant in Subramanium to the Advisory Board regarding his detention, 
those were not considered by the Board within three months. The applicant 
therefore contended that his continued detention was in breach of the 
statutory provisions of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention o f Crime) 
Ordinance and the mandatory requirements of Article 151 (1) (b) of the 
Constitution, and was thus unconstitutional.
The High Court in Subramanium was of the opinion that non-compliance with 
the statutory provisions relating to the review of applicant’s detention did not 
make the detention unlawful. The Court implicitly accepted the argument of
44 . .Original Article 151 (1) (b), Constitution of Malaysia:
Where any law or ordinance made or promulgated in pursuance of this Part 
provides for preventive detention -
(b) no citizen shall be detained under the law or ordinance for a period 
exceeding three months unless an advisory board ... has considered any 
representations made by him ... and has reported, before the expiration of that 
period, that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention.
Emphasis added.
Article 151 (1) (b) was subsequently amended, by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1976, Act 
No. A354 of 1976, so that the review by the Advisory Board was to be made within within three 
months of receiving representations from detainees, and not within three months of the 
detention. For a discussion of the reasons for this Amendment, see Chapter II, supra.
^  Section 6 (1), Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969:
Whenever any person has made any representations under section 5 (1) to an Advisory 
Board, the Advisory Board, shall within three months of the date on which such person 
was detained, consider such representations and make recommendations thereon to the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong.
Emphasis added.
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the respondents that the right of a detainee, under Article 151 (1) (b) of the 
Malaysian Constitution, to have his representations heard was a substantive 
right, whereas a delay in hearing the representations related only to a matter 
affecting procedure. With regard to the contentions of the applicant bearing 
on his constitutional rights, it was observed that:
[t]he courts are equally anxious to see that fundamental liberty 
of the subject is safeguarded ... [Nevertheless, the courts] must 
not readily lend their jurisdiction to unnecessarily interfere 
unless an infringement alleged to have been occasioned relates 
to an infringement of a real and substantive right of that 
individual as guaranteed by the Constitution. The courts must 
not be blinded by legal niceties that their approach to the whole 
issue will become very unrealistic.^
The Court characterised the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) 
Ordinance as an instrument directed solely to provide for "miscellaneous 
matters essential for the proper enforcement and execution of duties and 
functions connected with preventive detention".^ It was in this spirit of 
interpretation that the Court felt that the rights of detainees in the form of 
safeguards articulated in the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) 
Ordinance were merely "directory" and could not be regarded as "real and 
substantial" rights. That being so, the Court reasoned that non-compliance 
with these "directive" provisions would not make a detention bad in law. The 
Court’s reasoning was as follows.
[SJection 6 (1) of the ... [Emergency (Public Order and Prevention 
of Crime) Ordinance, 1969] is in effect in the nature of a 
statutory direction to the Advisory Board. It is probably open to 
a ... [detainee] to say that by right the Advisory Board should 
hear his representations and make recommendations thereon 
within three months but i t .. [is] obvious ... that such right cannot 
be held to be a real and substantive right of a citizen guaranteed 
by the Constitution an infringement of which may justify the 
Court to award a Writ of Habeas Corpus
The Court agreed that:
46 Subramanium, op. cit., at 83-84.
47 Ibid., at 84.
48 Ibid, emphasis added.
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there has been a failure to comply with the statutory direction 
but ... it ... [was not] open to ... the court to go behind such 
failure to inquire [into] the causes of it. In the final analysis ... 
mere non-compliance with the directory provision, so long as the 
Advisory Board considers the representations and makes its 
recommendations, should not ... render unlawful a detention 
lawfully m ade.^
Constitutional rights of a detainee
The High Court in Subramanium characterized the right of a detainee under 
Article 151 (1) (b) of the original Constitution of Malaysia, to have his case 
reviewed by the Advisory Board, as a substantive right. The Court, however, did 
not examine the implications of this substantive right and its co-relation with 
the statutory right under the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention o f Crime) 
Ordinance, 1969. In the appeal before the Federal Court, reported as Re Tan 
Boon Liat @ Allen & Another Et Alß® (henceforth, Tan Boon Liat 1) it was 
held that the requirement of Article 151 (1) (b) of the Constitution was 
mandatory. During the pendency of appeal, however, the Advisory Board had 
considered the representations of the detainees and made recommendations 
to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for continuation of their detentions. The Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong had accordingly confirmed the detention orders. But all this 
happened after the expiry of three months.
Before the Federal Court, the State argued that the detainees in Tan Boon 
Liat 1 could not challenge their detentions even though their detention orders 
were confirmed and continued by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong after the expiry 
of three months. Counsel for the State tried to impress upon the Court that 
under s. 6 (2) of Emergency (Public Order and Prevention o f Crime) Ordinance, 
the decision of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, as to the continuation or otherwise 
of detention, reached after consideration of the Advisory Board’s
50 [1977] 2 M.L.J. 108; sub nom. Tan Boon Liat v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari & Ors., 
Chuah Han Mow v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari & Ors., Subramanium v Menteri Hal Ehwal 
Dalam Negari & Ors.
The (Q! symbol refers to alias.
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recommendation, was final and could not be "called into question in any 
Court".^ The Federal Court did not accept the arguments of the State counsel 
and reversed the decision of the High Court.
Lord President Suffian felt that the inviolability of the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong’s decision referred to in s. 6 (2) of the Emergency (Public Order and 
Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, referred only to "real decisions" and not to 
"ultra vires decisions". Since in this case, the requirements of Constitution and 
the Ordinance were not met, the decision of the Yang di-Pertuan to confirm 
the detentions was ultra vires. On the basis of this reasoning, Suffian L.P. held 
that:
S2the court is free to order the release of the appellants.
In his concurring opinion in Tan Boon Liat 1, Lee Hun Hoe C.J. (Borneo), 
spoke of "strict compliance" with the provisions of the Constitution and the 
Law.
In such matter as fundamental as the liberty of the subject, it is
of utmost importance that there should be strict compliance with
the requirement of the Constitution and any law resulting in the
deprivation of personal liberty. ... [T]he failure of the Advisory
Board [in this case] to carry out its duty within the prescribed
time renders the continued detention after the three month
period to be unlawful as it cannot be said to be in accordance 
S3with law.
In Yit Hon Kit v Minister o f Home A f f a i r s the applicant was initially arrested 
in December, 1985, on suspicion of complicity in a murder case. While being 
held in detention, he was re-arrested under s. 3 (1) of the Emergency (Public
^  Section 6 (2), Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969:
Upon considering the the recommendations of the Advisory Board under this 
section the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may give the Minister such directions, if 
any, as he shall think fit regarding the order made by the Minister; and every 
decision of the Yang di-Pertuan thereon shall, subject to the provisions of 
section 7, be final, and shall not be called into question in any Court.
^  Tan Boon Liat 1, op. cit., at 109.
53 Ibid., at 114.
54 [1988] 2 M.LJ. 638.
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Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969.^ In February 1986, while the 
applicant was still incarcerated, the Minister for Home Affairs passed an order 
of detention under s. 4 (1) of the Ordinance. This detention order together 
with the grounds of detention was served on the detainee in the same month. 
Before the High Court at Penang it was contended on behalf of the applicant 
that the long delay in the communication of the grounds for his detention was 
a violation of Article 5 (3) of the Constitution which enjoined that:
Where a person is arrested he shall be informed as soon as may 
be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult 
and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice.^
In Yit Hon Kit, there was a delay of 57 days in communicating the grounds of 
detention by the detaining authority to the applicant. On examination of the 
provisions of Article 5 (3) of the Constitution, the Court observed that "the 
imprecision of the phrase as soon as may be in Article 5 (3) makes the 
determination of each case turn upon its own facts''.^ Regarding the case in 
issue, the Court was quite categorical in maintaining that:
it is impossible to hold, having regard to the inordinate delay of 
57 days, that there has been a sufficient compliance with the first 
limb of ... [the] requirements [of Article 5 (3) of the 
Constitution].
On this finding the Court concluded that:
there was an improper arrest and detention under section 3(1)
[of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime)
^  Section 3 (1) of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969, 
provided that:
Any police officer may without warrant arrest and detain any person in respect 
of whom he has reason to believe that there are grounds which would justify 
his detention under section 4 (1).
Section 3 (3) of the Ordinance provided a person arrested under s. 3 (1) could be detained in 
police custody for up to sixty days without a detention order being made under s. 4 (1).
Section 4 (1) of the Ordinance, quoted supra, empowered the Minister to pass detention orders.
^  Article 5 (3)„ Constitution of Malaysia, emphasis added.
^  Yit Hon Kit, op. cit., at 641.
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Ordinance, 1969] for non-compliance with the first limb of 
Article 5 (3) [of the Constitution] and, that in any event, the 
applicant’s detention during the period when enquiries under 
section 3 (1) ended and detention under section 4 (1) [of the 
Ordinance] began was unlawful.^
*  *  *
It should be noted that Tan Boon Liat 1 and Yit Hon Kit are two of those few 
decisions in Malaysia where emergency powers of the state have been strictly 
construed.^
Scope and application of Emergency Ordinances
The formal style of interpretation of the Malaysian Court is quite obvious 
when the Court is seen to inquire into the general scope and application of 
emergency legislation. In Re Application of Tan Boon Liat @ A. Allen^  
(henceforth, Tan Boon Liat 2), the applicant was detained under s. 4 (1) of the 
Emergency (Public Order and Prevention o f Crime) Ordinance, 1969, for being a 
"drug dealer" and thereby causing an increase in criminal activities. Section 4 
(1) of the Ordinance empowered the Minister to pass orders of detention to 
prevent persons from acting in any manner prejudicial to "public order" or for 
the suppression of "violence" or the prevention of "crimes involving 
violence".^ The statement of the grounds on which the detention order was 
passed against the applicant in this case stated:
That you are an active local ‘infra-stucture’ member of an 
international drug distribution syndicate. Your activities have 
not only damaged the international image of Malaysia but have 
also caused an increase in criminal activities involving violence
59 Ibid., at 644.
^  See also Koh Yoke Koon v Minister for Home Affairs, [1988] 1 M.L.J. 45, and the decision in 
the Supreme Court appeal, reported as Public Prosecutor v Koh Yoke Koon, [1988] 2 M.L.J. 301.
^  [1976] 2 M.L.J. 83, sub nom. Tan Boon Liat v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari, Malaysia & 
Others.
^  The text of s. 4 (1) of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969, 
is quoted supra.
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connected with drugs and y  
prejudicial to public order.
ou have thereby acted in a manner
On behalf of the applicant in Tan Boon Liat 2, it was argued that the charges 
of "drug trafficking" were related to the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, 1952,^ 
and not to the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 
1969. The scope of the latter Ordinance, it was argued, was limited; it applied, 
and was intended to apply only for the purposes of suppressing activities 
involving violence and preventing crimes of violence. In support of these 
arguments, the applicant relied on the Preamble to the Emergency (Public 
Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, which was in the following terms:
Whereas by reason of the existence of a grave emergency 
threatening the security of Malaysia, a Proclamation of 
Emergency has been issued by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
under Article 150 of the Constitution;
And whereas the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that 
immediate action is required for securing public order, the 
suppression of violence and the prevention of crimes involving 
violence;
The applicant in Tan Boon Liat 2 stressed that the necessity of immediate 
action highlighted in the Preamble meant that the Ordinance was directed to 
restore "order" in the immediate aftermath of the Proclamation of Emergency. 
Therefore the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention o f Crime) Ordinance, 
according to the applicant, could only have contemplated acts or crimes of 
violence committed within a reasonable period after the Emergency was 
declared in May, 1969, and was obviously intended to operate only until 
"public order" was restored.
The Court in Tan Boon Liat 2 rejected these arguments and held that the 
scope of the power of detention available under s. 4 of the Ordinance was to be 
determined by the express provisions of that section alone. The Court 
observed that:
63 A statement of the "grounds of detention" was required to be made under s. 5 (2) (b) of the 
Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969. The "grounds of detention" 
are reproduced in the judgment of Tan Boon Liat 2 at 83.
64 Ordinance No. XXX of 1952.
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the preamble to the [Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of 
Crime) Ordinance, 1969] is not relevant for the purposes of 
construing or considering the scope of the provisions of section 4 
(1) thereof as there is no ambiguity whatsoever in the latter.^
According to the Court, the need for "immediate action" for securing "public 
order", the "suppression of violence" and the "prevention of crimes involving 
violence", specified in the Preamble, were a generalised expression of the 
objective of the Ordinance. The introductory expressions in the recital to the 
Ordinance, could not, so the Court felt, control, qualify or restrict the 
provisions contained in the Ordinance. Referring to the wide powers of the 
State to pass orders of preventive detention under the enacted provisions of 
the Ordinance notwithstanding the recital in the Preamble, the Court observed 
that:
[the Preamble recites] general and wide words projecting the 
purpose and purport of the Ordinance and ... the enacting 
provisions of section 4 elaborate and provide for that purpose 
and purport in much wider terms, as they empower the Minister 
to order the detention of a person with a view to preventing him 
from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order ... - an 
amplification of the phrase ‘for securing public order’ appearing 
in the pream ble.^
The conclusion of the Malaysian Court in Tan Boon Liat 2 that "drug 
trafficking" was an activity that endangered "public security" was sought to be 
supported by several decisions of the Supreme Court of India.^^ In most of the 
Indian precedents cited by the Malaysian Court, detention for purposes 
extraneous to the stated objectives of prevention detention statutes, such as 
smuggling and black-marketeering, were generally sanctioned by the Indian 
Court. The Malaysian Court’s conclusion that "drug dealing" and "public order" 
were related, was summed up in the following way.
^  Tan boon Liat 2, op. cit., at 85.
66 Ibid., emphasis in original.
7 Some of these decisions were, Rameshwarlal Patwari v State of Bihar, [1968] A.I.R. (S.C.) 
1303; Kami Biswas v State of West Bengal, [1972] A.I.R. (S.C.) 1656; S. Kedar v State of West 
Bengal, [1972] A.I.R. (S.C.) 1647.
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[Trafficking in drugs ... strikes at the very core of public order 
and any person indulging in such activities must necessarily be 
acting in a manner prejudicial to public order. ... Trafficking in 
drugs ... [breeds crimes] that ultimately result in violence or at 
least have a shattering effect on public tranquillity and society 
generally.^
The Preamble to the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) 
Ordinance was also relied upon by the applicants in Re: P.E. Long @ Jimmy & 
Others concerning detentions on allegations of "drug trafficking". Here, the 
Malaysian Court adopted the technical argument that the Preamble was not 
part of the statute. The Court observed that:
the preamble is not part of the Ordinance although one can look 
into it to understand the scope of the Ordinance ...
On behalf of the detainees in P.E. Long, it was contended that "drug 
trafficking" did not come within the scope of the Ordinance. Instead of trying 
to relate "drug trafficking" to the declared objective of the Ordinance, the 
Court felt that the expression, "securing public order" in the recital to the 
Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance encompassed a 
wide variety of offences, which could not be listed in the Preamble. A very wide 
application of the expression "securing public order" was suggested by the 
Court.
[T]he words ‘securing public order’ contemplated dealing with 
all acts which were a threat to peace, order and good 
Government
Foreclosing court challenges to detention
The conclusions reached by the Malaysian Court on matters of preventive 
detention by a formal interpretation of the relevant constitutional and
^  Tan boon Liat 2, op. cit., at 88.
^  [1976] 2 M.L.J. 133; sub nom. P.E. Long & Others v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari 
Malaysia & Others.
70 Ibid., at 136.
71 Ibid., emphasis added.
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statutory provisions, were sometimes sought to be directed to foreclose future
72challenges to detention on similar grounds. In Tan Boon Liat 2, for example, 
the learned Judge deciding the case made the following observations.
I would ... express the hope that my judgement in this matter will 
have served a purpose, if for nothing else, at least perhaps in 
providing a sufficient contraceptive against the proliferation of 
like applications for habeas corpus founded on the identical 
contention.^
*  *  *
In the Introduction, it was indicated that the formal style of interpretation 
stressed a rigid precedent-oriented approach to legal issues and the isolation 
of legal questions from any consideration of values. Both of these 
characteristics of the formal style are attendant in judicial decision-making in 
Malaysia in quite a pronounced way.
The jurisprudence of Formalism of the Malaysian Court, as illustrated by the 
judicial decisions discussed in this Chapter will be critically examined in 
Chapters IX and X. In these later Chapters, the implications of the Malaysian 
Court’s jurisprudence as regards the basic concerns of citizens’ rights, and the 
principles of limited government will be addressed. Chapters IX and X will also 
be directed to study the nature of citizens’ rights and examine theories of 
judicial review opposed to the formal style of interpretation.
^  Re Application of Tan Boon Liat @ A. Allen, [1976] 2 M.L.J. 83. 
73 Ibid., at 88.
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SRI LANKA:
UNCOORDINATED JURISPRUDENCE
At Independence in 1948, the Constitution of Ceylon 1 did not contain a Bill of 
Rights.^ Even after the adoption of an autochthonous Constitution for the 
Republic of Sri Lanka in 1972, citizens’ rights were merely declared, and were 
stated to be non-justiciable.3 Rights of citizens in Sri Lanka were entrenched 
for the first time under the Constitution of 1978. Prior to 1978, therefore, 
Emergency rule in Ceylon/Sri Lanka was not impeded in any way by the 
operation of constitutional guarantees.
In the pre-1978 period, the Court in Sri Lanka adopted a formal style of 
interpretation to questions concerning the exercise of emergency powers of the 
State and its impact on the liberties of citizens. The Sri Lankan Court, during 
this period, persisted in a text-bound inquiry of emergency legislation in its 
interpretation of the powers available to the State under such laws.
Although the new constitutional order introduced by the Constitution of 1978 
differed significantly from the previous orders, the Supreme Court of Sri 
Lanka has failed to evolve any distinct approach to constitutional 
interpretation and in particular to the resolution of questions of the operation 
of constitutional rights. On the one hand, the Court has persisted in an enquiry 
based on the formal style of interpretation which characterized the earlier era 
of its decision-making. On the other hand, one finds the Supreme Court 
occasionally critical of State power derogating from citizens’ rights. The 
significance of such attempts is, however, by and large rendered illusory when 
the Supreme Court at the same time bases its reasoning on precedents from 
other jurisdictions concerned with different contexts. On the whole, the 
jurisprudence of the Court in Sri Lanka during this period can be
 ^ Prior to the adoption of an autochtonous Constitution in 1972, Sri Lanka was known as 
Ceylon. Ceylon’s Independence Constitution (1948) was based on the pre-Independence Ceylon 
(Constitution) Order in Council, 1946, as modified by the Ceylon Independence Order in Council, 
1947 and the Ceylon Independence Act, 1947, 11 & 12 G. 6, c. 7. See Chapter I, supra.
2
A brief account of the controversy relating to a Bill of Rights in the Ceylon (Constitution) 
Order in Council, 1946 is given in Chapter I.
See Chapter I, supra.
3
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characterized as "Uncoordinated Jurisprudence" or a "Jurisprudence of 
Discordance".
States of Emergency in Sri Lanka
Since Independence in 1948, Sri Lanka experienced numerous states of 
emergency. Proclamations of Emergency under the Public Security Ordinance, 
1947,4 were made in 1953, 1958, 1961, 1962, 1966, 1971, 1978, 1980, 1982, 
1983.^ The longest of these states of emergency have been the ones declared 
in 1971 and 1983. This Chapter will examine the use of emergency powers and 
the jurisprudence of the Sri Lankan Court in this regard during these two 
states of emergency.
The Remedy of Habeas Corpus prior to 1978
During the period preceding the entrenchment of constitutional rights in the 
Constitution of 1978, personal liberty in Sri Lanka was safeguarded by a 
statutory guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus. Until 1973, this guarantee was 
provided by the Courts Ordinance, 1889.^ By section 45 of this Ordinance, the 
Supreme Court of Ceylon was granted the power to issue a mandate in the
^ Ordinance No. XXV of 1947, Legislative Enactments of Ceylon, Cap. 40.
 ^ For the dates and context of the Proclamations of Emergency in 1953, 1958, 1961, 1962, and 
1966, see Joseph Minattur, Emergency Powers in Sri Lanka, (1982) 24 Journal of the Indian Law 
Institute 57; James Jupp, Constitutional Development in Ceylon since Independence, (1968) 41 
Pacific Affairs 169; James Jupp, Sri Lanka - Third World Democracy, London, Frank Cass & 
Co., 1978, 7-14.
The 1978 Emergency, occasioned by a cyclonic storm is briefly discussed in A. Jeyaratnam 
Wilson, The Guallist System in Asia: The Constitution of Sri Lanka (1978), London, 
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980, at 55.
The 1980 Proclamation issued on 16 July 1980 (Government Gazette Extraordinary No 97/6) 
was directed to deal with widespread trade union "strikes".
The 1982 Emergency was declared on 20 October 1982 (Government Gazette Extraordinary No 
215/7) was for political reasons in connection with presidential elections.
The 1971 and 1983 Proclamations of Emergency are discussed infra.
^ Ordinance No I of 1889, Legislative Enactments of Ceylon, Cap. 6.
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nature of a writ of habeas corpus which might be directed to a person to 
produce before the Court, "the body of any person to be dealt with according 
to law ... [or] the body of any person illegally or improperly detained in public 
or private custody". In 1973, the Courts Ordinance, 1889, was repealed, and the 
remedy of habeas corpus came to be provided by the Administration o f Justice
n
Law, 1973. The provisions relating to the grant and issue of mandates in the
Q
nature of writs of habeas corpus, contained in section 12 of this 1973 Act° were 
similar to those of section 45 of the Courts Ordinance, 1889.
Upon a Proclamation of Emergency in Ceylon/Sri Lanka under the previous 
constitutional orders of 1948 and 1972,  ^ it was usual to suspend the safeguard 
to personal liberty, by way of the remedy of habeas corpus. This was done by 
Emergency Regulations. Thus, after the Proclamation of Emergency in 1971, 
Regulation 55 of the Emergency Regulations 1971 declared:
Section 45 of the Courts Ordinance shall not apply in regard to 
any person detained or held in custody under any emergency
regulation.^
7 Act No. 44 of 1973.
8 Section 12 (2), Administration of Justice Law, 1973:
The Supreme Court may grant and issue mandates in the nature of writs of 
habeas corpus to bring up before such court -
(a) the body of any person to be dealt with according to law; or
(b) the body of any person illegally or improperly detained in public or private 
custody;
and to discharge or remand any person so brought up or otherwise deal with 
such person according to law ....
^ A Proclamation of Emergency was made in accordance with the powers available under the 
Public Security Ordinance, 1947, Ordinance No. XXV of 1947. The 1972 Constitution included 
some provisions relating to the mode of declaration of an Emergency by the President. See 
Section 134, Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1972.
^  The text of Regulation 55 is quoted in the opinion of H.N.G. Fernando CJ. in Janak 
Hirdaramani vA.R. Ratnavale, (1972) 75 N.L.R. 67, at 87.
It was during the Emergency of 1958 that the operation of the remedy of habeas corpus provided 
by section 45 of the Courts Ordinance, 1889, was excluded for the first time. Regulation 18 (10) 
of the Emergency Regulations of 1958 was phrased in the same language as Regulation 55 of the 
Emergency Regulations of 1971. See the concurring judgement of G.PA. Silva S.PJ. in Janak 
Hirdaramani, at 92.
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In S. Gunasekera v A. Ratnavale, ^  ^  the mechanism for the suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus during an Emergency in Sri Lanka was justified by 
reference to similar techniques in other constitutional systems. Referring to 
the provision for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under the 
Constitution of the U . S . A . a n d  under the emergency provisions of the Indian 
Constitution, Alles J. in Gunasekera observed that
[i]f written Constitutions like those of the United States and 
India, which recognize the liberty of the subject as a 
fundamental right, can make provision for the suspension of 
Habeas Corpus in their Constitutions in certain circumstances, I 
see no reason why our Sovereign Parliament cannot make such a 
provision by legislation and call for such a suspension in times of 
grave em ergency.^
Post 1978 - The Constitutional Remedy
11 (1973) 76 N.L.R. 316.
12 Constitution of the United States of America, Article I, Section 9, Paragraph 2:
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless 
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public safety may require it.
13 Under Article 359 (1) of the Indian Constitution, the President, consequent to a 
Proclamation of Emergency can, by Order, suspend the enforcement of specified constitutional 
rights. Until the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 (with effect from 20-6-1979), 
a Presidential Order Article 359 (1) could suspend the enforcement of the right to life and 
liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. This was in fact done during the States of 
Emergency of 1962-1969 and 1971-1977. Suspension of enforcement of the right to liberty meant 
that applications for the writ of habeas corpus was effectively suspended. After the passage of 
the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, Article 359 (1) of the Indian Constitution 
reads:
Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, may by order declare that 
the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the rights conferred 
by Part III (except Articles 20 and 21) as may be mentioned in the order and 
all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights so 
mentioned shall remain suspended for the period during which the 
Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in the 
order.
Cf Article 141C, Constitution of Bangladesh.
14 S. Gunasekera v A. Ratnavale, (1973) 76 N.L.R. 316, at 334.
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Under the present, 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka, the "Fundamental Rights" 
in Chapter III of the Constitution^ have been declared to be enforceable by 
petitioning the Supreme Court. Article 17 of the Constitution, which is itself a 
"Fundamental Right", provides:
Every person shall be entitled to apply to the Supreme Court, as 
provided by Article 126, in respect of the infringement or 
imminent infringement, by executive or administrative action, of 
a fundamental right to which such person is entitled under the 
provisions of this Chapter.
By Article 126 of the Constitution of Sri Lanka, the Supreme Court has been
vested with the "sole and exclusive jurisdiction" to determine questions relating
to the operation of the constitutional rights of citizens.^ An application
alleging infringement of a constitutional right is heard by the Supreme Court,
after "leave" on the matter has been granted.^ The Court of Appeal in Sri
Lanka may also refer cases of infringement of constitutional rights to the
Supreme Court, where during hearing of applications for the writ of habeas
18corpus, there is prima facie evidence for such infringement.
^  Articles 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14, Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
^  Article 126, Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978. Article 126 (1) states:
The Supreme Court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and 
determine any question relating to the infringement or imminent infringement 
by executive or administrative action of any fundamental right or language 
right declared and recognized by Chapter III or Chapter IV.
^  Article 126 (2), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978:
Where any person alleges that any fundamental right or language right relating 
to such person has been infringed or is about to be infringed by executive or 
administrative action, he may himself or by a attorney-at-law on his behalf, 
within one month thereof, in accordance with such rules of court as may be in 
force, apply to the Supreme Court by way of petition in writing addressed to 
such Court praying for relief or redress in respect of such infringement. Such 
application may be proceeded with only with leave to proceed first had and 
obtained from the Supreme Court, which leave may be granted or refused, as 
the case may be, by not less than two judges.
^  Article 126 (3), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978:
Where in the course of hearing in the Court of Appeal into an application for 
orders in the nature of a writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition, 
procedendo, mandamus or quo warranto, it appears to such Court that there is 
prima facie evidence of an infringement or imminent infringement of the 
provisions of Chapter III or Chapter IV by a party to such application, such
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Unlike the statutory remedy of habeas corpus, Articles 17 and 126 of the 
present Constitution of Sri Lanka are constitutional remedies and are not 
directly affected by a Proclamation of Emergency. However, most of the 
guaranteed constitutional rights for the protection of which this remedy exists 
are "suspended" during an Emergency. By Article 15 (7) of the Constitution, 
the right to liberty and freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention,^ the 
rights to speech, expression, assembly and movement, and the rights to
equality^, have been made subject to restrictions in the interests of "national
• • 22 security" and "public order".
Pre 1978 - Judicial Review of Detention
Before an examination of the role of the Sri Lankan Court during a state of 
emergency under the present Constitution is undertaken, it will be useful to 
discuss how the Court had performed in times of Emergency under the 
previous constitutional orders. Of the several periods of emergency rule in 
Ceylon/Sri Lanka since Independence till the adoption of the 1978 
Constitution, this discussion will focus on the Emergency proclaimed in 1971. 
In deciding questions of encroachment on the liberties of citizens by the 
operation of emergency laws during this Emergency, the Supreme Court of Sri 
Lanka is found to pursue an formal style of interpretation. The role of the Sri 
Lankan Court during this period is found to be similar to that of the Malaysian 
Court as discussed in the last Chapter.
The Proclamation of Emergency in 1971
Court shall forthwith refer such matter for determination by the Supreme 
Court.
^  Article 13, Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
^  Article 14, Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
^  Article 12, Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
^  See Chapter V, supra.
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An Emergency was declared in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) on March 16, 1971^ in the 
wake of some incidents of political violence by left revolutionaries.^ The 
Proclamation of Emergency by the Governor-General under section 2 of the 
Public Security Ordinance, 1947, brought into force the provisions of Part II of 
the Ordinance."^ Emergency Regulations made by the Governor-General 
under section 5 in Part II of the Public Security Ordinance enabled, among a 
wide range of other stringent controls, the detention of persons.^ By section 9 
of the Public Security Ordinance, Emergency Regulations could not be called 
into question in any Court:
23 Asian Recorder, Vol XVII, No 17, April 23-29, 1971.
In Janak Hirdaramani v Ratiiavale, (1972) 75 N.L.R. 67, Samerawickrame J., in his concurring 
judgement, quoted the following extract regarding the Proclamation of Emergency from the 
affidavit of the Permanent Secretary of Defence and External Affairs, a respondent in that case.
On or about the 16th day of March, 1971, His Excellency the Governor- 
General, by reason of the existence of a state of public emergency, declared by 
Proclamation dated the 16th day of March, 1971, that Part II of the Public 
Security Ordinance shall come into operation in the interests of public security, 
the preservation of public order and the maintenance of supplies and services 
essential to the life of the community ....
^  Widespread armed insurrection did not break out till after a couple of weeks of the 
Proclamation of Emergency. The insurrection, engineered by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 
(JVP) [or the People's Liberation Front (PLF)\, "was put down ruthlessly by government forces". 
(A.J. Wilson, Politics of Sri Lanka, London, Macmillan Press, 1971, at 163. See also J. Jupp, Sri 
Lanka - Third World Democracy, London, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1978, at 19.
23 Section 2 (1) of the Public Security Ordinance, 1947, (as at 1971) provided:
Where, in view of the existence or imminence of a state of public emergency, 
the Governor-General is of opinion that it is expedient so to do in the interests 
of public security and the preservation of public order or the maintenance of 
supplies and services essential to the life of the community, the Governor- 
General may, by Proclamation published in the Gazette, declare that the 
provisions of Part II of this Ordinance shall come into operation forthwith or 
on such date as may be specified in the Proclamation.
Section 5 (1) of the Public Security Ordinance, 1947, authorised the making of Emergency 
Regulations for safeguarding "public security", "preservation of public order", "suppression of 
mutiny, riot or civil commotion" or "maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of 
the community". Among several broad categories enumerated in section 5 (2), necessitating the 
making of Emergency Regulations are preventive detention, search and seizure, and special 
procedure for trial of offenders. By section 5 (2) (d), Emergency Regulations may provide for 
amending any law or for suspending the operation of any law. See below, Regulation 18 of 
Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations, No 6 of 1971.
More than 16, 000 people were detained under the Emergency Regulations of 1971. Of this 
figure, nearly 15,000 were youths. See, AJ. Wilson, op. cit., at 163; also J. Jupp, op.cit., at 317.
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No emergency regulation, and no order, rule or direction made 
or given thereunder shall be called into question in any court.
In accordance with this immunity, Regulation 18 (10) of the Emergency 
(Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations, No. 6 of 1971 (henceforth 
Emergency Regulations 1971) provided for the exemption from Court, the 
scrutiny on any ground whatsoever, of detention orders made under that 
Regulation.^
The Janak Hirdaramani case
Regulation 18 (1) of the Emergency Regulations 1971 authorized the 
Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs of the 
Government of Ceylon to make an order for the taking into custody and 
detention of a person if he was of the opinion that such order was necessary 
with a view to preventing that person from acting in any manner prejudicial to
J O
the "public safety" and to the maintenance of "public order". 1
In Janak Hirdaramani v R atnavale^  the petitioner was detained under 
Regulation 18 (1) of the Emergency Regulations 1971 on the belief that he was
^  See Janak Hirdaramani v Ratnavale, (1972) 75 N.L.R. 67, at 86,104.
28 Regulation 18 (1) of the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations, No 6 
of 1971 read:
Where the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and External 
Affairs is of opinion with respect to any person, that, with a view to preventing 
such person -
(a) from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety, or to the 
maintenance of public order, or to the maintenance of essential services; or
(b) from acting in any manner contrary to any of the provisions of sub- 
paragraph (a) or paragraph (2) of regulation 38 or regulation 24 of these 
regulations,
it is necessary to do so, the Permanent Secretary may make order that such 
person be taken into custody and detained in custody.
The text of Regulation 18 (1) is given in the concurring judgement of Samerawickrame J. in 
Janak Hirdaramani v Ratnavale, (1972) 75 N.L.R. 67, at 112.
29 (1972) 75 N.L.R. 67.
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connected with a foreign exchange smuggling operation, which was under 
investigation. The petitioner applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas 
corpus under section 45 of the Courts Ordinance, 1889, despite the suspension 
of the writ by Regulation 55 of the Emergency Regulations 1971. The Court had 
therefore to decide whether it was competent on its part to issue a writ on the 
grounds argued by the petitioner, notwithstanding the intended effect of 
Regulation 55.
It was contended on behalf of the State in Janak Hirdaramani, that the 
unlawful financial transactions of the petitioner helped finance, directly or 
indirectly, insurgent activities in Ceylon. On behalf of the petitioner, it was 
contended that the petitioner’s detention was not directed towards securing 
the purposes of Regulation 18, namely to prevent him from acting in any 
manner prejudicial to "public safety" or the maintenance of "public order", but 
was for the "ulterior motive" of facilitating interrogation and investigation 
relating to foreign exchange smuggling. Having thus impugned the "good faith" 
of the Permanent Secretary who ordered the detention of the petitioner, it was 
contended that the detaining authority could not properly be "of opinion" 
under Regulation 18 that the detention was necessary for the purposes of that 
Regulation.
(a) "Good faith" of the detaining authority
To rebut the allegations of impropriety of the detaining authority made by the 
petitioner in Jcuiak Hirdaramani, Fernando C.J., in his leading opinion, relied 
on several observations in the English war-time decisions of Liversidge v 
Anderson^  and Greene v Secretary o f S t a t e On the basis of these
[1942] A.C. 206. Regulation 18B of the British Defence (General) Regulations 1939, 
authorised the Secretary of State to order the detention of any person if he had "reasonable 
cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or associations or to have been recently in acts 
prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm ... ". The Defence Regulations were 
made by the King in Council as provided by the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939. Of these 
Defence Regulations in general, and Regulation 18B in particular, Lord Maugham had 
remarked in Liversidge:
I cannot myself believe that those responsible for the Order in Council could 
have contemplated for a moment the possibility of the action of the Secretary 
of State being subject to the discussion, criticism and control of a judge in a 
court of law.
Ibid., at 220.
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precedents, the learned Chief Justice concluded that the scope of an 
investigation into the question whether the Permanent Secretary did in fact 
form an opinion stated in his order under Regulation 18 would be "narrow and 
purposeless".*^ The Chief Justice upheld the detention order by presuming the 
"good faith" of the detaining authority.
The C ourt... [has] to commence by presuming the good faith of 
the Permanent Secretary [in ordering the detention]. ... Even if 
the fact that intensive investigation and interrogations did take 
place, could have led the Court to an inference that the 
Detention Order was made for an ulterior purpose, the affidavit 
[of the Secretary of State] serves to explain what had in the first 
instance to be presumed from the order itself, namely that the
In the same case, Lord Macmillan posed the question:
But how can a court of law deal with the question whether the was reasonable 
cause to believe that it was necessary to exercise control over the person 
proposed to be detained, which is a matter of opinion and policy, not of fact?
Ibid., at 253.
In answer to this question, Lord Macmillan quoted Lord Parker in The Zamora, [1916] 2 A.C. 
77 at 107:
Those who are responsible for the national security must be the sole judges of 
what the national security requires. It would be obviously undesirable that such 
matters should be made the subject of evidence in a court of law or otherwise 
discussed in public.
Quoted ibid., at 253.
^  [1942] A.C. 284. In Greene, Viscount Maugham had remarked:
It would be useless to attempt to examine the truth of the fact alleged in the 
order in a case where the fact relates to the personal belief of the Secretary of 
State, formed partly at least on grounds which he is not bound to disclose.
Ibid., at 296.
In the same case Lord Wright had concluded:
The order made by the Home Secretary in the terms of reg. 18B speaks for 
itself. It is admissible as a public executive document to show a good cause of 
the detention and needs no extrinsic justification. It is good on its face unless 
and until it is falsified.
Ibid., at 306.
32 Janak Hirdaramani, op. cit., at 78.
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Permanent secretary entertained some suspicion that the 
activities of the detainee may directly or indirectly be connected 
with the prevailing conditions of insurgency
Chief Justice Fernando noted the assertion of the Permanent Secretary that 
the materials on the basis of which petitioner in Janak Hirdaramcuii was 
detained were confidential, and observed that the Court would assume that 
this claim was genuine.
[The Permanent Secretary] has ... stated on oath ... that the 
material upon which he formed his opinion cannot be disclosed 
in the public interest. These statements relate to matters the 
correctness of which the Court could ordinarily assum ed
Although the Permanent Secretary was prepared to make the relevant 
materials available for the perusal of the Court, the Court declined the offer. 
The offer of disclosure by the Permanent Secretary was regarded "as a mark of 
good faith".^ Chief Justice Fernando suggested that there could be cases in 
which the Court may inquire into the "good faith" of an executive order.
If it is prima facie shown that an official who makes a particular 
executive order had an antecedent motive against the person 
affected by the order, or had an antecedent bias in favour of a 
person benefited by the order, then I think I think the Court may 
call upon the official to disprove the existence of bias or to 
establish that his action was not influenced by bias.*^
Having said this, the Chief Justice pointed to the extraordinary circumstances 
of the case being decided, and upheld the non-disclosure of the facts upon 
which the detention was ordered.
[E]ven if such antecedent bias was to be shown in the 
circumstances of the instant case, the special feature of the 
Permanent Secretary’s inability to disclose facts leading to the
Ibid., at 85.
Ibid., at 86, per H.N.G. Fernando C.J.
Ibid.
Ibid., at 79.
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formation of his opinion might well be a reason why a proper 
investigation cannot be held.
Chief Justice Fernando went to the extent of saying that:
[e]ven a mistaken opinion [on the part of the Permanent 
Secretary in ordering a detention] will not invalidate a detention 
order, and want of good faith can be established only by positive 
proof that the Permanent Secretary did not indeed form that
opinion.^
(b) Communication o f Grounds of Detention to a Detainee
Regulation 18 (4) of the Emergency Regulations 1971 made provision for a 
person aggrieved by a detention order to make objections to an Advisory 
Committee, consisting of persons appointed by the Governor-General. By 
Regulation 18 (5), the Advisory Committee was to communicate the grounds 
of detention to a detainee who filed an objection to his detention.^ Although 
in Janak Hirdaramani, the Court was not asked "to consider any ground stated 
by an Advisory Commi t te e" , t he  petitioner contended before the Court that 
the grounds stated in the affidavit of the detaining authority, on which the 
detention order was based were "vague" and "uncertain". The petitioner relied 
on several precedents of the Indian Supreme Court,'^ where detentions under 
the prevention detention statute were challenged as contravening the
'VI Ibid. The Chief Justice felt that the "Permanent Secretary may be virtually unable to defend 
himself' if the Court undertook an investigation whether the relevant facts existed for him to 
form an "opinion" as to the need for detention.
T Q
Ibid., at 77, per Fernando CJ.
The mechanism of the working of an Advisory Committee is discussed by G.PA.. Silva S.PJ. 
in Janak Hirdaramani, at 107. Regulation 18 (6), (7) and (8) prescribed the procedure to be 
followed by an Advisory Committee and empowered the Permanent Secretary to revoke an 
order of detention made by him after consideration of the report of the Advisory Committee.
^  The Court was "not aware that objections were made to an Advisory Committee" by the 
petitioner in Janak Hirdaramani, or that the Committee had communicated any "grounds of 
detention" to him, ibid., at 82-83, per Fernando C.J.
^  These were non-Emergency preventive detention cases. The detentions were under the 
Preventive Detention Act, 1950, Act 4 of 1950. The principal case in this regard discussed by the 
Sri Lankan Court was Bombay v Atma Ram, [1951] A.I.R. (S.C.) 157.
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constitutional guarantee for communication of the grounds of detention to the
detainees.^
In dealing with this contention, Fernando C.J. drew a distinction between the 
"conditional" requirement of an Emergency Regulation and the mandatory 
prerequisite of an entrenched constitutional provision.
[A]ny resemblance between the purely conditional requirement in 
our Regulation 18 for a statement of grounds by an Advisory 
Committee, and the peremptory constitutional requirement 
contained in Article 22 of the Constitution of India, is only 
superficial... [A]ny omission of the Permanent Secretary (even if 
there be such an omission in the instant case) to furnish grounds 
for detention in an affidavit ... cannot be compared with the 
failure on the part of a detaining authority in India to comply 
with a provision of the Constitution designed for the protection 
of a fundamental right.^
(c) Alternative remedy o f a Detainee
In Janak Hirdaramani, Chief Justice Fernando was confident of the efficacy of 
the remedy of representation by a detainee to the Prime Minister.
It is also significant that Regulation 18 itself requires a detainee 
to be informed of his right to make representations to the Prime 
Minister; this is presumably in order that the Prime Minister will
^  Article 22, Constitution of India:
(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being 
informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be 
denied the right to consult, and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his 
choice.
(5) When a person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law 
providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as 
soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order 
has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity to make a 
representation against the order.
Cf. Article 151 (1), Constitution of Malaysia; Articles 33 (1) and 33 (5), Constitution of 
Bangladesh.
Janak Hirdaramani, op.cit., at 84. Emphasis in original.43
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consider any such representations, and that in an appropriate 
case such representations can result in the release of the 
detainee.^
(d) Personal Liberty during an Emergency
In his leading opinion in Janak Hirdaramani, the Chief Justice argued strongly 
that the right to personal liberty should justifiably be superseded by 
considerations of the security of the State in times of Emergency. It was also 
felt that inquiries into questions of personal liberty during an Emergency were 
not the same as they were in normal times. In the words of Chief Justice 
Fernando:
This Court cannot ignore the fact that there had been early this 
year an actual armed insurrection in Ceylon, in an attempt to 
wrest power by force, that this attempt was put into action in 
numerous areas, that it had to be resisted by the Armed Forces 
of the State with foreign assistance, and that many lives were 
lost during these operations. When such conditions actually 
prevail, considerations of liberty have necessarily to be 
outweighed by the interests of the security of the State. And 
when action is taken by the authority entrusted with the 
protection of those interests, in purported pursuance of 
Emergency powers, such action does not fall to be tested by the 
Courts with the meticulous care and anxiety ordinarily devoted 
to cases of personal liberty
(e) Regulation 55 and the Court’s jurisdiction
Although all three Judges in Janak Hirdaramani upheld the detention order, 
there was a difference of opinion between the Chief Justice and the other two 
judges as to the applicability of Regulation 55 to preclude a challenge to a 
detention order. It will be remembered that Regulation 55 of the Emergency 
Regulations 1971 had suspended the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus 
provided by section 45 of the Courts Ordinance, 1889. With regard to
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., at 84.
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Regulation 55 Fernando C.J. argued for a complete ouster of jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court with regard to orders of detention issued under Regulation 
18.
I am compelled to the conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred 
by s. 45 of the Courts Ordinance [to issue a writ of habeas 
corpus] is ousted by Regulation 55, in the case of a Detention 
Order purporting to be made by the Permanent Secretary under 
Regulation 18.
Justices Silva and Samerawickrame differed with the Chief Justice as to the 
scope of Regulation 55. Justice Silva premised his approach to Regulation 55 
by stressing the importance of the right to personal liberty.
It is a well established rule of construction that statutes as well
on
Justice Silva felt that the presence or absence of "good faith" on the part of the 
detaining authority would determine whether or not the Court would abide by 
the injunction of Regulation 55, by which the remedy of habeas corpus was 
superseded, or the provisions of Regulation 18 (10) by which a detention order 
was made immune from court scrutiny. If the decision by the Permanent 
Secretary to make a detention order was actuated by an opinion made in good 
faith, even "an incorrect decision by reason of wrong judgement" on the part of 
the Permanent Secretary, would not make the order "justiciable by reason of 
the provisions ... of Regulation 18 (10) and ... Regulation 55". But, in a case of 
"bad faith" or mala fides on the part of the detaining authority:
the provisions taking away the right of the court to call the order 
in question would not apply
as subsidiary legislation which have the effect of infringing 
the liberty of the subject must be very strictly construed.
In such situations:
[w]hen a subject complains to court of an order restraining his 
liberty ... a court is obliged not merely to take a look at the face
46 Ibid., at 93.
47 Ibid., at 104.
48 Ibid., at 105.
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of the order but to go behind it and satisfy itself whether it has 
been validity made.
The anomaly of upholding the complete ouster of the Court’s jurisdiction was 
characterized by Silva S.P J . in the following way.
If one were to give Regulation 55 the meaning that the power of 
the Supreme Court to issue a writ of Habeas Corpus in terms of 
section 45 of the Courts Ordinance is taken away in the case of a 
person detained or held in custody under any emergency 
regulation, irrespective of whether he is detained under a valid 
order or not, or in consequence of a wrongful arrest or not, the 
resulting position would be that such person will be indefinitely 
denied access to a court to secure his liberty even though his 
detention is illegal.^
Justice Silva therefore concluded that:
Regulation 55 is intended to remove the court’s jurisdiction to 
issue a writ of Habeas Corpus only in respect of a lawful 
detention under any emergency regulation and not otherwise.^
Justice Samerawickrame agreed with Silva S.P.J. that the right to personal 
liberty safeguarded by section 45 of Courts Ordinance, 1889, was a "valuable 
right" and cannot be completely denied in all cases.^ The learned Judge 
pointed to the phrase "illegally or improperly detained" occurring in section 45 
of the Ordinance and suggested that:
[t]he use of the word ‘improperly’ [in section 45 of the Courts 
Ordinance, 1889] might be regarded as authorising a court to 
inquire into the propriety of a legal and otherwise lawful
detention.*^
49 Ibid., at 106.
50 Ibid., at 109.
51 Ibid., at 110.
Ibid., at 120. With regard to Regulation 55 Samerawickrame J. observed that:
[a] provision which restricts rights of this kind must be given no greater effect 
than the plain meaning of the words require.
53 Janak Hirdaramani, op.cit., at 120.
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On these premises, Samerawickrame J. concluded that:
Regulation 55 will not apply to the case of a person unlawfully 
detained under an invalid detention order made in abuse of the 
powers conferred by Regulation 18 (l).54
The argument for the non-application of Regulation 55 in cases of "unlawful" 
detention under an invalid order, as asserted by Silva S.P.J. and 
Samerawickrame J. was rejected by Fernando C.J. on the grounds that such a 
stand would mean the scrutiny of every order of detention by the Court.
[I]f it be correct that the Court does have power to review an 
invalid Detention Order, the Court must inquire into every Order 
which is challenged and decide whether or not it is invalid.^
The reasonings of Silva S.P.J. and Samerawickrame J. on the scope of 
Regulation 55 appear to be inconsistent. On the one hand, it has been 
proposed that a detention order made in "good faith" ousts the jurisdiction of 
the Court by the operation of Regulation 55. But on the other hand, it has 
been suggested that Regulation 55 is intended to oust the jurisdiction of the 
Court in cases of "lawful" detention only. The scope of an inquiry into 
questions of the legality of a detention order is much wider than the issue of 
"good faith" of the detaining authority.
Gunasekera v Ratnavale
The detainee in S. Gunasekera v A. R atnavale^  was originally arrested on 
March 18, 1971, two days after the Proclamation of Emergency, but was 
released by the police for insufficient evidence.^ He was again arrested in 
December 1971, for association with the outlawed JVP, the party promoting 
the armed insurgency that precipitated the Proclamation of Emergency in
^  Ibid., at 93, emphasis in original. Chief Justice Fernando, however, admitted that this was 
precisely what was done in the present case.
56 (1973) 76 N.L.R. 316.
57 The local Superintendent of Police realized that "the evidence was insufficient at the time to 
establish that the detainee had committed an offence under the Emergency Regulations". 
0Gunasekera, op. cit., at 318).
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1971. Gunasekera was arrested under Regulation 19 of the Emergency 
Regulations 1971, but the Supreme Court held the arrest and subsequent 
detention was unlawful for non-compliance with the procedure set out in
C Q
Regulation 19. On the same day as his release however, Gunasekera was 
again arrested, this time under Regulation 18 (1).
(a) Regulation 55 and the invalidity o f a Detention Order
Before the Supreme Court, it was contended on behalf of the detainee in 
Gunasekera that despite the bar of Regulation 55, the Court was competent to 
issue a writ of habeas corpus, because the detention order had not been made 
in "good faith". In deciding this plea, the majority in Gunasekera adopted the 
minority opinion of Fernando C.J. in Janak Hirdaramani that Regulation 55 of 
the Emergency Regulations 1971 effectively ousted the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus. Of the three Judges who heard the 
case, both Alles and Thamotheram JJ. upheld Chief Justice Fernando’s view 
that no exceptions can be made to the operation of Regulation 55.
Referring to the opinions of Silva S.P.J. and Samerawickrame J. in Janak 
Hirdaramani that Regulation 55 did not apply in cases of invalid detention 
orders, Alles J. observed that:
[i]f the invalidity is confined to the authenticity of the 
[Detention] Order or to the identity of the detainee I would 
agree [that Regulation 55 did not apply], because in such a case 
the Permanent Secretary could not have entertained the opinion 
that is a condition precedent to the exercise of powers under 
Regulation 18 (1), but in regard to the issue of good faith, I am 
in entire agreement with the conclusion of the Chief Justice [in 
Janak Hirdaramani] that in the case of a Detention Order, which 
is ex facie valid, it is not a justiciable matter.-^
In construing Regulation 55, Alles J. relied upon the intention of the Prime 
Minister in recommending, to the Governor-General, the enactment of the
58 Reported as Gunasekera v De Fonseka, (1972) 75 N.L.R. 246 (Gunasekera 2). This case is 
discussed infra.
59 Gunasekera, op. cit., at 336.
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Regulation in question. For Alles J., that intention was apparent from the 
language of the Regulation.
If plain words have to be given their plain meaning the 
conclusion is irresistible that the Prime Minister in 
recommending to the Governor-General the enactment of 
Regulation 55 intended to oust the jurisdiction of the Courts in 
regard to Section 45 of the Courts Ordinance in respect of 
Detention Orders issued under Regulation 18 (1) .^
Justice Alles categorically ruled out any jurisdiction of the Court with respect 
to detention orders under Regulation 18 (1), in view of the operation of 
Emergency Regulation 55.
Regulation 55 ... in my view, ousts the jurisdiction of the Court 
even on the issue of good faith .^
(b) "Opinion” and "reasonable belief' o f the detaining authority
In Gunasekera, Alles J. reviewed the same British war-time detention cases 
that Fernando C.J. considered in Janak Hirdaramani^ and compared the 
requirement of opinion on the part of the Permanent Secretary under 
Emergency Regulation 18 (1) with the condition of reasonable belief in 
Regulation 18B of the British Defence (General) Regulations 1939.^ This 
technical difference between two emergency detention provisions led the 
learned Judge to hold that:
[t]he use of the word ‘opinion’ in our Regulation 18 (1) is
narrower than the words of the English Regulation. ... [Under
60 Ibid., at 337.
^  Principally, Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, and Greene v Secretary of State, [1942] 
A.C. 284.
^  Regulation 18B of the British Defence (General) Regulations 1939, authorised the Secretary 
of State to order the detention of any person if he had "reasonable cause to believe any person to 
be of hostile origin or associations or to have been recently in acts prejudicial to the public 
safety or the defence of the realm ...". [Emphasis added] The Defence Regulations were made by 
the King in Council as provided by the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939.
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the English Regulation] the Home Secretary would [have] to be 
reasonably satisfied that the detention was necessary.^
For Justice Alles, the absence of any criterion of reasonableness in determining 
the necessity to order detention under Regulation 18 (1) meant that:
[u]nder Regulation 18 (1) even a dishonest or wrong opinion is 
not justiciable.*^
(c) Successive Orders o f Detention
It was argued before the Court in Gunasekera that the successive detention 
orders issued to the detainee revealed malice on the part of the detaining 
authority. In the leading opinion, Alles J. rejected the contention that 
successive orders of detention could be a proof of mala fides. In this regard, 
the learned Judge drew support from several Indian precedents, which in 
effect had held that successive detention orders were permissible.^ The Court 
in Gunasekera unanimously accepted the contention on behalf of the State that 
the Permanent Secretary, in ordering the second detention under Regulation 
18 (1), had acted bona fide in the "interests of public security". Justice Alles 
stated that after the discharge of the detainee under the previous order of 
detention under Regulation 19:
the Permanent Secretary may well have come to the honest 
opinion, on the material available to him that it was necessary in 
the interests of public security that he should be detained 
forthwith.^
64 Gunasekera, op. cit., at 323.
Ibid., emphasis added.
66 Among the Indian decisions cited by Alles J. were Narayan Singh Nathawan v State of Punjab, 
[1952] A.I.R. (S.C.) 106 and Godavari Parulekar v State of Maharashtra, [1966] A.I.R. (S.C.) 
1404. In Godavari Parulekar, Sikri J. of the Indian Supreme Court had observed that:
[t]he mere fact that the detention order is passed during the pendency of 
habeas corpus proceedings cannot by itself lead to the conclusion that the 
order is vitiated by malice in law ....
Ibid., at 1407.
This observation in the Indian decision was quoted by Alles J. in Gunasekera, op.cit., at 327.
Gunasekera, op.cit., at 326, emphasis added.67
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Detention under Regulation 19 and the Court’s stand: Gunasekera v De 
Fonseka
The inviolability of a detention order under Regulation 18 (1) of the
Emergency Regulations 1971, upheld by the minority and majority Judges in
Janak Hirdaramani and Gunasekera respectively was, however, not extended to
detentions under Regulation 19. Regulation 19 empowered a large number of
persons to search, detain and arrest without warrant. Included among these
persons were police officers, military personnel and prison officers and guards.
Search, detention and arrest under Regulation 19 could be made in respect of
an individual for any offence under the Emergency Regulations 1971 or, in
cases where there was a reasonable ground for suspecting that an individual
• 68was involved in committing an offence under any Emergency Regulation.
(a) Justiciability o f a Detention Order under Regulation 19
The nature and impact of Regulation 19 was discussed at some length in
Gunasekera v De Fonseka^ (henceforth Gunasekera 2), where the detainee
70was the same person as the detainee in S. Gunasekera v A. Ratnavale, 
discussed above. The detainee had been ordered to be arrested, under 
Emergency Regulation 19, by the Superintendent of Police, who later stated by 
affidavit provided to the Court that he had grounds for suspicion that the 
applicant had been involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the Government. 
Gunasekera was, however, arrested and detained not by the Superintendent of 
the Police, but by an Assistant Superintendent of Police. The Court in 
Gunasekera 2 unanimously held that the arrest of the detainee was not in 
accordance with the provisions of Regulation 19, and was therefore unlawful. 
Chief Justice Fernando, in his leading opinion observed that:
^  The provisions of Regulation 19 of the Emergency Regulations 1971 are summarized in 
Gunasekera \  De Fonseka, (1972) 75 N.L.R. 246 (Gunasekera 2), at 248-249.
69 (1972) 75 N.L.R. 246.
70 (1973) 76 N.L.R. 316.
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[t]he language of Regulation 19 has the plain meaning that ...
[one of the instances in which] the Regulation empowers an 
officer to arrest is where ... [he, himself] reasonably suspects 
something concerning an individual. On the facts of the present 
case therefore, Regulation 19, according to its plain meaning, 
did not authorize the A.S.P. [that is, the Assistant Commissioner 
of Police] to arrest Gunasekera, because on the averments in the 
affidavits it was the Superintendent, and not the A.S.P. himself, 
who suspected that Gunasekera had been concerned in some 
offence under the Emergency Regulations.^
In his concurring judgment, Silva S.P.J. pointed to the injustice that would 
ensue if the arresting officer was himself not personally aware of the grounds 
on which the arrest was being made.
The arresting person will not be able to inform the person 
arrested of the reasons for the arrest unless he is himself aware 
of the facts leading up to the arrest which produced in his own 
mind reasonable grounds for suspicion that the person arrested 
had committed an offence which would warrant the latter’s 
arrest without w arrant.^
On behalf of the State in Gunasekera 2 it was argued that Regulation 19 
empowered a police officer not only to arrest a person on reasonable 
suspicion, but also "to cause a person to be arrested". In rejecting this 
contention, Fernando C.J. referred to his observations in this regard in Janak 
Hirdaramani'J and drew attention to the implications for such a construction 
of Regulation 19.
71 Gunasekera 2, op. cit., at 249.
72
Ibid., at 255. Chief Justice Fernando also held in similar terms.
I do not say that the omission to inform a person of the grounds for his arrest 
will necessarily render a arrest unlawful. But the existence of the requirement 
that in a case such as the present one a person must be informed of the 
grounds for his arrest confirms the plain meaning of the relevant language in 
Regulation 19, namely that the officer who arrests a person suspected of an 
offence must himself entertain the suspicion.
Ibid at 251.
^  Janak Hirdaramani v Ratnavale, (1972) 75 N.L.R. 67.
In this decision, Fernando CJ. compared the implications of the provisions of Regulations 18 
and 19 of the Emergency Regulations 1971:
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Regulation 19 confers powers of arrest on literally thousands of 
members of the Police, Prisons or the Armed Services. But the 
Deputy Solicitor-General’s construction means that, in addition, 
any person whosoever can lawfully make an arrest if any of the 
thousands of the members of those Services orders or requests 
the arrest to be made. I am quite unable to agree that 
Regulation 19 was enacted with any such drastic intention.^
It may be recalled that in Janak Hirdaramani the Supreme court of Sri 
Lanka unanimously held that the satisfaction of the Permanent Secretary in 
ordering detention under Regulation 18 of the Emergency Regulations 1971 
was subjective, and was not subject to Court scrutiny. But with regard to the 
grounds for detention under Regulation 19, which was not an issue in Janak 
Hirdaramani, Fernando C.J. and Silva S.P.J., in obiter remarks, were quite 
emphatic in their opinion that the Court should adopt an objective test. °  This 
conclusion was reiterated in Gunasekera 2.
The power of detention is conferred by Regulation 18 on a single officer of 
high rank, who is required by the Constitution to act under the immediate 
direction of the Prime Minister; whereas the power of arrest under Regulation 
19 is conferred on literally thousands of members of the Services who are 
subject only to some remote control ... [A] Court has no power to inquire into 
the reasonableness or validity of the opinion which induces the making of a 
Detention Order under Regulation 18; whereas the language of Regulation 19 
clearly predicates that the Courts will an objective test in determining whether 
or not an arrest referred to in that Regulation is valid. Further, Regulation 18 
gives to a detainee a statutory right of recourse to the Prime Minister; whereas 
the right of course implicit in Regulation 19 is to the Courts.
Ibid., at 92.
Gunasekera 2, op. cit., at 252.
^  Janak Hirdaramani v Ratnavale, (1972) 75 N.L.R. 67.
Chief Justice Fernando had observed that:
the language of Regulation 19 clearly predicates that the Courts will apply an 
objective test in determining whether or not an arrest referred to in that 
Regulation is valid.
Janak Hirdaramani, op. cit., at 92.
Justice Silva had agreed that:
the test in regulation 19 is clearly objective and is justiciable.
Ibid., at 109.
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[W]hile there was a difference of opinion [among the Judges, in 
Janak Hirdaramani] as to the justiciability of a detention order 
under Regulation 18 of the Emergency Regulations, the full 
Court expressed the view that the detention of a person under 
the powers conferred by Regulation 19 was justiciable and that 
the test to be applied under that Regulation was an objective 
test. ... [There is ] no reason to deviate from that view in regard 
to Regulation 19 which we are concerned with in the present 
application.^
(b) Detention under Regulation 19 and the operation o f Regulation 55
In Gunasekera 2, the application to the Court on behalf of detainee for his 
release was brought under the provisions of section 45 of the Courts 
Ordinance, 1889. These provisions, which permitted the Court to issue a writ of 
habeas corpus, were suspended during the Emergency by Regulation 55 of the 
Emergency Regulations 1971. In deciding Gunasekera 2, the Supreme Court did 
not discuss the general impact of Regulation 55 on issues arising out of the 
arrest and detention under Regulation 19. In the earlier case of Janak 
Hirdaramani, however, the remarks of Fernando C.J. and Silva S.P.J. clearly
indicated that Regulation 55 did not preclude scrutiny of detention orders 
under Regulation 19. In Janak Hirdaramani, Fernando C.J. observed that:
Regulation 55 could not have been intended to cover cases of 
arrests under Regulation 19... . ^
The conclusion of Silva S.P.J. in Janak Hirdaramani that Regulation 55 did not 
operate so as to exclude judicial examination of invalid detention orders under 
Regulation 18, was partially grounded on his interpretation of Regulation 19. 
Pointing to the large number of persons who had powers of search, arrest and 
detention under Regulation 19, the absence of any provisions of 
representation available to detainees under Regulation 18, and the differences 
in the provisions between Regulations 18 and 19, Silva S.P.J. held that:
77 Gunasekera 2, op. cit., at 253, per G .PA . Silva, S.PJ.
^  Janak Hirdaramani v Ratnavale, (1972) 75 N.L.R. 67.
79 Ibid., at 93.
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[these factors make] the conclusion irresistible that it could 
never have been the intention of regulation 55 to exclude the 
jurisdiction of the court to issue a writ of Habeas Corpus in 
terms of section 45 of the Courts Ordinance in respect of a 
person who is the victim of an unlawful detention [under 
Regulation 19] .^
Post 1978 Judicial Review of Detention
Introduction
Since the adoption of the 1978 Constitution, there have been four 
Proclamations of Emergency in Sri Lanka. The first of these Proclamations in 
December 1978, was directed to deal with a natural disaster.*^ Proclamations 
of Emergency were then made in July, 1980, in October, 1982, and in May, 
1983. The 1980 Proclamation was made to deal with widespread trade union 
"strikes",^ while the Emergency in 1982 was declared for political reasons in 
connection with presidential elections.^ The Proclamation of Emergency in 
1983 was declared in the wake of incidents of violence generated by ethnic 
tensions.^
During previous Proclamations of Emergency in Sri Lanka, there were no 
justiciable constitutional rights which might fetter legislative or executive 
action. The Constitution of 1978 entrenched a Bill of Rights, but the 
guaranteed rights have been made subject to restrictions during an 
Emergency.^ The constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to inquire
80 Ibid., at 109.
8  ^ This Emergency is briefly discussed in A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Guallist System in Asia: 
The Constitution of Sri Lanka (1978), London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980, at 55.
8^ Proclamation issued on 16 July 1980, published in Government Gazette Extraordinary No 
97/6 of same date.
88 Proclamation of Emergency issued on 20 October 1982, published in Government Gazette 
Extraordinary No 215/7 of same date.
^  The 1983 Emergency was declared on May 18, 1983. See the Asian Recorder, Vol XXIX, No 
29, July 16-22,1983.
The acts of violence which precipitated this Proclamation of Emergency later developed into a 
civil war between the majority Singhalese and the minority Tamils in Sri Lanka.
8  ^Articles 15 (1) and 15 (7), Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
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into allegations of violation of constitutional rights is, however, not restricted 
during an Emergency.^ The right of a citizen, under the 1978 Constitution, to 
seek redress for infringement of his/her constitutional right, is also not 
curtailed during an Emergency by any law such as Regulation 55 of the 
Emergency Regulations 1971.^
The Court’s role in reviewing the exercise of emergency powers in derogation 
of constitutional liberties in the post-1978 period, is examined here in the 
context of the states of emergency declared in 1982 and 1983.
Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations of 1982
As was the case under the previous constitutional orders, the Proclamation of 
Emergency in 1982 brought into force Part II of the Public Security Ordinance, 
1947,88 ^  which the President has the right to promulgate Emergency 
Regulations.^ On the same day that Emergency was proclaimed in 1982, the 
President of Sri Lanka promulgated the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions 
and Powers) Regulations, No 2 of 1982. The same Regulations were renewed as 
Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations, No 3 of 1982, a 
month later.^0
Regulation 17 of the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) 
Regulations, Numbers 2 and 3 of 1982 (henceforth, Emergency Regulations 
1982) was similar to Regulation 18 of the Emergency Regulations 1971.
^  Article 126, ibid.
87 Article 17, ibid.
Q Q
Ordinance No. XXV of 1947, Legislative Enactments of Ceylon, Cap. 40.
Q Q
Section 5, Public Security Ordinance 1947, as amended by the Public Security (Amendment) 
Law, 1978, Act No. 6 of 1978.
on As pointed out in Chapter IV, the renewal of Emergency Regulations on a monthly basis is 
required under the provisions of section 2 (2) of the Public Security Ordinance, 1947.
For the dates of the promulgation of the two sets of the 1982 Emergency Regulations, see Wijaya 
Kumaranatunga v G. V.P. Samarasinghe and Others, Supreme Court Application No 121 of 1982, 
reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2 (April 1982 to December 1982), Colombo, Lake House 
Investments, 347-363, at 348-349.
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Regulation 17 of the Emergency Regulations 1982 empowered the Secretary to 
the Ministry of Defence to pass orders of arrest and preventive detention, if 
s/he was "of [the] opinion" that the detention was necessary to safeguard 
"national security", or "public order", or "supplies and services".^ By an 
amendment to Regulation 17, the Additional Secretary to the Ministry of 
Defence was also vested with the same powers.
The Wijaya Kumaranatunga c a se ^
(a) Facts and Issues
In Wijaya Kumaranatunga v G.V.P. Samarasinghe and O t h e r s the petitioner 
invoked the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 126 of the Constitution 
of Sri Lanka, for a declaration, inter alia, that his arrest and continued 
detention, under Regulation 17 (1) of the Emergency Regulations 1982 was 
unlawful. Two different orders of detention were passed in respect of the 
petitioner. The first order of detention was made on October 19, 1982 and was 
in the following terms:
By virtue of the powers vested in me in terms of Regulation 17 
(1) [of the Emergency Regulations 1982] ... I, ... Additional 
Secretary/Defence is (sic) o f the opinion that Wijaya 
Kumaranatunga ... acted in a manner prejudicial to the national 
security and to the maintenance of public order and thereby 
committed offences in contravention of Regulations 23 and 24
91 Regulation 17 (1) of the Emergency Regulations 1982 read:
Where the secretary to the Ministry of Defence is of opinion with respect to 
any person that, with a view to preventing such person - 
(a) from acting in any manner prejudicial to the national security, or to the 
maintenance of public order, or to the maintenance of essential services; or
It is necessary so to do, the Secretary may make order that such person be 
taken into custody and detained in custody.
92 Two major issues came up for decision by the Court in Wijaya Kumaranatunga. One was the 
permissibility of preventive detention under the 1978 Constitution, and the other was the legality 
of arrest and detention of the petitioner. The question as to the whether preventive detention 
under the Emergency Regulations is permissible, in view of the provisions of Article 13 of the 
Constitution, has been discussed in Chapter II supra. The discussion here centres on the legality 
of arrest and detention under Emergency Regulation 17.
93 Supreme Court Application No 121 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, op. cit., 
347-363, at 348-349.
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[of the Emergency Regulations] ... In terms of Regulation 17 (3) 
I hereby authorize the detention of Wijaya Kumaranatunga ....
The second order of detention purported to have been made a day later, while 
the petitioner was in detention, and denied to have been received by him, 
read:
By virtue of the powers vested in me by paragraph (1) of 
Regulation 17 ... I, ... Additional Secretary to the Ministry of 
Defence being of opinion that, with a view to preventing [Wijaya 
Kumaranatunga] ... from acting in any manner prejudicial to the 
national security or to the maintenance of public order, it is 
necessary so to do, do hereby order that such person be taken to 
custody and detained in custody
The police had arrested and detained the petitioner under the authority of the 
first detention order, which was later found to have issued upon a 
misconception of the scope of the relevant Emergency Regulation. The 
detention was therefore sought to be legalized by the second order.
The issues that arose for consideration by the Court in Wijaya Kumaranatunga 
were, the proper scope of the exercise of power of the detaining authority, the 
justiciability of subjective satisfaction, and the justifiability of relying on 
alternate bases of authority in case of an invalid exercise of power.
(b) The exercise o f the Power o f Detention and Rules o f Statutory 
Construction
On behalf of the petitioner in Wijaya Kumaranatunga, it was pointed out that 
the first detention order referred to the past misconduct of the detainee, 
whereas Regulation 17 was framed as a precautionary measure, authorizing 
preventive detention, in anticipation of future prejudicial acts. It was also 
pointed out that the order authorized detention, instead of ordering the 
detention.^ These basic mistakes, it was contended on behalf of the detainee, 
made the first detention order invalid. The majority of the Supreme Court of
Ibid., at 352. Emphasis added.
^  Ibid., at 357. Emphasis added.
^  On this point, see infra under sub-head, Preventive Detention and Criminal Law.
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Sri Lanka agreed that the detention order of November 19, 1982 was bad for 
these mistakes. But the majority reasoned that the arrest and detention of the 
petitioner did not become invalid because of these mistakes.
Delivering judgement for the majority, Ranasinghe and Soza JJ., Soza J. 
resorted to applying the technical rules of statutory construction to questions 
affecting the constitutional right to personal liberty. Justice Soza referred to 
several reported Indian decisions concerned with the law of contract and the 
law of income tax. One of those decisions, Deviprasad Khandelwal and Sons v 
Union o f In d ia ^  involved the interpretation of certain terms of a contract of 
sale of scrap iron and steel. Subsequent to the agreement between the 
government of India and the private purchaser, a dispute arose as to the price 
of the goods, in relation to which the Controller of Iron and Steel passed an 
order with reference to the wrong provision of the applicable law. In Wijaya 
Kumaranatunga, Soza J. quoted with approval the following observation of the 
Supreme Court of India in Deviprasad Khandelwal:
It is a well-settled principle of interpretation that as long as an 
authority has the power to do a thing, it does not matter if he 
purports to do it by reference to a wrong provision of law. The 
order can always be justified by reference to the correct 
provision of law empowering the authority making the order to 
make such o rder.^
Another Indian precedent cited by Soza J. in upholding the validity of arrest 
and detention of the petitioner in Wijaya Kumaranatunga was Hazari Mai 
Kuthiala v Income Tax Officer, AmbalaP^ The controversy in this case was in 
regard to a reassessment of the income of a business firm by the taxing 
authority. In the circumstances of the territorial readjustment of taxing zones 
and the supersession of regional taxation statutes, the relevant taxation 
authority referred to the old statute while reassessing the income of the 
petitioner firm. The Supreme Court of India rejected the argument of lack of 
jurisdiction of the taxing authority, and Soza J. quoted with approval the 
following observation of the Indian Court.
97 [1969] A.I.R. (Bom.) 163.
98 Ibid., at 173, quoted in Wijaya Kumaranatunga, op. cit., at 354.
99 [1961] A.I.R. (S.C.) 200.
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[T]he exercise of a power will be referable to a jurisdiction 
which confers validity upon it and not to a jurisdiction under 
which it will be nugatory ... .^ 0
Following these precedents, Soza J. observed:
[D]o the arrest and detention [of Wijaya Kumaranatunga] 
become invalid by the mistake in terms of the [first] ‘detention 
order’ ...? I think n o t . ^
(c) "Subjective satisfaction" and successive Orders o f Detention
On behalf of the petitioner in Wijaya Kumaranatunga, it was contended that 
the successive orders of detention issued within a day of one another clearly 
proved mala fides on the part of the detaining authority. It was put to the 
Court by counsel on behalf of the detainee that the detaining authority could 
not come by any fresh or additional materials within the span of twenty-four 
hours to justify making the second order of detention. It was argued that the 
forming of an opinion by the detaining authority, which was a condition 
precedent to ordering a detention under Emergency Regulation 17 (1), could 
not have come about without new compelling grounds for the detention.
For the majority of the Court, however, there was no inherent contradiction 
between the first and second detention orders. The majority proceeded on the 
grounds that the first detention order, although mistaken, was actually directed 
at preventive detention under Emergency Regulation 17, and that the same 
considerations prompted both the first and second detention orders. Honesty 
of opinion of the detaining authority or the adequacy of materials on which the 
detention orders were founded were immaterial for the majority of the Court. 
Justice Soza explained that:
when the [Additional Defence Secretary] made the ... [first 
detention order,] he made express reference to Regulation 17 
(1) of the Emergency Regulations showing that he really wanted
^  Ibid., at 202, quoted in Wijaya Kumaranatunga, op. cit., at 353. The Supreme Court of 
Ceylon, in a revenue adjudication, Peiris v The Commissioner o f Inland Revenue, (1963) 65 
N.L.R. 457, based its decision on the holding in Hazari Mai Kuthiala.
^  Wijaya Kumaranatutunga, op. cit., at 353.
CHAPTER VII 197
to make an order of preventive detention. He did not, however, 
achieve this object. But this has very little bearing on the honesty 
of his opinion or the adequacy of the material on which he 
formed it. There is nothing before us to say that the material on 
which he alleged past misconduct by the ... [detainee] in the [first 
detention] order ... was insufficient also to found the opinion he 
declared in [the second detention] order... ^ 2
With regard to the justification of the opinion of the authority to preventively 
detain a person, Soza J. observed that:
[t]he question of whether an order of preventive detention 
should be made or not is a matter for the subjective decision of 
the authority competent to make it. It cannot be subjected to 
objective tests in a Court of law. ^ 3
In this regard, Soza J. quoted with approval Fernando C J.’s opinion in Janak 
Hirdaramani v Ratnavale^^ that even a mistaken opinion on the part of the 
detaining authority would not invalidate a detention order. ^  The plea of 
mala fide intention of the detention authority, taken on behalf of the petitioner 
in Wijaya Kumaranatunga, although accepted by Soza J. to be the "only 
justiciable issue", failed because there was no "positive proof oimalafides".
(d) Preventive Detention and Criminal Law
Having held that the first detention order was invalid, Soza J. had to reconcile 
the validity of the second detention order with the initial arrest and detention 
of the petitioner under the first order. In this regard, the learned Judge 
considered whether the validity of the arrest and detention of the petitioner by
^  Ibid., at 358, emphasis added.
104 (1971) 75 N.L.R. 67.
^  In Janak Hirdaramani, Chief Justice Fernando had observed that:
[ejven a mistaken opinion will not invalidate a detention order, and want of 
good faith can be established only by positive proof that the Permanent 
Secretary did not indeed form that opinion.
Ibid., at 77, quoted by Soza J. in Wijaya Kumaranatunga, at 358.
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the police could be justified under Regulation 18 (1) of the Emergency 
Regulations 1982. Under Regulation 18 (1), any police officer could arrest any 
person on "reasonable grounds" for suspecting the person to be engaged in 
offences under the Emergency Regulations. The police officer who arrested 
the petitioner had, however, acted on order of his superior officer, in terms of 
the first order of detention. The arresting officer had thus not been personally 
satisfied about the necessity of the arrest, which was a condition precedent for 
arrest under Regulation 18 ( 1 ) . ^ 6  Justice Soza therefore agreed that the 
initial arrest and detention of the petitioner "[could not] be justified under 
Regulation 18 ( 1 ) " . ^ 7  por t^e learned Judge, however:
[s]uch an arrest without a warrant and detention [for] up to 
twenty hours ... [could] be justified under Sections 23 and 37 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure Act No 15 of 1 9 7 9 .^
Justice Soza’s reasoning in this regard was strengthened by the fact that some 
of the offences specified in Regulations 23 and 24 of the Emergency 
Regulations 1982, which were mentioned as grounds in the first detention order 
of the Additional Defence Secretary under Regulation 17 (1), were also 
"offences" under the criminal law. In respect of those criminal offences, arrest 
without a warrant was justifiable under the Code o f Criminal Procedure, 
1 9 7 9  109 conclusion of Soza J. was, therefore, that:
[the petitioner was arrested] by a Police Officer with reasons 
given and despite the fact that he was acting under the authority 
of the [first] ‘detention order’ [of the Additional Defence 
Secretary, acting under Emergency Regulation 17,]his action can 
be justified under the powers vested in him under the Code of 
Criminal Procedure Act. Such an arrest is in accord with the 
provisions of Article 13 (1) of the Constitution. ^
106 jk e proy^ious 0f Regulation 18 of the Emergency Regulations 1982 were similar to those of 
Regulation 19 of the Emergency Regulations 1971. A discussion of the powers available under 
the 1971 Emergency Regulation 19 is found in Gunasekera v De Fonseka, (1972) 75 N.L.R. 246, 
discussed above.
107
108
Wijaya Kumaranatunga, op. cit., at 354.
Ibid.
109
110
Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 1979, Act No. 15 of 1979.
Ibid.
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The second detention order by the Additional Defence Secretary, under 
Regulation 17 (1), which rectified the mistakes of the first order, came into 
operation the next day. Justice Soza calculated that there was a lapse of some 
ten hours since the petitioner was arrested by the combined operation of the 
first detention order and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and 
the passing of the second order. Such a delay was acceptable to Soza J.
In the circumstances under which the petitioner was first 
arrested and detained and the preliminaries that would have had 
to be attended to like recording of statements a ten hour 
detention accountable under the Code of Criminal Procedure 
Act cannot be said to be longer than reasonable.m
(e) Service o f Detention Order
The petitioner in Wijaya Kumaranatunga denied that the new detention order 
was ever served on him, and the respondents failed to produce the original 
order in Court. Justice Soza felt it "reasonable to infer that a detention order 
... [of which the copy produced in Court was the office copy] was in fact 
made".H3 On behalf of the majority, Soza J. accepted the affidavit of the 
police officer in charge, that the fact of the new detention order was 
communicated to the detainee. The mode of communication noted by the 
Court was a conversation of the police officer with the detainee, during which 
the petitioner was appraised that a new detention order was made against 
him. Upon examination of the relevant provisions of the Emergency 
Regulations 1982, Soza J. was unable to locate any provision relating to the 
service of the detention order on the detainee.
Nowhere is service of the detention order made imperative by 
any rule of law. The order really serves as authority for the 
person putting it into effect.
111 Ibid, at 355.
113 This was recorded in the notes of the police officer, ibid., at 356.
^  Wijaya Kumaranatunga, op. cit., at 360. Justice Soza compared the procedure for arrest and 
detention under the Emergency Regulations with the relevant provisions for arrest with warrant 
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1979, and observed that:
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(f) Chief Justice Samarakoon 's dissent
Chief Justice Samarakoon vigourously dissented from the conclusions reached 
by the majority in Wijaya Kumaranatunga. For Samarakoon C.J., since the first 
detention order was bad in law, "the arrest and detention of the petitioner ... 
was wholly illegal". ^  Chief Justice Samarakoon’s strong exception to the 
arrest and detention of the petitioner was based on three grounds. There was 
firstly, according to the Chief Justice, no power conferred on the Additional 
Defence Secretary to order detention under Emergency Regulation 17 for past 
offences, as was mentioned in the first detention order. ^  Secondly, with 
respect to the recourse to the criminal law provisions of arrest and detention 
sanctioned by the majority as the basis for justifying the detention of the 
petitioner under Regulation 17, Samarakoon C.J. found that:
[the Additional Defence Secretary] had no power to make an 
order of arrest and detention under any other law - or even to 
‘authorize’, such arrest and detention. He cannot seek refuge 
under the Criminal Procedure C o d e .^
The third ground of Samarakoon C.J. for holding the detention unlawful was 
the illegality of the arrest and detention of the applicant by the police. This 
was because, "no police officer ... [had] been given ... [the] power of preventive 
arrest and detention under the Criminal Procedure C o d e " .^  Chief Justice
even under the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, no charge-sheet or warrant of 
arrest where the arrest is on a warrant is provided for. The person being 
arrested can ask to see the warrant or order but there is no legal requirement 
that it should be served. No legal consequences flow from the non-service of 
the order.
Ibid.
^  Wijaya Kumaranatunga, op. cit., at 362.
^  Chief Justice Samarakoon was implicitly referring to the very concept of preventive 
detention which was a precautionary measure and not an indictment for the past activities of a 
person. Regulation 17 of the Emergency Regulations 1982 provided a mechanism for enabling 
preventive detention.
117 Wijaya Kumaranatunga, op. cit., at 362.
118 Ibid., at 363.
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Samarakoon censured the repeated efforts of the state authorities to keep the 
applicant in detention and emphasized the overriding importance of the 
constitutional right to personal liberty, guaranteed by Article 13 of the 
Constitution of Sri Lanka.
When provisions affecting the liberty of the subject are in 
question inroads into them must be strictly scrutinized and 
construed. What is lost on the roundabouts cannot always be 
made up on the swings.
The Article 14 cases
It appears that about the same time as Wijaya Kumaranatunga was decided, 
the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka began attempting to assert some degree of 
control over executive emergency measures. The extent to which such 
assertion of control facilitated the operation of constitutional rights, if at all, is 
examined below. The three decisions to be discussed in this regard were not 
concerned with the constitutional right to personal liberty guaranteed under 
Article 13 of the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka, but with the freedom of 
speech and expression under Article 14 of the Constitution. In these cases, a 
question arose concerning the nature of the satisfaction of the competent 
government authority in ordering the closure of newspapers under the 
provisions of the Emergency Regulations 1982. This in turn raised the issue of 
the justiciability of the satisfaction of executive decisions during an Emergency, 
and is similar to such issues in respect of the right to personal liberty. A 
discussion of these decisions will therefore facilitate the proper portrayal of 
the Sri Lankan Court’s jurisprudence.
(a) Subjective & Objective Satisfaction: The Siriwardena case
Regulation 14 (3) of the Emergency Regulation 1982 provided for the closure of 
newspapers and the confiscation of printing presses in the interests of "national 
security", "public order" and similar other considerations.^  Empowered by
119 Ibid., per Samarakoon C J.
120 Regulation 14 (3) of the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations, No 3 
of 1982 was in the following terms.
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this Regulation, the Secretary to the Ministry of State, the first respondent in 
B. A. Siriwardena & Others v DJ.F. Liyanage and Others, ordered the
closure of the petitioners’ newspaper and printing press. By the same 
order, the Inspector General of Police was authorized to take possession of the 
printing press which was publishing the newspaper. By an application under 
Article 126 of the Constitution, the petitioners complained to the Supreme 
Court of the violation, by the impugned order, of their constitutional rights to 
the freedom of speech and expression under Article 14 (1) of the
Constitution.
If a competent authority is of opinion that there is or has been or is likely to be 
in any newspaper, ... which is, in his opinion, calculated to be prejudicial to the 
interests of national security or the preservation of public order or the 
maintenance of the supplies and services essential to the life of the community 
or matter inciting or encouraging persons to mutiny, riot or civil commotion, 
he may -
(a) by order direct that no person shall print, publish or distribute ... such 
newspaper for such period as may be specified in the order, ... and authorize 
any person specified ... [in the order] to take ... steps ... [for] taking possession 
of any printing presses ... for securing compliance with the order; or
(b) take such [other] measures ... [as provided by this Regulation], in respect of 
such newspaper.
121 Supreme Court Application No 120 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, op. cit., 
310-346.
1 ?? The order of the Secretary to the Ministry of State dated 20.11.1982 is reproduced in 
Siriwardena, op. cit.
There were two orders dated 2.11.1982 and 20.11.1982. The Court dealt with the second of these 
two orders, which was operative at the time when the applications challenging the actions were 
filed in Court.
The petitioners also contended the right to the freedom of trade, profession and business 
guaranteed by Article 14 (1) (g) was violated by the Order. Articles 14 (1) (a) and (g) of the 
Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978, provides:
Every citizen is entitled to -
(a) the freedom of speech and expression including publication;
(g) the freedom to engage by himself or in association with others in any lawful 
occupation, profession, trade, business or enterprise;
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The petitioners’ newspaper and printing press were closed down about a 
month after the presidential elections in 1982. Soon after those elections, it 
was declared by the President that instead of parliamentary elections, which 
were due, there would be Referendum to extend the term of the sitting 
Parliament. The petitioners maintained that their newspaper and press was 
closed down because during the presidential elections they had supported an 
opposition presidential candidate. They had moreover strongly campaigned 
against the proposed Referendum. It was alleged by the petitioners that the 
order of the Secretary to the Ministry of State under Emergency Regulation 14 
(3) was unlawful and mala fide for these reasons.
On behalf of the State in Siriwardena, it was contended that "the publications 
[of the petitioners] were ... calculated to be prejudicial to the preservation of 
public order and calculated also to incite persons to riot or civil commotion or 
to breaches of the peace. Apart from directly inciting people to violence the 
[published] articles could have provoked the supporters of the ruling party 
which could lead to public d i s o r d e r . . . " A f t e r  noting the "change in the 
attitude of the [English] Courts" with regard to discretionary powers, ^  
Wimlaratne J., giving the leading opinion of the majority in Siriwardena, 
summarized his views with regard to nature of the discretionary power 
available under Emergency Regulation 14 (3).
Emergency Regulation 14 (3) is framed not entirely in subjective 
terms. The competent authority is empowered to make an order 
under that Regulation only if he is satisfied of the existence of 
certain facts. The Court can inquire whether it was reasonable 
for the authority to be satisfied of the existence of those 
facts. 127
^  The allegations of mala fides by the petitioners are noted in the judgement of Wimlaratne J. 
in Siriwardena, op. cit., at 314-315.
125 Siriwardena, op. cit., at 318.
126 Among the English decisions cited by Wimlaratne J. were, Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, [1968] A.C. 997, Greene v Amalgamated Engineering Union, [1971] 2 Q.B. 
175, and Secretary of State v Tameside, [1976] 3 All E.R. 665.
127 Siriwardena, op. cit., at 330.
Of the five Judges of the Supreme Court who decided Siriwardena, Rodrigo J. held that: 
orders under Emergency Regulations ... [were] not reviewable by Courts ....
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Justice Wimlaratne held that this approach was justified in situations like 
those presented in the case under discussion.
[W]here the opinion of the competent authority [to totally 
prohibit publications] is one that is formed on something that 
has already been published, then the opinion is in my view, not a 
purely subjective opinion. The opinion can be formed only if ...
[the authority] is satisfied of the existence of certain facts, 
namely, the existence of publications which are calculated to be 
prejudicial to the interests of national security or the 
preservation of public order etc. ... [I]n such a situation the 
Court can inquire into the circumstances, not in order to 
substitute its own opinion for that of the [competent] authority, 
but in order to ascertain whether the authority was reasonable in 
... [its] opinion that the publications were calculated to be 
prejudicial. ^
But, Wimlaratne J. continued, this objective test for the exercise of restrictive 
measures during an Emergency was not applicable where:
[t]he opinion [of the competent authority to take action under 
Emergency Regulation 14 (3) is based upon] a publication [that] 
is likely to be ... prejudicial ... [In such a case] the opinion is a 
subjective opinion. ^
Justice Wimlaratne said also that the objective test was inapplicable in cases of 
preventive detention under the Emergency Regulations.
[A detention order under Emergency Regulation 17] is one 
made to prevent a person from acting [in a prejudicial manner] 
and is one made merely on the opinion of the ... [detaining
Ibid., at 346.
For the learned Judge this was because:
[t]he constitutional machinery ... [was] not geared to meet ... [challenges to 
orders under Emergency Regulations] during an emergency when state officers 
ought to be more usefully left alone to deal with urgent matters needing 
prompt attention and decisions ....
Ibid.
128 Ibid., at 329, per Wimlaratne J.
Ibid.
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authority] that unless ... [the person] is so detained he would act 
in that manner. *3^
Having applied the objective test to a consideration of the materials upon 
which the Secretary to the Ministry of State ordered the closure of the 
petitioners’ newspaper and printing press in Siriwardena, the Court upheld the 
action of the State authority. Justice Wimlaratne remarked that:
[s]ome of ... [the publications of the petitioners] could have 
incited persons to breaches of the ... [peace]. Some others were 
highly defamatory, while others are scurrilous and in extremely 
bad language. Taking also into account the history of escalating 
post-election violence in this country, and the mounting tension 
prior to the Referendum I am of the view that the decision of 
the Competent Authority was not unreasonable, for the 
publications taken as a whole were certainly calculated to be 
prejudicial of public order. ^
(b) "Omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta": The Janatha 
Finance case
The observations of Wimlaratne J. in Siriwardena were generally upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Janatha Finance and Investments v D.J.F.D. Liyanage 
Acting under Regulation 14 (7) of the Emergency Regulations 1982, ^ 33 the 
Secretary to the Ministry of State ordered the closure of the printing press of 
the petitioner, Janatha Finance. ^  The Chairman of the Board of Directors 
of the petitioner was Dr Neville Fernando, who had until recently belonged to 
the ruling party and had been a Member of the Sri Lankan Parliament. Upon 
expulsion from the ruling party and resigning from Parliament, Dr Fernando 
joined an opposition party.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid., at 332.
132 Supreme Court Application No 127 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, op. cit., 
373-396.
133 The text of Regulation 14 (7) is given in the judgement of the Court in Janatha Finance, op. 
cit., at 381.
134 There were two such orders, of which one was impugned in this case. The text of this order 
is given in the judgement of the Court in Janatha Finance, op. cit., at 385-386.
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The petitioner alleged that the order of closure of their press was directed "to 
victimise, punish and/or to take revenge on Dr Fernando for actively 
campaigning against ... [the ruling government] ... " . ^  The order of closure 
was further said to be directed "to deter, discourage and prevent Dr Fernando 
from campaigning against the Government in the ... [forthcoming] 
Referendum, and also to cause financial loss and damage to ... [him] ... ". 
Consequently, according to the petitioner, the relevant authority, in ordering 
the closure of the press, "acted wrongfully, unlawfully and maliciously . . . °
In affidavits before the Court, the Secretary to the Ministry of State claimed 
that the order of closure of the petitioners’ printing press was passed on the 
basis of "credible information".33^ The agencies who had supplied these 
information to the Secretary were the police and the civil and military 
intelligence authorities.33^ The information, according to the Secretary, 
revealed that:
pamphlets and other material printed at the ... [petitioners’ 
press] prior to and after the Presidential election [of] 1982 were 
calculated to cause racial disharmony between the Sinhala and 
Tamil communities and also to incite the masses to resort to 
violence against the state ... . 33^
After a lengthy review of recent English precedents* 3^  and text-books, 
Ranasinghe J. delivering the opinion of the Court in Janatha Finance agreed 
that:
all discretion, even where there is a subjective element in it, 
must be exercised reasonably, and in good faith and upon proper 
grounds. 3^ 3
Janatha Finance, op. cit., at 377.
136 Ibid., at 377.
137 Ibid., at 378, 391.
138 Ibid., at 396.
139 Ibid., at 391.
3^  Some of the decisions cited by the Court were common to those examined by the Court in 
Siriwardena, op. cit.
141 Janatha Finance, op. cit., at 389.
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However, for the learned Judge:
there are situations, in which such words are used, where it is 
clear both from the subjective language and the context that the 
discretion granted is exceptionally wide. Such instances are most 
common in powers granted to meet emergency s itua tions.^
In addition, Ranasinghe J. also noted the common law doctrine of omnia 
praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta, by which all acts are presumed to have 
been done rightly and regularly. In this regard, Ranasinghe J. observed that:
[i]n considering the facts [of this case,] it has also to be borne in 
mind that the respondents are entitled to call in aid the maxim 
omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta and that where an Order 
regular on the face of it - such as ... [the order of closure of the 
petitioners’ press] - is produced the burden is on the petitioner 
to rebut the p resum ption .^
Upon considering the facts of the case and noting the statements in the 
affidavits on behalf of the respondents, Ranasinghe J. upheld the order of 
closure of the petitioners’ printing press. Referring to the materials which were 
made available to the Secretary to the Ministry of State, on the basis of which 
the order was made, Ranasinghe J. noted that:
[i]t has to be remembered that the material placed before the ...
[the Secretary] was so placed before him by senior responsible 
officers, officers whose sense of responsibility and bona fides, the 
... [the Secretary] would have no reason to d o u b t .^
On the basis of these materials:
[the Secretary] cannot be said to have done what no reasonable 
person would have ever done in such circumstances.^^
142 Ibid.
141
Janatha Finance, op. cit., at 390.
144 Ibid., at 396.
145 Ibid.
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Regarding charges of mala fides on the part of the Secretary, the Court found 
that:
[t]he good faith of the ... [the Secretary], though attacked on the 
grounds of political vengeance, improper motives, failure to 
exercise his discretion, acting on the dictation of the President, 
and partiality has not been shaken. ^
(c) Latitude o f executive emergency decision-making
The last of the three decisions concerning the freedom of the press in which 
the Sri Lankan Supreme Court discussed the issue of reasonableness of the 
subjective decisions of State authorities during an Emergency is K. Visvalingam 
& Others v D.J.F. Liyanage and O t h e r s In Visvalingam, powers under 
Emergency Regulation 14 (3) of the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and 
Powers) Regulations, Numbers 1, 2 and 3 of 1 9 8 3 ^  (henceforth Emergency 
Regulations 1983) were invoked, following the Proclamation of Emergency on 
May 18, 1983, to close down the newspaper, "Saturday Review". ^  One of the 
express objects of this publication "was to highlight the grievances of the
147 Supreme Court Application Numbers 47, 53 and 61 of 1983, reported in Fundamental 
Rights, Vol 2, op. cit., 529-601.
148 Regulation 14 (3) of the Emergency Regulations 1983 was identical to Regulation 14 (3) of 
the Emergency Regulations 1982. It was phrased in the following terms:
If a competent authority is of opinion that there is or has been or is likely to be 
in any newspaper,... which is, in his opinion, calculated to be prejudicial to the 
interests of national security or the preservation of public order or the 
maintenance of the supplies and services essential to the life of the community 
or matter inciting or encouraging persons to mutiny, riot or civil commotion, 
he may -
(a) by order direct that no person shall print, publish or distribute ... such 
newspaper for such period as may be specified in the order, ... and authorize 
any person specified ... [in the order] to take ... steps ... [for] taking possession 
of any printing presses ... for securing compliance with the order; or
(b) take such [other] measures ... [as provided by this Regulation], in respect of 
such newspaper.
^  Details of the Order are given in the judgements of Wanasundera J. and Soza J. in 
Visvalingam, op. cit., at 533-534 and 552-553 respectively.
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[minority ethnic] Tamil [community in Sri Lanka] by laying bare the atrocities 
and excesses of the police and the armed forces [towards members of that 
community]". The applicants in Visvalingam were the shareholders and 
directors of the newspaper company as well as the company itself. Before the 
Supreme Court, the petitioners in Visvalingam alleged the infringement of 
their constitutional rights to e q u a lity ^  and freedom of expression!^ by the 
order of closure of their newspaper.
Although there was some controversy among the Judges who decided 
Visvalingam as to the standing of the petitioner-company, as distinct from the 
shareholder petitioners, the allegations of infringement of constitutional rights 
by the petitioners were unanimously rejected by the Supreme Court. ! ^  jn his 
concurring opinion in Visvalingam, Soza J. examined the meaning of the
Visvalingam, op. cit., at 549.
^  Article 12, Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978.
152 Article 14, ibid.
153 This controversy was generated by two previous decisions of the Supreme Court, Dr S. 
Neville A. Fernando and Others v DJ.F.D. Liyanage and Others, S.C. Application No. 116 of 
1982, and Dr S. Neville A. Fernando and Others v DJ.F.D. Liyanage & Others, S.C. Application 
No. 134 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, op. cit., at 300-309, and 409-417 
respectively. The same questions of law were involved in these two cases, the second case being 
concerned with a plea of per incuriam in the previous decision. With regard to the closure of 
printing press, in these cases, by order under Emergency Regulation, the question arose whether 
the action encroached upon the constitutional rights of the shareholders of the company as well 
as the company itself.
The petitioners in the Fernando cases had complained to the Court that the order of closure of 
the press denied to the petitioner-company the right to the freedom of the press guaranteed 
under Article 14 (a) of the Constitution of Sri Lanka. The petitioner-shareholders also alleged 
that their constitutional right to engage in trade, profession or business was infringed by the 
closure of the press. The Court found that the rights under Article 14 of the Constitution of Sri 
Lanka were available only to "citizens", so that the petitioner-company cannot complain of 
violation of any constitutional right under Article 14. With regard to the allegation of the 
infringement of the constitutional rights of the shareholders, the Court was of the opinion that 
there has been no infringement since they had not suffered any "distinct and separate injury".
The decisions in two Fernando cases above, proceeded on the assumption that the company was 
a entity, distinct from its shareholders. In Visvalingam, the Court was concerned with similar 
questions of law as to the respective standing of the shareholder-petitioners and the petitioner- 
company publishing the "Saturday Review". Wanasundera and Ratwatte JJ. denied that the 
company publishing the newspaper had a personality distinct from that of its shareholders. The 
majority of the Court in Visvalingam, Soza, Ranasinghe and Rodrigo JJ., however, upheld the 
holdings in the two Fernando cases.
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phrase "if it appears to the Secretary of State", which occurred in Regulation 
14 (3) of the Emergency Regulations 1983 and observed:
[this phrase,] in my opinion, does not mean that the Minister’s 
decision is put beyond ch a llen g e .^
According to the learned Judge, the scope of the challenge to a Minister’s 
decision would depend on the subject-matter of the Minister’s action. In 
situations like those presented in Visvalingam:
if the Minister does not act in good faith, or ... acts on 
extraneous consideration which ought not to influence him, or if 
he plainly misdirects himself if fact or in law, it may well be that 
a court would interfere ... [B]ut when ... [the Minister] honestly 
takes a view ... which could reasonably be entertained, then his 
decision is not to be set aside simply because ... someone [else] 
thinks that his view was wrong. ^
Since Visvalingam was concerned with executive decision during an 
Emergency, Soza J. reiterated that:
emergency procedure[s] ... [would have] to be set in motion 
quickly, when there ... [would be] no time for minute analysis or 
of law. The whole process would be ... [ineffectual] if the 
Minister’s decision was afterwards to be ... [scrutinized] word by 
word, letter by letter, to see if he has in any way misdirected 
himself.156
Wanasundera J. also spoke of this attitude of the Court during an Emergency.
In dealing with an Emergency situation, courts have always been 
prepared to give the Executive sufficient leeway in making 
decisions affecting the safety of the people and the security of 
the country. These decisions have to be made rapidly and in the 
light of information then available and under the constraint of 
available resources. ^
154 Visvalingam, op. cit., at 586.
155 Ibid., per Soza J. Emphasis added.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid., at 550, per Wanasundera J.
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The Edirisuriya case
The attitude to judicial scrutiny of the reasonableness of emergency executive 
action reflected in the cases just discussed was applied to preventive detention 
action in Edirisuriya v Navaratnam and O t h e r s It will be remembered that 
in Wijaya Kumaranatunga v Samarasinghe}^ it was held that preventive 
detention was a subjective decision of the competent authority. In BA. 
Siriwardena and Others v D.J.F.Liyanage and O t h e r s , it was indicated that 
although an objective evaluation of certain emergency action could be made by 
the Court, a similar approach will be inapplicable in cases of emergency 
preventive detention. The decision of the Sri Lankan Supreme Court in 
Edirisuriya is, however, different from the earlier stand on the Court on 
preventive detention.
The petitioner in Edirisuriya, a lawyer and former Member of Parliament, was 
arrested and detained by the Deputy Inspector General of Police. Prior to his 
arrest, the petitioner’s house was searched and the petitioner was taken away 
to the police station on the basis that he was wanted by the Deputy Inspector 
General of Police. A day later, while the petitioner was still in detention at the 
police station, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, acting under the 
provisions of Regulation 19 (2) of the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and 
Powers) Regulations, No. 7 of 1984 (henceforth Emergency Regulations 1984), 
authorized the officer-in charge of the police station to detain the 
petitioner.
Emergency Regulation 19 (2) of the Emergency Regulations 1984 did not, as 
such, provide for any powers of detention. Regulation 19 (2) merely provided 
that:
any person detained in pursuance of the provisions of 
Regulation 18 [of the Emergency Regulations 1984] in a place
158 [1985] 1 Sri L.R. 100.
Supreme Court Application 121 of 1981, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, op. cit., at 
347-363.
Supreme Court Application No 120 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, op. cit., 
at 310-346.
^  The order of detention is reproduced in Edirisuriya, op. cit., at 110.
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authorized by the Inspector-General of Police may be so 
detained for a period not exceeding ninety days...
It is clear that in order for the provisions of Regulation 19 (2) to be applied, 
there had to be a valid detention under Regulation 18 of the Emergency 
Regulations 1984. Under Regulation 18 (1), any police officer was empowered:
[to] search, detain for purposes of such search or arrest without 
warrant any person ... whom he has reasonable ground for 
suspecting to be concerned in or to be committing or to have 
committed an offence under any emergency regulation ...
The petitioner in Edirisuriya contended that his constitutional right, not to be 
arrested "except according to procedure established by law" under Article 13 
(1) of the Constitution, was infringed by the illegal order of detention under 
Emergency Regulation 19 (2). It was pointed out to the Court that the 
condition precedent to the order of detention under Regulation 19 (2), namely 
an order of detention under Regulation 18 (1), was not fulfilled. The order of 
detention under Regulation 19 (2) could not thus, according to the detainee, 
have been legally made. In delivering the leading opinion of Court in 
Edirisuriya, Ranasinghe J. summed up the position correctly.
A person who can ... be detained in ... an authorized place [as 
provided by Emergency Regulation 19 (2)] is a person who has 
either been detained for purposes of search or has been arrested 
without a warrant under [Emergency] Regulation 18. The pre­
requisites of a detention extending up to ninety days empowered 
by paragraph (2) of Regulation 19 are: a person who has already 
been taken in for detention under paragraph (1) of Regulation 
18, either for the purposes of search or by way of arrest without 
a warrant , and a place authorized for such detention by the 
Inspector-General of Police (or a Deputy Inspector-General of 
Police). ^
Since Emergency Regulation 18 (1) empowered any police officer to arrest 
and detain any person, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in this case
^  Regulation 19 (2) of the Emergency Regulations 1984 is quoted by Ranasinghe J. in 
Edirisuriya, at 110-111.
^  Regulation 18 (1) of the Emergency Regulations 1984 is quoted by Ranasinghe J. in 
Edirisuriya, at 110.
164 Edirisuriya, op. cit., at 111.
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could have first ordered the detention of petitioner under that power and then 
made the order under Regulation 19 (2). That, however, was not done. 
Notwithstanding this basic flaw, the Supreme Court held the detention valid 
on the reasoning that the Deputy Inspector General of Police had the power to 
detain under Regulation 18 (1). The issue was therefore similar to that which 
arose in Wijaya Kumaranatunga,^^ where the Court had applied rules of 
interpretation derived from contract and revenue laws to decide questions of 
the constitutional right to personal liberty. In Edirisuriya, Ranasinghe J. 
referred to these holdings to conclude that:
as long as an authority has the power to do a thing, it does not 
matter if he purports to do it by reference to a wrong provision 
of law ... [T]he order can always be justified by reference to the 
correct provision of law empowering the authority making the 
order to make such order ... . ^ 7
Although the detention in Edirisuriya was not in pursuance of an order under 
Regulation 18 of the Emergency Regulations 1984, Ranasinghe J. dwelt at some 
length on the judicial approach to detentions under this Regulation. As 
already noted, there was similarity in regard to certain aspects of emergency 
detention, in the respective approaches of the majority in Wijaya 
Kumaranatunga and Ranasinghe J.’s opinion in Edirisuriya. However, 
Ranasinghe J., who wrote for the majority in Wijaya Kumaranatunga, appears 
to have taken a different approach in Edirisuriya with regard to the 
justiciability of executive orders of detention. In Wijaya Kumaranatunga, Soza 
J., with whom Ranasinghe J. concurred, had observed that an order of 
preventive detention could not be "subjected to objective tests in a Court of 
law". ° In Edirisuriya however, Ranasinghe J. proposed an objective test for 
determining the validity of the exercise of the power of preventive detention. 
With regard to the powers of detention available under Emergency Regulation 
18 (1), the learned Judge observed that:
^  Wijaya Kumaranatunga v G.VP. Samarasinghe and Others, Supreme Court Application No 
121 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, op. cit., 347-363.
166 Wijaya Kumaranatunga, op. cit., at 353.
167 Edirisuriya, op. cit., at 114. In reaching this conclusion, Ranasinghe J. also referred to some 
of the Indian precedents cited by Soza J. in Wijaya Kumaranatunga.
168 Wijaya Kumaranatunga op. cit., at 358.
CHAPTER VII 214
[Emergency Regulation 18 (1)] does not confer a power to arrest 
[or detain] arbitrarily. It is a power to be exercised only upon the 
existence of the circumstances expressly stated therein. When the 
exercise of such powers is challenged it is open to the Court to 
go into it and see whether or not the impugned power has been 
exercised as required by law in circumstances under which alone 
such power could have been exercised. ^ 9
The justification for the intervention of the Court in this regard was, however, 
apologetic. The Court’s role was seen by Ranasinghe J. as an intrusion.
Once the existence of facts and circumstances, upon which a 
reasonable man could have ... acted [in a manner similar to the 
detaining authority] is established to the satisfaction of the 
Court, the ‘judicial intrusion’ should then come to an end. ... It is 
only if the facts and circumstances, upon which ... [a detention 
order under Regulation 18 (1)] is sought to be justified by those 
who have exercised the powers in question, are such that it is 
clear that no reasonable man could have ... done what has been 
done, that the court can justifiably intervene
The objective approach, in deciding the validity of preventive detention under 
Regulation 18 (1), suggested by Ranasinghe J. was, however, not applied to the 
patently unjustified detention of the petitioner in Edirisuriya. In the absence of 
proper application of the new premises in the jurisprudence of emergency and 
preventive detention, articulated by Ranasinghe J., albeit in the form of obiter 
remarks, the utility of such an approach is not apparent. Also, as has been 
already seen, Ranasinghe J. also resorted to applying the incongruous rules of 
commercial law to uphold the invalid detention of the petitioner in Edirisuriya, 
despite upholding the justiciability of a detention on grounds of 
reasonableness.
In addition to such inconsistencies, Ranasinghe J. overruled the application of 
the safeguards to arrest and detention provided by the Sri Lankan Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1 9 7 9 / '* 1 in the case of the detainee in Edirisuriya. ^
169 Edirisuriya, op. cit., at 112. Emphasis added.
170 Ibid., per Ranasinghe J. Emphasis added.
171
1 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1979, Act No 15 of 1979.
1 7 7 . .
Sections 36, 37 and 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1979, provided for the following:
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Under Emergency Regulation 19 (1) of the Emergency Regulations 1984, the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, relating to magisterial authority
for detention beyond twenty-four hours, and for detention without warrant,
were inapplicable to a person arrested and detained under Regulation 18 (1).
As has been pointed out earlier, there was, in Edirisuriya, no order of
detention under Regulation 18 (1). Ranasinghe J. nevertheless discussed the
non-application of these rules of the Code o f Criminal Procedure, and then
concluded that even if those rules applied, the provisions of the Code would
not be attracted in any case. This conclusion was predicated on a technical
• • 173interpretation of the date of the detention order served on the petitioner.* 1 2
The date of the detention order was July 21, which according to Ranasinghe J. 
meant the midnight of July 20-21. Since the applicant was arrested in the 
afternoon of July 20, it was less than twenty-four hours from his initial arrest 
until the service of his order of detention under Regulation 19 (2), which 
although invalid, was deemed to be valid by the learned Judge.
The discordance between Justice Ranasinghe’s stand in upholding the 
justiciability of a detention order under Emergency Regulation 18 (1) and his 
actual grounds for decision in Edirisuriya is also revealed in another important 
aspect. Under Article 126 of the Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978, an 
application alleging infringement or alleged infringement of a constitutional 
right is to filed in Court within a month of the cause of action. ^  Although
that an arrested person was to be sent before a Magistrate without unnecessary 
delay;
that an arrested person was not to be detained in any event for a period longer 
than 24 hours; and
that arrests without warrant were to be reported to a Magistrate.
These sections of Code are reproduced in full in the judgement of Wanasundera J. in 
Edirisuriya, op. cit., at 119.
173 Ibid., at 114.
*7<* Article 126, Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978:
(1) The Supreme Court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and 
determine any question relating to the infringement or imminent infringement 
by executive and administrative action of any fundamental right or language 
right declared and recognized by Chapter III or Chapter IV.
(2) Where any person alleges that any such fundamental right or language right 
relating to such person has been infringed or is about to be infringed by
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the Sri Lankan Supreme Court has generally held the one month time-limit in 
Article 126 as mandatory, yet in some decisions it was observed that the Court, 
in its discretion, might entertain applications which were out the time. J In 
Edirisuriya, Ranasinghe J. noted that in HewakuruppaP^ and Vadivel 
Mahenthiran,A' '  the Supreme Court had expressed its willingness to waive the 
time-limit of one month provided by Article 126 in fit cases where there were 
adequate grounds for the waiver. ^  But in the case of the detainee in 
Edirisuriya, Ranasinghe J. was unprepared to waive the time-limit of one 
month for submitting an application to the Supreme Court under Article 126 
for infringement of the detainee’s constitutional right to liberty under Article 
13. The grounds for the non-waiver of the one-month rule in Article 126, 
according to the learned Judge, was that:
[although the petitioner mentioned the difficulties of access to 
legal advice because of restrictions imposed by the detaining 
authority, he had not specifically] referred to his inability to have 
presented his petition to this Court within the time limit of one 
month set out in ... Article 126 (2) ... [The applicant had also 
not] pleaded any excuse or explanation regarding the failure to 
comply with the ... requirement of Article 126(2).™
executive or administrative action, he may ... within one month thereof, ... apply 
to the Supreme Court ... praying for relief and redress in respect of such 
infringement....
Emphasis added.
175 See for example, Aiyathurai Thadchanamoorthi v Attorney-General and Vadivel Mahenthiran 
v Attorney General and Others, Supreme Court Application Nos 63 and 68 of 1980, reported in 
Fundamental Rights, Vol 1, Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka (April 1979 to 
December, 1981), Colombo, Lake House Investments, 1984, at 129-142; K.S.S.E. Ranatunga v 
A.R.M. Jayawardena, Fundamental Rights, Vol 1, op. cit., 77-80; B.M. Jayawardena v Attorney- 
General, ibid., 175-177; A.K.TJ. Gunawardena v E.L. Senanayake, ibid., 178-179; Hewakurruppa 
v GA. de Silva, Tea Commissioner et al, Supreme Court Application No 118/84 - S.C. Minutes 
of 10.11.84.
1 Hewakurruppa v GA. de Silva, Tea Commissioner et al, Supreme Court Application No 
118/84 - S.C. Minutes of 10.11.84.
177
Vadivel Mahenthiran v Attorney General and Others, Supreme Court Application No 68 of 
1980, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 1, op. cit., 129-142.
^  Edirisuriya, op. cit., at 106.
179 Ibid., at 109.
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The result of Justice Ranasinghe’s decision in Edirisuriya does not in any way 
mark a change in the attitude of the Sri Lankan Court towards the operation 
of emergency laws and consequent denial of constitutional rights. The 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka since the coming into force 
of the new Constitution of 1978 has been discordant. In Edirisuriya, while an 
objective basis for resorting to preventive detention was suggested, the 
detention of the petitioner was upheld by applying the incongruous rules of 
other branches of law. The discordance manifest in other decisions on 
emergency powers was thus continued in Edirisuriya.
The Discordant Approach of the Sri Lankan Court
The examination of the jurisprudence of the Sri Lankan Court, relating to 
issues of emergency powers and citizens’ liberties in the pre-1978 and post- 
1978 periods has revealed that the Court’s approach to those issues has not 
been consistent. In the earlier cases, the Court’s technique can be identified as 
one based wholly on the formal style of interpretation. In the latter cases, the 
Court has not been found to deviate from its previous approach to questions of 
individual liberties in any meaningful way. Nevertheless, during this later 
period, certain observations in some decisions have indicated a willingness on 
the part of the Court to change its formal approach. But the potential impact 
of those holdings has been found to be negated when other disparate rules of 
interpretation, inappropriate for a consideration of the rights of citizens, were 
upheld by the Court. The consequences of this uncoordinated jurisprudence of 
the Sri Lankan Court will be critically analysed in Chapters IX and X.
218
CHAPTER VIII
BANGLADESH:
JURISPRUDENCE OF LEGALITY
In contrast to the approaches of the Courts in Malaysia and Sri Lanka, 
identified in Chapters VI and VII as the "jurisprudence of the formal style" and 
"uncoordinated jurisprudence" respectively, the Court in Bangladesh had 
endeavoured to uphold basic notions of legality! during Emergency rule. The 
Court in Bangladesh sought to prescribe "objective" criteria of evaluation in 
examining actions of the State authorities directed to deprive citizens of their 
constitutional rights during an Emergency. The provisions of emergency 
preventive detention statutes were strictly interpreted by the Court, so that any 
lapses on the part of the detaining authorities were held to have rendered the 
detention invalid. During a state of Martial Law, the jurisdiction of the Court 
was expressly curtailed. But even during this period, the Court sought to 
provide some relief for unjust deprivation of personal liberty, whenever 
possible. The role of the Court in Bangladesh can generally be described as 
one which has endeavoured to uphold a jurisprudence based on principles of 
legality.
States of Emergency and Martial Law in Bangladesh
As noted earlier in Chapter III, there were no provisions granting emergency 
powers to the Executive in the Constitution of Bangladesh as adopted. There 
were, likewise no provisions relating to preventive detention in the original
* The principle of legality:
demands that government be conducted in accordance with well established and 
performable norms ... Rule must be by law and not discretion. Also, and especially, the 
lawmaker itself must be under the law .... [The principle of legality] is targeted against 
arbitrary government and palm tree justice.
(A.C. Hutchinson and P. Monahan, Democracy and the Rule o f Law, in A.C. Hutchinson and P. 
Monahan (Eds), Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology, Canada, Carswell & Co., 1987, 97-124, at 101).
In The Morality of Law, New Haven, Yale University Press, Rev. Ed., 1969, L. Fuller put 
forward eight principles of legality which are inherent in the idea of law. They are (a) generality, 
(b) promulgation, (c) non-retroactivity, (d) clarity, (e) non-contradiction, (f) capacity of 
compliance, (g) constancy, and (h) congruence between official action and declared rule. Ibid., 
at 46-91.
CHAPTER VIII 219
Constitution. Within a year of the adoption of the Constitution, however, 
provisions relating to emergency powers and preventive detention were 
entrenched in the Constitution by the Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 
1973.2 A year later, on December 28, 1974, a Proclamation of Emergency was 
issued by the President.^
During the pendency of the 1974 Proclamation of Emergency, Martial Law 
was declared in Bangladesh on August 15, 1975. The Emergency co-existed 
with the state of Martial Law until the Proclamation of Emergency was 
revoked by a Martial Law decree in 1979.^ Another state of emergency was 
declared in 1981 following the assassination of the President.^ Bangladesh
L Act No 24 of 1973. For a discussion on other extraordinary powers of the State available under 
the Constitution prior to the Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, and the process of 
introduction of the new emergency powers, see supra, Chapter III.
The Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1973 introduced into the Constitution, the following 
new Articles:
Article 141 A, relating to a Proclamation of Emergency by the President; Article 141B, providing 
for the suspension of constitutional rights while a Proclamation of Emergency was in force; and 
Article 141C, by which the means for the enforcement of specified rights could be suspended 
during an Emergency.
3 Notification No. 3 (50)/74-CD (CS), dated December 28, 1974, reprinted in (1975) 27 D.L.R. 
76 (Statutes Section).
^ Martial Law was declared on August 15, 1975 following a military coup d ’ Etat. The 
declaration of Martial Law by radio broadcast was followed by a gazetted Proclamation dated 
August 20, 1975. The text of the Proclamation is quoted in full in F.K.MA. Munim, Legal 
Aspects of Martial Law, Dhaka, Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs, 1989, at 
234-236; also in Halima Khatun v Bangladesh, (1980) 30 D.L.R. (S.C.) 207, at 213-314. A second 
Proclamation was made on November 8, 1975, continuing the Martial Law declared earlier. This 
second Proclamation is also quoted in F.K.MA Munim, op. cit., at 274-275 (Appendix VIII), 
and in Halima Khatun, op. cit., at 215.
3 The state of emergency was terminated on November 27, 1979. See Nasiruddin v Government 
of Bangladesh, (1980) 32 D.L.R. (A.D.) 216 at 221; see also A.B.M. Mafizul Islam Patwari, 
Liberty of the People: Britain and Bangladesh, Dhaka, Institute of Human Rights and Legal 
Affairs, 1987, at 140.
^ The Proclamation of Emergency was made on May 30, 1981 and published in the Bangladesh 
Gazette Extraordinary on July 10, 1981. The text of the Proclamation is reprinted in (1981) 33 
D.L.R. 119-120 (Statutes Section). The Emergency was, however, short-lived; it was withdrawn 
on September 21, 1981. See A.B.M. Mafizul Islam Patwari, op. cit., at 140. For the political 
context of the withdrawal of this Emergency see Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade, 
India, South Asian Publishers, 1982, at 324.
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experienced a third declaration of Emergency in 19877 A distinctive feature 
of the Proclamations of Emergency in 1981 and 1987 was that, during their 
pendency, there was no invocation of the constitutional provision permitting 
the suspension of means for the enforcement of constitutional rights during an 
Emergency.^
Bangladesh had in the past witnessed two states of Martial Law. Both periods 
of Martial Law was initiated by coups d ’ Etat. The first was proclaimed in 1975 
and continued till 1979. The state of Martial Law declared on August 15, 1975 
continued till 1979 when it was withdrawal by a Proclamation of the 
President.^ A second state of Martial Law was proclaimed in 1982. It 
continued for about five years until its revocation on November 11, 19867*
The Remedy of ‘Habeas Corpus’ during 
an Emergency: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
Included among the powers of the High Court Division in Bangladesh to 
enforce the rights of citizens, entrenched by the Constitution, is the power to 
pass an order analogous to the writ of habeas corpus. Article 102 of the 
Constitution provides:
(1) The High Court Division on the application of any person 
aggrieved, may give such directions or orders to any person or 
authority, including any person performing any function in 
connection with the affairs of the Republic, as may be 
appropriate for the enforcement of any of the fundamental 
rights conferred by Part III of this Constitution.
7
The Emergency was proclaimed on November 27, 1987 amidst a confrontation between a 
military-turned-civilian government and the political opposition. The Proclamation is published 
in the Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary of November 27, 1987.
8
Article 141C, Constitution of Bangladesh.
9
The Proclamation dated April 7, 1979 is reproduced in F.K.MA. Munim, Legal Aspects of 
Martial Law, Dhaka, Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs, 1989, at 284-287 
(Appendix XII).
^  Proclamation of Martial Law, The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, March 24, 1982. The 
1982 Proclamation is also quoted in full in F.K.MA. Munim, op. cit., at 245-248.
11 See F.K.MA. Munim, op. cit., at 248.
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(2) The High Court Division may, if satisfied that no other 
equally efficacious remedy is provided by law -
(b) on the application of any person, make an order -
(i) directing that a person in custody be brought before it so that 
it may satisfy itself that he is not being held in custody without 
lawful authority or in an unlawful manner ....
A statutory guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus is also available in 
Bangladesh under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.^ Section 491 (1) of 
the Code o f Criminal Procedure provides:
[The] High Court may, whenever it thinks fit, direct
(b) that a person illegally or improperly detained in public or 
private custody ... be set at liberty.
During an Emergency in Bangladesh, certain constitutional rights are wholly 
suspended. The Constitution also provides for the suspension of means for 
the enforcement of rights by the operation of a Presidential Order during an 
Emergency.^ Notwithstanding the suspension, and the suspension of the 
means for the enforcement of constitutional rights, the power of the Court, 
under Article 102 of the Constitution, to grant the remedy of habeas corpus is 
not affected during an Emergency. Also, measures taken during an Emergency 
do not suspend the statutory remedy of habeas corpus available under the 
Code of Criminal Procedure.
Judicial Review of Detention during the 1974-1979 Emergency
Because of the suspension of constitutional rights, and the suspension of 
means for the enforcement of rights during the 1974-1979 Emergency in 
Bangladesh, detainees resorted to petitioning the High Court Division for the 
remedy of habeas corpus under the Code of Criminal Procedure (henceforth,
Act No. 5 of 1898, as amended to date.
Article 141B, Constitution of Bangladesh. See Chapter V supra for a discussion on the 
provisions of this Article.
Article 141C, Constitution of Bangladesh. See Chapter V.
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the Code). It is not clear from the decisions of the Court in this regard whether 
the statutory remedy of habeas corpus under the Code continues to operate 
after the suspension of means for the enforcement of the constitutional right 
to personal liberty. It appears that the rationale of the detainees for seeking 
the remedy of habeas corpus under the Code proceeded on the basis that the 
suspension of the constitutional remedy could not bar the statutory redress for 
illegal or improper detention.
During the 1974-1979 Emergency, the Court in Bangladesh also readily 
invoked its jurisdiction under Article 102 of the Constitution to inquire into 
the legality of an emergency detention, notwithstanding the bar on citizens to 
enforce their rights during the Emergency. The approach of the Supreme 
Court of India, on the potential effect of the suspension of the means for the 
enforcement of the constitutional right to liberty during an Emergency, has 
been different. The Indian Supreme Court’s stand has been that although the 
power of the Court was not affected during an Emergency, a detainee had no 
locus standi to enforce his/her right to liberty.
[T]he petitioner’s right to move this Court, but not this Court’s 
power ... has been suspended during the operation of the 
Emergency, with the result that the petitioner has no locus standi 
to enforce his right, if any, during the Emergency.^
In taking a different approach on the matter of the standing of a detainee, the 
Court in Bangladesh has not examined the jurisprudential issues relating to 
the suspension of means for the enforcement of rights. The Bangladesh 
Supreme Court simply invoked its jurisdiction to examine the propriety of 
detention during the Emergency. Detentions during the Emergency were 
challenged before the Court on the procedural grounds of, inter alia, 
impropriety, mala fides, and breach of process. These grounds enabled the 
detainees to argue that the suspension of means for the enforcement of the 
constitutional right to personal liberty was not attracted.
The 1974 Proclamation of Emergency
^  Mohan Chowdhury v Chief Commissioner, Union Territory o f Tripura, [1964] A.I.R. (S.C.) 173, 
at 177, per Sinha, C.J. See also Chapter V, supra. For a discussion on this decision, see K.I. 
Omar, Emergency, Personal Liberty and the Courts in India and Pakistan, Unpublished LL.M. 
Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 1985, 75-76.
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The Proclamation of Emergency in 1974 was issued on dubious grounds. 
Sectarian political objectives were intended to be attained by recourse to the 
emergency provisions of the Constitution.^ The reason for the invocation of 
the state of emergency in 1974, was stated to be considerations of the "security" 
and "economic life" of Bangladesh, which were purportedly threatened by 
"internal disturbance". The Proclamation of Emergency, under the provisions 
of Article 141A of the Constitution of Bangladesh,^ issued by the President 
and countersigned by the Prime Minister, read:
Whereas the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists 
in which the security and economic life of Bangladesh are 
threatened by internal disturbance;
Now Therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause 
(1) of Article 141 of the Constitution ... the President is pleased 
hereby to issue this Proclamation of Emergency...
On the same day, the President, by Order under Article 141C of the
1QC onstitu tion ,su sp en ded  the means for the enforcement of nearly all of the
^  For an insight into the political situation in Bangladesh at that time, and the real intention of 
the government in proclaiming the Emergency, see Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, Dhaka, University Press Limited, 1983, at 231-235.
17 Article 141A (1), Constitution of Bangladesh:
If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists in which the security 
or economic life of Bangladesh or any part thereof, is threatened by war or 
external aggression or internal disturbance, he may issue a Proclamation of 
Emergency....
to
Notification No. 3 (50)/74-CD (CS), dated December 28,1974, reprinted in (1975) 27 D.L.R. 
76 (Statutes Section).
The original Constitution of Bangladesh required that the Presidential Order proclaiming 
Emergency must be countersigned by the Prime Minister. That provision was omitted by the 
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, Act No. 2 of 1975.
The original provision of the Constitution of Bangladesh, requiring the countersignature of the 
Prime Minister in the Presidential Order declaring an Emergency, was similar to the provisions 
of Article 134 (2) of the 1972 Constitution of Sri Lanka, and Clause (20) of the Malaysian 
Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1983, which was superseded a year later by the Constitution 
(Amendment) Act, 1984.
^  Article 141C (1), Constitution of Bangladesh:
While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President may, by 
order, declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of
CHAPTER VIII 224
constitutional rights, including the right to life and personal liberty.^ The 
Presidential Order read:
In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 141C 
of the Constitution ..., the President is pleased hereby to declare 
that the right of any person to move any court for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by articles 27, 31, 32, 33, 35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42 and 43 of that Constitution, and all 
proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the said 
rights, shall remain suspended for the period during which the 
Proclamation of Emergency ... is in fo r c e d
Acting under the provisions of Article 93 (1) of the Constitution of
29
Bangladesh, the President also promulgated the Emergency Powers 
Ordinance, 1974, which was soon superseded by the Emergency Powers A ct, 
1975.^  Section 2 of the Emergency Powers Act, 1975 delegated to the 
government very broad powers to make Emergency Rules on a wide variety of 
subjects. The Emergency Rules could, in addition to other matters, provide 
for:
the rights conferred by Part III of this Constitution as may be specified in the 
order, and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the 
right so specified, shall remain suspended for the period during which the 
Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be specified in the 
order.
70 Under the Constitution of Bangladesh, the right to life and personal liberty is guaranteed by 
Article 32:
No person shall be deprived of life and personal liberty save in accordance with law.
^  Notification No 3 (51)/74-CD (CS),dated December 28,1974, reprinted in (1975) 27 DLR 76 
(Statutes Section).
^  Article 93 (1), Constitution of Bangladesh (as at 1974):
At any time when Parliament is not in session, if the President is satisfied that 
circumstances which render immediate action necessary, he may make and 
promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him to require, 
and any Ordinance so made shall, as from its promulgation have the like force 
of law as an Act of Parliament....
^  Ordinance No. XXVII of 1974, published in the Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 
December 28, 1974; reprinted in (1975) 27 D.L.R. 76-78, (Statute Section).
^  Act No. 1 of 1975, passed by Parliament on January 25, 1975, and published in the 
Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary of the same date.
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the apprehension and detention of any person with respect to 
whom the authority empowered by or under the rules to 
apprehend and detain is o f the opinion that his apprehension and 
detention are necessary for the purpose of preventing him from 
acting in a manner prejudicial to Bangladesh’s relation with 
foreign powers, or to the security, the public safety or interest of 
Bangladesh, the maintenance of supplies and services essential 
to the life of the community or the maintenance of peaceful 
condition in any part of Bangladesh... ?**
The Court’s general approach to Preventive Detention during an Emergency
The attitude of the Court in Bangladesh towards preventive detention during 
an Emergency was summed up by the High Court Division in its decision in 
Farida Rahman v B a n g la d e s h concerning a detention order under the 
Emergency Powers Rules 1975.^ Delivering the opinion of the Court in Farida 
Rahman, Masud J. observed:
It is a well-settled principle that preventive detention which 
makes an inroad on the personal liberty of a citizen, without 
[the] safeguards inherent in a formal trial before a judicial 
tribunal, must be zealously kept within the bounds fixed by the 
constitution and the relevant law. It is also a settled principle 
that [the] requirements] of law providing [for] preventive 
detention must be strictly followed and scrupulously complied
Scope of Court’s power to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus during an 
Emergency
25" Section 2 (2) (viii), Emergency Powers Act, 1975. Emphasis added.
26 (1981) 81 D.L.R. 130.
27 Emergency Power Rules 1975, framed under the Emergency Powers Ordinance, 1974, and 
continued by the Emergency Powers Act, 1975. The Rules issued on January 3, 1975 were 
published in the Gazette as Notification No S.R.O. ll-L /75, reprinted in (1975) 27 D.L.R.78 
(Statutes Section).
28 Farida Rahman, op. cit., at 133-134.
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In decisions concerning emergency preventive detention, there appears to 
have been some controversy in the High Court Division, regarding its 
respective powers under Article 102 of the Constitution, and those available 
under section 491 (1) of the Code o f Criminal Procedure, 1898. In Mukhlesur 
Rahman v The S ta te d  it was held that the scope of Article 102 of the 
Constitution was much wider than section 491 of the Code.
Under Article 102, the Court has got constitutional powers to 
examine the facts of a ... [detention] in order ‘to satisfy itself 
that the ... [detainee] is not being detained without lawful 
authority or in an unlawful manner. But under ... [section 491 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure,] what the court is required to do 
is to see whether a person has been illegally or improperly 
detained.-^ *
In Kripa Shindu Hazra v The S ta te d  on the other hand, it was asserted that 
the scope of section 491 of the Code o f Criminal Procedure in granting relief to 
a detainee was wider than the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court 
Division under Article 102 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Justice B.H. 
Chowdhury delivering the opinion of the Court, observed that:
29 Act No. 5 of 1898.
30 (1976) 28 D.L.R. 172.
Ibid., at 177, per Shahabuddin Ahmed J. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judge 
quoted with approval a similar distinction made by Hamoodur Rahman J. (later Chief Justice) 
of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Government of West Pakistan v Begum Agha Abdul Karim 
Shorish Kashmiri, (1969) 21 D.L.R. (S.C.) 1. The provisions of Article 98 of the 1962 
Constitution of Pakistan were almost identical with those of Article 102 of the Bangladesh 
Constitution, while the provisions of section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, were 
the same in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Comparing the powers of the Court in Pakistan under the 
Code, the Constitution, and in respect of the old prerogative writs, Hamoodur Rahman J. had 
observed in Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri that:
so far as the deprivation of the liberty of a citizen was concerned, the 
Constitution-makers [in Pakistan] intended that this most cherished right 
should not be taken away in an arbitrary manner ... [H]ence by sub-clause (b) 
of clause (2) of Article 98 ... [of the Constitution, the constitution-makers] left 
it to the High Courts to review the actions of the detaining authority, 
untrammelled by the formalities of either section 491 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code or the old prerogative writ of habeas corpus ....
Ibid., at 12.
32 (1978) 30 D.L.R. 103.
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the contention that [the] scope of ... [judicial inquiry under 
section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure] is limited and 
narrower than ... [that available under] Article 102 of the 
Constitution has no force. ... [The scope of judicial inquiry under 
section 491 of the Code] is not hedged by constitutional 
limitations ... The expression, "whenever it thinks fit" [in Section 
491 of the Code] confers an absolute discretion on the court to 
exercise its power thereunder ... , having regard to the 
circumstances of each case ... [T]he expression "whenever it 
thinks fit" does not warrant any ... limitation on ... [the Court’s] 
absolute discretion.*^
It must be admitted that the premises of Justice Chowdhury’s assertion that 
the statutory basis of the High Court’s jurisdiction was wider than that 
afforded by the Constitution, are erroneous.*^ However, the manner in which 
the learned Judge proceeded to use this basis to give relief to the detainee in 
Kripa Shindu Hazra is interesting. With regard to the enforcement of 
constitutional rights during an Emergency, Chowdhury J. observed that:
during Emergency, when the fundamental rights are suspended 
and the right to move the court for the enforcement of the same 
has been taken away, neither Article 102 [of the Constitution,] 
nor ... [section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure] is 
available to seek ... [remedy for infringement of constitutional 
rights].*^
Justice Chowdhury characterized section 491 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure as encompassing a remedial process which was discretionary in 
nature.
Under ... [section] 491 of the Code, there is neither a right ... 
[available to a] person detained, to move the High Court for the 
enforcement of the fundamental right [to personal liberty,] nor 
there is an obligation on the part of the High Court to give the 
relief ... [Section 491 confers] only a discretionary jurisdiction, 
conceived as a check on arbitrary action ... . ^
33 Ibid., at 114. Justice B.H. Chowdhury was relying on the minority opinion of Subba Rao J. in 
the Indian Supreme Court decision in Makhan Singh Tarsikka v State of Punjab, [1964] A.I.R. 
(S.C.) 381.
This is discussed in Chapter IX infra.
35 Kripa Shindu Hazra, op. cit., at 114.
^  Ibid., at 115, per Chowdhury J.
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Justice Chowdhury’s conclusion is stated to be based on the minority opinion
of Subba Rao J. in the Indian Supreme Court decision in Makhan Singh
Tarsikka v State o f Punjab Justice Subba Rao argued that section 491 of the 
- 2 0
Code, ° though remedial in form, postulated the existence of a substantive 
right, and went on to identify that substantive right as the common law 
principle that no person could be deprived of his liberty except in the manner 
prescribed by law .^  In Kripa Shindu Hazra, Chowdhury J. did not discuss the 
questions relating to the locus standi of a petitioner in seeking relief under the 
Code for the infringement of his right of personal liberty. It is however to be 
assumed that the premises of the learned Judge would be the same as Indian 
Judge’s dissenting opinion in Makhan Singh Tarsikka.
Compliance with provisions of Emergency Legislation
Under the Emergency Powers Rules 1975, as originally framed, there was no 
provision for the communication, to the detainee, of the grounds on which the 
detention order was based. In this situation, the Court in Bangladesh 
scrutinized strictly the compliance by the detention authority of the mandatory 
provisions of the Rules. By such a course, the effort of the Court was directed 
to uphold the right to personal liberty during the Emergency. Referring to the 
absence of any provision for communicating the grounds of detention to the 
detainee, who was detained under Rule 5 (1) of the Emergency Rules 1975,^
37 [1964] A.I.R. (S.C.) 381. In Kripa Shindu Hazra, it is, however, not mentioned that the 
opinion in Makhan Singh Tarsikka, which was relied upon was a minority opinion. The majority 
in the Indian case held that all actions before the Court for the enforcement of "rights" during 
Emergency, whether by constitutional writs or under statutes, were barred. See K.I. Omar, 
Emergency, Personal Liberty and the Courts in India and Pakistan, Unpublished LL.M. 
Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1985, at 91-92.
38 The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Act No. 5 of 1898, was passed during the colonial 
phase of South Asia, so that the provisions of the Code were identical in Pakistan, India and 
Bangladesh.
39 See K.I. Omar, Emergency, Personal Liberty and the Courts in India and Pakistan,
Unpublished LL.M. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1985, at 92-93.
40 Rule 5 (1), Emergency Powers Rules 1975:
The Government, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to 
preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security, the public 
safety or interest of Bangladesh, Bangladesh’s relation with any foreign power,
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the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, in Krishna Gopal 
Bhowmick v Secretary, Ministry o f Home Affairs, B a n g la d e s h observed:
The position is that a man can be deprived of his liberty under ... 
[Emergency Rule 5(1)] simply on the making of an order by the 
authority and the only protection, albeit a precarious one, that 
can be given is that, unless there is strict compliance with the 
essential provisions o f ... [Rule 5 (1)], the detention order cannot 
be sustained.^
On behalf of the Court in Krishna Gopal Bhowmick, Kemaluddin Hossain C.J. 
continued:
If there be any doubt as to whether the Rules have been 
substantially complied with, the doubt must be resolved in 
favour of the ... [detainee].^
Communication of the Grounds for Detention
The Emergency Powers Rules 1975 were amended in 1977 to provide for the 
communication to the detainee of the grounds for his/her detention within two 
weeks 44 Since then, the Court has insisted on strict compliance with these 
provisions. In Farida Rahman v Government of Bangladesh,* 4  ^ the detainee was
the maintenance of public order, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any 
part of Bangladesh or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the 
life of the community it is necessary so to do, may make an order -
(a) directing that such person be detained....
41 (1979) 31 D.L.R. (A.D.) 145.
4^ Ibid., at 148, per Kemaluddin Hossain C.J.
44 The Emergency Powers Rules 1975, were amended in 1977 by the Martial Law government, 
vide the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Notification No S.R.O. 278-L/77, dated August 18, 1977. 
Am ong the changes made in 1977 was the requirement for the communication of the grounds 
for detention to a detainee within two weeks (Rule 5A), and provisions for the establishment of 
Advisory Board for reviewing detentions.
The newly introduced Rule 5A of the Emergency Powers Rules 1975 was almost identical to 
Section 8 (2) of the Special Powers Act, 1974, a non-emergency statute providing for preventive 
detention and other measures for special offences.
45 (1981) 33 D.L.R. 130.
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not supplied with the grounds for detention until nearly a month after the 
order of detention became effective. The Court was not prepared to condone 
the delay.
When the law providing for preventive detention has made 
specific provision that the grounds of detention should be 
furnished within a time limit prescribed, then it should be done 
within that time limit. It is a right of the ... [detainee] and an 
obligation upon the detaining authority who must scrupulously 
follow it. This is a mandatory requirement of law and non- 
compliance with the same would definitely invalidate the 
detention...
Specificity of Grounds of Detention
The Court in Bangladesh has consistently required that the grounds on which 
an order of detention was based must be specific. The order of detention in
A H
Krishna Gopal Bhowmick v Secretary, Ministry o f Home Affairs, Bangladesh 
stated several alternate grounds as justifying the detention. The order stated:
Whereas the Government is satisfied with a view to preventing 
... [the detainee] from acting in a manner prejudicial to the 
security or interest of Bangladesh or the public safety or the 
maintenance of law and order, it is necessary to make an order 
for his detention.^
The Appellate Division pointed out that in passing this detention order in 
Krishna Gopal Bhowmick, the detaining authority relied on four discrete 
grounds, all drawn from the same set of materials available to the detaining 
authority. Since, for the Court, it was not possible to be sure which of the four 
grounds prevailed on the authority to order the detention, the order was held 
to have been passed without a proper basis of satisfaction. The Appellate 
Division also found that one of the alternate grounds mentioned in the 
detention order, "maintenance of law and order", was not within the scope of
^  Farida Rahman, op. cit., at 133, per Masud J.
47 (1979) 31 D.L.R. (A.D.) 145.
^  This order (emphasis added) is quoted in the judgement in Krishna Gopal Bhowmick, op. cit., 
at 148.
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Emergency Rule 5 (1), on which the detention order was based. On the basis 
of these findings, the detention order in Krishna Gopal Bhowmick was held 
invalid and the detainee ordered to be released.
The Appellate Division’s requirement in Krishna Gopal Bhowmick of the 
specificity of grounds on the basis of which detention is being ordered was 
subsequently applied in a number of decisions. In Akram Hossain Mondal v 
Government of Bangladesh,^ the order of detention read:
Whereas ... [the detainee] is likely to prejudice the security of 
Bangladesh and/or to endanger public safety and/or the 
maintenance of the public order within the meaning of Rule 2 
(e) of the Emergency Powers Rules ... Now, in exercise of the 
powers conferred by ... direct that [the detainee] be detained ...
[under Rule] 5 (1) (a) of the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975...
On the basis of the precedent in Krishna Gopal Bhowmick, the High Court 
Division held that the order of detention in Akram Hossain Mondal was illegal.
The conclusion of the detaining authority that the ... [detainee] 
is likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the security of 
Bangladesh and/or to endanger public safety and/or ... have 
been drawn from the same set of facts. The detaining authority 
was, therefore, not quite sure as to which of the prejudicial acts 
the ... [detainee] was likely to ... [commit, and thus,] the grounds 
of detention [have been mentioned] disjunctively ... This shows 
that the detaining authority passed the order without due 
application of mind ... [and in a casual m anner]... P^
The detaining authority in Amaresh Chandra v Bangladeshp^ instead of 
referring to any of the specific heads of prejudicial activities specified in 
Emergency Rule 5 (1) as grounds for detention, referred to the Rule itself in 
the detention order. Chief Justice Kemaluddin Hossain recalled his earlier 
opinion in Krishna Gopal Bhowmick and observed:
49 (1979) 31 D.L.R. 127.
^  The order of detention is quoted in the judgement in Akram Hossain Mondal, op. cit., at 138. 
^  Akram Hossain Mondal, op. cit., at 139.
52 (1979) 31 D.L.R. (A.D.) 240.
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The ... [detaining authority] refers to Rule 2 (e) of the 
Emergency Power Rules and then invokes the powers under 
Rule 5 (1) (a) in passing the order of detention against the ... 
[detainee] ... [Excepting ... [this] casual and careless reference 
to the numbers of the two clauses [of the Emergency Power 
Rules] nothing has been mentioned in the detention order which 
could at all be said to be an order passed under Rule 5 (1) of the 
Emergency Power Rules ... [OJn this ground alone ... the order 
of detention must be struck down as invalid... .
Successive petitions for Habeas Corpus
In addition to infirmity on account of the grounds in the detention order, the 
High Court Division in Akram Hossain Mondal v Government of Bangladesh^ 
had also to decide whether successive petitions by the detainee to the Court 
against the same order of detention were maintainable. An earlier petition of 
the detainee in Akram Hossain Mondal, under section 491 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure before the High Court Division was unsuccessful. 
Subsequently, another petition, the basis of the decision in Akram Hossain 
Mondal, was preferred before the High Court Division on fresh grounds. On 
behalf of the State it was contended that the subsequent petition of the 
detainee before the High Court division was not maintainable, since the 
previous petition was heard by the Court on its merits and rejected.
The High Court Division had therefore to consider whether successive 
petitions of this kind were prohibited by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
repugnant to any rule or practice, or were contrary to public policy. After
Ibid., at 241. See also Md Famque Reza v Government of Bangladesh, (1977) 29 D.L.R. 4, 
where the detention order referred to "prejudicial acts" of the detainee, without specifying which 
of the prejudicial acts, defined in Rule 2 (e) of the Emergency Powers Rules 1975, pertained to 
the detainee’s activities. It was held by the High Court Division that:
[vjagueness in an order of detention may not be fatal, but if this court finds it 
difficult to satisfy itself as to the lawful authority of the order, then such order 
ought not be allowed to continue.
Ibid., at 6.
54 (1979) 31 D.L.R. 127.
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referring to the High Court R ules^  and an elaborate examination of 
precedents on this issue from Pakistan and India, the High Court Division held 
that a fresh petition against an order of detention was maintainable on new 
grounds.^ The underlying basis for this decision of the Court in Akram 
Hossain Mondial was its conclusion that the detention of the petitioner was 
otherwise invalid.
[T]he order of detention, if otherwise invalid, the detention of 
the ... [detainee] is a continuing wrong. To redress the wrong the 
... [detainee] is entitled to maintain fresh ... [petitions] on new 
grounds.
Successive Orders of Detention
Although the Court in Bangladesh has held that successive petitions to the 
Court against a detention order was not barred, it has held successive orders of
C O
detention invalid. In A.KM. Shamsuddin v Government of Bangladesh, the 
petitioner was detained before the Proclamation of Emergency in 1974 under 
the provisions of the Special Powers Act, 1974,^ a non-emergency statute 
providing for preventive detention and other measures special offences. After 
the Proclamation of Emergency in December, 1974, the petitioner’s order of 
detention under the Special Powers Act was revoked, and a fresh order of 
detention was passed under Rule 5(1) (a) of the Emergency Powers Rules 1975. 
During the applicant’s detention under the previous order, the grounds for his 
detention were made available to him. However, since the new order of 
detention under the Emergency Powers Rules, no fresh grounds were offered by 
the detaining authority for the continued detention of the applicant. Justice
^  Rules 28 to 40 of the High Court Rules in Bangladesh governs proceedings under section 491 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court Division found that no provision of those 
Rules barred successive applications under the Code.
Among the decisions which supported this conclusion were several decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan. These decisions were, Gulzar Hassan Shah v Ghulam Murtaza, [1970] P.L.D. 
(S.C.) 335; Mazahar Hossain Bhuiyan v The Province of East Pakistan, [1970] P.L.D. (S.C.) 397; 
and Khizir Hayat Khan v Zainab Begum, (1967) 19 D.L.R. (S.C.) 327.
57 Akram Hossain Mondal, op. cit., at 138.
58 (1976) 29 D.L.R. 117.
59 Act No. 14 of 1974.
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F.K.M.A. Munim, later Chief Justice, delivering the opinion of the Court in 
A.KM. Shamsuddin, observed:
It has not been made clear to us why after the revocation of the 
previous order of detention this order under the Emergency 
Powers Rules was passed, since the grounds of detention as were 
communicated in pursuance of the first order of detention do no 
longer exist...
After examining the order of detention under the Emergency Powers Rules 
1975, Munim J. continued:
Unless fresh causes existed or came into existence, a fresh order 
under the Emergency Powers Rules, 1975, was not called for ...
[The detention] cannot be justified simply because there is no 
basis for i t .^
In Ranabir Das v Secretary, Ministry o f Home A ffa ir s i  the High Court Division 
did not need to decide whether the detaining authority was debarred from 
making, on the same materials, a fresh order of detention under the Emergency 
Powers Rules 1975, after it had revoked an earlier order of detention under the 
Special Powers Act, 1974. However, the Court found that the grounds under 
the previous detention order of the applicant Ranabir Das were "vague" and 
"irrelevant". Since there were no fresh materials on which to base the 
subsequent detention order, the Court found:
no difficulty in holding that the detaining authority had no 
requisite satisfaction based on relevant materials ... [A]s such the 
detention ... [could] not be sustained.^
A fresh detention order served on the detainee, while he was still in the 
premises of the jail, was held unlawful in Anwar Hossain v Government of 
B angladeshi Justice Ruhul Islam held that:
^  A.K.M. Shamsuddin, op. cit., at 122.
61 Ibid.
62 (1976) 28 D.L.R. 48.
^  Ibid., at 57, per Masud J.
^  (1978) 30 D.L.R. 423. Cf. the Sri Lankan decision in Gunasekera v Ratnavale, (1973) 76 
N.L.R. 316, discussed in Chapter VII, supra.
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[a]fter revocation of [the previous] detention order, it should be 
presumed that there is no material for continuing his detention.
In the absence of any fresh materials, and in this case there was 
no scope for giving rise to any materials, as the ... [detainee] was 
not allowed to come out of the jail gate, the impugned order of 
detention is not in accordance with law, and as such the 
detention is wholly unauthorised.*^
In Shamsun Nahar Begum v Bangladesh,**** among a number of successive 
detention orders, was one served on the detainee, while he was still in prison. 
The previous orders of detention were directed to prevent the detainee from 
acting in a manner "prejudicial to the security, the public safety or interest of 
Bangladesh".07 This last order made while the detainee was still in prison 
stated that he was being detained for the further period on account of his 
prejudicial activities against the "maintenance of supplies and services 
essential to the life of the community".*^ The detention by successive orders, 
based on disparate grounds, was challenged as being motivated by malafides.
On behalf of the State, it was contented that the disparity in the orders of 
detention was due to the mistake of using a wrong form in making an earlier 
order. It was proposed by the State that the Court accept the subsequent 
rectified order as the basis of the detention. The Court, however, was not 
prepared to accept the rectified order, and held the detention to be unlawful. 
Delivering the opinion of the Court, B.H. Chowdhury J. held:
Liberty of a citizen does not rest on the user of a printed form, 
or for that matter a cyclostyled form ... [The] liberty [of a citizen] 
can only be circumscribed by arriving at a decision that it is ... 
necessary to prevent him from acting prejudicially. The degree 
of consideration, the degree of care, the degree of duty that is 
cast on the ... [State] is of [the] highest order ... [The] slightest 
deviation care from such care, from such consideration, from 
such duty w ill... [be considered to be an act of bad faith].
65 Ibid., at 424.
66 (1978) 30 D.L.R. 33.
*  ^Rule 5 (1), Emergency Powers Rules 1975.
68
69 Shamsun Nahar, op. cit., at 40.
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Satisfaction of the detaining authority
Rule 5 (1) (a) of the Emergency Power Rules 1975, sanctioned preventive 
detention if the government was satisfied that detention was necessary to 
prevent any person from acting in a number of prejudicial ways. A number of 
decisions relating to detention under the Rules considered the nature of the 
satisfaction of the detaining authority in ordering detention during an 
Emergency. It will be remembered that in Humayun Kabir v The State, a
non-emergency decision, it was held that preventive detention must be based 
on "reasonable and valid grounds, sufficient to satisfy the judicial 
conscience".^1 The Court has in relation to detentions during an Emergency 
continued to require a reasonable basis for detention based on objective 
criteria.
In Malaysia, the Courts have characterised the satisfaction of the detaining 
authority in passing preventive detention orders as subjective. The Malaysian 
Courts have relied principally upon the English House of Lords decision in 
Liversidge v Anderson?^ In Sri Lanka, the Supreme Court also relied upon this 
English precedent during its earlier period of decision-making, but in more 
recent times it has, in some decisions, appeared to forsake the Liversidge rule. 
But as has been noted, the Sri Lankan Court has not discarded the doctrine of 
subjective satisfaction. In the context of Bangladesh, the predecessor Supreme 
Court of Pakistan rejected the doctrine of subjective satisfaction of the 
detaining authority upheld by the House of Lords in Liversidge v Anderson. In
^  (1976) 28 D.L.R. 259. This decision has been discussed in Chapter II, supra.
71 Ibid., at 279, per Justice Ruhul Islam:
‘Satisfaction’ must be based on reasonable grounds. Ascertainment of 
reasonable grounds is essentially in the nature of a judicial or at least a quasi­
judicial function. The Constitution guarantees that every citizen shall be dealt 
with strictly in accordance with law. In view of ... [this], the executive also is 
required to exercise the power of making detention orders, judicially. The right 
given to a ... [detainee] to make a representation [against his detention] makes 
[it] all the more necessary to make [a] detention order on reasonable and valid 
grounds sufficient to satisfy the judicial conscience.
72 [1942] A.C. 206.
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Ghulam Jilani v Government of West P a k is ta n i  which concerned preventive 
detention during an Emergency,^ the Supreme Court of Pakistan overruled 
the decision of the High Court of West Pakistan, from which the appeal arose. 
The High Court had based its decision on Liversidge, but the Supreme Court 
held:
It is too late in the day to rely, as the High Court has done, on 
the dictum in the English case of Liversidge for the purpose of 
investing the detaining authority with complete power to be the 
judge of its own satisfaction. Public power is now exercised in 
Pakistan under the Constitution of 1962, of which Article 2 
requires that every citizen shall be dealt with strictly in 
accordance with law7^
Regarding the nature of the satisfaction of the detaining authority in ordering 
detention, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in Ghulam Jilani, observed:
‘[Satisfaction’ of the detaining authority ... must be a state of 
mind, which has been induced by the existence of reasonable 
grounds for such satisfaction ... [The exercise of this power is 
not] immune to judicial review ... 7^
This principle was reaffirmed and expanded subsequently in the Pakistan
77Court’s decisions in Abdul Baqi Baluch v Government o f Pakistan, and
. 78Government o f West Pakistan v Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri.
The Court in Bangladesh continued the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan. In Mukhlesur Rahman v The S ta te d  the High Court Division relied 
upon the Pakistani precedents in Ghulam Jilani, Abdul Baqi Baluch, and 
Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri to hold that:
73 (1967) 19 D.L.R. (S.C.) 403; [1967] P.L.D. (S.C.) 373.
7  ^ The detention was ordered under the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance, 1965, and the Rules 
made thereunder.
75 (1967) 19 D.L.R. (S.C.) 403, at 415, per Cornelius CJ.
7  ^Ibid., at 418, per Cornelius C J.
77 (1968) D.L.R. (S.C.) 249; [1968] P.L.D. (S.C.) 313.
78 (1969) 21 D.L.R. (S.C.) 1; [1969] P.L.D. (S.C.) 14.
79 (1976) 28 D.L.R. 172.
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[i]t is now an established principle of law that when an authority 
makes an order of preventive detention, he must show that there 
are reasonable grounds for such detention ... [Satisfaction of the 
detaining authority is amenable to judicial review, so as to guard 
against deprivation of a citizen’s liberty by any arbitrary action 
of the Executive.
In reviewing the materials on the basis of which the detention order was 
passed in Kripa Shindu Hazra v The S ta te d  the High Court Division of 
Bangladesh upheld the judicial scrutiny of the reasonableness of the materials 
and grounds upon which the detention order was based. Relying on the 
precedent of Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri, the High Court 
Division observed that:
the Court is to see whether any reasonable body of persons 
could have acted upon such ... materials] and pass the order of 
detention. Reasonable ground or belief is an important 
ingredient in ascertaining bonafides ...
In Nurunnahar Begum v Government o f Bangladesh,^ the High Court Division 
identified the satisfaction required by Rule 5(1)  (a) of the Emergency Powers 
Rules 1975 as an "onerous responsibility".
[Satisfaction [of the detaining authority] as required by Rule 5 
(1) (a) is an onerous responsibility ... [I]t is well settled that ... 
[detention based on the satisfaction of the Executive] is to be 
viewed with [a] scrutinizing eye, so that the liberty [of the 
citizen] is not jeopardized even at the time of emergency. ^
^  Ibid., at 176, per Shahabuddin J. These observations, according to the learned Judge, related 
to the powers of judicial review under Article 102 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. The powers 
of review under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 being narrower, no relief 
was granted to the petitioner in Mukhlesur Rahman.
81 (1978) 30 D.L.R. 103.
83 Ibid., at 115. Like Mukhlesur Rahman, the jurisdiction of the High Court Division in Kripa 
Shindu Hazra was invoked under section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Unlike the 
previous case, the High Court Division in Kripa Shindu Hazra was prepared to uphold almost as 
broad parameters for judicial review under the Code as under the Constitution.
83 (1977) 29 D.L.R. 372.
8  ^Ibid., at 376, per B.H. Chowdhury J.
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Judicial Review during a State of Martial Law
The jurisprudence of legality, upheld by the Court in Bangladesh during a 
state of constitutional Emergency, was sought to be continued during a period 
of extra-constitutional Emergency occasioned by a Proclamation of Martial 
Law. During a state of Martial Law, however, the Proclamation and decrees 
made under it were made paramount and non-justiciable. The Proclamation of 
Martial Law in 1982 suspended the Constitution.^ The earlier Proclamation 
of Martial Law in 1975 did not suspend the Constitution, but it provided that 
the Proclamation and all decrees made under it were to be considered valid 
notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution. Clauses (d) and (e) of 
the 1975 Proclamation provided:
(d) [T]his Proclamation and the Martial Regulations and Orders 
(and other Orders) ... shall have effect notwithstanding anything 
contained in the Constitution ... or in any law for the time being 
in force;
(e) the Constitution ... shall, subject to this Proclamation and the 
Martial Law Regulations and Orders (and others Orders) ... 
continue to remain in force ...
The Supreme Court or any other Court or Tribunal was barred by this 
Proclamation from exercising any jurisdiction in respect of the Proclamation 
or decrees.
(g) [N]o Court, including the Supreme Court, or [any] tribunal 
or authority shall have any power to call in question in any 
manner whatsoever or declare illegal or void this Proclamation 
or any Martial Law Regulation or Order (or other O rders)....
^  Clause (f), Proclamation of Martial Law, March 24, 1982 (published in the Bangladesh 
Gazette Extraordinary of same date):
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh shall stand suspended 
with immediate effect.
^  The Proclamation of August 20, 1975, is quoted in full in Halima Khatun v Bangladesh, 
(11978) 30 D.L.R. (S.C.) 207, at 213-214.
^  Ibid., Clause (g). Clause (h) of the 1982 Proclamation of Martial Law was phrased in 
identical terms.
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The position under the 1975 Proclamation was summed up by the Supreme 
Court in the following way.
In view of clauses (d), (e) and (g) of the Proclamation, the 
supremacy of the Constitution as declared in ... Article [7 (2) of 
the Constitution,] is no longer unqualified. In spite of ... Article 
[7 (2),] no constitutional provision can claim to be sacrosanct 
and immutable ...
on
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in State v Haji Joynal Abedin.
[There is] no room for doubt that [since the 1975 Proclamation 
of Martial Law,] the Constitution, though not abrogated, was 
reduced to a position subordinate to the Proclamation ... [T]he 
unamended and unsuspended constitutional provisions were 
kept in force and allowed to continue subject to the 
Proclamation and Martial Law Regulations... .
Despite the sweeping embargo on the Court’s jurisdiction by the 1975 
Proclamation of Martial Law, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh was able to 
afford some relief for unjustified encroachment on personal liberty by 
Tribunals constituted under Martial Law decrees. Since in decisions during 
this state of Martial Law, the Court in Bangladesh relied upon precedents in 
Pakistan, a brief reference to those precedents will be helpful.
In Asma Jilani v Government o f Punjab, where the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan retroactively invalidated the 1969 Proclamation of Martial Law, it 
was held that, notwithstanding the state of Martial Law, the Court had powers 
to scrutinize acts of the authorities in appropriate cases. Later, in The State v 
Zia-ur-Rahman?^ the Pakistan Supreme Court elaborated the circumstances
88 Halima Khatun v Bangladesh, (1978) 30 D.L.R. (S.C.) 207, at 218, per F.K.MA. Munim J. 
Article 7 (2) of the Constitution of Bangladesh provides:
This Constitution is, the solemn expression of the will of the people, the 
supreme law of the Republic, and if any other law is inconsistent with this 
Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.
89 (1980) 32 D.L.R. (A.D.) 110.
^  Ibid., at 122, per Ruhul Islam J.
91 [1972] P.L.D. (S.C.) 139.
92 [1973] P.L.D. (S.C.) 49.
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in which the Court’s jurisdiction would be attracted. In Zia-ur-Rahman, the 
Court agreed that the validity of Martial Law Regulations would not normally 
be questioned. However, the validity of the acts under Martial Law decrees 
would not extend to acts done, orders made or proceedings taken without 
jurisdiction, or made mala fide.
Turning now to the Bangladesh cases, in K. Ehteshamuddin Ahmed v
Q-2
Bangladesh, the trial and sentencing of the appellant by a Special Martial 
Law Court, which had been constituted by a Martial Law decree, was 
challenged before the High Court Division under Article 102 of the 
Constitution. The High Court had summarily rejected the application.^ On 
appeal, the Appellate Division invoked the Pakistani precedents of Asma 
Jilani and Zia-ur-Rahman, and held that:
[t]he moment any Martial Law Court is found to have acted 
without jurisdiction, [or] more precisely, has taken cognizance of 
an offence not triable by such Courts under the [applicable]
Martial Law Regulation, or the Martial Law Court is not 
properly constituted, the ... [the Supreme Court has the] power 
[under Article 102 of the Constitution] to declare the 
proceedings wholly illegal and without any lawful authority ...
In the absence of any relief granted to the appellant in K. Ehteshamuddin 
Ahmed, the observations of the Court were strictly speaking, obiter. However, 
the conclusions of the Court in K  Ehteshamuddin Ahmed regarding the power 
of the Court to scrutinize actions taken under Martial Law decrees enabled 
the Appellate Division in a subsequent decision to set aside a verdict of a 
Martial Law Court. In Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed v Bangladesh^ the 
appellant was installed as President following a military coup d ’ Etat in August,
93 (1981) 33 D.L.R. (A.D.) 154.
94
In rejecting the application, the High Court Division based its decision on the Appellate 
Division’s findings in Halima Khatun v Bangladesh, (1978) 30 D.L.R. (S.C.) 207. In that case it 
was held that the 1975 Proclamation of Martial Law had totally ousted the jurisdiction of the 
Court from examining, inter alia, any action taken under Martial decrees. See the discussion on 
this case in Chapter IV, supra.
95 K. Ehteshamuddin Ahmed, op. cit., at 170, per Ruhul Islam J.
O f.
(1982) 34 D.L.R. (A.D.) 222. The appeal arose from the decision of the High Court Division 
reported as Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed v Bangladesh, (1981) 33 D.L.R. 348. The High Court 
Division had declined to interfere with the order of the Special Martial Law Court.
CHAPTER VIII 242
1975. He had declared the first state of Martial Law in Bangladesh. However, 
in the confusion of a series of military coups and counter-coups in November of 
the same year, the appellant had lost his presidency. He had also afterwards 
declined to take up the position of President when offered. About a year later, 
the appellant was arrested, tried and convicted by a Special Martial Law Court 
on charges of corruption while in power as President.
Before the Appellate Division, it was argued on behalf of the appellant in
Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed that the trial and conviction of the appellant was
actuated by mala fides on the part of the Martial Law government. It was
contended that the conviction of the appellant on criminal charges by the
government was directed to preclude him from future political activities. The
appellant’s conviction, it was argued, was aimed at attracting the provision of
the Constitution of Bangladesh, by which a person convicted of a criminal
offence is debarred from participating in parliamentary or presidential 
97elections. The attention of the Appellate Division was drawn to the 
attendant political circumstances and the course of events which led to the 
arrest and the subsequent hastily arranged trial of the appellant before a 
Special Martial Law Court.
The Court examined the sequence of events leading up to the arrest of the 
appellant in Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed and his subsequent trial, and noted:
The sequence of events are in so close proximity that the same 
undoubtedly stares [one] at the face.^
The changes brought about in the composition of the Special Martial Law 
Court, by Martial Law decrees, for the purpose of trying the appellant, in 
Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed, were also examined. In that regard, the Court 
held:
The materials on record reveal that ... [the changes in the 
composition of the Special Martial Law Court] were brought 
about to achieve a direct purpose of debarring the appellant 
from elective political activities.^
97 Articles 50 and 66, Constitution of Bangladesh.
98 Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed, op. cit., at 235, per Chowdhury J.
99 Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed, op. cit., at 231.
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With regard to the plea of mala fides by the appellant in Khondker Moshtaque 
Ahmed, the Appellate Division considered, amongst others, the Pakistani 
decisions of Asma Jilani and Zia-ur-Rahman, and its previous decision in K  
Ehteshamuddin Ahmed and observed that:
the proposition that has been laid down consistently is that ... 
mala fide or coram non judice proceedings are not immune from 
the scrutiny of the Supreme Court notwithstanding any ouster 
clause in the Martial Law Proclamation.^^
In view of its findings with regard to the sequence of events leading to the 
arrest and trial of the appellant in Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed, the Court 
concluded:
The cumulative effect of these particulars leads to [the] 
irresistible conclusion that the proceedings were instituted with 
[an] ulterior purpose and such proceedings ... [are] mala fide
On this finding, the Appellate Division set aside the order of the Special
102Martial Law Court and quashed the conviction of the appellant.
*  *  *
The decisions of the Court in Bangladesh, during an Emergency, show that the 
Court required state authorities to conform to the principles of legality in 
derogating from the right to liberty. When possible, a similar stand was taken 
by the Court during a state of Martial Law. This approach of the Court in 
Bangladesh contrasts quite significantly with the techniques of interpretation 
adopted by the Malaysian and Sri Lankan Courts. Can the jurisprudence of the 
Bangladesh Court be then identified as a model for judicial review of the
^  Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed, op. cit., at 234. The findings of the Appellate Division in K  
Ehteshamuddin Ahmed and Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed regarding the non-ouster of the 
Court’s jurisdiction on procedural irregularities and mala fides were subsequently held to be 
applicable in cases of Court-Martial of military personnel; see (Captain) Jamil Huq v 
Bangladesh, (1982) 34 D.L.R. (A.D.) 125.
^  Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed, op. cit., at 237.
By the time the decision of the Appellate Division in Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed was 
handed down, the appellant had already served his jail sentence. The Court’s decision removed 
the constitutional bar on the appellant to participate in parliamentary and presidential elections.
It should also be noted that the Court’s decision in Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed was given after 
the withdrawal of the 1975 Proclamation of Martial Law.
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rights of citizens during an Emergency ? This question, together with other 
more substantial issues relating to constitutional interpretation, the nature of 
judicial review under a Constitution, and the nature and operation of 
constitutional rights will be discussed in Chapters IX and X.
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CHAPTER IX
EMERGENCY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
The descriptive account of the jurisprudential trends of the Courts in Malaysia, 
Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh presented in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII projects a 
range of fundamental issues. These issues cannot be resolved by an exegesis of 
the emergency provisions of the Constitution alone, but must be addressed in 
the context of the basic premises which underlie the constitutional system, and 
in this respect the most crucial issues are the proper scope of judicial review 
under the constitution, the principles of legal and constitutional interpretation, 
and the content of constitutional rights. These’matters, although underlying 
the basic premises of constitutional litigation during an Emergency, were not 
examined in any significant way by any of the Courts. The task therefore falls 
upon the serious examiner of emergency powers to address these problems 
and try and reach some conclusions.
The current Chapter and the next, will examine critically the general patterns 
of judicial decision-making during an Emergency as revealed in the previous 
Chapters, and suggest alternative premises for judicial review, legal 
interpretation, and constitutional rights. The present Chapter will address the 
themes of judicial review and legal interpretation, while Chapter X will discuss 
the nature of constitutional rights and judicial decision-making concerning 
these rights.
Emergency Powers and Judicial Review: An evaluation 
of the prevailing Jurisprudence
A. Malaysia
In decisions of the Federal and High Courts of Malaysia, one encounters a 
strong and traditional reluctance to interfere in matters relating to the 
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. 1 In the process of upholding 
the overhelming number of detention orders on a wide variety of grounds, the 
Malaysian Court has been instrumental in making the subjective satisfaction of 
Executive detention authorities virtually immune from judicial scrutiny. This
 ^See Chapter VI, supra.
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inviolability of Executive satisfaction was applicable to preventive detention in 
normal and emergency situations alike.
The only ground for review of executive detention orders conceded by the 
Court in Malaysia is one of bad faith (mala fides). Such an allegation is, 
however, difficult to establish in Court, and this concession to the detainees is 
of dubious practical significance. In this regard it is also to be noted that the 
manner of inquiry of the Court has been customarily based on the proposition 
that the Executive was presumed to have acted properly. A detainee alleging 
mala fide action thus has a burden to prove his allegations which is exceedingly 
difficult to discharge.
In its interpretation of constitutional provisions on citizens’ liberties, the 
Federal/Supreme Court of Malaysia pursued a formal stlye of interpretation 
at the expense of the protection of the values sought to be promoted by the 
Constitution. Thus in Karam Singh?  Suffian F.J. (as he was then), appeared to 
suggest that Article 5 of the Constitution of Malaysia,^ which guaranteed the 
right to life and liberty, could be curtailed by the State in any manner however 
arbitrary. His Lordship drew attention to the absence of the word procedure in 
Article 5(1)  and concluded that the Malaysian Constitution did not visualize 
that any particular procedure be followed by the State when it deprived a 
person of his life or personal liberty/*
 ^Karam Singh v Menteri Ehwal Dalam Negari, [19691 2 M.L.J. 129.
' I
Article 5 (1) of the Malaysian Constitution provided:
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance 
with law.
Emphasis added.
 ^ Suffian F.J. compared Article 5 of the Malaysian Constitution with Article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution which provided:
No person shall be deprived of his life and liberty except according to 
procedure established by law.
Emphasis added.
On the reasoning that the Indian constitutional provision referred to procedure, whereas the 
Malaysian provision did not, Suffian L.J. concluded:
[In Malaysia] ... detention in order to be lawful, must be in accordance with 
law, not as in India where it must be in accordance with procedure established 
by law.
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This proposition is truly extraordinary. What Article 5 of the Malaysian 
Constitution lays down is that an infringement of life or liberty of the citizen 
must be in accordance with law. The law by which deprivation of liberty can be 
justified should have a substantive content, that is, it should define the 
circumstances in which a person can be deprived of his or her liberty and, in 
addition, the law should stipulate some procedure to ensure fairness. If the law 
does not provide for procedure, then the Court ought to turn to the general 
law, that is, to natural justice principles. This is the position taken in 
Bangladesh. The guarantee of life and liberty under the Constitution of 
Bangladesh is phrased in terms identical to Article 5 of the Constitution of 
Malaysia.-* The Supreme Court of Bangladesh interpreted the constitutional 
provision relating to the deprivation of liberty by the sanction of law to mean 
not only statute law, but also other rules and principles ensuring justice and 
fairness.^
To assert that Article 5 of the Malaysian Constitution does not require any 
procedural proprieties to be followed, is to sanction arrest and detention in 
any arbitrary manner whatsoever. Indeed, in Tan Boon Liat, Suffian L.P. made 
it clear that no serious consequences would ensue if procedural requirements 
relating to the deprivation of liberty are breached.^ Such an interpretation of 
Article 5 cannot have been the intention of the makers of the Malaysian 
Constitution.
The formal style of interpretation overlooks the indeterminacy of language, 
construction and expression that sometimes characterise written
Karam Singh, op. cit., at 150; emphasis in original.
This proposition was reaffirmed by Suffian L.P. in Re: Tan Boon Liat @ Allen and Another Et 
Al, [19771 2 M.L.J. 108, at 109. It should be noted however, that one of the concurring Judges in 
this decision, Lee Hun Hoe, C.J. (Borneo) remarked that Article 5 covered procedure as well 
(Ibid., at 114).
-* Constitution of Bangladesh, Article 32:
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance 
with law.
 ^Abdul Latif Mirza v Government of Bangladesh, [1979] 31 D.L.R. (A.D.) 1, at 23.
 ^Re: Tan Boon Liat @ Allen & Another Et Al, [1977] 2 M.L.J. 108, at 109.
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communication. Moreover, the context of the Constitution or statute and the 
intent of framers should be kept in mind in its interpretation. The decisions in 
Karam Singh and Tan Boon Liat indicate that the Malaysian Court had failed 
to appreciate these dimensions of constitutional interpretation. On the other 
hand, it appears that the Malaysian Court has on occasion been inclined to 
interpret the enabling provisions of emergency statutes in expansive terms to 
the benefit of the Executive. In P.E. Long^ for instance, the Court held that 
the phrase, "securing public order" in the Emergency (Public Order and 
Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969,^ encompassed all threats to "peace, 
order and good government".
Another distinctive feature of the Malaysian Court’s decision-making is its
arbitrary classification of statutory and constitutional provisions as directory or
mandatory. Thus in Che Su Bind Shafie}® the Court implicitly accepted the
contention on behalf of the State that the provisons of section 5 of the
11
Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969, were not 
mandatory. This provision related to the communication to a detainee of the 
grounds for his or her detention. For the Court, the non-fulfilment of this 
requirement by the detaining authority did not invalidate the detention order. 
On the other hand, in S u b r a m a n iu m the High Court of Malaya 
characterised as directory, the provisions of section 6 of the Ordinance which 
provided that representations from detainees were to be considered by an 
Advisory Board within three months of the date of detention. Although similar 
provisions existed in the Constitution,^ the Court distinguished section 6 of 
the Ordinance from the constitutional provision by identifying section 6 as a 
directory provision. The characterisation of this provision of the Ordinance as 
merely directory meant that non-fulfilment of this requirement did not vitiate 
the detention in derogation of a person’s constitutional liberty.
 ^ Re: P.E. Long @ Jimmy and Others, sub nom. P.E. Long and Others v Menteri Hal Ehwal 
Dalam Negari Malaysia and Others, [1976] 2 M.LJ. 133.
 ^Ordinance No. V of 1969.
^  Chu Su Bind Shafie v Superintendent of Prisons, Pulau Jerejak, Penang, [1974] 2 M.LJ. 194.
^  Ordinance No. V of 1969.
^  Subramanium v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari & Others, [1977] 2 M.LJ. 82.
1 "3
Constitution of Malaysia, Article 151 (1) (b), amended since then.
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This tendency of the Malaysian Court to segregate provisions of the 
Constitution and the law into mandatory and directive categories without 
discussion of the values in issue is another manifestation of its disposition to 
interpret law in the formal style. Thus interpreted, the Constitution and the 
law, especially to the extent that such provisions relate to life and liberty, lose 
their intrinsic significance, and become vulnerable to manipulation.
In other major respects too, the reasoning of the Malaysian Court reflects the 
formal style. The Court has for example advanced the argument that the 
preamble to a statute does not constitute a part of the statute. As has been 
seen in Chapter VI, this proposition in P.E. Long^  was a basis for sanctioning 
detention for purposes extraneous to the objects of the preventive detention 
statute stated in its preamble. In that case, "trafficking in drugs" was held to 
constitute an act "prejudicial to public order" and consequently attracted 
preventive detention measures under the emergency statute. Reasoning of this 
nature subjects a whole range of criminal and anti-social activities to the 
sanctions of preventive detention statutes, in circumvention of ordinary 
criminal and legal processes.
An observer of Emergency decisions of the Malaysian Court is struck by its 
overhelming reliance on English war-time preventive detention cases. 
Decisions of the English Courts are almost venerated. Most of the English 
decided cases relied upon by the Malaysian Court in its decisions on 
emergency powers and preventive detention belong to a period when Malaysia 
was administered by Britain. The English precedents most frequently cited by 
the Malaysian Court, such as Halliday}^ Lees}^ Liversidge^ and Greene^  
were all decided in the first half of this century when Britain was still the 
colonial power in Malaysia. In that pre-Independence stage of Malaysia’s
14 Re: P.E. Long (5 Jimmy and Others, sub nom. P.E. Long and Others v Menteri Hal Ehwal 
Dalam Negari Malaysia and Others, [1976] 2 M.LJ. 133. This decision has been analysed in 
detail in Chapter VI, supra.
15 Rex v Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260.
^  The King v Secretary o f State for Home Affairs, Ex Parte Lees, [1941] 1 K.B. 72.
^  Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206.
I Q
Greene v Secretary o f State o f Home Affairs, [1942] A.C. 284.
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history, those English decisions formed part of the law in Malaysia. Upon 
Independence, the application of case-law of an earlier era must have regard 
to the principles of the Independence Constitution, and more importantly to 
the entrenched rights provisions. The applicable principles of construction and 
interpretation in the post-Independence constitutional order cannot be 
derived solely from those of the colonial era.
It is also the case, moreover, that those English decisions were given in 
circumstances of actual warfare, during the first and second world wars. In 
Malaysia, these precedents continued to be applied years after the Emergency 
was declared on grounds of "internal disturbance". Although the causes giving 
rise to such a Proclamation ceased to exist in a matter of weeks, the 
Emergency was not revoked when the crisis was over. Like the political 
authorities of State who prolonged the Emergency beyond its initial 
justification, the Malaysian Court continued to rely on English war-time 
precedents to rationalise its decisions.
Overall, the manner in which the Malaysian Court exercised its power of 
judicial review suggests that it did not regard itself as a constitutional court. 
The Court construed the procedural requirements of preventive detention in a 
manner which was directed to accord legitimacy to the detaining authority 
rather than to ensure that the requirements of legality were met. By refusing to 
examine the discretion of the detaining authority, the Malaysian Court has 
suggested that it had no inherent power to determine whether the detaining 
authority had complied with the requirements of the Constitution and law.
B. Sri Lanka
In Sri Lanka, neither the Constitution of 1948 nor that of 1972 provided for 
justiciable rights or express powers of judicial review. Under the 1978 
Constitution of Sri Lanka, rights of the citizens were entrenched and the 
Supreme Court was expressly accorded the power to enforce the constitutional 
rights. However, despite the changed circumstances, there was no basic change 
in the attitude of the Sri Lankan Supreme Court.
Like its counterpart in Malaysia, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka refused to 
examine the subjective satisfaction of the executive detention authority. This
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has been the dominant theme of judicial review of preventive detention both 
during the operation of Sri Lanka’s Independence Constitution of 1948 and 
under the subsequent autochtonous Constitutions of 1972 and 1978. By placing 
the good faith of the detaining authority above the reach of judicial scrutiny, 
the Sri Lankan Court, under the previous constitutional orders, made the 
subjective satisfaction of the executive authority inviolable.^ More recently, 
the Supreme Court appeared to assert that it would review the reasonableness 
of executive detention pow ers.^ This change of attitude has, however, 
remained illusory for the Court has been prepared to uphold new orders of 
detention, on the same set of circumstances, in a situation where a previous 
order was found to be unreasonable, invalid or defective. The judicial sanction 
of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was thus continued in a 
different way.
The Sri Lankan Court justified successive detention orders in various ways. In 
Senthilanayagam, for example, the detaining authority served fresh orders of 
detention while the detainees were incarcerated. The new orders of detention 
were directed to "cure" the "defects" of the initial orders of detention. The 
Court found the old orders "invalid ab i n i t i o but at the same time upheld 
the new orders as "valid ex f a c i e " The presumption of honest opinion has 
also been a ground for upholding a new order of detention. In Gunasekera^
19 See for example, Janak Hirdaramani v Ratnavale, (1972) 75 N.L.R. 67 and S. Gunasekera \A .  
Ratnavale, (1973) 76 N.L.R. 316. Wijaya Kumaranatunga decided after the 1978 Constitution was 
decided similarly: Wijaya Kumaranatunga v G.V.P. Samarasinghe and Others, Supreme Court 
Application No 121 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, Decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Sri Lanka (January 1982 - December 1982), Colombo, Lake House Investments, 347- 
363.
20 E.g. in Senthilanayagam and Others v Seneviratne and Another, [1981] 2 Sri L.R. 187; 
Ediriyasuriya v Navaratnam, [1985] 1 Sri L.R. 100.
It should be noted that the changed attitude was in turn upheld by reliance on English case-law, 
principally Ridge v Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40, Padfield v Minister o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 
[1968] A.C. 997, and Anis minie Ltd. v The Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 1 All E.R. 
208.
21 Senthilanayagam and Others v Seneviratne and Another, [1981] 2 Sri L.R. 187.
22 Ibid., at 205.
23 Ibid., at 206.
2^5. Gunasekera v A. Ratnavale, [1973] 76 N.L.R. 316.
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the new order of detention, after the detainee was released upon a court 
order, was upheld on the basis of the honest opinion^  of the detaining 
authority.
In several respects, the Sri Lankan Judges have invoked presumptions or mles 
of statutory interpretation which have worked in favour of the Executive. In 
Janak Hirdaramani^ Chief Justice Fernando, speaking of executive detention 
orders, said that the Court "commence[s] by presuming the good faith of the 
Permanent Secretary ... when making an order of detention. The 
invocation of this presumption is indicative of a formal technique of 
interpretation which pays insufficient attention to context.
In upholding the immunity of executive discretion, the Sri Lankan Court has 
further held that even a mistaken or dishonest opinion of the detaining 
authority would not invalidate an order of detention.^ According to Alles J., 
this conclusion followed because the enabling legislation authorizing detention 
on the basis of the opinion of the Executive was not qualified by the expression 
reasonable. The opinion of the Executive could not, therefore, be challenged 
on any ground whatsoever.*^ But it is surely reasonable to suppose that in 
passing emergency legislation of this kind, sanctioning detention on executive 
opinion, the legislature assumes that power will be used reasonably. In this 
context, it should be pointed out that the absence of the expression reasonable 
in Sri Lanka’s emergency legislation was highlighted by Alles J. by comparison 
to English emergency legislation.*^ Interpretation by reference to the 
provisions of foreign statutes could be very misleading.
25 Ibid., at 326.
^  Janak Hirdaramani v Ratnavale, (1972) 75 N.L.R. 67.
27 Ibid., at 78.
^  Janak Hirdaramani, at 105; S. Gunasekera \  A. Ratnavale, (1973) 73 N.L.R. 316, at 323.
29 Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations, No 6 of 1971, Regulation 18
( 1 ).
30 S. Gunasekera, op. cit., at 323.
Defence (General) Regulations 1939, Regulation 18B.
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Chief Justice Fernando has advanced the presumption of absolute good faith 
of the detaining authority. Justice Alles has suggested the presumption against 
invalidity of a detention order in the absence of any criteria of reasonableness 
on the part of the detaining authority. In Wijaya Kumaranatunga, Soza J. has
relied on another presumption of statutory interpretation which it might be 
said is not appropriate where what is in question is the validity of an exercise 
of executive discretion which impinges on personal liberty. Concerning the 
validity of an exercise of the power of detention, Soza J. reasoned that if the 
power of the detaining authority was exercised by reference to the wrong 
provisions of law, it might nevertheless be found to have been exercised under 
the correct provisions of law .^ This presumption was reiterated in 
E d ir is u r iy a Justice Ranasinghe explained that "as long as an authority ... 
[had] the power to do a thing, i t ... [did] not matter if he ... [purported] to do it 
by reference to a wrong provision of law ... [T]he order can always be justified 
by reference to the correct provision of law ... It has been pointed out 
earlier that the conclusions of Soza and Ranasinghe JJ. were based on 
precedents from another jurisdiction and concerned with issues of revenue and 
contract law s.^ Whatever may be the merits of the application of this 
presumption in these branches of law, its application where questions of the 
constitutional liberty of citizens is in issue is very dubious. ' At least, that the 
contexts are different should be acknowledged, and the application of the 
presumption justified.* 3^
'X? Wijaya Kumaranatunga v G.V.P. Samarasinghe and Others, Supreme Court Application No 
121 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri 
Lanka (January 1982 - December 1982), Colombo, Lake House Investments, 347-363.
33 Ibid., at 353-354.
^  Ediriyasuriya v Navaratnam, [1985] 1 Sri L.R. 100.
33 Ibid., at 114.
^  The precedents cited by the learned Judges were mostly of the Indian Supreme Court. An 
Indian authority on "Interpretation of Statutes" was also quoted. See Chapter VII, supra.
3^ The Privy Council, for example, has maintained that the principles of constitutional 
interpretation do not necessarily adopt:
all the presumptions that are relavant to legislation of private law.
(Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher, [1980] A.C. 319, at 329, per Lord Wilberforce).
38
See the discussion on principled interpretation infra.
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The same English war-time decisions on preventive detention^ that had been 
relied upon by the Malaysian Court are found to inspire the Sri Lankan 
ju d ic ia ry .^  Sri Lanka was a colony of Britain until 1948 and the English 
decisions relied upon were of the period when Sri Lanka was still a colony. In 
addition to relying on precedents of the pre-Independence era, the Supreme 
Court of Sri Lanka had also relied upon case-law of the Indian Supreme 
Court. Thus in Gunasekera^ Alles J. invoked Indian precedents to uphold 
successive detention orders. In Kumaranatunga! ^  and E d ir is u r iy a the Court 
relied upon Indian precedents to uphold a misconceived rule as to the 
presumption of legality.^ While foreign precedents are sometimes of great 
persuasive value, reliance on the case-law of another jurisdiction, without 
careful consideration of the different contexts, is unacceptable.
Foreign decisions do not simply state rules, but in addition 
incorporate the social values which those rules reflect and there 
must always be a question whether those values are consonant...
[with the society under consideration].^
There are other indications that the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka interprets 
provisions of emergency legislation in a formal style. In Kumaranatunga^ for 
instance, the Court found that no legal consequences flowed from the non­
service of the order of detention on the detainee.^ Justice Soza reasoned that
'IQ
Principally, Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206 and Greene v. Secretary o f State for Home 
Affairs, [1942] A.C. 284.
40 Janak Hirdaramani, S. Gunasekera and decisions of the Supreme Court on preventive 
detention before the adoption of the 1978 Constitution were all based on the rule in Liversidge 
and Greene.
^  S. Gunasekera \  A. Ratnavale, (1973) 76 N.L.R. 316.
^  Wijaya Kumaranatunga v G.V.P. Samarasinghe and Others, Supreme Court Application No 
121 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri 
Lanka (January 1982 - December 1982), Colombo, Lake House Investments, 347-363.
^  Ediriyasuriya v Navaratnam, [1985] 1 Sri L.R. 100.
44 Discussed supra.
^  P.J. Bayne, The Constitution and the Franchise in Western Samoa, (1985) 1 Queensland 
Institute of Technology Law Journal 201, at 215.
46 Wijaya Kumaranatunga, op. cit.
^  See Chapter VII, supra.
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service of the detention order had not been "made imperative by any rule of 
law". The Court is then suggesting that a detainee could be incarcerated 
without being informed of the grounds or the reasons for his or her detention.
Like the Malaysian Court, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka also appear not to 
have regarded its function as a Court whose powers of judicial review were 
entrenched by the Constitution. By upholding detention orders on a variety of 
dubious grounds, the Sri Lankan Court denied its power under the 
Constitution to ensure that the Executive had acted in accordance with 
constitutional and legal requirements.
C. Bangladesh
Unlike the Courts in Malaysia and Sri Lanka, the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh has endeavoured to uphold a jurisprudence based on principles of 
legality in matters of infringement of personal liberty. From the outset, the 
Court in Bangladesh has rejected the doctrine of subjective satisfaction of the 
detaining authority. In almost all of its decisions regarding preventive 
detention, in Emergency and non-Emergency situations, the Supreme Court 
sought "to make an objective assessment on which the necessary satisfaction of 
the detaining authority has been based and to be satisfied that an average 
prudent man could reasonably be so satisfied".^ In Humayun K a b i r it was 
held that a detention order must be based upon "reasonable and valid grounds 
sufficient to satisfy the judicial conscience".^ * And in Mukiilesur R a h m a n ^  
the proposition that "satisfaction of the detaining authority ... [was] amenable 
to judicial review" was characterised as "an established principle of law".^
48 Ibid., at 360.
49 Aruna Sen v Government of Bangladesh, (1975) 27 D.L.R. 122.
50 Humayan Kabir v The State, (1976) 28 D.L.R. 259.
51 Ibid., at 276.
52 Mukhlesur Rahman v The State, (1976) 28 D.L.R. 172.
53
Ibid., at 176; similar observations were also made in Nurunnahar Begum v Government of 
Bangladesh, (1977) 29 D.L.R. 372, at 376.
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In conformity with this approach to questions relating to preventive detention, 
the Court in Bangladesh had maintained that detaining authorities comply 
with all requirements of the relevant law. Requirements such as the 
communication of the grounds of detention to a detainee within the specified 
time was identified as a "mandatory requirement of law", the non-compliance 
with which would invalidate a detention o rder.^  The Appellate Division held 
that "unless there ... [was] strict compliance with the essential provisions of ... 
[the emergency legislation, [a] detention order ... [could not] be sustained".^ 
It was also held by the Appellate Division that any doubts in relation to the 
compliance by the detaining authority of the requirements of the law of 
emergency preventive detention "must be resolved in favour of the ... 
[detainee]".
In Shamsun N a h a r the Court observed that the "slightest deviation from the 
care, consideration and duty expected from detaining authority would attract 
allegations of bad faith".^ By contrast the Malaysian Court had, on occasion, 
been prepared to condone the failure of the detaining authority to observe 
fully the pre-conditions of preventive detention by accomodating such failure 
through the mandatory/directory dichotomy. The Sri Lankan Court had 
upheld an invalid exercise of the powers of detention by referring it to 
alternate sources of power.
The Malaysian and Sri Lankan Courts had been prepared to sanction 
successive detention orders, detention extraneous to the objects of the 
detention law, and also generally to accept detention orders which were 
otherwise defective. The Bangladesh Court on the other hand provides a large 
number of decisions where orders of detention were struck down on similar 
grounds. Thus in Krishna Gopal Bhowmickr^  and Akram Hossain M ondial^
^  Farida Rahman v Government of Bangladesh, (1981) 33 D.L.R. 130, at 133.
^  Gopal Krishna Bhowmick v Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Bangladesh, (1979) 31 D.L.R. 
(A.D.) 145, at 148, per Kemaluddin Hossain C.J.
Shamsun Nahar Begum v Bangladesh, (1978) 30 D.L.R. 33.
57 Ibid., at 40.
58 Ibid.
^  Akram Hossain Mondal v Government of Bangladesh, (1979) 31 D.L.R. 127.
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disjunctive and alternate grounds for detention were held to have vitiated the 
detention orders. Successive orders of detention to extend or validate previous 
orders on a variety of grounds, were also disallowed by the Court in
Bangladesh.^
The role of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in giving effect to the basic 
notions of legality must be acknowledged. To a large extent, this approach was 
made possible by the fact that the detaining authority provided to the Court 
information concerning and reasons for the detention. The Constitution of 
Bangladesh does however sanction the non-disclosure of the materials relating 
to detention in certain circumstances.^ During the 1975-77 Emergency in 
India, the Indian Government relied heavily on similar provisions in the 
Constitution and the preventive detention statute to deny access to 
information relating to the detention.^ Although authorities in Bangladesh 
have not relied on such a course of action, the Bangladesh Court will in that 
eventuality face difficulties in discharging its role of judicial review.
Some problems of interpretation are also encountered in certain decisions of 
the Court in Bangladesh. These difficulties are in some respects similar to the 
problems of construction noted in the context of the Malaysian and Sri Lankan 
Courts. In Mukhlesur Rahman^  and Kripa Shindu H a zra ^  for example, the 
High Court Division sought to differentiate its jurisdiction on the basis of the 
expressions used in the respective provisions of the statute and the 
Constitution. It was quite rightly held in Mukhlesur Rahman that the
60 Anwar Hossain v Government o f Bangladesh, (1978) 30 D.l.R. 423; Shamsun Nahar Begum v 
Bangladesh, (1978) 30 D.L.R. 33.
 ^Constitution of Bangladesh, Proviso to Article 33 (5):
Provided that the authority making any such order may refuse to disclose facts 
which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose.
The Special Powers Act, 1974, by section 8 also expresses this rule.
62 See K.I Omar, Emergency, Personal Liberty and the Courts in India and Pakistan,
Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1985, 143-145. The non-disclosure of 
information relating to preventive detention is provided by Article 22 (6) of the Indian 
Constitution.
63 Mukhlesur Rahman v The State, (1976) 28 D.L.R. 172.
^  Kripa Shindu Hazra v The State, (1978) 30 D.L.R. 103.
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constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court Division to enforce the right to 
liberty^ was wider than a similar judicial power under the criminal law .^ 
However, having so held, the Court denied relief to a detainee because the 
application was made to the Court under the provisions of the criminal law.
In Kripa Shindu Hazra, on the other hand, the Court advanced the proposition 
that the scope of judicial inquiry into questions of personal liberty under the 
provisions of the criminal law was wider than that afforded by the
cn
Constitution.0  This interpretation was focussed on the wording of the 
relevant criminal law provisions. The argument that the judicial power under a 
sub-constitutional statute could be wider in scope than the constitutional 
jurisdiction of the Court in matters affecting the entrenched right of personal 
liberty is unacceptable.
In contrast with the attitude of the Malaysian and Sri Lankan Courts the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh is found to vigourously assert its constitutional 
jurisdiction under the Constitution. However, there has been some confusion 
about the exact nature and parameters of this jurisdiction.
The Problem
The permeating influence of conventional ideas of law and justice, the 
familiarity with common law rules of interpretation and the self-denial of the 
Court of its status as constitutional court have all contributed to the failure of 
the Malaysian and Sri Lankan Courts to render justice on vital questions 
concerning constitutional liberty. Adherence to the formal style of 
interpretation in relation to constitutional questions overlooks the fact of post- 
Independence statehood and the principles, priorities and values of the post- 
Independence constitutional order. The Bangladesh Court has also been 
influenced by the formal style, although to a lesser degree than its 
counterparts in Malaysia and Sri Lanka.
^  Article 102, Constitution of Bangladesh.
66
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, section 491. The relevant provisions of the Constitution 
and statute are discussed in the judgement in Mukhlesur Rahman, op. cit., at 177.
67 Kripa Shindu Hazra, op. cit., at 114.
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The influence of the formal style in constitutional adjudication appears to be 
quite significant in Courts of countries which had previously been part of the 
British colonial empire. The significance of the break with the old legal order 
and the introduction of new constitutional orders in the independent States 
has not been sufficiently grasped. In one study, the powerful influences of the 
common law in judicial reasoning has been presented and rebutted in the 
context of a judicial decision concerning the franchise under the Constitution 
of Western Samoa. With regard to the tendency of lawyers and judges in 
Western Samoa to read the Constitution and its Bill of Rights as merely 
stating the common law, it has been remarked that:
this method of reasoning avoids the difficult questions of 
balancing competing interests which the constitutional 
provisions require.^
While the common law may sometimes provide a guide for interpretation:
what is further required is analysis of whether it conforms to the 
constitution and the values and principles it incorporates.^^
70In a decision on an appeal from Bermuda, Minister o f Home Affairs v Fisher, 
the Privy Council advocated a "generous interpretation" of constitutional
71
provisions on citizens’ rights avoiding the "austerity of tabulated legalism". 
The way to interpret a Constitution, according to the Privy Council in Fisher, 
was to construe it:
as sui generis, calling for principles of interpretation of its own, 
suitable to its character ... without necessary acceptance of all 
the presumptions that are relevant to legislation of private 
law.
^  P J . Bayne, Tl\e Constitution and the Franchise in Western Samoa, (1985) 1 Queensland 
Institute of Technology Law Journal 201, at 215.
^  Ibid. See also, P.J. Bayne, Judicial Technique and the Interpretation o f Pacific Island 
Constitutions, in P. Sack (Ed), Pacific Constitutions, Canberra, Law Dept., RSSS, ANU, 1982, 
291-306.
70 [1980] A.C. 319.
71 Ibid., at 328.
77 Ibid., at 329, per Lord Wilberforce. See also Attorney General o f St Christopher, Nevis and 
Anguilla v Reynolds, [1980] A.C. 637, OngAh Chuan v. Public Prosecutor, [1981] A.C. 648, and 
Attorney General v Momodu Jobe, [1984] 1 A.C.689, where the principles of interpretation 
developed in the Fisher case proved to be influential, "at least rhetorically".
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It is just this kind of initial approach that is lacking in the vast bulk of the 
decisions of the Courts of Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh reviewed in 
Chapters VI, VII, and VIII, and more briefly in this Chapter. In the concluding 
part of this Chapter, a new basis of interpretation will be advanced. Before 
that is done, two other alternative theories of interpretation and judicial 
review will be examined.
The Literal/Purposive Dichotomy
Approaches to judicial review and constitutional interpretation are sometimes 
classified as narrow or broad, literal or liberal, legalistic or purposive.^ As 
will be argued, these classifications are inadequate, unrealistic and misleading.
In presenting the approaches to judicial review of the Nigerian Court, 
Nwabueze adopts a similar classification.
In deciding the constitutionality of statutes the Nigerian courts 
have vacillated between two approaches: the broad or liberal 
interpretation as represented by the practice in the United 
States Supreme Court and the strict or narrow interpretation 
which generally characterizes judicial review in many parts of 
the Commonwealth.^
Nwabeuze then remarks that:
73 There could be different combinations based on each of these trends. Techniques of 
interpretation and review have also been presented in other contrasting categories.
The distinction is made between ‘precedent-oriented legal positivism’ and 
‘policy-oriented legal realism’, ... between ‘mechanical’ and ‘political’ 
jurisprudence, ... between decision-making built upon ‘logic’ and that built 
upon ‘experience’ between ‘legalism’ and ‘pragmatism’ ....
(G. Evans, The Most Dangerous Branch? The High Court and the Constitution in a Changing 
Society, in D. Hambly and J. Goldring (Eds), Australian Lawyers and Social Change, Australia, 
Law book Co., 1976, 13-76, at 65).
74 B.O. Nwabeueze, Constitutional Law of the Nigerian Republic, London, G. Hurst & Co., 
1964, at 304, quoted in CJ. Antieau, Adjudicating Constitutional Issues, New York, Oceana 
Publications Inc., 1985, at 47.
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[o]ne would therefore wish to see the Nigerian Constitution 
interpreted in a broad m anner.^
A similar sentiment was expressed by the Pakistan Supreme Court.
Consistently with the language used, constitutional instruments 
should receive a broader and more liberal construction than 
statutes.^
Trends of constitutional interpretation explicated as belonging to narrow and 
broad categories of contruction raises problems of delineating the parameters 
and the content of the respective approaches.^ A wide range of values and 
justification would be encompassed in each of the judicial review processes so 
that a characterization based on the narrow/broad category is not an adequate 
classification.
A strict or narrow technique of interpretation follows from a commitment to a 
literal construction of legal and constitutional provisions.
Literalism has been manifested by refusing construction and 
limiting the judicial role to an interpretation of the language 
used in the organic law ... [S]uch interpretation [is restricted] to 
the meaning of words at the time they were employed by the 
framers of national constitutions ... 7®
While it is true that such techniques of interpretation are unacceptable, the 
suggested alternative of a liberal approach need to be more substantively 
identified. There would then be the additional problem of choosing from a 
wide variety of values which would qualify as liberal.
^  B.O. Nwabeueze, at 306.
Jibendra Kishore Chowdhury v Province o f East Pakistan, [1957] P.L.D. (S.C.) 9, at 42, per 
Munir, C J .
77 The pre-New Deal decisions of the Supreme Court of the U.SA. embracing liberty of 
contract can be interpretated as both liberal and conservative according to the perspective of the 
commentator. The exercise of judicial power over legislative acts during that period can be seen 
as a liberal role. In so far as the Court sought to preserve the socio-economic status quo from 
the encroachment of new legislative policies, it was conservative.
78 C J .  Antieau, op. cit., at 47.
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At his investiture with the office of the Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Australia, Sir Owen Dixon upheld a "a strict and complete legalism" in 
constitutional adjudication.
It may be that the Court is thought to be excessively legalistic. I 
should be sorry to think that it is anything else. There is no other 
safe guide to judicial decisions in great conflicts than a strict and 
complete legalism.^
Legalism as a technique of constitutional interpretation is identified as a rigid 
adherence to rules of statutory interpretation. It is generally asserted that a 
legalistic interpretation disregards the economic, social and political premises 
of decision-making.^ However, in the context of legalism of the Australian 
High Court it has been pointed out that:
[i]t seems that many judges who emphasize the importance of 
legalism do not regard that method of approach as denying 
resort to broad social and political values they perceive in the 
Constitution.^
A purposive approach to judicial review, as opposed to a legalistic enquiry, fails 
to satisfy the criteria of clarity and practicability as a distinct technique. It has 
been suggested, in the context of constitutional adjudication in Australia, that 
a legalistic enquiry was also concerned with "the purpose of the particular 
constitutional provision".^ The distinction between a legalistic and purposive 
approach is therefore not a practicable one to assert.^
There are other significant difficulties as well. The underlying premises of a 
purposive approach to judicial review is to ascertain the "purpose(s)" behind 
the provisions of the Constitution. However an investigation into the purpose 
of particular constitutional provisions in isolation and without regard to the
7Q
Reported in (1952) 85 C.L.R. xiv, (1952) 26 A.LJ. 2, at 4.
^  See Introduction, supra.
81 L. Zines, High Court and the Constitution, Sydney, Butterworths, 1981, at 290.
82 Ibid.
83 The reference here is to the legalistic/purposive dichotomy and not to the singular category 
of legalism or formalism which is adopted in this thesis as a practical characterization of the 
approaches of the Courts in the countries examined.
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context in which a provision is applied could defeat the very object of such a 
technique. In this regard, an "Emergency" decision from the Supreme Court of 
India, A.D.M. Jabalpur v Shivkant Shukla^  is very revealing. In this case, the 
majority of the Indian Supreme Court upheld a purposive interpretation of the 
emergency provisions of the Constitution. The majority felt that the scope of 
the emergency provisions of the Indian Constitution was to be ascertained 
solely by reference to its purpose as a emergency provision. This, for the 
Judges, meant that the content of the constitutional rights were to be defined 
in terms of the "necessary" scope of the emergency powers of the 
Constitution.^^
In this vein, Bhagwati J observed that the consequence of giving a restrictive 
interpretation to the scope of the emergency provisions of the Constitution 
would be:
that even in a perilous situation when the nation is engaged in 
mortal combat with the enemy, the courts would be free to 
examine the legality of detention and even if a detention has 
been made for efficient prosecution of the war or protecting the 
nation against enemy activities, it would be liable to be struck 
down by the courts if some procedural safeguard has been 
violated...
The Indian Supreme Court decision in Shivkant Shukla illustrates the practical 
difficulties inherent in a purposive approach to judicial review. Also, as has 
been suggested, a technique of interpretation based on legalism can also 
encompass aspects of a purposive enquiry. It would therefore seem unwise to 
suggest that the problems of interpretation encountered in constitutional 
adjudication in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh could be resolved by 
recourse to techniques proposed in the form of linguistic categories like 
legalistic or purposive.
The only merit that can be conceded to these models of judicial interpretation 
is that these distinctions could sometimes be helpful starting points for a more
84 [1976] A.I.R. (S.C.) 1207.
oc
See K.I. Omar, Emergency, Personal Liberty and the Courts in India and Pakistan,
Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1985, at 150-151.
00 Shivkant Shukla, op. cit., at 1356, per Bhagwati J.
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thorough analysis. In order to confront the deep-rooted problems of 
interpretation and judicial review in the constitutional systems of the post­
colonial States, theoretical premises of more substance are called for. Before 
that task is undertaken, another alternative model of interpretation and 
judicial review is discussed in the following section.
Judicial Review and "Basic Features" of the Constitution
In Keshavananda Bharati v State o f K era la^  the Supreme Court of India has 
suggested an approach to constitutional interpretation on the basis of a theory 
which has come to be known in Indian jurisprudence as the Basic Features
o o
Doctrine. Although directed to constitutional interpretation and judicial 
review in respect of constitutional amendments, the Doctrine has some 
relevance to legal interpretation in general. Simply stated, the Doctrine 
proposed that the Indian Constitution encompassed certain basic and 
immutable features. If those basic features of the Constitution were 
transgressed by Parliament in its exercise of amending p o w e r s , t h e  Supreme 
Court would hold the Acts of Parliament invalid by invoking its constitutional 
jurisdiction.
QJ
0/ [1973] A.I.R. (S.C.) 1461; [1973] 4 S.C.C. 225; [1973] S.C.R. Supp. 1.
88 The theory has generated some interest in several Courts in South and South-east Asia. See 
for example, Darwesh M. Arbey v Federation o f Pakistan, [1980] P.L.D. (Lah.) 206; Hamidul Huq 
Chowdhury v Bangladesh, [1981] 33 D.L.R. 381. Arguments based on the Basic Features 
Doctrine were rejected by the Malaysian Court in a number of decisions. See Looh Kooi Choon 
v Government of Malaysia, [1977] 2 M.LJ. 187, Phang Chin Hock v Public Prosecutor, [1980] 1 
M.LJ. 70, Mark Koding v Public Prosecutor, [1982] 2 M.LJ. 120.
In the context of Malaysia, a judicial interpretation based on the Basic Features Doctrine has 
been suggested by A.J. Hickling, Death o f a Doctrine ? Phang Chin Hock v Public Prosecutof 
[1979] 21 Malaya Law Review 365, and by H.P. Lee, Emergency Powers in Malaysia, in FA. 
Trindade and H.P. Lee (Eds), The Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives and 
Developments, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1986, 135-156.
For an elaborate study on the Basic Features Doctrine expounded in Keshavananda Bharati, see 
R. Dhavan, The Supreme Court of India and Parliamentary Sovereignty, India, Sterling 
Publishers Ltd., 1976.
89 Constitution of India, Article 368.
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The origins of this theory lie in a dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Kennedy 
of the Irish Supreme Court in State (Ryan) v Lennon?® where his Honour 
proposed that certain basic principles or features in a constitution were 
fundamental, immutable and outside the amending powers of Parliament.^ In 
Ryan, Kennedy C.J.’s dissent was prompted by his grave concern at the 
introduction of extensive emergency powers in the Constitution of the Irish 
Free State 1922, by a constitutional amendment in 1931.^ The 1931 
Amendment provided for the establishment of special military tribunals, 
sanctioned the curtailment of the ordinary processes of law, and granted 
extraordinary police powers of search and arrest. The Chief Justice denied that 
the Irish Parliament had the authority to amend the fundamental principles of 
the 1922 Constitution by the 1931 Amendment.
In my opinion, any amendment of the Constitution, purporting 
to be made under the power given by the Constituent Assembly, 
which would be a violation of, or be inconsistent with, any 
fundamental principle so declared, is necessarily outside the 
scope of the power and invalid and void.^
Chief Justice Kennedy’s proposal in Ryan, that certain basic principles or 
features in a Constitution were fundamental, immutable and outside the 
amending powers of Parliament, motivated the Supreme Court of India, some 
forty years later, to formulate the Basic Features Doctrine in its decision in 
Keshavananda Bharati?^ In an earlier decision, Golaknath v. State of 
P u n j a b the Indian Supreme Court had held that the fundamental rights in
90 [1935] I.R. 170.
Ibid., at 209. Cf. Dr. Bonham's Case, [1610] Coke’s Reports 114, at 118, where Coke CJ. held:
[W]hen an Act of Parliament is against common right or reason, or repugnant, 
or impossible to be performed, the common law will control and adjudge such 
act to be void.
92 The Constitution (Amendment 17) Act, 1931.
0^
State (Ryan) v Lennon, [1935] I.R. 170, at 209.
94 In Keshavananda Bharati, Sikri C J. of the Indian Supreme Court agreed that the Irish and 
Indian Constitutions did not stand on an equal footing, but nevertheless adopted Chief Justice 
Kennedy5s approach on the question of the "basic principles" of the Constitution, Keshavananda 
Bharati, [1973] A.I.R. (S.C.) 1461, at 1549.
QS
Golaknath v State of Punjab, [1967] A.I.R. (S.C.) 1643.
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the Constitution were immune to modification under Parliament’s amending 
power. In Keshavananda Bharati, the Court unanimously conceded amending 
power to the Indian Parliament, including the power to amend provisions of 
the entrenched rights. But by a narrow majority, it held that this general power 
of amendment did not include any amendment which would destroy the basic 
features of the Constitution. If such an amendment was attempted, it would be 
ultra vires the powers of Parliament.
Although the seven majority judges in Keshavananda Bharati differed in their 
views as to the identity of these basic fea tu res^  all held to be basic, the 
supremacy of the Constitution, and the separation of powers between the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary.^ According to Sikri C.J., these 
basic features related to the dignity and freedom of the individual which was of 
supreme importance and could not by any form of amendment be destroyed.^ 
The basic features, according to the Chief Justice, are easily discernable from 
the Preamble and the whole scheme of the Constitution. Although, in 
Keshavananda Bharati, the Court modified its previous position in Golaknath 
in respect to the sanctity of constitutional rights, the new Basic Features 
Doctrine was not confined in its application to the constitutional rights only, 
but extended to the entire Constitution.
The problem with such a theory as the Basic Features Doctrine is that the 
categories, "supremacy of the constitution", "separation of powers", or the 
"dignity and freedom of the individual", by themselves offer no guidance to 
constitutional interpretation. It has the fimiliar ring of the arguments
96 For a statement on the ratio decidendi of the decision in Keshavanandi Bharati see E. 
McWhinney, Supreme Courts and Judicial Lawmaking: Constitutional Tribunals and 
Constitutional Review, Dordrecht, Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 1986, at 137.
97
Sikri CJ., identified the following basic features of the Indian Constitution:
(1) Supremacy of the Constitution;
(2) Republican and Democratic forms of Government;
(3) Secular character of the Constitution;
(4) Separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary;
(5) federal character of the Constitution.
[1973] A.I.R. (S.C.) 1461, at 1535.
98 [1973] A.I.R. (S.C.) 1461, at 1534-5.
CHAPTER IX 2 6 7
proposing a broad or liberal or purposive interpretation. Just how some of the 
suggested basic features of the Constitution can be manipulated to conform to 
diverse interpretations is exemplified by the Indian Supreme Court’s 
subsequent decision in A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant S h u k la ^  given during the 
1975-77 Emergency. In Shivkant Shukla, Chandrachud J. held that the 
emergency provisions of the Indian Constitution were part of the basic features 
of the Constitution. Referring to Article 359 (1) of the Indian Constitution by 
which the President, following the declaration of Emergency, was enabled to 
suspend the enforcement of specified constitutional rights, ^ 0  Chandrachud J. 
observed:
That Article is as much a basic feature of the Constitution as any
other ... [provision of the Constitution].1^ 1
The predominating importance of the dignity and freedom of the individual, 
which Sikri C.J. in Keshavananda Bharati characterized as the foundation of 
the basic features of the Indian Constitution, has been the subject of much 
theorization and debate over the years. Dicey, for example, has encompassed 
such an idea in his Rule of Law concept. ^  Argument based on this rule of 
law concept was advanced on behalf of the detainees in Shivkant Shukla. 
Three of the majority judges - Ray C.J. and Beg and Chandrachud JJ - 
dismissed this argument as "intractable". All three judges felt that the 
emergency provisions of the Indian Constitution constituted the rule of law 
during an Emergency.1^  Chandrachud J. emphatically pointed out that "there
99 [1976] A.I.R. (S.C.) 1207.
100
Constitution of India, Article 359 (1), as amended:
Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President may by order 
declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement of such of the rights 
conferred by Part III (except articles 20 and 21) as may be mentioned in the order and 
all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the rights so mentioned 
shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation is in force or for 
such shorter period as may be specified in the order.
^  Shivkant Shukla, op.cit., at 1331. In this regard the learned Judge also observed that 
arguments based on the theory of basic features were not particularly relevant. Ibid., at 1330.
102 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, London, Macmillan 
& Co. Ltd., 10th Ed., 1960, at 202.
103 Shivkant Shukla, op.cit., at 1235, 1309.
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... [could] not be a brooding and omnipotent rule of law drowning in its 
effervescence the emergency provisions of the C onstitu tion .^
The Basic Features Doctrine postulated by the Indian Supreme Court 
recognizes that the Parliament has the power to amend the provisions of 
constitutional rights in consideration of a policy goal in the constitution. The 
doctrine thus implicitly accepts that the citizens have only those rights as have 
been granted by the constitution. This aspect of the Basic Features Doctrine 
will be discussed in Chapter X.
The theory of Basic Features is admittedly directed to examine the validity of 
amendments to the Constitution. In so far as it projects certain constitutional 
values as basic, the theory would appear to have some relevance to 
constitutional interpretation in general. It was on this understanding that the 
postulates of the Basic Features Doctrine were relied upon in arguments 
before the Court in India on a variety of grounds including preventive 
detention during an Emergency. As the decision in Shivkant Shukla suggests 
however, the categories of the basic features are susceptible of a wide range of 
interpretations. In the context of the present study, the Basic Features 
Doctrine offers little insight into the fundamental problems of constitutional 
interpretation.
Both the literal/purposive models of judicial review, reviewed earlier, and the 
Basic Features Doctrine are thus not adequate guides towards resolving the 
problems encountered in judicial interpretation in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh. In the concluding part of this Chapter, the new and more realistic 
premises of legal interpretation suggested by Ronald Dworkin will be 
examined. ^ 5
104 Ibid., at 1334.
^  Taking Rights Seriously, London, Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1978 (new impression) 1st 
pub. 1977, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985, Law’s 
Empire, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press & London, Fontana Press, 1986.
In Law’s Empire, the jurisprudential approach in Taking Rights Seriously and A Matter of 
Principle is continued at a broader philosophical level. In Law’s Empire, Ronald Dworkin offers 
an extensive presentation of his theory of law. This account of law is built on two basic 
propositions - interpretation and integrity. According to Dworkin, legal practice is interpretive, not 
semantic. Further that, law should be seen as serving a fundamental political ideal called 
integrity, which encompasses a coherent conception of justice and fairness and serve as a guide in 
the adjudicative process.
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Principled Approach to Interpretation and Judicial Review
This section is principally directed to discuss the basic premises of Dworkin’s 
jurisprudence and to suggest its application to constitutional interpretation by 
the Courts in the countries under review. Dworkin’s theory is expounded as a 
critique of legal positivism and of H.L.A. Hart’s philosophy of l a w .^  ft [s 
desireable therefore that the basic features of positivism are identified and 
Hart’s theory is reviewed in brief before the discussion centres on Dworkin.
Legal Positivism
The rigid precedent-oriented, and strict rule-based approaches of the Courts 
in Malaysia and Sri Lanka are representative of a positivist technique of 
interpretation. To a lesser extent, judicial interpretation of the Court in 
Bangladesh has also tended towards a positivistic inquiry. While the term 
positivism is now "radically ambiguous and dominantly perjorative",^  the 
variety of views represented by legal positivism may be identified as including 
the following:
(1) that law as it is can be clearly differentiated from law as it 
ought to be,
(2) that only the concepts of existing positive law are fit for 
analytical study,
(3) that force or power is the essence of law,
(4) that law is a self-sufficient closed system which does not draw 
on other disciplines for any of its premises,
(5) that laws and legal decisions cannot, in any ultimate sense, 
be rationally defended,
1 fVi
Expounded principally in, The Concept of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961.
^  R.S. Summers (Ed), Essays in Legal Philosophy, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1968, 
Introduction, at 16.
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(6) that a logically self-consistent Utopia exists to which positive 
law ought to be made to conform,
(7) that, in interpreting statutes, considerations of what the law 
ought to be have no place,
(8) that judicial decisions are logical deductions from pre­
existing premises,
(9) that certainty is the ‘chief end of law’,
(10) that there is an absolute duty to obey evil laws,
(11) that there can be no higher law in any significant sense, and
(12) the law consists of hard and fast rules. ^ 8
Hart’s Positivism
In contemporary times, one of the most influential legal philosophers of the 
positivist tradition is H.L.A. H a r t . ^  In Concept of Law, Hart presents law as 
a system of rules, differentiated as primary and secondary rules.
Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered the 
basic or primary type, human beings are required to do or 
abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or not. Rules 
of the other type are in a sense parasitic upon or secondary to 
the first; for they provide that human beings may by doing or 
saying certain things introduce new rules of the primary type, 
extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their 
incidence or control their o p e ra tio n s .^
108 Ibid., at 15. As the writer points out, "No legal philosopher holds all of these views." Ibid.
Some "key tenets" of positivism are also given in R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at 17.
109 Hart’s jurisprudence may be more descriptively identified as representing a "neo-positivist" 
trend in the "School of Linguistic Analysis". See Hendrik Jan van Eikema Hommes, M^jor 
Trends in the History of Legal Philosophy, Netherlands, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1979, at 
358-365.
110 Concept o f Law, at 78-79.
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The secondary rules in Hart’s model of law are comprised of "rules of 
recognition", "rules of change" and "rules of adjudication". Rules of recognition 
accord validity to primary legal rules. However, "[f]or the most part the rule of 
recognition is not stated ... [I]ts existence is sh ow n  in the way in which 
particular rules are identified ... ". The medium through which a rule of 
recognition commonly operates include "a written constitution, enactment by a 
legislature and judicial precedents". ^  In the hierarchy of legal rules of Hart’s 
model, the rule of recognition is the u ltim a te  rule,3 ^  which need not satisfy 
the criteria of validity. 333 Rules of change provide for the alteration of 
primary rules. In addition to specifying the legislative body, the rules of change 
define the "procedure to be followed in legislation".^ Conflicts are resolved 
through rules of adjudication, which "[bjesides identifying the individuals who 
are to adjudicate,... also define the procedure to be followed".^3
Hart’s ultimate rule of recognition can be considered from two points of view.
[Ojne is expressed in the external statement of fact that the rule 
exists in the actual practice of the system; the other is expressed 
in the internal statements of validity made by those who use it in 
identifying the l a w .^
In presenting his model of rules, Hart admits that a "fringe of vagueness or 
‘open texture’" attaches to all rules.
The open texture of law means that there are, indeed, areas of 
conduct which must be left to be developed by courts or officials 
striking a balance, in the light of circumstances, between 
competing interests which vary in weight from case to case.1
111 Ibid., at 98.
112 Ibid., 10-104.
113 Ibid., at 105.
114 Ibid., at 93.
115 Ibid., at 94.
116 Ibid., at 108.
117 Ibid., at 132.
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In conceding the open-texture of the rules and the resulting task that devolved 
on the courts, Hart implicitly acknowledges that a wide discretion is left to the 
judiciary.
Here at the margins of rules and in the fields left open by the 
theory of precedents, the courts perform a rule-producing 
function which administrative bodies perform centrally in the 
elaboration of variable stan d ard s.^
Dworkin’s Jurisprudence
This section is primarily concerned with Dworkin’s formulation on law, the 
legal system, and judicial decision-making. The rights thesis will be discussed 
in Chapter X . ^
^  In reviewing M. Cohen (Ed), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence, New 
Jersey, Rowman and Allenheld, 1986, Stephen Ball has encapsulated Dworkin’s theory in a 
"sequence of six logically connected thesis".
1. Existing law consists not only of ‘rules’ in Hart’s sense, but also ‘principles’ 
of morality (fairness, equity, etc.), which are chiefly distinguished by the fact 
that they have merely presumptive weight in deciding cases ....
2. No positivistic litmus test like Hart’s ... [rule of recognition] can be 
formulated to include such principles as legally valid.
3. Consequently, since there is no veridical test for identifying all law in terms 
of positivist features apart from moral criteria, there is no conceptual 
‘separation’ between morality and legal validity.
4. In place of Hart’s ... [rule of recognition], a ‘coherence theory* 12345 6of legal truth 
must be substituted according to which the correct decision in a case at law is a 
function of how well it fits with the entire history of the legal system, and how 
convincingly it can be justified by principles of morality embedded in both the 
legal system and other political institutions ....
5. The Right Answer Thesis: when the job of judicial decision-making is 
conducted as in (4), there is in theory a uniquely correct answer, determined by 
already existing law, to almost every legal issue in modern, complex legal 
systems.
6. The Rights Thesis: therefore, litigants in civil cases and defendants in 
criminal cases have a right to have their cases decided correctly according to 
(5), and, in ‘hard cases’ not settled by ‘rules’, judges have a duty (contrary to 
Hart’s doctrine of discretion) so to decide on the basis of ‘principle(s)’ rather 
than to ‘legislate’ interstitially on the basis of ‘policy5....
Book Review, (1987) 6 Law and Philosophy 135, at 136-137.
A somewhat similar itemized account of Dworkin’s theory is given by John Mackie, The Third 
Theory of Law in M. Cohen (Ed), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence, 161-170, 
at 161-163.
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(a) Principles and Rules
In Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin argues that the positivist's portrayal 
of law as a system of rules is fallacious and chooses Hart’s "model of rules" to 
demonstrate the fallacy. Dworkin points that in the resolution of disputes 
about legal rights and obligations, standards are used which do not function as 
rules. These standards operate variously as principles, policies and other 
standards. A  principle, according to Dworkin, is:
a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or 
secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed 
desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or 
some other dimension of morality. ^ 0
Legal principles as formulated by Dworkin differ from the legal rules of Hart’s 
model of law in their application to decisions about legal obligations. In Hart’s 
model:
[r]ules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a 
rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which 
case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in 
which case it contributes nothing to the decision.
Contrary to the nature of rules, the principles within a legal system offer 
standards to be taken into account, subject to relevancy, in deciding the 
direction of legal decisions. Legal principles have the dimensions of weight and 
importance not found in rules; in reaching legal decisions involving conflicting 
principles, the relative weights and importance of the principles are to be 
considered.
Principles have a dimension that rules do not - the dimension of 
weight or importance. When principles intersect ... , one who 
must resolve the conflict has to take into account the relative 
weight of each. This cannot be, of course, an exact 
measurement, and the judgement that a particular principle or 
policy is more important than another will often be a
^  Taking Rights Seriously, op. cit. at 22. 
121 Ibid., at 24.
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controversial one. Nevertheless, it is an integral part of the 
concept of a principle that it has this dimension that it makes 
sense to ask how important or how weighty it i s . ^
According to Dworkin, the origins of principles as legal principles cannot be 
derived from statutes or precedents and there is no "formula" as to what kind 
of "institutional support" is necessary for legal principles to be asserted.
We argue for a particular principle by grappling with a whole set 
of shifting, developing and interacting standards (themselves 
principles rather than rules) about institutional responsibility, 
statutory interpretation, the persuasive force of various sorts of 
precedents, the relation of all these to contemporary moral 
practices, and hosts of other such standards. ^
Since the origins of legal principles are complex and diverse, the concept of a 
"fundamental rule of recognition" suggested by Hart is irrelevant. In the 
application of principles, questions of acceptance and validity - which are 
distinctly different in Hart’s model - lose their distinctiveness. It is not possible 
to formulate criteria according to which the Validity’ of a principle can be 
tested. There is no ‘rule of recognition’ one can apply to principles. Substituting 
principles compendiously as the "rule of recognition", however, is not the 
answer, for that would be like saying that "law is law". It is not possible to put 
together an enumerative list of legal principles because:
[t]hey are controversial, their weight is all important, they are 
numberless, and they shift and change ... [very] fas t....
Since legal rules as formulated by Hart do not have the dimensions of weight 
and importance that principles have, decisions on conflicting rules would then 
have to be based on considerations beyond the rules themselves. Among such 
considerations would be the principles of law and the legal system. It would, 
however, be a mistake to assert the idea that principles can be accomodated in 
Hart’s model of rules, for the whole notion of principles is basically different 
from rules, as Dworkin explains in elaboration of his concept of principles. 
Legal principles are different from legal rules on moral, political and 
philosophical grounds. For Dworkin legal standards cannot be distinguished in 
principle and as a group from the moral and political standards of a
122 Ibid., at 26.
123 Ibid., at 40.
124 Ibid., at 44. See also Law’s Empire, at 413.
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society. J Nor are legal principles and policies directed to explain settled legal 
rules by historical interpretevist methods.
If a theory of law is to provide a basis for judicial duty, then the 
principles it sets out must justify the settled rules by identifying 
the political and moral concerns and traditions of the
19 f\community which ... support the rules. iZ,°
This justificatory process for a theory of law is not concerned with a "test" of 
"pedigree" in the tradition of Hart, but is based on political and moral 
values. 127
(b) Principles and the Soundest Theory o f Law
For Dworkin, the set of principles which justify and explain the correct 
propositions of law should be designated as the "soundest theory of law". 
Principles of morality, according to Dworkin are not co-extensive with legal 
principles. It is only those moral principles which figure in the "soundest theory 
of law" of a particular jurisdiction which are also legal principles.
[A] principle is a principle of law if it figures in the soundest 
theory of law that can be provided as a justification for the 
explicit substantive and institutional rules of the jurisdiction in 
question. ^ 8
(c) Principles and Policies
In Dworkin’s theory, a policy is:
[a] kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, generally 
an improvment in some economic, political, or social feature of 
the community......^ 9
12~?/Znd., at 60.
Ibid., at 67, emphasis in original.
127 Ibid.
^  Ibid., at 66. See also Law’s Empire, at 100.
129 Ibid., at 22.
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Policies are different from principles. The fundamental distinction between 
principles and policies is found in the context of "political theory".
Arguments of policy justify a political decision by showing that 
the decision advances or protects some collective goal of the 
community as a whole ... Arguments of principle justify a 
political decision by showing that the decsion respects or secures 
some individual or group right. ^
(d) Principles and Judicial Review
In Hart’s model of law, rules dictate the result of judicial decisions, and when 
no applicable rules are found, a judge exercises "discretion", which really 
amounts to a fresh piece of "legislation".^! But in Dworkin’s view .principles 
do not determine the results of judicial decision-making.
Principles ... incline a decision one way, though not conclusively, 
and they survive intact when they do not prevail. This seems no 
reason for concluding that judges who must reckon with 
principles have discretion because a set of principles can dictate 
a result. If a judge believes that principles he is bound to 
recognize point in one direction and that principles pointing in 
the other direction, if any, are not of equal weight, then he must 
decide accordingly, just as he must follow what he believes to be 
a binding rule. He may, of course, be wrong in his assessment of 
the principles, but he may also be wrong in his judgement that 
the rule be binding. ^
Dworkin proposes that Courts should base their decisions, on arguments of 
principle rather than of policy.
[A]n argument of principle fixes on some interest presented by 
the proponent of the right it describes, an interest alleged to be 
of such a character as to make irrelevant the fine discriminations 
of any argument of policy that might oppose it. A judge who is 
insulated from the demands of the political majority whose
130 Ibid., at 82.
i - j i
Hart, Concept of Law, at 132.
Taking Rights Seriously, at 35, emphasis in original.132
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interests the right would trump is, therefore in a better position 
to evaluate the argument. ^ 3
In the performance of the judicial task:
[w]hen a judge chooses between the rule established in 
precedent and some new rule thought to be fairer, he does not 
choose between history and justice. He rather makes a 
judgement that requires some compromise between 
considerations that ordinarily combine in any calculation of 
political right, but here compete.
Dworkin’s Jurisprudence and the CLS critique
In addition to conventional criticisms of Dworkin’s jurisprudence, directed 
at the inclusion of morals in legal theory and the presumed entailment of legal 
indeterminacy,1 Dworkin has come under consistent attack from writers 
within the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) School. The use of principles in judicial 
decision-making has been criticized by CLS writers on the grounds that this 
does not overcome the problem of indeterminacy. Dworkin’s assignment of 
varying weights to different principles has been attacked by proponents of CLS 
as being implausible and incoherent. The attack is predicated on the premises 
that there is no discoverable metaprinciple for assigning weights.
Dworkin’s attempt to portray "legal determinacy" through a coherent theory, 
by explicating the law and the legal system in terms of legal principles of 
variable "weights", decided according to the "soundest theory of law", has been
133 Ibid., at 85. 
l ' U Ibid., at 87. See also Law’s Empire, Chapter 11.
135 See generally M. Cohen (Ed), Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence which 
contain a collection of essays by well-known legal theorists critical of Dworkin’s theory. 
Compared to the CLS critique, Neil MacCormick, for example, is conventional because he 
shares with Dworkin the assumptions that legal doctrine is, by and large, logical and coherent. 
See A. Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, (1986) 15 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 205, at 223-225.
136 This critique of "indeterminacy" is different from the CLS critique on the same point. The 
conventional critique is predicated on the fact that the use of Dworkin’s principles will unsettle 
fixed points of law.
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described by Roberto Unger as a "daring and implausible" venture. ^  But a 
writer, supportive of Dworkin’s theory notes that the trend of writers of the 
CLS School may lead them to assert that an infinite number of interpretations 
are possible and that conflicts of interpretation can never be rationally 
adjudicated. If this position is taken up, the CLS position, according to the 
writer, can be identified as "deconstructive legal nihilism".
Dworkin has been much criticized by CLS writers for proposing that moral, 
political and social controversies in society could be resolved by judges, 
thereby rechanneling controversies away from political and other societal 
institutions. The choice of judges to perform the job of protecting the moral 
basis of society is interpreted by CLS writers as implying that the public is not 
to be burdened with the problem of deciding issues affecting the common 
good.
The distinction made by Dworkin while dealing with political questions is 
overlooked by CLS writers. Dworkin proposes a distinction between principles 
and policies. By assigning arguments of policy to political forums and projecting 
principles as the basis of judicial decisions, Dworkin insulates his theory from 
the charges of usurping the functions of political, social, and communitarian 
institutions.
The Formal Style and the need for a Principled Approach to Constitutional 
Interpretation
Several decades have now passed from the time that the countries, the focus of 
this study, moved from from colonial status to independent polities with well 
defined objectives in the respective Constitutions. Yet, in varying degrees, the 
Courts in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have confined their 
constitutional decision-making to the elements of the formal style. By so 
confining the interpretation of the law and Constitution, Courts in Malaysia 
and Sri Lanka have been instrumental in justifying, promoting and continuing
VV7
R.M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 561, at
571.
138 David Couzens Hoy, Dworkin’s Constructive Optimism v. Deconstructive Legal Nihilism, 
(1987) 6 Law and Philosophy 321.
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the moral and political values of the pre-Independence colonial era. In earlier 
Chapters, it has been seen how the invocation of outdated foreign precedents 
and outmoded common law rules of interpretation by the Courts in Malaysia 
and Sri Lanka have reduced the significance of the principles and values of the 
new constitutional orders.
The Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh project visions of 
social orders based on values of equality, liberty, justice, dignity and related 
social and moral values. These values are not only projected in the Preambles 
to the Constitutions, or in some cases a set of "Directive Principles of State 
Policy", but underlie the whole scheme of the Constitution, including 
principally the entrenched rights. ^  jn place of the pre-Independence formal 
style, a new jurisprudential approach based on broad moral and philosophical 
grounds is thus unavoidable. Such an approach is unaviodable even apart from 
the fact of the Constitutions. Sir Anthony Mason, for example, has observed 
that:
[ujnfortunately, it is impossible to interpret any instrument, let 
alone a constitution, divorced from values. To the extent they 
are taken into account, they should be acknowledged and should
139 The Preamble to the Constitution of Bangladesh empahsizes the realization, "through the 
democratic process a socialist society, free from exploitation - a society in which the rule of law, 
fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice, political, economic and social, will 
be secured for all citizens...
Further elaborate state policies are contained in the "Fundamental Principles of State Policy", 
Articles 8-25, Constitution of Bangladesh.
The Preamble to the Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978, constitutes the State into a 
"DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, whilst ratifying the immutable republican 
principles of REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, and assuring to all peoples FREEDOM, 
EQUALITY, JUSTICE, FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, and the INDEPENDENCE 
OF THE JUDICIARY as the intangible heritage that guarantees the dignity and well being of 
succeeding generations of the People of SRI LANKA and of all the people of the World, who 
come to share with those generations the effort of working for the creation and preservation of a 
JUST AND FREE SOCIETY ...". Emphasis in original.
The "Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Duties" of the Sri lankan Constitution 
are contained in Articles 27-29.
The Constitution of Malaysia does not contain any Preamble or "Principles of State Policy”, but 
the concerns of freedom, equality, justice and human rights, rule of law and related principles 
are addressed in similar terms in the provisions on "Fundamental Liberties" and other parts of 
the Constitution.
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be accepted community values rather than mere personal 
values. ^
Dworkin’s jurisprudence is broadly based on philosophical, moral and political 
considerations. The expansive parameters of Dworkin’s theory attaches to it a 
character of universality that transcends the confines of the older democratic 
societies which provided the immediate background for his theorization. The 
application of Dworkin’s theoretical premises to judicial interpretation in 
countries like Malaysia, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh is not only possible but can 
prove to be very useful. If Courts recognize that constitutional interpretation 
involve complex social, moral and political standards, then a wide array of 
considerations will be available on which to base and legitimize judicial 
decisions, other than the strict "letter" of the law or the Constitution. In the 
context of the new Constitutions of the Pacific region, it has been suggested 
that statements in the Preables and provisions of the Bills of Rights be 
explicated in terms of the principles articulated in Dworkin’s jurisprudence.
It is suggested that it is appropriate and indeed desirable that 
the judges should explicitly resort to such principles to justify a 
decision on constitutional review. The process is not essentially 
different from the manner in which the common law has 
developed. Common lawyers have no difficulty working with 
principles as broad as that which presumes that property shall 
not be taken without compensation. Other kinds of social values 
can be employed in the same manner.
If legal and constitutional provisions are construed, as Dworkin suggests, as 
encompassing principles which have variable dimensions of significance and 
emphasis, then the so-called rule of subjective satisfaction, for example, is 
exposed to scrutiny on a variety of grounds. A multiciplicy of principles, such 
as aspects of the liberty of the citizen, the moral questions surrounding 
deprivation of liberty, the concerns of security of other citizens, evidentiary 
questions, and questions of political priorities shall all have to be taken into 
consideration in reaching a decision on the legality of an act of preventive 
detention. Questions raised by these principles will have to be decided
140 •Sir Anthony Mason, The Role of the Constitutional Court in a Federation: A Comparison of 
the Australian and United States Experience, (1986) 16 Federal Law Review 1, 5.
141 P.J. Bayne, The Constitution and the Franchise in Western Samoa, (1985) 1 Queensland 
Institute of Technology Law Journal 201, at 220.
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notwithstanding that the Constitution or a statute sanctions detention on the 
satisfaction of a state official without providing for any further elaboration. For 
these questions implicate the social, moral, and political concerns of the 
constitutional order, and must therefore be addressed to secure fairness and 
the basic tenets of justice. Similarly, in an inquiry along these lines, the Court 
would not have search in vain for legal rules to settle the question of the 
consequences of a failure to observe the administrative process governing the 
communication of a detention order and its grounds to a detainee. While rules 
of statutory interpretation (such as those concerning the mandatory/directory 
dichotomy) are obviously relevant to such an inquiry, concerns of fairness, 
human liberty and dignity which are implicit in the constitutional system will 
also be taken into account in ensuring procedural proprieties.
It has been noted that the Court in Malaysia had engaged in linguistic and 
semantic debates as to whether deprivation of the constitutional right to 
liberty could be legitimized on substantive or procedural grounds. ^  Fallacies 
of this kind would be avoided if the right to liberty is construed in terms of a 
cluster of principles, which cannot be segregated in the way that the Malaysian 
Court suggests. It has also been noted that the Sri Lankan Court sought to 
resolve questions of liberty in terms of the formal style. ^  If it is accepted 
that the values encompassed in the right to liberty are fundamentally different 
to the principles that inhere in say, branches of commercial law, an 
interpretation in terms of relative principles of differing "weights" and 
"importance" would avoid attempts like the Court in Sri Lanka. An 
interpretation based on a consideration of variable standards which are 
identified in isolation or in combinations, would avoid conclusions, like the 
Bangladesh Court, that questions of the right to liberty could be considered 
exclusively from either a statutory or a constitutional point of view. It would 
also then be appreciated that in view of the various dimensions which attach to 
a particular right, like the right to liberty, a separation of the subject-matter of 
the right cannot be feasible.
*  *  *
^  See Chapter VI, supra.
1 AT.
See Chapter VII supra.
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While the present Chapter was concerned primarily with the theme of judicial 
interpretation in general, Chapter X will be directed to explore the theoretical 
basis of judicial review of constitutional rights in particular.
CHAPTER X
EMERGENCY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND RIGHTS
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In Chapter IX, it was suggested that a principled approach to constitutional 
interpretation and to judicial review be adopted. Some aspects of the right to 
liberty were implicit in the discussion of judicial interpretation. The present 
Chapter will analyse the nature of constitutional rights and the judicial 
interpretation of these rights. As was stressed in the last Chapter, the issues of 
constitutional rights, although arising in the context of the use of emergency 
powers, cannot be resolved by reference to the emergency provisions of the 
Constitution alone. A discussion of emergency powers and constitutional rights 
cannot therefore be limited to the scope of emergency powers, but must 
encompass a consideration of the basic principles of citizens’ rights and their 
relevance to the constitutional system.
This Chapter begins by highlighting the issues raised by the suspension and 
suspension of means for the enforcement of constitutional rights during an 
Emergency in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The Court’s role with 
regard to these issues is examined, and the fundamental problems of 
articulation and adjudication of constitutional rights are presented. With these 
problems as the background, two contemporary theories of rights and judicial 
review - those of John Hart Elyl and Ronald Dworkin^ - are examined. It is 
then proposed that Dworkin’s theory of rights and judicial review is the more 
appropriate in the context of rights-adjudication in the countries under review.
Emergency Powers, Rights and the Courts: 
Unanswered Questions
In Chapter V, the techniques of curtailment of constitutional rights during an 
Emergency under the Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
were examined. Since the discussion in this Section will centre on the
1 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1980.
"  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1978 (new 
impression) 1st pub. 1977, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press,
1985, Law’s Empire, .Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press & London, Fontana Press,
1986.
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questions that arise as a result of the curtailment of rights during an 
Emergency, it is helpful to recapitulate briefly the constitutional mechanisms 
which permit such curtailment.
The Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh contemplate two 
techniques of curtailment of rights during a state of emergency. By the first, 
which is common to all three Constitutions, some or all of the constitutional 
rights are suspended during an Emergency. The suspension of rights is effected 
by legalizing emergency measures which, in normal times would derogate from 
the constitutional rights.^ The second is found only in the Bangladesh 
Constitution, and permits an indirect derogation of constitutional rights during 
an Emergency. This is brought about by suspension of means for the 
enforcement of specified rights by the operation of a Presidential Order during 
the Emergency.^
With regard to the first technique, the question arises as to whether 
"suspension" of rights means the "abrogation" of rights during an Emergency. 
Does "suspension" mean that in their entirety the rights are "unenforceable 
and inoperative" during the Emergency? Or does the suspension merely 
permit the Legislature, during an Emergency, to make laws inconsistent with 
the "suspended" rights, those rights otherwise remaining intact?
Further, since the "suspension" of constitutional rights during an Emergency 
extends protection to both legislative and executive action, other questions 
arise with regard to executive measures during the Emergency. Three 
fundamental questions arise in this regard. Firstly, what is the extent of the 
protection extended to executive measures that violate the rights which are 
suspended? Secondly, what is the scope of the power of the Executive to act in 
violation of the constitutional rights "suspended" by virtue of the Proclamation 
of Emergency? Thirdly, does the removal of fetters imposed by the 
constitutional rights upon the Legislature and the Executive imply that 
executive action during an Emergency which is contrary to law is immune to 
challenge as a violation of the rights which are suspended?
3
See Chapter V, supra.
4 Ibid.
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Under the Malaysian Constitution, all of the constitutional rights are 
"suspended" during an Emergency. Under the Constitutions of Bangladesh and 
Sri Lanka only specified rights are "suspended".^ In Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
therefore, a Proclamation of Emergency operates to remove the fetters on 
state power imposed only in so far as the specified Articles of Constitution are 
concerned. Would this then not mean that no immunity is granted to the State 
in making a law or taking an action which is inconsistent with the rights that 
are not suspended?
The second technique of curtailing constitutional rights during an Emergency, 
adopted by the Constitution of Bangladesh, raises additional questions. The 
suspension of means for the enforcement of specified rights would appear not 
to affect the existence of the rights specified in the Presidential Order, but 
operates merely to deprive the citizen of the right to approach the Courts to 
seek a remedy. But if the suspension of means for the enforcement of specified 
rights implies that the provisions of the rights which are not "suspended" apply 
to the Legislature and the Executive even during an Emergency a question 
arises as to the effect of a Presidential Order suspending the means for the 
enforcement of constitutional rights.
This question acquires additional significance when it is considered that under 
the Bangladesh Constitution, a number of important rights, such as the 
safeguards respecting arrest and detention, and the right not to be deprived of 
life or personal liberty save in accordance with law,^ are outside the purview 
of "suspension" during an Emergency. There is, however, no bar to the 
suspension of means for the enforcement of these rights by Presidential Order 
during an Emergency.^ With regard to the constitutional rights whose means 
for enforcement are barred, would it be possible for someone to rely on one of
 ^ In Sri Lanka, only the provisions of rights guaranteed by Articles 12, 13 (1), 13 (2), 13 (5), 13 
(6), and 14 of the 1978 Constitution are "suspended". See Chapter V supra.
In Bangladesh, "suspension" operates only in respect of the rights entrenched by Articles 36, 37, 
38, 39, 40 and 42 of the Constitution. See Chapter V supra.
 ^Articles 33 and 32, Constitution of Bangladesh. Other important rights such as "equality before 
law" (Article 27), and "right to protection of law" (Article 31) cannot also be "suspended".
7
The Emergency Presidential Order of December 28, 1974 suspended the enforcement of 
nearly all of the constitutional rights, including those guaranteed by Articles 27, 31, 32 and 33. 
The Order is quoted in Chapter VIII, supra.
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those rights, not for the purpose of enforcing the right, but merely to 
demonstrate that a particular law is violative of an unsuspended right?
This question is further complicated by the fact that the constitutionally 
entrenched judicial power of the Bangladesh Court is not expressly curtailed 
during the operation of a Proclamation of Emergency. Thus the power of the 
High Court Division under Article 102 of the Constitution to enforce the 
constitutional rights remains alive during an Emergency. Additionally, the 
citizen’s right, under Article 44, to move the High Court Division for 
enforcement of any of the constitutional rights cannot be "suspended" during
o
Emergency. And, although the "suspensive power" of the President during an 
Emergency has reference to all of the constitutional rights, this right was not 
included in the 1974 Emergency Presidential Order.^ Would this state of 
affairs mean that the Court can exercise its judicial power to ensure that the 
liberty of the citizen is not encroached upon arbitrarily ?
If the judicial power of the Court is indirectly affected by the suspension of 
means for the enforcement of rights would then this mean that the Legislature 
can enact, and the Executive can take measures, which are contrary to law? 
Also, when the suspension ceases to operate either during the Emergency or 
after it ceases to operate,1^  would the right to move the Court revive so that 
an aggrieved person could seek judicial redress with respect to actions taken 
during the operation of the Presidential Order? Is it possible to construe the 
emergency constitutional provisions in a manner which, notwithstanding the 
suspension of enforcement of rights, would not deprive the Court of its 
constitutional power to prevent the enactment of unconstitutional laws?
These questions which are fundamental to the interpretation of rights during 
an Emergency are not discussed in the decisions of the Courts in Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh. However, a stand in respect to a few of the questions 
appears to be implicit in some decisions of the Courts. In some other
8
This right is not included in the catalogue of rights which are "suspended" during an 
Emergency by the operation of Article 141B, Constitution of Bangladesh.
o
See the text of the Presidential Order quoted in Chapter VIII, supra.
^  By Article 141C of the Constitution of Bangladesh, the Presidential Order is either co­
extensive with the duration of the Emergency or for such shorter period as is specified in the 
Order.
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decisions, there are statements stating or denying a proposition with respect to 
one or other of the questions above, but no further explanation is given. In 
several decisions of the Courts in Malaysia and Sri Lanka, one gets the 
impression that the "suspension" of rights during an Emergency renders 
executive measures virtually immune from challenge on any ground 
whatsoever. This seems to be true even though the executive actions are 
violative of the safeguards provided to a detainee by the emergency preventive 
detention statute. The procedural safeguards which are provided by 
emergency preventive detention statutes are aimed to ensure that detention is 
in accordance with recognized principles. Failure by the executive detaining 
authority to abide by the procedural requirements of the detention laws means 
that their actions are unlawful and thereby violative of the rights which are 
"suspended". By failing to provide any remedy, to a detainee, for infringement 
of these procedural safeguards, the Courts in Malaysia and Sri Lanka have, in 
effect, said that executive action contrary to law cannot be challenged as a 
violation of the "suspended" rights.
In Che Su Binte Shafie}^ the Malaysian Court held the failure of the executive 
detaining authority to observe the provisions of the Emergency (Public Order 
and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969,^ relating to the communication of 
the grounds of detention to the detainee, did not invalidate the detention 
order. ^  The right of a detainee to have the grounds of detention 
communicated to him or her is a entrenched right under the Malaysian 
Constitution, ^  which was reiterated in the O r d in a n c e Two conclusions can 
be inferred from the decision in Che Su Binte Shafie. Firstly, the decision 
suggests that because of the "suspension" of rights, illegal executive actions 
cannot be challenged as a violation of the rights. Secondly, the Court appears 
to suggest that the necessity of compliance with the statutory requirements of 
the preventive detention law could be dispensed with as a result of the
11 Che Su Binte Shafie v Superintendant of Prisons, Pulau Jereja/c, Penang, [1974] 2 M.LJ. 194.
^  Ordinance No V of 1969.
1^ Che Su Binte Shafie, op. cit., at 194. See the discussion in Chapter VI, supra.
^  Article 151 (1), Constitution of Malaysia.
^  Section 5 (2) (b), Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969.
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"suspension" of constitutional rights. In S u b r a m a n iu m the Malaysian Court 
held that non-compliance with the statutory right of the detainee to have 
representations heard by an Advisory Committee within a specified time, did 
not render his detention invalid.^ The same conclusions that were inferred 
from the judgement in Che Su Binte Shafie flow from this decision as well.
Like the Malaysian Court, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has been 
instrumental in giving the impression that emergency executive measures were 
immune from challenge even though the actions were invalid under the law 
and thereby violative of the "suspended" rights. In Wijaya Kumaranatunga 
the majority of the Supreme Court refused to hold invalid, "an illegal arrest 
and detention"^ purported to have been made under the provisions of the 
1982 Emergency Regulations.^^ In the face of the arrest and detention of the 
petitioner in Wijaya Kumaranatunga being carried out under the wrong 
provisions of the detention laws, the majority ascribed the correct provisions to 
the "intention" of the detaining authority.^ Similarly, in EdirisuriyaJ^ an 
invalid detention order was justified by the Court by "referring" it to the 
correct provision of law. These decisions indicate that the Court in Sri Lanka
^  Subramanium v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari & Ors, [1977] 2 M.LJ. 82.
17 Ibid., at 84. The right to have representations against executive detention heard by an 
Advisory Board within a fixed period of time was afforded by s. 6 of the Emergency (Public 
Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance, 1969. Article 151 (1) (b) of the Constitution also 
provided for this right.
18 Wijaya Kumaranatunga v G.V.P. Samarasinghe and Others, Supreme Court Application No 
121 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri 
Lanka (January 1982 - December 1982), Colombo, Lake House Investments, 347-363. This 
decision has been discussed in Chapter VII, supra.
In his dissenting judgement in Wijaya Kumaranatunga, Samarakoon C J . concluded that "the 
arrest and detention of the petitioner was ... was wholly illegal". Wijaya Kumaranatunga, op. cit., 
at 362.
20 The Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations, No. 2 of 1982 
promulgated by the President on October 20, 1982, the same day that the Emergency was 
proclaimed. The same Regulations were renewed as Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and 
Powers) Regulations, No. 3 of 1982 on November 20,1982. See Chapter VII, supra.
21 Wijaya Kumaranatunga, op. cit., at 358.
22 Edirisuriya v Navaratnam & Others, [1985] 1 Sri L.R. 100. See Chapter VII, supra for 
discussion of this decision.
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has not been responsive towards the need of requiring the Executive to act in 
accordance with law during an Emergency.
It is true that in some decisions the Sri Lankan Court one comes across the 
odd statement that actions under emergency laws are only "restrictive" of 
constitutional rights, and do not operate as a "total denial" of rights. In Jcmatha 
Finance, for example, the Supreme Court held that the Emergency 
Regulation which permitted the closure and forfeiture of a printing press^  
was not directed to totally denying the equality rights of the Constitution. 
There is, however, no further discussion on this important question of the 
nature of the restriction of rights during an Emergency.
In Bangladesh the High Court and the Appellate Divisions of the Supreme 
Court have been prepared to employ their jurisdiction under the 
Constitution^ and sta tu te^  to give relief to detainees. It was possible for the 
Court to exercise its judicial power when in addition to some constitutional 
rights being "suspended", means for the enforcement of others were barred. In 
granting remedies to persons under emergency preventive detention, the 
Court in Bangladesh engaged in a technique of requiring strict compliance, on 
the part of the detaining authorities, with the safeguards in the detention laws. 
But unfortunately, there is no discussion on the jurisprudential questions 
relating to the "suspension" and suspension of means for the enforcement of 
rights during an Emergency. There are occasional statements in some 
decisions affirming or denying the Court’s position with respect to the 
operation of rights during an Emergency, but no reasoned analysis for such a 
judicial stand is offered. In Kripa Shindu H a z r a for example, the Court
J Janatha Finance & Investments v DJ.F.D. Liyanage, Supreme Court Application No 127 of 
1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, Decisions of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka 
(January 1982 - December 1982), Colombo, Lake House Investments, 373-396. See Chapter VII, 
supra, for a discussion on the issues involved in the case.
Regulation 14 (7) of the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations, No. 3 
of 1982.
^  Article 12, Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978.
Article 102, Constitution of Bangladesh.
Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, Act No. 5 of 1898.
28 Kripa Shindu Hazra v The State, (1978) 30 D.L.R. 103.
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stated that, during an Emergency, neither the Court’s constitutional nor its 
statutory jurisdiction was available to grant relief in terms of the constitutional 
rights. But, neither the reasons for adopting such a position nor the 
implications for such a stand are discussed.
There are no simple answers to most of the questions which arise as a result of 
the "suspension" or the suspension of means for the enforcement of rights 
during an Emergency. A wide array of fundamental jurisprudential issues are 
involved in the process of reaching some conclusions regarding these 
questions. Inquiries into the complex issues presented by the curtailment of 
rights during an Emergency cannot be confined to the emergency provisions of 
the Constitution only. For the most basic of the issues in this regard relates to 
the very nature of constitutional rights. The controversies generated by the 
restrictions on rights during an Emergency must, therefore, be addressed in 
the context of the intrinsic nature of the constitutional rights and the scope of 
judicial review with regard to these rights.
The thrust of this Chapter is directed to examine theories of rights and judicial 
review, but before that is undertaken, some other issues relating to the nature 
of constitutional rights in general, arising from decided cases in Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka and Bangladesh during states of emergency will be highlighted.
Emergency Powers and Judicial Interpretation of Rights: 
Othenssues
In addition to a host of vital questions which arise as a result of the 
curtailment of constitutional rights during an Emergency, there are other 
issues of rights which must be taken into account. These additional issues 
emanate not from unanswered questions, but as a result of judicial 
determination of aspects of constitutional rights made in the course of 
deliberating on the operation of rights during an Emergency.
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Deprivation of Liberty
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In Malaysia, Suffian L.P. had suggested that Article 5 (1) of the Malaysian 
Constitution, which guaranteed that no person would be deprived of life or 
liberty "save in accordance with law",*^ did not envisage any "procedural" 
requirement for the deprivation of these rights. This assertion was made in 
Karam Singh?^ a non-emergency preventive detention case, and later re­
affirmed in Tan Boon L i a t The conclusion on the part of Suffian L.P. that 
Article 5 (1) of the Malaysian Constitution did not contemplate "procedure" 
was based on a linguistic analysis of the provisions of the Article and was 
premised on the absence of the word "procedure" in that Article.*^ The 
consequences of this holding was that "the courts... [would] take a serious view 
of failure to comply with substantive law but not of failure to comply with 
procedural law".** 3'*
A similar tendency to conceive a constitutional right as encompassing either 
substantive or procedural provisions is discerned in older decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Ireland. While Suffian L.P. contended that the right to 
liberty in the Malaysian Constitution did not import any "procedural" 
dimensions, the Irish Supreme Court had occasion to assert that the 
constitutional right to liberty was entirely "procedural". Although the 
Malaysian and Irish Courts have emphasized different aspects of a basically 
similar constitutional right, the problems of interpretation presented by the 
respective approaches are similar. In The State (Ryan) v Lennon, J Fitzgibbon 
J. of the Supreme Court of the Irish Free State characterised the right to 
liberty under the 1922 Constitution,*^ as merely "procedural". For the learned
30
Article 5 (1), Constitution of Malaysia:
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance 
with law.
Emphasis added.
3  ^Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari, [1969] 2 M.LJ. 129.
33 Re: Tan Boon Liat (a: Allen and Another, [1977] 2 M.LJ. 108.
3 3
Karam Singh, op. cit., at 148.
34 _Re: Tan Boon Liat, op. cit., at 109, per Suffian L.P.
35 [1935] IR 170.
n s
Article 6, Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) Act, 1922:
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Judge, this meant that the law could make all kinds of provisions in 
accordance with which a person might be deprived of his or her liberty.
In Article 6, it is declared that ‘liberty of the person is
inviolable,’ but that is not a law of universal application, for the
Article proceeds: ‘and no person shall be deprived of his liberty
except in accordance with law ’ The law may, therefore, make
provisions in accordance with which a person may be deprived
of his liberty. It is for the Legislature to prescribe those
provisions, and for the Courts to enforce them, and even if ... a
person has been deprived of his liberty by the mere caprice of an
Executive Minister ... such a deprivation would be ‘in
raccordance with law’... r
More recently, however, the Supreme Court in Ireland has asserted a broader 
interpretation of the constitutional right to liberty which transcends the narrow 
confines of the controversies regarding the substantive and procedural aspects 
of the right. Interpreting the right to liberty in Article 40 of the Constitution of 
Ireland 1937,*^ Henchy J. of the Supreme Court has observed that:
the guarantee in Article 40, s.4, sub-s. 1, that no citizen shall be 
deprived of personal liberty save in accordance with law ... 
means without stooping to methods which ignore the 
fundamental norms of the legal order postulated by the 
Constitution...
Looking now to India, the controversy regarding the "substance" and "process" 
of the right to liberty under the Indian Constitution,^ was resolved soon after
The liberty of the person is inviolable, and no person shall be deprived of his 
liberty except in accordance with law.
37 [1935] IR 170, at 229. Justice Fitzgibbon was one of the two majority Judges in Ryan. Chief 
Justice Kennedy dissented on a number of issues including the construction of right to liberty 
under Article 6. For Kennedy CJ.’s views on Article 6, see Ryan, at 208.
i o
Constitution of Ireland 1937, Article 40.4.1:
No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty save in accordance with law.
■xq
Neville Francis King v The Attorney General, [1981] IR 233, at 257. 
an
Article 21, Constitution of India:
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to 
procedure established by law.
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the adoption of the Constitution. In A.K  Gopalan v S ta ted  the majority of the 
Indian Supreme Court agreed that the right to life and liberty in Article 21 of 
the Constitution deals with both substantive and procedural rights. One of the 
majority Judges, Mukherjea J. observed that:
[i]t is not correct to say that Art. 21 is confined to matters of 
procedure only. There must be a substantive law, under which 
the State is empowered to deprive a man of his life and personal 
liberty and such a law must be a valid law which the legislature 
is competent to enact within the limits of the powers assigned to 
it and which does not transgress any of the fundamental rights 
that the Constitution lays down.^
There is no indication that the Malaysian Court has been prepared to overrule 
Suffian L.P.’s stand in Karam Singh that the right to liberty under the 
Malaysian Constitution has no reference to "procedure". Rather it has been 
noted that the learned Judge reiterated the proposition in the subsequent 
decision in Tan Boon L ia t ^
The controversy relating to the substantive and procedural aspects of rights 
has also indirectly generated another significant trend in the Malaysian Court. 
This trends relates to the inclination to visualize the Constitution as the "sole 
repository" of the concern of individual rights.
The Constitution as "Sole Repository" of Rights
The proposition that the Constitution is the "sole repository" of rights emerges 
quite clearly from the decision of the Malaysian Court in Subram anium ^ In 
that case, it was contended inter alia that non-compliance by the detaining 
authority of the procedural requirements of the emergency preventive
41 [1950] S.C.R. 88.
4  ^Ibid., at 255, quoted in H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Volume 1, India, Tripathi 
Ltd., 3rd Ed., 1983, at 701. See also the discussion on the holdings of the majority and minority 
Judges in E. McWhinney, Judicial Review in the English-Speaking World, University of 
Toronto Press, 3rd Ed., 1965, at 132-136.
4  ^Re: Tan Boon Liat @ Allen & Another, [1977] 2 M.LJ. 108.
44 Subramanium v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari, [1977] 2 M.LJ. 82.
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detention sta tu te^  infringed the detainee’s right to personal liberty under the 
Constitution. Justice Abdul Hamid rejected the submission that considerations 
of the right to liberty could be implicit in the safeguards in a detention 
statu te.^  The rights which were entrenched in the Constitution were, for 
Abdul Hamid J., "real and substantial", while the provisions of the detention 
statute were solely directed to "miscellaneous matters essential for the proper 
enforcement and execution of duties and functions connected with preventive 
detention".^
The conclusion in Subramanium that all aspects of particular individual rights 
are to be found only in the constitutional provisions on rights and nowhere 
else, is suggested in other decisions as well. A similar conclusion is implicit in 
Suffian L.P.’s opinions in Karam Singh^  and Tan Boon L i a t ^  where it was 
held that no consequences arose for breach of procedural law relating to the 
right of liberty. The reason for this being, as has already been discussed, that 
the constitutional right to liberty has no reference to "procedure". These views 
of the Malaysian Court can be identified with the proposition that particular 
constitutional rights are the "sole repositories" of the subject-matter of the 
"rights" concerned.
Taking again a brief comparative look, the view that a particular constitutional 
right is the "sole repository" of the subject-matter of the "right", was articulated 
at some length by several Judges of the Indian Supreme Court in A.D.M. 
Jabalpore v Shivkant Shuklaß® Chief Justice Ray characterized Article 21 of
The reference here was to s. 6 (1) of the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) 
Ordinance, 1969, by which a detainee was entitled to have representations heard by an Advisory 
Committee within a period of three months.
46 In this regard, Abdul Hamid J. observed:
[I]t cannot seriously be suggested that it is the objective of the ... [Emergency 
Ordinance 1969] to pronounce therein the fundamental right and liberty of a 
subject.
Subramanium, op. cit., at 84.
^  Subramanium, op. cit., at 84.
48
Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari, [1969] 2 M.LJ. 129, at 153-154.
49 Tan Boon Liat, op. cit., at 109.
50 [19761 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1207.
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the Indian Constitution, which guarantees the right to "life" and "liberty", as 
"the sole repository of rights to life and liberty".^ * It was Ray C J.’s contention 
that since there can be no right to life or personal liberty outside the 
constitutional right conferred by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, the 
suspension of means for its enforcement during an Emergency meant that this 
"right" could not be asserted in any manner whatsoever.
A similar view was articulated in a High Court decision of the Irish Free State, 
reported as The State (Walsh) v Lennon The applicants applied to the Court 
for orders of "habeas corpus" and "prohibition" against their detention in 
military barracks, and their trial before a military tribunal. Since constitutional 
rights were suspended at that time, the applicants argued that they were basing 
their right to an order of "habeas corpus" not on the Constitution, but on 
common law principles. Justice Gavan Duffy observed that the antecedent 
rights to personal liberty under common law principles had merged with the 
express constitutional provisions.^ Justice Maguire felt that this argument 
implied that the state had two constitutions, the one written and defined, and 
the other unwritten and undefined.^ On the basis of these holdings, the 
contentions of the applicants were rejected by the Court.
In contrast to the trend to regard constitutional rights as the- singular 
repository of citizens’ rights, there has been the tendency to equate 
constitutional rights with ordinary legal rights. A not dissimilar approach to 
this has been to assert that a statutory remedy to a right was totally separate 
and distinct from the corresponding constitutional right. These trends are 
projected in the next section.
Constitutional, Legal and Statutoiy Rights
^  Ibid., at 1241; see also at 1229. See also the reasonings of Beg and Chandrachud JJ. in this 
regard at 1284 and 1337 respectively.
52 [1942] I.R. 112.
53 Ibid., at 122.
54 Ibid., at 123.
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In Kathigesu Visvalingam^ Soza J. of the Sri Lankan Supreme Court was not 
prepared to accord to the constitutional rights any more weight than ordinary 
legal rights. For the learned Judge, "[t]here ... [was] nothing special in the 
nature of fundamental rights to justify a departure from the usual approach 
which the Court would adopt in enforcing a legal right".^
In Kripa Shindu H a zra ^  the High Court Division of Bangladesh held that the 
statutory remedy of habeas corpus under the criminal law ^  had nothing to do 
with the right to move the Court for enforcement of the constitutional right to 
liberty.^ The criminal law remedy was characterised as "discretionary" and 
hence distinct from the right to move the High Court Division to enforce the 
constitutional right to liberty.*^ This judicial stand overlooks the fact that 
whether the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked by virtue of a constitutional 
provision, or invoked by reliance upon an ordinary statute, does not, by itself, 
affect the content of the substantive right sought to be asserted.
So far, the major questions with regard to the "suspension" and the suspension 
of means for the enforcement of certain rights during an Emergency have been 
suggested. Other basic issues in the way of interpretation of constitutional 
rights have also been noted. The task now is to give consideration to a theory 
of rights and judicial review.
The Need for a Theory of Rights and Judicial Review
It is possible to go to great lengths to confront each of the questions which 
were asked in the beginning of this Chapter. It is also possible to go into each 
of the other issues in detail. But the problems of emergency powers,
^  Kathigesu Visvalingam v DJ.F. Liyanage, S.C. Application Nos 47, 53 and 61 of 1983, reported 
in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, op. cit., 529-601.
56 Ibid., at 565.
^  Kripa Shindu Hazra v The State, (1978) 30 D.L.R. 103.
Section 491, Code o f Criminal Procedure, 1898.
^  Article 102 (2) (b) (i), Constitution of Bangladesh.
60 Kripa Shindu Hazra, op. cit., at 115, per B.H. Chowdhury J.
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constitutional rights and judicial interpretation will not be solved in that way. 
This is because solutions to each of the problems arrived at in isolation will 
generate more problems of interpretation. The need therefore is to adopt 
broad theoretical premises about the nature of constitutional rights and the 
function of judicial review.
As has been suggested earlier, the problems raised by the curtailment of 
constitutional rights during an Emergency cannot meaningfully be addressed 
by application of the formal style of interpretation to the constitutional 
framework of emergency powers. The issues presented by the encroachment of 
rights during Emergency rule must be addressed in the context of the basic 
nature and operation of constitutional rights and by identifying the nature of 
constitutional judicial review. Although many newly independent States have 
lived with constitutional Bills of Rights and entrenched powers of judicial 
review, some for several decades now, little scholarship has been directed to 
establishing the basis for theorizing about these crucial aspects of the new 
constitutional orders. Choice of a jurisprudence of rights and judicial review 
has therefore, in the main, to be necessarily reliant upon scholarly ventures in 
the western world, based upon the experiences in the older democracies.
In recent times, issues of constitutional rights and judicial review has been the 
subject of much debate in legal and academic circles in the USA. The writings 
of John Hart E ly^  and Ronald Dworkin^ have been very influential, and in 
the following sections their theories are examined.
A Process-Based Theory: John Hart Ely
In Democracy and Distrust, John Ely’s primary concern is to reconcile judicial 
review with "democratic theory".^ Ely’s basic premise is that rule by the
^  John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1980.
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, London, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1978 
(new impression) 1st pub. 1977, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1985, Law’s Empire, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press & London, Fontana 
Press, 1986.
63 In Ely’s Theory of Judicial Review: Preserving the Significance of the Political Process, (1981) 
42 Ohio State Law Journal 167, J.D. Grano summarizes Ely’s theory in the following terms:
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majority is "the core of the ... [democratic system",^ and he argues that his 
theory of judicial review "is consistent with ... [the] underlying assumptions of 
[democracy]".^ Decisions in a democracy must, according to Ely be made by 
electorally accountable officials. Thus, his theory recognizes:
the unacceptability of the claim that appointed and life-tenured 
judges are better reflectors of conventional values than elected 
representatives, devoting itself instead to policing the 
mechanisms by which the system seeks to ensure that ... [the] 
elected representatives will actually represent.^
In Ely’s model, judicial review is justified only:
when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change 
to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) 
though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, 
representatives beholden to an effective majority are 
systematically disadvantaging some minority out of a simple 
hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of 
interest, and thereby denying that minority the protection 
afforded other groups by a representative system ....
Ely’s conception of judicial review as "policing the process of representation" 
may be described as a process-based judicial review. Ely seeks to demonstrate
Several constitutional provisions are so open-ended that their meanings cannot 
be determined by reference to text or history. Courts and most commentators 
usually attempt to define these open-ended provisions by reference to 
fundamental values discovered in such places as natural law, tradition, or 
contemporary morality. Each possible source of fundamental values confronts 
fatal theoretical and practical difficulties, the result being that each only masks 
the court’s or commentator’s imposition of personal values on society. Because 
this is unacceptable in representative democracy, an alternative model for 
judicial enforcement of these open-ended provisions must be developed ...
[This alternative model of judicial review] is ‘participation-oriented’ and 
‘representation-reinforcing....
Ibid., at 168-169.
64 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, at 7.
65 Ibid., at vii.
66 Ibid., at 102.
67 Ibid., at 103; see too at 117, "unblocking stoppages in the democratic process is what judicial
review ought preeminently to be about... ”.
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that his theory was the form of review contemplated by the makers of the 
Constitution.
[C]ontrary to the standard characterization of the Constitution 
as ‘an enduring but evolving statement of general values,’ ... in 
fact the selection and accommodation of substantive values is 
left almost entirely to the political process and instead the 
document is overhelmingly concerned, on the one hand, with 
procedural fairness in the resolution of individual disputes 
(process writ small), and on the other, with what might 
capaciously be designated process writ large - with ensuring
the process and distribution of
For Ely, a participation-oriented form of judicial review concerns itself with 
h ow  decisions effecting value choices are made. By engaging in this review, the 
Court will uphold what Ely terms "participational values”. The Court should 
pursue such values because they are those with which:
(1) ... [the] Constitution has ... concerned itself, (2) whose 
‘imposition’ is not incompatible with, but on the contrary 
supports, the ... system of representative democracy, and (3) that 
courts set apart from the political process are uniquely situated 
to ‘impose.
The function of review that Ely assigns to the Court is connected to his 
suggested technique of judicial interpretation. Ely rejects "interpretivism" as a 
technique of constitutional interpretation. Interpretivism, according to Ely is a 
technique of judicial interpretation whereby "the work of the political branches 
[of government] is to be invalidated only in accord with an inference whose 
starting point, whose underlying premise, is fairly discoverable in the 
Constitution".^ Constitutional interpretation, according to Ely, must be based 
on the premise that the Constitution envisions "certain fundamental principles 
whose implications for each age must be determined in contemporary 
context".^
68 Ibid., at 87.
69 Ibid., at 75 n.
70 Ibid., at 2.
71 Ibid., at 1.
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Ely argues that instead of pursuing an interpretivist technique, judicial review 
must ultimately rely upon "noninterpretivist" arguments. Non-interpretivist 
judicial decisions are those which draw "their mandates not from any 
documentary provisions but rather from some principle derived externally".^ 
Since the American Constitution did not explicitly provide for judicial review, 
"the justification for judicial review ... must ultimately rely upon 
noninterpretivist arguments".^
In advocating non-interpretivist judicial review, Ely does not suggest that 
fundamental values can be discovered beyond the Constitution. In this regard 
Ely emphatically concludes that:
our society does not, rightly does not, accept the notion of a 
discoverable and objectively valid set of moral principles ...
Thus, there not being in existence a set of objective moral values to guide 
adjudication, non-interpretivist judicial review cannot be directed to "overturn 
the decisions of ... [the] elected representatives [on those grounds]".^ Ely’s 
rejection of the availability of any objective set of moral values is also the 
underlying theme of his interpretation of constitutional rights.
Ely sees the provisions of the United States Constitution concerning rights as 
process-oriented. This is because the Constitution does not:
root ... a set of substantive rights entitled to protection. The 
Constitution has instead proceeded from the quite sensible 
assumption that an effective majority will not inordinately 
threaten its own rights, and has sought to assure that such a 
majority not systematically treat others less well than it treats 
itself - by structuring decision processes at all levels to try to 
ensure, first, that everyone’s interests will be actually or virtually 
represented (usually both) at the point of substantive decision,
72 Ibid., at 40. As an example of a noninterpretivist decision, the writer cites Dr Bohnam ’s Case, 
(1610) 8 Coke Rep. 114; 77 E.R. 646 (K.B.).
73 M. Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge o f Town: The Contributions o f John Hart Ely to 
Constitutional Theory, (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 1037, at 1040, summarizing Democracy and 
Distrust, 11-41.
74 Democracy and Distrust, at 54.
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and second, that the processes of individual application will not 
be manipulated so as to reintroduce in practice the sort of 
discrimination that is impermissible in society.^
A C ritique of Ely
Ely defines ‘democracy’ "in purely procedural terms as a requirement that only 
electorally accountable officials may make decisions".^ But when one is 
referring to constitutional democracy, ‘democracy’ cannot simply mean 
majority rule because constitutional democracy is not synonymous with 
majority rule.
The Constitution is based neither on a concept of democratic 
rule that is purely majoritarian nor on an assumption that all 
policies must be chosen by electorally accountable officials.^
Countries like Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are constitutional 
democracies where the Constitutions are directed to ensure "limited 
government". Ely’s conception of "procedural democracy" is therefore 
inapplicable in these contexts.
With regard to Ely’s contention that participation supports democracy, it has 
been observed that:
[tjhere are two difficulties with any such argument for enshrining 
participation in a constitutional theory. First, as a practical 
matter, democracies continue to function despite very low rates 
of participation. Second and more important, this approach 
assumes that maintaining a certain form of government rather 
than, say, preserving individual liberty, is the fundamental value 
embodied in the Constitution.^
76 Ibid., at 100-101.
77 E. Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional 
Scholarship and Judicial Review, (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1207, at 1212.
78 Ibid., at 1232-33.
79 M. Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to 
Constitutional Theory, (1980) 89 Yale Law Journal 1037, at 1048.
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Rates of participation are even lower in the emergent democracies. This 
means that legislatures in countries like Malaysia, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh 
are generally "unrepresentative" of citizens’ aspirations. In India, the Supreme 
Court has even sought to justify judicial review of "constitutional amendments" 
on the grounds that Parliament was unrepresentative.
Two-thirds of the members of the two Houses of Parliament 
need not necessarily represent even the majority of people in 
this country. Our electoral system is such that even a minority of 
voters can elect more than two-thirds of the members of
Parliam ent.^
The electoral mechanisms and rates of participations in countries like Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia are similar to that in the Indian context. These 
observations of the Indian Supreme Court would therefore be applicable in 
those situations as well.
Ely’s primary concern is to reconcile judicial review with democracy. But "Ely’s 
theory fails to reconcile non-interpretivist review with his definition of 
democracy because the Court still overturns the decisions of popularly elected
Q 1
officials based on their own substantive value judgements". In fact, the role 
of judicial review that Ely visualises permits the Court:
to perceive and portray themselves as servants of democracy 
even ... as they strike down the actions of supposedly democratic 
governments...
In addition to the flaws revealed in Ely’s attempt to harmonize judicial review
with his conception of democracy, the task of reconciling judicial review with
democracy is not so crucial in countries such as those the subject of this thesis.
0-2
In these countries, judicial review is entrenched in the Constitution.
^  Keshavananda Bharati v State o f Kerala, [19731 A.I.R. (S.C.) 1461, at 1626, per Hedge and 
Mukherjea JJ.
^  E. Chemerinsky, The Price o f Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional 
Scholarship and Judicial Rexiew, (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1207, at 1226, quoting P. Brest, 
The Substance o f Process, (1981) 42 Ohio State Law Journal 131, at 131.
^  L. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence o f Process-Based Constitutional Theories (1980) 89 Yale 
Law Journal 1063, at 1063.
^  Constitution of Malaysia: Article 4, the provisions of judicial review in respect of the 
"Fundamental Liberties" in Part II, Article 128 and Article 162 (6).
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The process-based, non-interpretivist approach to judicial review is equally 
unconvincing.
The process theme by itself determines nothing unless its 
presuppositions are specified, and its content supplemented, by 
a full theory of substantive rights and values.^
In order that judicial review ensure "fairness" of the participatory processes, as 
Ely suggests, the Court cannot avoid making substantive value judgements. 
This is because a decision on what is a fair process within the constitutional 
scheme requires a determination of the nature and character of the subject- 
matter of the interests in issue. A determination in that regard:
requires a theory of values and rights as plainly substantive as ... 
the theories of values and rights which underlie the 
Constitution’s provisions...
Viewed from another perspective, process-based judicial review "necessarily 
involves judicial displacement of citizens’ choices between political and other 
kinds of activity, in the name of the objective value of political 
participation".^
Just as ensuring fair participatory process involves decisions on substantive 
values, so also constitutional rights are not simply directed to "protecting 
whatever ‘entitlements’ happen to be conferred by legislation or administrative 
regulation" 0  . A realistic theory of constitutional rights must "posit a right to 
individual dignity, or some similarly substantive norm, as the base on which
Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978: Article 126 relating to judicial review of executive and 
administrative action. Although judicial review of legislation is excluded, the Supreme Court of 
Sri Lanka reviews legislative bills referred to it for determining consistency with the 
Constitution.
Constitution of Bangladesh: Articles 26 and 102.
84 L. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence o f Process-Based Constitutional Theories (1980) 89 Yale 
Law Journal 1063, at 1064.
0 «
J L. Tribe, op. cit., at 1069.
Of.
M. Tushnet, op. cit., at 1038.
^  L. Tribe, op. cit., at 1070.
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conceptions of procedural fairness are constructed".^ Ely himself concedes 
that "there are ... provisions in the ... [Constitution] that seem almost entirely 
value oriented".^
In the specific circumstances of the emergent democracies, it cannot seriously 
be suggested that the rights entrenched in the Constitutions are merely 
procedural rights. In Constitutions such as those of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, 
the entrenched rights are characteristically designated as "fundamental 
r ig h ts " .^  The historical intervention of colonialism in these societies has made 
the significance of the post-colonial constitutional rights very substantive. 
Rights in the Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh cannot, 
therefore, be explained in terms of "procedure" only as Ely suggests.
Ely has generally been criticized for moving the focus away from rights in 
constitutional interpretation. In contrast, Ronald Dworkin presents a model of 
judicial review which is based on an articulation of the substantive nature of 
rights.
Rights-Based Theory: Ronald Dworkin
The Nature of Rights
Dworkin’s jurisprudence centres on the proposition that "rights" are to be 
taken "seriously". He dismisses arguments that citizens "have only such legal 
rights as the Constitution grants them "^ or, that they "have no moral rights 
against the state and only such rights as the law expressly provides". While 
rejecting these arguments, Dworkin does not however, direct himself to 
establish a theory of moral rights against the State. Rather, the purpose of his
88 Ibid.
^  Democracy and Distrust, at 92, though it is pointed out that "they are few and far between". 
Ibid.
oo "Fundamental Liberties" in the Constitution of Malaysia.
^  Taking Rights Seriously, at 138.
Ibid.
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jurisprudence is to examine the implications of the premise that citizens do 
have moral rights against their government.^ In Dworkin’s view:
a man has a moral right against the state if for some reason the 
state would do wrong to treat him in a certain way, even though 
it would be in the general interest to do so .^
Conceived in this way, a theory of rights "simply shows a claim of right to be a 
special, in the sense of a restricted sort of judgement about what is right or 
wrong for governments to do".^
According to Dworkin, when rights characterized by these moral dimensions 
are "fused" with the "legal" rights enumerated in the Constitution, the validity 
of a sub-constitutional law is made dependent on answers to complex moral 
problems like liberty or equality. But:
though the constitutional system adds something to the 
protection of moral rights against the Government, it falls far 
short of guaranteeing these rights, or even establishing what they 
are.96
Since rights have legal and moral dimensions, Dworkin suggests that citizens 
have a "duty to obey the law but have the right to follow their consciences 
when it conflicts with that duty". While a citizen has the right to disobey the 
law whenever the law wrongly invades his or her right, the right to disobey the 
law is not to be considered as a separate right.
The right to disobey the law is not a separate right, having 
something to do with conscience, additional to other rights 
against the Government. It is simply a feature of these rights 
against the Government, and it cannot be denied in principle 
without denying that any such rights exist.^
9^ Ibid., at 184:
I shall not be concerned ... to defend a thesis that citizens have moral rights 
against their governments; I want instead to explore the implications of that 
thesis for those ... who profess to accept it.
Q4 Taking Rights Seriously, at 139.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., at 186.
97 Ibid., at 192.
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Constitutional provisions on rights are often expressed in "vague" terms. 
Dworkin proposes that these "vague" constitutional clauses are "appeals to the 
concepts they employ, legality, equality and cruelty" and points out that "as 
appeals to moral concepts, they could not be made more precise by being
no
more detailed". ° On the basis of these propositions, Dworkin advances the 
following conclusion about constitutional rights and judicial review in the 
context of the U.S.A.
Our constitutional system rests on a particular moral theory, 
namely, that men have moral rights against the state. The 
difficult clauses of the Bill of Rights, like the due process and 
equal protection clauses, must be understood as appealing to 
moral concepts rather than laying down particular conceptions; 
therefore a court that undertakes the burden of applying these 
clauses fully as law must be an activist court, in the sense that it 
must be prepared to frame and answer questions of political 
morality.
Rights and Utilitarian considerations
Since rights against the Government, as Dworkin conceptualizes them, are 
rights which are available even though the majority in society considers them 
wrong, "utilitarian" arguments have no place in Dworkin’s jurisprudence. The 
accommodation of utilitarian considerations in an explanation of rights would 
mean the "annihilation" of rights.
If we ... say that society has a right to do whatever is in the 
general benefit, or the right to preserve whatever sort of 
environment the majority wishes to live in, and we mean that 
these are the sort of rights that provide justification for 
overruling any rights against the Government that may conflict, 
then we have annihilated the latter rights. ^
98 Ibid., at 135-6.
99 Ibid., at 147.
100 Ibid., at 194.
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For Dworkin, the question of "competing rights" has relevance only to the 
extent that the "competing rights" are of individual fellow members of the 
community to have "protection" against the liberty of "acts" of others. The 
argument that the public interest must be balanced against personal claims is 
flawed because:
[t]he institution of rights against the Government is not a gift of 
God, or an ancient ritual, or a national sport ... Anyone who 
professes to take rights seriously ... must accept, at the minimum, 
one or both of two important ideas. The first is the vague but 
powerful idea of human dignity ... The second is the more 
familiar idea of political equality. ^
The question of balancing the competing interests of the society and the
individual, according to Dworkin, can only arise in situations of grave
Emergency. The Emergency must, however, be a "genuine" one, "of
102magnitude", posing a "clear and present danger" - not of a speculative kind.
In extraordinary situations where rights are at stake, Dworkin urges "tolerance"
- for such a course cannot destroy or threaten the community in a way strict 
law enforcement in this regard can.
[Citizens often do the right thing in exercising what they take to 
be moral rights to break the law, and that prosecutors often do 
the right thing in failing to prosecute them for i t . ^
Rights for Dworkin are crucial because the institution of rights:
represents the majority’s promise to the minorities that their 
dignity and equality will be re sp ec ted .^
Right to Equal Concern and Respect
Dworkin rejects conventional ideas of the right to liberty because those ideas 
create "a false sense of a necessary conflict between liberty and other values
101 Ibid., at 198.
102 Ibid., at 195.
103 Ibid., at 197.
104 Ibid., at 205.
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[of society]". ^  Rights to certain liberties, according to Dworkin, must be 
based "on grounds of political morality". ^  In this regard the fundamental 
principle is not "liberty" but "equality". Dworkin articulates the right to equality 
as the "right to equal concern and respect". For Dworkin, this right to equal 
concern and respect is the criterion by which other rights are identified.
Citizens governed by the liberal conception of equality each 
have a right to equal concern and respect. But there are two 
different rights that might be comprehended by that abstract 
right. The first is the right to equal treatment, that is, to the 
same distribution of goods or opportunities as anyone has or is 
given ... The second is the right to treatment as an equal. This is 
a right, not to an equal distribution of some good or opportunity, 
but the right to equal concern and respect in the political 
decision about how goods and opportunities are to be
distributed.
Of the two grounds of political morality that are comprehended by the 
"abstract" right to "equal concern and respect", Dworkin proposes that the 
"right to treatment as an equal", rather than the "right of equal treatment", be 
taken as fundamental.
I propose that the right to treatment as an equal must be taken 
to be fundamental under the liberal conception of equality, and 
the more restrictive right to equal treatment hold only in those 
special circumstances in which, for some reason, it follows from 
the more fundamental right... .^ 8
The proposition that right to treatment as an equal is the fundamental basis of 
other rights means that "individual rights to distinct liberties must be 
recognized only when the fundamental right to treatment as an equal can be 
shown to require these rights". ^ 9  Conceived in this way, "the right to distinct 
liberties does not conflict with any supposed competing right to equality, but
105 Ibid., at 271.
106 Ibid., at 272.
107 Ibid., at 273.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., at 274.
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on the contrary follows from a conception of equality conceded to be more 
fundamental".****
The political dimensions of Dworkin’s theory of rights are elucidated in the 
context of the adjudication of rights.
The Adjudication of Rights* **
Dworkin’s theory of adjudication of rights is described as the "Rights Thesis". 
The central propositions are that:
(1) even in hard civil cases ... the effect of a judicial decision is to 
enforce a right of one of the litigants; (2) the right enforced is a 
preexisting right; (3) preexisting rights derive from political 
morality; (4) there is a uniquely correct answer in every case; 
and (5) by virtue of 1 - 4 above, judges never exercise judicial 
discretion in the strong sense".
Dworkin elaborates his theory of adjudication by drawing a distinction 
between individual rights and collective goals. The distinction proceeds "by 
fixing on the distributional character of claims about rights ... against claims of 
a different distributional character".**'* The separation is, however not 
intrinsic, but "formal"; it is directed to "discover what rights people actually 
have by looking for arguments that would justify claims having the appropriate 
distributional character".* *  ^ The distinction between "rights" and collective 
"goals" is stated in the following way.
A political right is an individuated political aim. An individual 
has a right to some opportunity or resource or liberty if it counts 
in favour of a political decision that the decision is likely to 
advance or protect the state of affairs in which he enjoys the
i n Some aspects of Dworkin’s theory of adjudication has been discussed in Chapter DC, supra. 
Discussion of those aspects is not repeated here.
117
z Jules L. Coleman, Book Rex’iew, "Taking Rights Seriously", (1978) 66 California Law Review 
885, at 903-4.
1 1 "2 •
3 Taking Rights Seriously, at 90.
114 Ibid., at 91.
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right, even when no other political aim is served and some 
political aim is disserved thereby, and counts against that 
decision that it will retard or endanger that state of affairs, even 
when some other political aim is thereby served ... A goal is a 
nonindividuated political aim, that is, a state of affairs whose 
specification does not in this way call for any particular 
opportunity or resource or liberty for particular individuals.^
While collective goals are prone to "trade-offs", a right "has a certain threshold 
weight against collective goals in g e n e ra l" .^  In Dworkin’s model of 
adjudication, arguments of "policy" that describe collective goals in society, 
cannot be the basis of judicial decision-making on rights. It has been suggested 
that:
Dworkin’s more profound arguments against policy as a basis of 
decision in hard cases seem to rely on the assertion that the 
effect of a judicial decision based on policy is to announce or 
create new rights and thus the decision violates the right to a 
decision based on existing rights.
Dworkin presents a model of adjudication of rights through the medium of his 
philosophical judge, Hercules. In that model:
there is no inconsistency in saying both that judges must protect 
the rights of individuals and that judges may justify their 
decisions by reference to new and contemporary moral views of 
what these rights are. There is no unavoidable tension between 
judicial originality and rights as long as a reconstruction of the 
development of a branch of law in a particular jurisdiction can 
be shown to be consistent with a new conception of the right in 
question. ^
As noted earlier, the rights which are the subject of adjudication in Dworkin’s 
model, are preexisting rights.
116 Ibid., at 92.
117 Jules L. Coleman, op. cit., at 905. See Chapter IX, supra, for Dworkin’s justification on why 
judges should base their decisions on arguments of "principles" rather than those of "policy".
118
Robert P. Churchill, Dworkin’s Theory of Constitutional Law, (1980-81) 8 Hastings 
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The rights of individuals which justify judicial decisions are not 
‘found’ through the process of legal reasonings; they are not 
independent and intransigent reference points to which the 
judicial decision must conform. Rather, rights are themselves a 
product of the process of legal reasoning: they emerge and take 
shape as reasons for and against a course of action which are 
weighed against a background theory of constitutional l a w .^
Dworkin recognizes that judicial decision-making on rights is sometimes 
difficult, and that different judges may differ in their conclusions in "hard" and 
controversial cases. The emphasis, however, is on the point that:
[i]n hard cases judges must show how their decisions fit into the 
context of a general political theory ... [W]hen judges reason 
about rights and obligations in hard cases they need not plunge 
themselves into a sea of subjectivity. By emphasizing the 
elaboration of reasons and the creative reconstruction of legal 
theory, Dworkin believes judges can show a decision to be based 
on conceptions of individual right rather than resulting from 
"legislating" interstitially to fill gaps in the law.^O
Dworkin’s theory of rights has generated a host of critical responses from legal 
and philosophical writers. By far the most critical of responses have come 
from writers of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) School. The next section will 
briefly consider the major objections to Dworkin’s theory of institutionalized 
rights from the communitarian perspective of the CLS School.
Individual Rights and Communitarian Visions
It is outside the scope of this study to discuss at any length the work of those 
writers within the CLS School who have resisted the claims of institutionalized 
individual rights. In the brief account which follows, the views of only two 
writers, who are considered to be representative of the major trend within the 
CLS School, are considered.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., at 73.
121 For critical responses of a "conventional” nature, see generally, M. Cohen (Ed), Ronald 
Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence, New Jersey, Rowman & Allanheld, 1984.
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In reviewing Taking Rights S e r i o u s l y Peter Gable has asserted that 
Dworkin and "other modern writers in the liberal tradition" direct themselves 
to "defend a liberty that is only an anxious privatism and a legal equality that 
conceals practical domination". ^ 3  Continues Gable:
[bjecause their philosophy is but an abstraction from their 
present, they confuse a historically contingent social experience 
with human nature, reifying ‘man’ in their own alienated self- 
image and constructing imaginary ‘communities’ which are 
simply idealized representations of the alienated social 
relationships they have known in their lives. ^
The alternative premise suggested by Gable involves the comprehension of 
"justice" in concrete terms.
If we are to think about justice from the point of view of 
people’s concrete experience, we must begin by penetrating the 
false and massified ‘institutional morality’ that Dworkin has 
elevated to the status of a natural law, and focus on the details 
of the production process that directly or indirectly infects every 
aspect of our lives ... It is only by transforming these processes 
themselves rather than by tinkering with a legal system that 
legitimates them that we can create the possible conditions for 
concrete justice...
In An Essay on R ig h ts }^  Mark Tushnet advances four related critiques of 
"rights" with more or less a similar underlying theme as Peter Gable presents. 
These critiques are summarized in the following way.
(1) Once one identifies what counts as a right in a specific 
setting, it invariable turns out the right is unstable; significantly 
but relatively small changes in the social setting can make it 
difficult to sustain the claim that a right remains implicated. (2)
The claim that a right is implicated in some settings produces no 
determinate consequences ... (3) The concept of rights falsely
2^2 Peter Gable, Book Review, "Taking Rights Seriously", (1977-78) 91 Harvard Law Review 302.
123 Ibid., at 315.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., at 314-315.
126 (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1363.
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converts into an empty abstraction (reifies) real experiences that 
we ought to value for their own sake ... (4) The use of rights in 
contemporary discourse impedes advances by progressive social 
forces 12/
Simply stated, Tushnet’s first point disputes that any purpose is served by 
discussing rights in the abstract. The important consideration is whether "some 
specific right is or is not recognized in some specific social setting". 128 
Tushnet’s second and third points are more fundamental. In the second, 
Tushnet distinguishes between two kinds of indeterminacy - "technical" and 
"fundamental". By technical indeterminacy of rights, Tushnet emphasizes that 
"the outcome of the ‘balancing’ of competing interests necessitated by a prima 
facie rights-claim is not determined by the prima facie rights-claim in
• ! i 1 2 Qquestion". y According to Tushnet, fundamental indeterminacy results from 
claims of abstract rights. Because of such indeterminacy:
it [is] impossible to connect ... [an] abstract right ... [like] 
‘autonomy’ or ‘equal concern and respect’ ... to any particular 
outcome without fully specifying a wide range of social 
arrangements that the proponents of the right take for granted 
but another person who believes in ‘autonomy’ might reject ...
The argument for fundamental indeterminacy is that abstract 
rights get specified in particular social contexts. ^ 0
In relation to his third point, Tushnet concludes that:
[t]he language of rights should be abandoned to the very extent 
that it takes as a goal the realization of the reified abstraction 
‘rights’ rather than the experiences of solidarity and
individuality. ^ 21
127 Ibid., at 1363-4.
128 Ib id ., at 1364.
17Q
Michael J. Perry, Taking Neither Rights-Talk not the ‘Critique o f Rights’ Too Seriously, (1984) 
62 Texas Law Review 1405, at 1413, summarizing Tushnet’s arguments 'mAn Essay on Rights, 
op. cit., at 1371-75.
130
An Essay on Rights, op. cit., at 1375.
131 Ibid., at 1382-3.
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Tushnet’s fourth point, that the discourse on rights is "harmful", ^ 2  is justified 
on the following overarching consideration.
People need food and shelter right now, and demanding that 
those needs be satisfied - whether or not satisfying them can 
today persuasively be characterized as enforcing a right - strikes 
me as more likely to succeed than claiming that existing rights to 
food and shelter must be enforced.
With this brief survey of the CLS critique, the next section will be primarily 
concerned to relate Dworkin’s theory of rights to the critical problems of 
rights-adjudication during states of emergency in the countries under review. 
The CLS critique will be taken up towards the end of this analysis.
Emergency, Rights and Dworkin’s Jurisprudence
To return to the questions which were framed at the beginning of this Chapter, 
the "suspension" of rights during an Emergency should not render illegal 
legislative or executive action immune from judicial scrutiny. While the 
constitutional mechanisms for the "suspension" of rights during an Emergency 
in Malaysia, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh purport to remove the fetters on state 
power imposed by all or some of the constitutional rights, every executive act 
to the prejudice of any person must be supported by legislation. In Bangladesh, 
a number of constitutional rights cannot be "suspended" during an Emergency. 
This means that during an Emergency, no laws can be made and no executive 
action can be taken which would be inconsistent with the "unsuspended" rights. 
With regard to the rights that are "suspended" during an Emergency in 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, every piece of emergency legislation that 
purport to deprive a citizen of his or her constitutional rights would be subject 
to judicial scrutiny on a variety of grounds. The challenge to the Emergency 
(Security Cases) (Amendments) Regulations 1975 in Malaysia, and the 
decision of the Privy Council in Teh Cheng Poh v Public Prosecutor^  that the
132 Ibid., at 1386.
133 Ibid., at 1394.
134 The Regulations were promulgated by the Yang di-Pertuan, purporting to act under s. 2 of 
the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, 1969, Ordinance No. I of 1969.
[1979] 1 M.L J. 50. For a discussion of this decision, see Chapters IV and V, supra.
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Regulations were invalid, provides an instance where emergency legislation, 
albeit "delegated legislation", is subject to judicial examination and 
invalidation if found unlawful.
A similar conclusion must be made with regard to the suspension of means for 
the enforcement of specified rights during an Emergency. The mere fact that 
under the Constitution of Bangladesh, an aggrieved person may be 
temporarily prevented from moving the Court for the enforcement of a 
constitutional right does not relieve the State of its obligation to comply with 
the provisions of the right. The suspension of the remedy for the infringement 
of a right cannot negate the right itself. It should further be concluded in this 
regard that the suspension of the remedy cannot invest the Legislature with 
power to make laws contrary to those rights. In addition to the constitutional 
duty of state authorities to abide by the provisions of constitutional rights, 
there is also the consideration of the common law principle of legality. Under 
that principle, no member of the Executive can interfere with the liberty of a 
person except on the condition that the legality of the action can be suported 
in a court of law. ^ 6
It has already been noted that while the Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh provide for the curtailment of rights during an Emergency, the 
jurisdiction of the Courts in this regard does not suffer any diminution. This is 
especially significant when one considers that the Constitution in each of the 
countries entrusts the Court with the enforcement of the constitutional rights. 
The conclusion that neither the suspension of rights, nor the suspension of 
means for the enforcement of rights during an Emergency , has the effect of 
rendering executive and legislative action immune from judicial scrutiny, is 
therefore strengthened.
These propositions are, however, easier made than enforced. The Privy 
Council decision in Teh Cheng Poll was predicated upon a manipulation of the 
principles of statutory interpretation. It did not state any general premises
^  See for example Lord Atkin’s observation in Eshugbayi Eleko v Officer administering the 
Government of Nigeria, [1931] A.C. 662, at 670:
In accordance with British jurisprudence no member of the executive can 
interfere with the liberty or property of a British subject except on the 
condition that he can support the legality of his action before a court of justice.
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regarding the legality of executive and legislative action during an Emergency 
in so far as the constitutional rights of citizens were concerned. The decision in 
Teh Cheng Poh was, additionally, a solitary decision in this regard. In the vast 
majority of decisions on emergency powers, the Malaysian Court has given the 
impression that, because of the "suspension" of rights, the Court has no power 
whatsoever to enforce compliance with the constitutional rights. The Supreme 
Court of Sri Lanka was similarly disposed.
In Bangladesh, as has been noted, the Court had invalidated executive action 
during an Emergency, on a wide variety of grounds. This has been possible on 
the part of the Court in Bangladesh even when, unlike Malaysia and Sri 
Lanka, both techniques of curtailment of constitutional rights were in 
operation. The approach of the Bangladesh Court in this regard had been to 
subordinate the interpretation of emergency powers to the basic postulate that 
the Executive must act in conformity with law. The Courts in Malaysia and Sri 
Lanka failed to take a similar approach. While upholding the basic principles 
of legality, the Court in Bangladesh has however, been unable to offer any 
broad theoretical premises explaining the nature of constitutional rights or the 
extent of their "availability" during an extraordinary situation of Emergency. 
The need for a consistent and coherent theory of rights and adjudication 
therefore becomes crucial. In this regard, Dworkin’s jurisprudence offers 
significant insights.
The proposition that constitutional rights are neither entirely "suspended", nor 
made totally unenforceable during an Emergency, finds powerful support in 
the theory of rights expounded by Dworkin. If, as Dworkin suggests, individual 
rights in a Constitution such as those of Malaysia or Sri Lanka, are conceived 
as moral-political rights against the State, the conventional arguments based 
on the bare language of the provisions of rights in the Constitution lose force. 
Constitutional provisions on rights are then explicated in terms of moral
137 See, for example, BA. Siriwardena and Others v DJ.F. Liyanage and Others, Supreme Court 
Application No. 120 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, Colombo, Lake House 
Investments, 1986, 310-346, at 346, per Rodrigo J.:
Emergency Regulations are not reviewable by Courts, in any case by petitions 
under Sec. 126 of the Constitution relating to alleged infringement of 
fundamental rights ... The constitutional machinery is not geared to meet this 
kind of challenge during an emergency when state officers ought to be more 
usefully left alone to deal with urgent matters needing prompt attention and 
decisions in the conditions of an emergency.
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concepts which encompass ideas, for example, of liberty, equality and dignity. 
Once these dimensions of rights are agreed upon, it becomes impossible to 
assert that these values can be negated in any substantial degree even during 
situations of crisis, such as are occasioned by states of constitutional 
emergency.
A major source of confusion with regard to the operation of constitutional 
rights, and their curtailment during an Emergency, has been a fallacious 
assumption that rights were, in some way, "gifts" or "bequests" of the 
constitutional charter. Such an implicit assumption has been responsible for 
the assertion, for example, by the Malaysian Court that all aspects of the right 
to liberty were to be deduced only from the text of the C onstitu tion .^  It has 
been noted earlier that such a position entailed the conclusion that the 
Constitution was the "sole repository" of individual rights. As Dworkin 
emphatically asserts, rights are not "gifts" of the Constitution. It is also rightly 
argued by Dworkin that, given the nature of individual rights as moral rights 
against the government, the Constitution falls far short of guaranteeing these 
rights. According to Dworkin, constitutional rights are rather better 
understood as appeals to values like liberty or equality. Conceptualized in this 
way, since rights are neither creatures of the Constitution, nor adequately 
"guaranteed" in the document, it follows that these rights cannot be curtailed 
during an Emergency in the way suggested by conventional interpretation of 
constitutional provisions on rights and Emergency.
Dworkin rejects the idea that individual rights can be balanced against the 
interests of society as a whole. In the context of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh, this is a crucial proposition to adopt. The whole notion of 
constitutional emergency provisions in these countries is generally interpreted 
to mean that curtailment of rights is legitimized whenever the interests of the 
State are claimed to be at stake. Reliance on Dworkin’s jurisprudence will 
have the effect of overcoming the idea that constitutional rights must always 
be "balanced" with the priorities of state interests. Dworkin concedes that only 
a situation of grave emergency may justify a departure from the general 
premise that individual rights must not be seen to be competing with state
^  Subramanium v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari, [1977] 2 M.LJ. 82; Karam Singh v Menteri 
Hal Ehwal Dalam Negari, [1969] 1 M.LJ. 129; Re: Tan Boon Liat @ Allen and Another, [1977] 2 
M.LJ. 108.
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interests. No one will seriously contest the proposition that constitutional 
rights in Malaysia Sri Lanka or Bangladesh may be curtailed to some extent in 
a situation of genuine Emergency. The point of Dworkin’s position is to rebut 
the general claim that rights are necessarily curtailed to the extent that the 
Courts in Malaysia have been prepared to uphold, whenever there is a 
Proclamation of Emergency, regardless of its justification.
Dworkin’s articulation of the right to liberty in terms of the right to equality, 
meaning the "right to treatment as an equal", is also very significant in the 
context of emergency jurisprudence. State authorities in countries like 
Malaysia may offer "persuasive" grounds in support of an encroachment on the 
right to liberty during an Emergency. It will, however, be more difficult for the 
Government to justify a restriction of the "right to treatment as an equal", in 
the way that Dworkin conceives this right. Such a course of reasoning will 
facilitate the operation of the right to liberty and at the same time avoid the 
real or imagined conflict between personal liberty and state interests.
In Dworkin’s model of adjudication of rights, there is a fundamental 
distinction between principles and rights on one side, and policies and goals on 
the other. The task of a Judge in that model is to identify principles and uphold 
the resulting rights; it is not the Judge’s task to base his or her decision on 
considerations of policy. Implicit in Dworkin’s distinction between principles 
and policies is the legitimation of judicial review. The explanation of judicial 
review as directed to the "discovery" and application of principles, rather than 
to the resolution of questions of policy, is a particularly attractive proposition 
in the context of the interpretation of constitutional rights in the emergent 
constitutional orders. In countries such as those the subject of this thesis, the 
judiciary has sometimes to contend with attempted manipulation of the 
process of justice by the political organs of state. ^  Real or attempted 
encroachment on judicial independence is especially prevalent during 
extraordinary situations occasioned by a Proclamation of Emergency or
139 In 1988, the Lord President of the Supreme Court of Malaysia was suspended from office by 
the Yang di Pertuan Agong and later dismissed from office. For events surrounding this 
dismissal see, for example, R.H. Hickling, The Malaysian Judiciary in Crisis, [1989] Public Law 
20 (Analysis). In Sri Lanka, several Justices of the Supreme Court lost office in 1978 when the 
President made fresh appointments under the new Constitution. See M JA . Cooray, Judicial 
Role under the Constitutions of Ceylon/Sri Lanka, Colombo, Lake House Investments, 1982, 
at 289-290.
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Martial Law. In situations like this, the legitimacy of judicial review has to 
be defended on grounds of principle. In this regard, Dworkin’s jurisprudence 
offers a strong justification of judicial review at a sophisticated and persuasive 
level.
Dworkin’s articulation of legal principles and their role in the process of 
judicial decision-making means that judges lack plenary discretion in 
adjudicating on rights. This aspect of Dworkin’s theory of adjudication is of 
fundamental importance in the emergency jurisprudence of countries like 
Malaysia and Sri Lanka. Courts in these countries have too often exercised the 
"discretion" to rule on the unavailability of any "right" during an Emergency. 
These rulings have been characterised by a lack of any realistic considerations 
of the basic attributes of citizens’ rights in a constitutional system. The 
decisions further reveal the absence of any analysis of the necessitating 
circumstances for the curtailment of rights claimed by the political authorities 
of the State. Application of Dworkin’s suggested theory of adjudication would 
mean that in deciding questions of constitutional rights, a Judge would be 
obliged to seek out and apply relevant principles which are expressly or 
implicitly recognized by the constitutional system. Considerations of justice, 
fairness, equal concern, dignity and the like must all have to be deliberated in 
the task of judicial review of rights. The course of judicial inquiry would have 
to be the same even during an Emergency.
By proposing that the basic principles of Dworkin’s jurisprudence be adopted 
as the basis of constitutional interpretation and rights-adjudication, it is not 
suggested that the Courts in Malaysia or Sri Lanka should persistently take a 
confrontationist course with the political organs of the government. This need 
not be so. There would be situations where restraint in asserting judicial power 
would be prudent. But in such instances of judicial restraint, the affirmation of 
judicial review in principle is important. To take an example from Bangladesh,
140 In Bangladesh, Martial Law goverments resorted to the devious means of lowering the 
retirement age of Judges to achieve their objective. Two senior Justices of the Supreme Court 
were retired in 1977 by this method. In 1982, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was 
similarly retired. See K. Imtiaz Omar, Independence of the Judiciary and the Role of the 
Bangladesh Supreme Court, (1988) 11 Journal of the Bangladesh Institute of Law and 
International Affairs 80, at 94-96. Cf The position in India during the 1975-77 Emergency when 
the government resorted to overt and covert ways to intimidate the judiciary . See H. M. Seervai, 
The Emergency, Future Safeguards and the Habeas Corpus Case: A Criticism, Bombay, N.M. 
Tripathi Ltd., 1978, at 123-126.
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there was little that the Court could provide by way of relief against arbitrary 
action under Martial Law decrees during the operation of a state of Martial 
Law. In K  Ehteshamuddin Ahmed, ^  decided while Martial Law was in force, 
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh nevertheless affirmed its power of judicial 
review regarding findings of Martial Law Courts. While no relief was afforded 
to the appellant in K. Ehteshamuddin Ahmed, the Supreme Court’s assertion of 
judicial review in this decision enabled the Court at a subsequent time, when 
Martial Law was withdrawn, to set aside a conviction of a Martial Law 
Court. 1*2
CLS scholars like Tushnet have highlighted that the institution of rights can be 
"harmful" to the concerns of basic human needs like food and shelter. It is true 
that in the new constitutional orders, the need to meet fundamental human 
needs like food and shelter present grave challenges in the continuing process 
of transition to a truly welfare State. But it is difficult to see how 
institutionalized rights necessarily impede such a process. There is no inherent 
contradiction between the institution of rights and the priorities of political, 
social or economic change. This is true not only in the situation of the 
emergent polities, but more generally.
While it is easy to understand how one person’s right to 
separately possess property limits another person’s separate 
possession, ... [it does not follow that] one person’s exercise of, 
for example, free speech and dissent necessarily limits another 
person’s. Quite the contrary; the exercise of these latter rights 
can increase the other person’s ability to exercise them. It is not 
the social legitimation which flows from the formal recognition 
of rights that inhibits transformative, humanizing social struggle.
Many factors impede such struggle. But rights such as free 
speech and dissent protect the ability of groups of people - 
including working people - to change their society, better their 
group situation, and expand their human freedom.
141 K. Ehteshamuddin Ahmed v Bangladesh, (1981) 33 D.L.R. (A.D.) 154. This case is discussed 
in Chapter VIII, supra.
14?
Khondker Moshtaque Ahmed v Bangladesh, (1982) 34 D.L.R. (A.D.) 222. See Chapter VIII, 
supra.
143 Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A 
Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, (1983-1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 
509, at 530, emphasis in original.
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Long periods of states of emergency or Martial Law in post-colonial states like 
Malaysia or Bangladesh have had the effect of precluding any legitimate 
political activity in opposition to the governments of the day. In such periods 
of extraordinary rule, the protection of individual rights assume crucial 
significance. No immediate purpose is really served if one were to renounce 
this protection of individual rights and argue instead for community rights. 
Even in normal situations, the principles of individual rights offer a kind of 
protection that communitarian rights, like trade union rights, are unable to 
provide. In fact the vision of a conflict between the two is unfounded. 
Notwithstanding powerful critiques of institutionalized rights, some writers of 
the Critical Legal Studies School have admitted the "limited" role of rights. It 
has, for example, been acknowledged that:
the critique of rights as liberal philosophy does not imply that 
the left should abandon rights rhetoric as a tool of political 
organizing or legal argument. ^
Other CLS writers have recognized the important role of constitutional rights 
in more positive terms. Staughton Lynd, for example, has this to say.
Notwithstanding ... [the] criticisms of the traditional rights 
rhetoric, I believe that wholly to discard the language of rights 
would present serious dangers and forgo obvious opportunities.
First, demolishing the conceptual underpinning of the Bill of 
Rights, without putting something in its place, would deprive 
dissenters of such protection as they now have under ... [the] 
Constitution. ^
Speaking of the "serious dangers" and the "foregone opportunities" which 
would entail if the dominant CLS trend against individual rights were to be 
accepted, a scholar "sympathetic to the CLS movement" has observed that:
144 Duncan Kennedy, Critical Labor Law Theory: A  Comment, (1981) 4 Industrial Relations 
Law Journal 503, at 506. Cf. Gabel and Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical 
Legal Theory and the Practice o f  Law, (1983) 11 New York University Review of Law and Social 
Change 369, at 377, n. 13:
That one must use the language of rights in court does not necessarily mean 
that one must use it with one’s clients and in everyday political activity.
14  ^Communal Rights, (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1417, at 1419.
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[the CLS attack on the notion of legal rights] is both ahistorical 
... and reactionary. It is sometimes blind to the significance of 
legal protections for certain fundamental human rights. This 
attack leads not to ‘transformative’ social activity but to a 
nihilistic perspective which can encourage repression and 
tyranny. °
146 Ed Sparer, op. cit., at 512. In stating his position in the debate on rights, Professor Sparer 
says:
I write as someone sympathetic to the CLS movement. I do not know yet 
whether I am a part of it, even though I consider myself as a person ‘of the
left’....
Ibid at 511.
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CHAPTER XI
TOWARDS A NEW JURISPRUDENCE OF EMERGENCY, RIGHTS
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
States of Emergency and Constitutionalism
Since Independence, people in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh has had to 
endure considerable periods of time under Emergency rule. The independent 
state of Malaysia was born amidst a State of Emergency proclaimed in 1948 
which was continued till 1960. In 1964, an Emergency was proclaimed 
throughout Malaysia on account of the confrontation with Indonesia over 
Sabah and Sarawak. In 1969, there was another Proclamation of Emergency in 
the wake of ethnic violence. Besides these two Proclamations of Emergency, 
having effect throughout Malaysia, there were two other localised 
Proclamations of Emergency, one in Sarawak in 1966 and the other in 
Kelantan in 1977.1 None of the Proclamations of Emergency made so far have 
been revoked.
In addition to the fact that Emergency rule continued for long periods of time, 
the constitutional emergency provisions have undergone constant tinkering in 
Malaysia. The latest Amendment in 1981 has sought to make a Proclamation 
of Emergency or its continuance non-justiciable. The Amendment has also 
legitimized successive Proclamations of Emergency.^
The long duration of Emergency rule in Malaysia has entailed a denial of the 
basic liberties of the new constitutional order. In this regard, it has been 
observed:
The invocation of the emergency powers ... on so many 
occasions in the short life-span of the Malaysian Constitution to 
date poses problems of profound constitutional significance. In 
particular, it raises a big question mark over the state of 
constitutionalism in Malaysia.^
1 See Chapter VI, supra for the dates and other particulars of the these Proclamations.
2
See Chapter IV, supra.
^ H.P. Lee, Emergency Powers in Malaysia, in FA. Trindade & H.P. Lee (Eds), The 
Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives and Developments, Singapore, Oxford 
University Press, 1986,135-156, at 137.
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Like Malaysia, there have been neumerous Proclamations of Emergency in Sri 
Lanka since Independence. Proclamations of Emergency were made in 1953, 
1958, 1961, 1962, 1966, 1971, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983.4 The most significant of 
these states of emergency in terms of their duration have been the ones 
declared in 1971 and 1983. The propensity to declare states of emergency in 
Sri Lanka has been summed up in this revealing comment.
Widespread disturbances ... [in 1958 led to the Proclamation of 
a] state of emergency ... on 27 May 1958. From then on, the 
pattern was set for governments to resort to emergency rule 
whenever they were confronted with serious and embarrassing 
situations.^
In Bangladesh there has been fewer years of Emergency rule, compared to 
Malaysia or Sri Lanka. But there has been about ten years of Martial Law 
when the Constitution was partially or fully suspended. States of Emergency 
was declared in Bangladesh in 1974, 1981, and in 1987. The 1974 Proclamation 
of Emergency in Bangladesh had no compelling justification at all. Reflecting 
on the Proclamation, a former Judge and President of Bangladesh has 
commented:
Even before the proclamation of Emergency, the Prime Minister 
in reality possessed all the powers, and as such its need was 
widely doubted.^
^ For the dates and context of the Proclamations of Emergency in 1953, 1958, 1961, 1962, and 
1966 see Joseph Minattur, Emergency Powers in Sri Lanka, (1982) 24 Journal of the Indian Law 
Institute 57; James Jupp, Constitutional Development in Ceylon Since Independence, (1968) 41 
Pacific Affairs 169; James Jupp, Sri Lanka - Third World Democracy, London, Frank Cass & 
Co., 1978, at 7-14. For particulars of the States of Emergency in 1971,1978, 1980, 1982,1983 see 
Chapter VII, supra.
^ AJ. Wilson, Politics and Political Development Since 1948, in K.M. De Silva (Ed) Sri Lanka: A 
Survey, University Press of Hawaii, 1977, 281-311, at 287. See also the comment regarding the 
"increasing use of states of emergency" in the 1948-1966 period, in James Jupp, Constitutional 
Developments in Ceylon Since Independence, (1968) 41 Pacific Affairs 169, at 180.
^ Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, The Bangladesh Constitution in American Perspective, in L.W. Beer 
(Ed), Constitutionalism in Asia, University of California Press, 1979, 24-34, at 28.
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While on some occasions, the justification for a Proclamation of Emergency 
has been dubious,7 for other Proclamations there were some necessitating 
conditions at the time when the states of emergency were declared. Thus in 
Malaysia, a situation of external confrontation, and violent ethnic rivalry, 
justified declarations of states of emergency in 1964 and 1969 respectively. The 
same may also be said of the Proclamation of Emergency in Sri Lanka in
o
1971. In most cases, however, the state of emergency was continued long after 
the crisis which was its justification.
One of the essential purposes of constitutionally entrenched emergency 
powers is to predefine the legal consequences of a situation of state crisis. 
Constitutional emergency powers further appear to be directed to replace the 
ambiguity that may be associated with the judicial determination of the extent 
of such powers. When the makers of the Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh incorporated these drastic emergency powers, they no doubt 
had in mind situations of dramatic national peril, such as might arise from 
wars, invasions or violent rebellions. More importantly, the discretionary 
powers associated with Emergency rule were conceived as purely temporary 
powers directed for preserving democracy, not destroying it. It was assumed 
that parliamentary control of the emergency powers would be an adequate 
safeguard against the abuse of these powers by the Executive.
In this regard, it should be noted that under the Constitution of Bangladesh, 
once a Proclamation has received the requisite parliamentary approval, it can 
only be revoked by a subsequent Proclamation issued by the Executive. An 
innovative feature of the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka is the stipulation of 
periodic parliamentary review of the duration of a Proclamation of 
Emergency. Under this arrangement, a resolution supported by a two-third 
majority must be passed by Parliament if a state of emergency is to continue 
beyond a maximum period. It has, however, been pointed out that it is possible 
to overcome this obstacle.
[A] government such as the present one which commands a 
more than five-sixths majority in Parliament will, it can be
7
Thus for example, the 1974 declaration of Emergency in Bangladesh was patently mala fide 
(see Chapter VIII, supra.). The same is true of the 1982 Proclamation in Sri Lanka. Both of 
these Proclamations were motivated by sectarian political objectives.
 ^See Chapter VII, supra.
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argued have no difficulty in crossing the two-thirds barrier 
should occasion demand it.^
The long periods of Emergency in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have 
demonstrated that the political controls envisaged by the provisions of 
constitutional emergency powers have failed dismally. What is to happen if the 
political controls, envisaged by the Constitution, against the abuse of 
emergency powers fail? How may then the concept of constitutionalism be 
articulated?
The Requirements of Constitutionalism
The principal function of a written Constitution is to articulate limitations on 
the exercise of state power. What is of special significance for an analysis of 
constitutional rights and judicial review is not the nature of the 
institutionalized mechanisms of enforcing such limitations but the factual 
effectiveness of a constitutional system in controlling the abuse of state power 
in the context of the limitations which that Constitution imposes.
Where Constitutions such as those of Malaysia, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh 
articulate legal norms which purport to limit the scope of Executive power, 
there must likewise exist an effective mechanism of control to ensure the 
Executive does in fact act within the scope of the power conferred by the 
Constitution. It does not suffice that mechanisms of control exist at a notional 
level. For if the mechanisms of control fail to the satisfy the criterion of 
effectiveness, the limitations which the Constitution purport to impose are 
reduced to a meaningless facade.
Viewed from this perspective, the judicial power to interpret the Constitution 
imposes upon the Courts not only the right, but also the constitutional duty to 
examine whether the mechanisms of political control of executive power do in 
fact provide an adequate safeguard against the abuse of state power. Where 
alternative safeguards are patently inadequate, the power not only to interpret, 
but also to enforce compliance with the constitutional mandate devolves upon
^ A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Guallist System In Asia: The Constitution of Sri Lanka (1978),
London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980, at 55.
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the Courts. This judicial power exists as a concomitant of a constitutional 
system of government.
An examination of the judicial powers available under the Constitutions of 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh reveal the existence of significant powers 
of judicial review.
The Political Function of the Court
With regard to function of constitutional review by the Court, it has been 
observed:
There is an inescapable political element in the function of 
review of the constitutionality of governmental action, for the 
decisions of the courts bear on what governments can and 
cannot do, and thus on how resources are distributed in society. 
Moreover, the nature of legal reasoning is such that there is an 
element of choice as to outcome, and this is particularly true 
where courts must interpret broadly worded constitutional 
provisions which embody social goals and values.^
The admission that constitutional judicial review involves decisions on political 
questions, however, does not end the inquiry into the function of constitutional 
courts.
[The observation that the judicial process is a political process 
and that judges are policy-makers, whether wittingly or 
unwittingly, is not the end of the discussion, but its beginning. ^
 ^ Peter Bayne, The Constitution in the Courts 1975-1980, in David Weisbrot, Abdul Paliwala 
and Akilagpa Sawyerr (Eds), Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea, Australia, 
Butterworths, 1982, 219-239, at 219.
See also Sir Anthony Mason, The Role o f a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A  Comparison 
o f the Australian and the United States Experience, (1986) 16 Federal Law Review 1, at 5:
[I]t is impossible to interpret any instrument, let alone a constitution, divorced 
from values.
^  H.W. Chase and C.R. Ducat, Constitutional Interpretation, West Publishing Co., 2d Ed., 
1979, at 56, quoted in Peter J. Bayne, The Constitution and the Franchise in Western Samoa, 
(1985) 1 Queensland Institute of Technology Law Journal 201, at 207.
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The exercise of the power of judicial review on questions involving the 
constitutionality of governmental action would have to be related back to the 
source of this power. In the context of the constitutional democracies of 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the legitimacy for the assertion of this 
kind of judicial power is provided by the Constitutions themselves. All three 
Constitutions expressly grant powers of judicial review to the Courts. The 
scope of judicial review under the Constitution of Bangladesh has been 
explained in the following way.
A combined reading of the provisions ... [of Articles 7, 22, 26 (1),
102, and 108 of the Constitution of Bangladesh] indicates that 
full judicial powers have been conferred ... on the [superior] 
judiciary as an independent organ of the State. [The Supreme 
Court] has the power to declare a law [ultra vires , if it is] 
inconsistent with the Constitution or [the] fundamental rights ...
The ... [Supreme Court] has also been conferred with the power 
of judicial review of executive acts ...
Powers of judicial review are also expressly recognized by the Constitution of 
Malaysia. Under the Malaysian Constitution, the superior judiciary has been 
given the responsibility:
[t]o adjudicate on the constitutionality or validity of executive 
and legislative acts ....
Under Article 126 of the present Constitution of Sri Lanka:
[t]he Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear and determine any question relating to the infringement or 
imminent infringement by executive and administrative action of 
any fundamental right or language right enshrined in the 
Constitution...
^  (Captain) Jamil Huq and 11 Others v Bangladesh and Others, (1982) 34 D.L.R. 125, at 129, 
per Kemaluddin Hossain C J . See also Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, The Bangladesh Constitution in 
American Perspective, in L.W. Beer (Ed), Constitutionalism in Asia, University of California 
Press, 1979, 24-34, at 34; F.K.MA. Munim, Rights of the Citizen under the Constitution and 
Law, Dacca, Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs, 1975, at 14.
^  Tun Mohamed Suffian, The Malaysian Constitution and the United States Constitution, in 
L.W. Beer (Ed), op. cit., 130-139, at 133.
^  M JA . Cooray, Judicial Role under the Constitutions of Ceylon/Sri Lanka, Colombo, 
Lakehouse Investments Ltd., 1982, at 279.
CHAPTER XI 329
Although judicial review of legislation is excluded by the Constitution of Sri 
Lanka, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has been entrusted with:
[t]he function of determining the constitutionality of 
[Legislative] Bills referred to it ... [by the President or by any 
citizen.] A Bill comes up before the Supreme Court for ... 
determination as to whether the Bill or any provision thereof is 
inconsistent with the Constitution ...
Emergency provisions in the Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh provide for curtailing the operation of the entrenched rights. 
There is, however, no provision for the exclusion of the broad powers of 
judicial review of any of the Courts during an Emergency. The express 
provisions of judicial review under the Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh are sufficient to dispel any vague doubts regarding the 
legitimacy of the exercise of judicial authority on questions of constitutionality 
of executive and legislative action. In this regard, it is interesting to note that 
the institution of judicial review of legislation had crystallized into a 
convention even before the entrenchment of powers of judicial review in the 
respective Constitutions. This came about as a result of the exercise of powers 
of judicial review by the Privy Council with respect to colonial legislation.
The essential premise on which the Privy Council proceeded was 
that colonial legislatures were subordinate legislative bodies vis- 
a vis the United Kingdom Parliament, and that their enactments 
were therefore subject to review by the courts on the same basis 
as, for example, regulations passed by local government bodies 
within the United Kingdom.
With respect to Sri Lanka and Malaysia, the Privy Council continued to 
exercise judicial review powers for varying lengths of time after Independence.
Having concluded that explicit powers of judicial review are granted by the 
Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the issues to be 
addressed concern the use of that judicial power. For although a firm basis for 
judicial review may be found in the constitutional text and in practice, the 
exercise of the power of judicial review must be justified in two principal ways.
15 Ibid,  at 276-277.
^  E. McWhinney, Judicial Review in the English-Speaking World, University of Toronto Press, 
3rd Ed., 1965, at 13-14.
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In the first place, constitutional judicial review must be based on principles of 
interpretation which recognize the unique nature of a constitutional text, as 
distinct from that of a statute. In the second place, judicial review, especially 
on matters of conflict between the citizen and the State, must be legitimized 
on broad philosophical, moral and political grounds.
The Constitution is different from ordinary statutes in one 
striking way. The Constitution is foundational of other law, so ... 
interpretation of the document as a whole, and of its abstract 
clauses, must be foundational as well. It must fit and justify the 
most basic arrangements of political power in the community, 
which means it must be a justification drawn from the most 
philosophical reaches of political theory. ^
Justification in judicial reasoning is crucial for two reasons. Firstly, judgements 
of the Court have to be ‘justified’ by reasoned opinions so as to maintain 
respect for and confidence in the judicial process.
One of the major functions of any system of law is to assure its 
own acceptance in the society it governs and this is part of the 
job of each judicial opinion.
17 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, London, Fontana Press, 1986, at 380.
Cf Lord Wilberforce’s remarks in Minister o f Home Affairs v Fisher, [1980] A.C. 319, that the 
proper approach to interpret a Constitution would be to treat it:
as sui generis, calling for principles of interpretation of its own, suitable to its 
character ... without necessary acceptance of all the presumptions that are 
relevant to legislation of private law ... A Constitution is a legal instrument 
giving rise, amongst other things, to individual rights capable of enforcement in 
a court of law. Respect must be paid to the language which has been used and 
to the traditions and usages which have given meaning to that language. It is 
quite consistent with this, and with the recognition that rules of interpretation 
may apply, to take as a point of departure for the process of interpretation a 
recognition of the character and origin of the instrument, and to be guided by 
the principle of giving full recognition and effect to those fundamental rights 
and freedoms with a statement of which the Constitution commences.
Ibid at 329.
I Q
Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, (1961) 61 Colorado Law Review 
810, at 812, quoted in M. Taggart, Should Canadian Judges be Legally Required to give Reasoned 
Decisions in Civil Cases?, (1983) 33 University of Toronto Law Journal 1, at 28, n. 44. See also 
Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory o f Common-Law 
Justification, (1978) Cornell Law Review 707, 714.
Justice Kirby notes that:
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Secondly, justification in the judicial review process of the appellate courts is 
directed to a more fundamental objective. The justificatory process serves to 
legitimize the very exercise of the function of judicial review. Although, as 
observed earlier, the function of judicial review has an inescapable political 
element, Courts are institutionally very different from the political organs of 
the State. Courts must therefore distinguish their role from the other state 
institutions in a manner which then legitimize the assumption of the function 
of judicial review. It has been pointed out that "any difference which inheres in 
the judicial institution exists because of the justification which judges are 
compelled to offer for their decisions".^ The critical link between the 
justification and the legitimacy of judicial review has been identified in the 
following way.
[T]he Court’s power is legitimate only if it has, and can 
demonstrate in reasoned opinions that it has, a valid theory, 
derived from the Constitution, of the respective spheres of 
majority and minority freedom .^
Judicial interpretation of constitutional provisions assumes a critical 
significance during states of emergency. The difference between, on the one 
hand, the application of the appropriate principles of interpretation, and the 
adoption of misconceived premises on the other, would mean vastly different 
outcomes in the body politic. In terms of political consequences, the disparity 
could result either in constitutional government or constitutional dictatorship.
decisions [of courts] not only resolve conflicts of the parties before them. They 
also quite frequently expound principles of general application in 
circumstances which are analogous to those considered in the instant case. It is 
in this way that courts, and particularly the final courts ... take a part in the 
continuous process of influencing opinion.
{The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights by Reference to International Human Rights 
Norms, (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 514, at 526.)
19 H.W. Chase and C.R. Ducat, Constitutional Interpretation, West Publishing Co., 2d Ed., 
1979, at 57, quoted in Peter J. Bayne, The Constitution and the Franchise in Western Samoa, 
(1985) 1 Queensland Institute of Technology Law Journal 201, at 207.
20 R. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, (1971) 47 Indiana Law 
Journal 1, at 3, quoted in Peter J. Bayne, op. cit., at 207.
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Constitutional Interpretation, Emergency Powers 
and Judicial Review
The Context
It is generally assumed that the rights which citizens enjoy in normal times may 
be curtailed during times of crisis. In common law countries, theoretical 
justification for the curtailment of rights are sought to be grounded on the 
principle of necessity. In accordance with this rationale, Courts in common law 
jurisdiction have been prepared to sanction, in varying degrees, the necessarily 
disruptive legal consequences that ensue in times of national crisis. But the 
invocation of the principle of necessity logically presupposes some degree of 
connection, some reasonable nexus between the nature of the crisis and the 
kinds of legal consequences which the Courts are prepared to sanction.
In countries such as Britain where the authority to legislate is supposedly
unfettered, the Courts achieve this differentiation through the manipulation of
doctrines of statutory interpretation.^* In jurisdictions such as the
Commonwealth of Australia, where the power to legislate is restricted by a
written Constitution, the inquiry into claims of emergency measures and the
resultant legal consequences is not simply a matter of statutory interpretation.
The answer to the question whether there is a reasonable nexus between the
nature of a given crisis and the degree of permissible deviation from normal
constitutional practice is influenced by substantive principles of constitutional
law.^2 But under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, the
23range of substantive principles which may be invoked is very limited.
The context of judicial interpretation of emergency powers in countries like 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh, is fundamentally different. Under the 
Constitutions of these countries, legislative power is restricted by the 
entrenchment of constitutional rights. Thus, the question of a reasonable 
nexus between the purposes of emergency powers and the manner of their
^  Compare Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206 to Nakkuda Ali vJayaratne, [1951] A.C. 66.
^  Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth, (1951) C.L.R. 1 (the substantive principle 
being that under a written constitution the judiciary must decide questions of constitutionality).
^  See George Winterton, Extra-Constitutional Notions in Australian Constitutional Law, (1986)
16 Federal Law Review 223.
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exercise presents substantive constitutional issues. These issues cannot be 
resolved by the application of the formal style of statutory interpretation.
The most disturbing feature of the emergency provisions of the Constitutions 
of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh is the absence of any limit to the 
occasions for the exercise of emergency powers. The only words of limitation 
to be found in the emergency provisions relate to the satisfaction of the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong in Malaysia and the President in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
as to the need for a Proclamation. The suspension of constitutional rights 
which automatically results as a result of a Proclamation of Emergency in 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh, is in no manner expressly confined to the 
purpose(s) of the Emergency.
In the absence of legally relevant limitations to the occasions for the exercise 
of emergency powers by the Executive, the task for the Courts in these 
countries is by no means simple. It falls upon the Courts to reconcile their own 
position as a constitutional court, entrusted with significant powers of judicial 
review, with the moratorium on the rights of citizens brought about by the 
Proclamation of an Emergency. There is no doubt that the rigidity of the 
emergency provisions, entrenched in the Constitution with the object of 
granting comprehensive powers to the Executive in the event of a national 
crisis, render the task of defining standards of judicial control quite 
complicated.
It is within this broad context of constitutional emergency powers, entrenched 
rights, and institutionalised judicial power that one must approach the 
questions arising out the operation of a state of emergency.
The Predicament
(a) The Reviewability o f a Proclamation
The Courts in Malaysia and Sri Lanka have consistently held that a 
Proclamation of Emergency is non-justiciable.^ In Malaysia, the issue of the
24 See Chapter IV, supra. Among those cases where this question is discussed are, Malaysia: 
Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Government of Malaysia, [1968] 1 M.LJ. 119, Public Prosecutor v Ooi 
Kee Saik, [1971] 2 M.LJ. 108; Sri Lanka: JA. Yasapala v Ranil Wickremesinghe and Others, S.C. 
Application No 103 of 1980, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 1, Colombo, Lakehouse 
Investments, 1984, 143-164, Janatha Finance and Investments v DJ.F.D. Liyanage and Others,
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justiciability of a Proclamation has apparently been set to rest by the 1981
Amendment to the Constitution. The 1981 Amendment declares the non-
• 75justiciability of a Proclamation of Emergency or its continued operation. 
Notwithstanding the new provisions in the Constitution of Malaysia, it is 
theoretically possible to successfully challenge a Proclamation of Emergency 
made under the Constitution of Malaysia and one made under the 
Constitutions of Sri Lanka or Bangladesh. The exercise of the power of 
proclaiming an Emergency could, for example, be impugned on grounds of 
bad faith or an invalid exercise of power. In the context of the Indian 
Constitution, which entrenches similar emergency powers, it has suggested that 
the Court could justifiably intervene in a case of invalid exercise of the 
President’s power to proclaim an Emergency.
[I]f it can be shown that there is no satisfaction of the President
at all, the exercise of the power would be constitutionally
invalid.
26
In Chapter III, a state of Martial Law was characterised as an instance of 
extra-constitutional Emergency. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan held a Proclamation of Martial Law illegal and 
invalid.^
S.C. Application No 127 of 1982, reported in Fundamental Rights, Vol 2, Colombo, Lakehouse 
Investments, 1986, 373-396.
It should be noted that in Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Government o f Malaysia, [1968] 2 M.LJ. 
238, the Privy Council had suggested that the issue of the justiciability of a Proclamation was 
"debatable".
^  Article 150 (8), Constitution of Malaysia, inserted by Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1981, 
Act No. A514 of 1981.
^  Woman Rao v Union of India, [1981] A.I.R. (S.C.) 271, per Bhagwati J. , quoted in K.I. 
Omar, Emergency, Personal Liberty and the Courts in India and Pakistan, Unpublished LLM 
Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1985, at 55.
Bhagwati J.’s separate judgement in Waman Rao is reported in Minerva Mills v Union of India, 
[1980] A.I.R. (S.C.) 1789, at 1838.
See the discussion of the English position in J.M. Evans (Ed) De Smith's Judicial 
Review of Administrative Action, London, Stevens & Sons, 4th Ed., 1980, at 
336.
^  Asma Jilini v. Government of Punjab, [1972] P.L.D. (S.C.) 139. The Proclamation of Martial 
Law was invalidated retroactively on the ground that the Military Commander who declared 
Martial Law and instituted himself Chief Martial Law Administrator was an usurper who acted
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The dictum of the Indian Supreme Court and the precedent of the Pakistan 
Supreme Court suggest that it is, in theory, possible to challenge a 
Proclamation of Emergency on the ground that it was made in bad faith. 
However, there would be considerable difficulties in conclusively establishing 
that the power of proclaiming an Emergency had been exercised in such a way. 
Proof of bad faith would be exceedingly difficult to substantiate in a Court. 
The theoretical proposition of successfully challenging a Proclamation of 
Emergency would thereby lose any practical significance.
(b) The Reviewability o f the Exercise o f Emergency Powers
In the context of countries like Malaysia, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh, as perhaps 
elsewhere, the crucial question is not so much the way in which the emergency 
powers are invoked. Rather, the substantial issues relate to the extent and 
manner to which these powers may be permissibly applied. For if the 
Executive can be effectively prevented from abusing the powers resulting from 
a Proclamation of Emergency, then the existence of the state of emergency is 
reduced to a matter of secondary importance. Judicial control of executive 
powers resulting from a declaration of Emergency is of critical significance in 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh because the Constitutions of these 
countries fail to expressly limit the legal effects of a Proclamation of 
Emergency.
The discussions in Chapters VI and VII reveal that the Courts in Malaysia and 
Sri Lanka had not been able to play even a minimal role in ensuring 
constitutionalism or in safeguarding the rights of citizens during states of 
emergency. This is so despite the fact that provisions of citizens’ rights and 
powers of judicial review are entrenched in the Constitutions of both the 
countries. In varying degrees, the Malaysian and Sri Lankan Courts persisted 
in the tradition of an undiscriminating deference to the will of Executive to the 
detriment of the basic liberties of citizens.
illegally and unconstitutionally. For a discussion of this case, see Leslie Wolf-Phillips, 
Constitutional Legitimacy: A Study of the Doctrine of Necessity, London, Third World 
Foundation, (nd c 1980), at 17-21.
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The manner in which the Courts in Malaysia and Sri Lanka exercised its 
powers of judicial review during an Emergency suggests that these Courts did 
not regard themselves as constitutional courts. This is obvious when one 
considers the extent to which the Courts in Malaysia and Sri Lanka had 
acquiesced to the exercise of delegated powers under sub-constitutional 
emergency legislation. By holding that the Court could not scrutinize detention 
orders, the Malaysian and Sri Lankan Courts have suggested that there was no 
judicial power to determine whether or not the detaining authority had 
complied with the requirements of the enabling legislation. In Malaysia, issues 
of legality of detention were seen as questions of whether procedural 
requirements were mandatory or directory. By identifying the substantive 
issues of liberty as a procedural matter, and by determining that procedural 
defects were not serious enough to invalidate detention orders, the Malaysian 
Court struck at the very roots of constitutionalism.
The Malaysian and Sri Lankan Courts have been instrumental in making 
executive discretion in powers of detention during an Emergency totally 
immune from judicial scrutiny. More recently the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka 
appeared to assert that the subjective satisfaction of the Executive in ordering 
detention should be based on some objective criteria. At the same time, 
however, the Court negated its stand by validating executive action on other 
dubious grounds. The Sri Lankan Supreme Court’s decision in Edirisuriya 
illustrates this quite vividly.
In judicial decision-making on violations of constitutional rights during an 
Emergency, the Courts in Malaysia and Sri Lanka persisted in a formal style of 
interpretation. In addition, these Courts invoked precedents of the colonial era 
to justify executive discretion in resorting to preventive detention during an 
Emergency. In Chapters IX and X it was argued that a formal style approach 
to constitutional interpretation and explication of constitutional rights must be 
rejected.
The consequence of the trend of decision-making pursued by the Courts in 
Malaysia and Sri Lanka has been to legitimize every exercise of emergency 
powers by the Government. The Courts have adopted an undiscriminating
28 Edirisuriya v Navaratnam, [1985] 1 Sri L.R. 100. See the discussion of this case in Chapter 
VII, supra.
CHAPTER XI 337
attitude towards emergency executive and legislative action, and have 
sanctioned plenary powers in this regard to the political organs of the State 
during times of Emergency. The judicial approval of every exercise of 
emergency powers has meant that the Courts in Malaysia and Sri Lanka have 
in effect encouraged the excesses of the abuses of these powers.
The role of the Court in Bangladesh, discussed in Chapter VIII, has been quite 
different. It has made a consistent effort to uphold the basic principles of 
legality during an Emergency. By subordinating the interpretation of 
constitutional emergency powers and the executive power of detention during 
an Emergency to the basic requirements of legality, the Court in Bangladesh 
had been able to assert a minimum degree of judicial control. The decision in 
Khondker Moshtaque^  shows that the Court was able to require a standard of 
legality even with regard to acts during a state of Martial Law. As noted, 
however, the Court had not been able to articulate a realistic and consistent 
approach to constitutional rights and emergency powers.
It was stressed in Chapters IX and X that the problems and issues presented 
by the use of emergency powers in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh 
cannot be resolved within the confines of the constitutional provisions on 
emergency powers alone. The issues raised by the invocation of a state of 
emergency, it was suggested, would have to be addressed in the context of the 
fundamental premises of a constitutional system. A new jurisprudence was 
therefore considered essential. In that regard, Ronald Dworkin’s theoretical 
premises of law, constitution, rights and adjudication*^ was proposed as an 
alternate model.
Towards a New Jurisprudence of Rights, Emergency 
and Judicial Review
It appears that political authorities in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh 
have chosen to rely on constitutional emergency powers for purposes of
29 Khondker Moshtaque v. Bangladesh, (1982) 34 D.L.R. (A.D.) 222. See the discussion on the 
case in Chapter VIII, supra.
30 Taking Rights Seriously, London, Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1978 (new impression) 1st pub. 
1977, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985, Law’s Empire, 
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press and London, Fontana Press, 1986.
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implementing policies of political, economic and social change. The expansion 
of executive and legislative powers, which during a constitutional emergency, 
automatically accrue to the government, appears to offer an irresistible 
temptation to utilize the expedient of a national emergency for the purpose of 
realizing policy goals. For the political authorities in these countries, the 
availability of emergency powers has meant that they could dispense with the 
obligations of ensuring compliance with constitutional limitations. The 
temptation to resort to emergency powers offers to these governments the 
justification of derogating from the entrenched rights.
It must be admitted that since Independence, there have serious political, 
social and economic problems in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. It can 
be conceded that these admittedly severe crises might justify a re-allocation of 
institutional power. But it is difficult to see how such crises can, for example, 
justify the deprivation of the right to liberty whenever the Executive, in its 
discretion, determines that detention is necessary. In Bangladesh, detention 
can be ordered on the subjective satisfaction of a multitude of civil servants. 
Printed detention order forms stating that satisfaction are conveniently 
available for use, a fact that led the Supreme Court in Bangladesh to say that 
"[liberty of a citizen does not rest on the user of a printed form".^
The problems of emergency powers, constitutionalism and rights-enforcement 
have proved incapable of resolution by the application of statutory and 
common law rules. These problems cannot also be resolved by employing 
traditional rules of constitutional construction. The context of the post-colonial 
constitutional orders, and the entrenchment of rights and powers of judicial 
review in the Constitutions of Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh calls for a 
wholly new jurisprudential approach. Ronald Dworkin’s theoretical premises, 
discussed in Chapters IX and X offer valuable guidance in defining the nature, 
content and operation of constitutional rights and in promoting a principled 
approach in these matters.
Dworkin’s jurisprudence is broadly based on philosophical, moral and political 
considerations. The expansive parameters of Dworkin’s legal-constitutional 
theory has a character of universality that transcends the confines of the 
settings of the older democratic societies which provided the immediate
^  Shamsun Nahar Begum v Bangladesh, (1978) 30 D.L.R. 33, at 40.
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background for his theorization. The application of Dworkin’s theory to the 
problems of enforcement of rights and of judicial review in the constitutional 
systems of countries like Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, is not only 
possible but can prove to be very useful.
The constitutional rights of citizens, in countries like Malaysia or Sri Lanka 
have been customarily projected to be "gifts" of the Constitution. The 
pervasiveness of this kind of disposition is, in part, explicable by the historical 
circumstances of the intervention of colonialism between the phases of pre- 
colonial independent status and post-colonial statehood. During the colonial 
period, legal rights against the state were not recognized as such. Upon 
attainment of Independence, the entrenched rights of the new Constitutions 
were therefore seen to be something which the constitutional charter 
bequeathed to the citizens.
The constitutional recognition of citizens’ rights, while having roots in some of 
the ancient traditions of the East, achieved its explicit articulation in the West. 
In the process of its evolution, it has come to be seen as a birth-right of all 
people. Aversion to Western traditions and the quest for ethnocentric bias in 
modelling constitutional systems must not overlook the now accepted 
international character of basic individual rights. The past experience of 
colonial administration makes it all the more compelling that citizens’ rights in 
the newer democracies be allowed to flourish without impediment.
In Chapter X, it was noted that Dworkin’s strong advocacy of individual rights 
has come under much criticism from the communitarian perspective of the 
CLS School. In addition to the CLS critique of rights, there has been other 
disagreement, in Western jurisprudence, over a vigourous rights-based 
approach. In this regard, it has to be remembered that such disagreement with 
Dworkin’s approach in the Western world take place in an environment where 
individual rights are, on the whole, secure and assured. In countries such as 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh the context is very different. The 
entrenchment of individual rights in the Constitutions of these countries has so 
often proved illusory that the advocacy of rights should not be 
underemphasized. Rights in countries such as these has the potential of not 
only safeguarding individual interests but also in performing a vital role 
towards ensuring a balanced and stable polity.
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The assertion of individual rights in countries such as those under study can 
mean the difference between a constitutional government and an authoritarian 
one. The recurrent and prolonged periods of Emergency rule in these 
countries and the resultant authoritarianism strengthens the argument in 
favour of individual rights advocacy. During times such as these, the 
constitutional rights are all that citizens can fall back upon. In the articulation 
of the parameters of these rights and their enforcement, Dworkin’s theory is 
very persuasive and realistic. His jurisprudence therefore merit serious 
consideration for application in the situation of Third World rights- 
enforcement.
Dworkin articulates citizens’ rights in terms of political-moral rights against 
the State. The significance of the constitutional entrenchment of these rights, 
for Dworkin, lies in the fact of their appeal to moral values like liberty and 
equality. These conceptions are particularly significant in the context of 
emergent polities like Malaysia or Bangladesh where citizens’ liberties are 
sought to be negated by long periods of constitutional emergencies. Reliance 
on Dworkin’s arguments would enable one to assert that the values 
encompassed by the constitutional rights can never be negated in any 
substantial way. Dworkin’s portrayal of individual rights in terms of the "right 
to treatment as an equal" is a powerful argument in the context of the 
prevailing emergency jurisprudence in countries such as Malaysia or Sri 
Lanka. While it may be comparatively easy to legitimize governmental 
restrictions on personal liberty by projecting a real or imagined crisis, it will be 
difficult to justify a restriction of the "right to treatment as an equal".
In the context of judicial review of the use of constitutional emergency powers 
in Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, Dworkin’s jurisprudence would help in 
two ways. In the first place, judicial review directed to the marshalling and 
application of principles inherent in the constitutional order and grounded on 
political morality, would be more easily legitimized. The suggested model of 
decision-making would also exclude judicial discretion in a strong sense, by 
making it incumbent on the Court to address the concerns of liberty, fairness, 
dignity and related principles while adjudicating questions of detention during 
an Emergency. It will thereby not be possible for Courts during an Emergency 
to defer to executive satisfaction directed to the deprivation of personal liberty 
without an exhaustive consideration of all relevant principles.
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Reliance on the principles of the legal-constitutional orders, in the way that 
Dworkin conceptualizes them, would also enable the Court to apply some test 
of the relation between a particular emergency measure and the nature of an 
Emergency. In this way, although the policy of the government to proclaim and 
continue a state of emergency would not necessarily be invalidated, it would 
be possible for the Court to subject to review the emergency measures 
introduced under a Proclamation. The Court could, for example, employ 
principles of reasonableness in scrutinizing emergency legislation to the 
detriment of citizens’ liberties. The use of standards of fairness and 
reasonableness, for example, would also enable the Court to require a 
reasonable nexus between the nature of the Emergency and the kinds of legal 
consequences which it would be prepared to condone. In this regard, a test like 
the "clear and present danger test", suggested by Holmes J. of the Supreme 
Court of the U.S.A. could be relevant.^
It is sometimes argued that the different priorities of emergent polities like 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, as compared to those of the older 
democracies, can be the basis of a differentiated operation of individual rights. 
Arguments of this nature are based on the objectives of the State declared in 
the policy-goals of the Constitution.^ These are fallacious contentions. There
In Schenck v U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1918), Holmes J. delineated the circumstances under which 
the freedom of speech, guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, could be 
restricted.
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as create a clear and present danger 
that will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximity.
Ibid., at 52.
The clear and present danger test, has been controversial and the premises underlying the 
doctrine had been subsequently misused, especially during the trials of the Communist Party 
leaders in the U.S.A. under the infamous Smith Act, 1940. The decision in Dennis v United 
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) illustrates this quite vividly. The misuse of the clear and present 
danger test, however, cannot be an argument against its proper use.
The Constitution of Sri Lanka identifies these goals as the "Directive Principles of State 
Policy and Fundamental Duties", Articles 27-29. In the Bangladesh Constitution, these are 
described as "Fundamental Principles of State Policy”, Articles 8-25. The Malaysian Constitution 
does not declare any similar goals. It has, however, been pointed out that a consensual 
agreement between representatives of political parties and interests groups in Malaysia, 
described as the Rukunegara could constitute the "Directive Principles of Policy", if inserted into 
the Constitution. The Rukunegara was proclaimed by the Yang di-Pertuan in 1970 and "was the 
result of result of lengthy deliberations in the National Consultative Council". See Parliamentary
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can be no inherent contradictions between the civil, and political rights of the 
citizens on the one hand and the priorities of distributive justice or political 
transition on the other. It is true that the economic rights of citizens , such as 
the right to property might, in certain circumstances, be re-adjusted to accord 
with the theme of distributive justice.
Constitutional state policies directed at implementing the "goals" enumerated 
in the Constitution must accommodate the basic human values of dignity, 
liberty and equality. In addition to the imperatives of political, social and 
economic transition, the Principles o f State Policy (PSP) also recognize 
democratic values and human r i g h t s Thus under the Constitution of 
Bangladesh, one of the Fundamental Principles of State Policy stresses that:
The Republic shall be a democracy in which fundamental 
human rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and 
worth of the human person shall be guaranteed.*^
Similarly in Sri Lanka, one of the Directive Principles of State Policy is:
the full realization of the fundamental rights and freedoms of all 
persons.*^
Debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill 1971, Kuala Lumpur, Government Printers, 1972, 
at xi, ("Introduction" by Ahmad Ibrahim), quoted in H.P. Lee Emergency Powers in Malaysia, in 
FA. Trindade and H.P. Lee (Eds), The Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives and 
Developments, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1986,135-156, at 150.
A typical Principle of State Policy is thus defined:
The State shall adopt effective measures to remove social and economic 
inequality between man and man and to ensure the equitable of wealth among 
citizens and of opportunities in order to attain a uniform level of economic 
development throughout the Republic.
(Article 19(2), Constitution of Bangladesh).
^  In addition to the declarations in the PSP, the Preambles to the Constitutions of Sri Lanka 
and Bangladesh also stress the basic values and liberties of the constitutional orders. The 
Preamble to the Constitution of Bangladesh emphasizes the realization "through the democratic 
process a socialist society, free from exploitation - a society in which the rule of law, 
fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice, political, economic and social, will 
be secured for all citizens ...". The Preamble to the Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978 declares that 
"the fundamental rights which are by the Constitution declared and recognized shall be 
respected, secured and advanced by all the organs of government, and shall not be abridged, 
restricted or denied, save in the manner and to the extent herinafter provided ...".
35 Article 11, Constitution of Bangladesh.
^  Article 27 (2) (a), Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978.
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In Malaysia, the Rukunegarcr^ declares the dedication of the State "to 
maintaining a democratic way of life" and upholding the Rule of Law
The Principles of State Policy (PSP) in the Constitutions of Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh, and the Malaysian Rukunegara, embody therefore different kinds 
of standards as guides to the activities of the State. On the one hand, they set 
broad parameters to state activity directed to the achievement of certain goals. 
On the other hand, they also project a range of principles, envisioning the 
requirements of liberty, equality, justice, fairness and other dimensions of 
political and social morality. These principles can form the basis for evaluating 
and scrutinizing executive and legislative conduct. These principles combined 
with the values projected in the entrenched rights provisions of the 
Constitutions, must inform inquiries into the legitimacy of governmental acts 
in relation to citizens’ rights.
Emergent polities are certainly not in danger of too much political freedom. 
The extensive use of emergency powers and the consequent inroads on citizens 
rights in countries like Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh vividly illustrates 
that concerns for liberty and equality are perhaps nowhere more pressing than 
in the emergent polities. The rights of citizens in countries such as these are 
capable of enforcement by recourse to the method of interpretation suggested 
in this thesis.
In suggesting this approach, one is reminded of the vulnerability of the 
Judiciary in the countries studied in this thesis, in common with their 
counterpart in most Third World polities. It cannot, however, be seriously 
contended that apprehended threats to the Judiciary by the political branches 
of government can be the rationale for the abdication of judicial responsibility. 
While there may be situations of restraint, powers of judicial review cannot be 
forsaken.
Experience has shown that even while engaged in a predominantly pliant role, 
the Judiciary has been threatened and manipulated by governments. In 
adopting the more expansive dimensions of judicial review suggested in this
^  Supra, n. 33.
T O
Quoted in H.P. Lee, op. cit., at 150.
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thesis, the Judiciary will not be worse off. The Court in the emergent state 
must not shrug off its responsibility, especially when in the circumstances of 
the emerging societies it is the only forum for enforcing the citizens’ rights.
APPENDIX I
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PART II - FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES
5. (1) No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in 
accordance with law.
(2) Where complaint is made to a High Court or any judge thereof 
that a person is being unlawfully detained the court shall inquire into the 
complain and, unless satisfied that the detention is lawful, shall order him to 
be produced before the court and release him.
(3) Where a person is arrested he shall be informed as soon as may 
be of the grounds of his arrest and shall be allowed to consult and be defended 
by a legal practitioner of his choice.
(4) Where a person is arrested and not released he shall without 
unreasonable delay, and in any case within twenty-four hours (excluding the 
time of any necessary journey) be produced before a magistrate and shall not 
be further detained in custody without the magistrate’s authority.
Provided that this Clause shall not apply to the arrest or detention of 
any person under the existing law relating to restricted residence, and all the 
provisions of this Clause shall be deemed to have been an integral part of this 
Article as from Merdeka Day.
(5) Clauses (3) and (4) do not apply to any enemy alien.
6. (1) No person shall be held in slavery.
(2) All forms of forced labour are prohibited, but Parliament may 
by law provide for compulsory service for national purposes.
(3) Work accidental to the serving of a sentence of imprisonment 
imposed by a court of law shall not be taken to be forced within the meaning 
of this Article.
(4) Where by any written law the whole or any part of the functions 
of any public authority is to be carried on by another public authority, for the 
purpose of enabling those functions to be performed the employees of the first 
mentioned public authority shall be bound to serve the second mentioned 
public authority, and their service with the second mentioned public authority 
shall not be taken to be forced labour within the meaning of this Article, and 
no such employee shall be entitled to demand any right from either the first 
mentioned public authority or the second mentioned public authority by 
reason of the transfer of his employment.
7. (1) No person shall be punished for an act or ommission which was 
not punishable by law when it was done or made, and no person shall suffer 
greater punishment for an offence than was prescribed by law at the time it 
was committed.
(2) A person who has been acquitted or convicted of an offence 
shall not be tried again for the same offence except where the conviction or
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acquittal has been quashed an a retrial ordered by a court superior to that by 
which he was acquitted or convicted.
8. (1) All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal 
protection of the law.
(2) Except as eiq^ressly authorised by this Constitution, there shall 
be no discrimination against citizens on the ground only of religion, race, 
descent or place of birth in any law or in the appointment to any office or 
employment under authority or in the administration of any law relating to the 
acquisition, holding or disposition of property or the establishing or carrying 
on of any trade, business, profession vocation or employment.
(3) There shall be no discrimination in favour of any person on the 
ground that he is a subject of the Ruler of any State.
(4) No public authority shall discriminate against any person on the 
ground that he is resident or carrying on business in any part of the Federation 
outside the jurisdiction of the authority.
(5) This Article does not invalidate or prohibit -
(a) any provision regulating personal law;
(b) any provision or practice restricting office or employment 
connected with the affairs of any religion, or of an institution managed by a 
group professing any religion, to persons professing that religion;
(c) any provision for the protection, well-being or
advancement of the aboriginal peoples of the Malay Peninsula (including the 
reservation of land) or the reservation to aborigines of a reasonable 
proportion of suitable positions in the public service;
(d) any provision prescribing residence in a State or part of a 
State as a qualification for election or appoinment to any authority having 
jurisdiction only in that State or part, or for voting in such an election;
(e) any provision of a Constitution of State, being or 
corresponding to a provision in force immediately before Merdeka Day;
(f) any provision restricting enlistment in the Malay
Regiment to Malays.
9. (1) No citizen shall be banished or excluded from the Federation.
(2) Subject to Clause (3) and to any law relating to the security of 
the Federation or any part thereof, public order, public health, or the 
punishment of offenders, every citizen has the right to move freely throughout 
the Federation and to reside in any part thereof.
(3) So long as under this Constitution any other State is in a special 
position as compared with the States of Malaya, Parliament may by law 
impose restrictions, as between that State and other States, on the rights 
conferred by Clause (2) in respect of movement and residence.
10. (1) Subject to Clauses (2), (3) and (4) -
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(a) every citizen has the right to freedom of speech and
expression;
(b) all citizens have the right to assemble peaceably and
without arms;
(c) all citizens have the right to form associations.
(2) Parliament may by law impose -
(a) on the rights conferred by paragraph (a) of Clause (1), 
such restrictions as it deems necessary or e>q>edient in the interest of the 
security of the Federation or any part thereof friendly relations with other 
countries, public order or morality and restrictions designed to protect the 
privileges of Parliament or of any Legislative Assembly or to provide against 
contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to any offence;
(b) on the right conferred by paragraph (b) of Clause (1), 
such restrictions as it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the 
security of the Federation or any part thereof or public order;
(c) on the right conferred by paragraph (c) of Clause (1), 
such restrictions as it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the 
security of the Federation or any part thereof, public order or morality.
(3) Restrictions on the right to form associations conferred by 
paragraph (c) of Clause (1) may also be imposed by any law relating to labour 
or education.
(4) In imposing restrictions in the interest of the security of the 
Federation or any part thereof or public order under Clause (2) (a), 
Parliament may pass law prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right, 
status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected 
by the provisions of Part III, Article 152, 153 or 181 otherwise than in relation 
to the implementation thereof as may be specified in such law.
11. (1) Every person has the right to profess and practise his religion
and, subject to Clause (4), to propagate it.
(2) No person shall be compelled to pay any tax the proceeds of 
which are specially allocated in whole or in part tor the purposes of a religion 
other than his own.
(3) Every religious group has the right -
(a) to manage its own religious affairs;
(b) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or 
charitable purposes; and
(c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it 
in accordance with law.
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(4) State law and in respect of the Federal Territory federal law 
may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine or belief 
among persons professing the religion of Islam.
(5) This Article does not authorise any act contrary to any general 
law relating to public order, public health or morality.
12. (1) Without prejudice to the generality of Article 8, there shall be
no discrimination against any citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, 
descent or place of birth -
(a) in the administration of any educational institution 
maintained by a public authority, and, in particular the admission of pupils or 
students or the payment of fees; or
(b) in providing out of the funds of a public authority 
financial aid for the maintenance or education of pupils or students in any 
educational institution (whether or not maintained by a public authority and 
whether within or outside the Federation).
(2) Every religious group has the right to establish and maintain 
institutions for the education of children in its own religion, and there shall be 
no discrimination on the ground only of religion in any law relating to such 
institutions or in the administration of any such law; but it shall be lawful for 
the Federation or a State to establish or maintain or assist in establishing or 
maintaining Islamic institutions or provide or assist in providing instructions in 
the religion of Islam and incur such expenditure as may be necessary for the 
purpose.
(3) No person shall be required to receive instruction in or to take 
part in any ceremony or act of worship of a religion other than his own.
(4) For the purposes of Clause (3) the religion of a person under the 
age of eighteen years shall be decided by his parent or guardian.
13. (1) No person shall be deprived of property save in accordance with
law.
(2) No law shall provide for the compulsory acquisition or use of 
property without adequate compensation.
PART IX - THE JUDICIARY
121. (1) Suject to Clause (2) the judicial power of the Federation shall be
vested in two High Curts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and status, namely -
(a) one in the States of Malaya, which shall be known as the 
High Court in Malaya and shall have its principal registry in Kuala Lumpur; 
and
(b) one in the State of Sabah and Sarawak, which shall be 
known as the High Court in Borneo and shall have its principal registry at such 
place in the State of Sabah and Sarawak as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may 
determine.
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(c) (Repealed).
and in such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law.
(2) The following jurisdiction shall be vested in a court which shall 
be known as the Supreme Court and shall have its principal registry in Kuala 
Lumpur, that is to say -
(a) exclusive jurisdiction to determine appeals from decisions 
of a High Court or a judge thereof (except decisions of a High Court given by 
a registrar or other officer of the court and appealable under federal law to a 
judge of the Court); and
(b) such original or consultative jurisdiction as is specified in 
Articles 128 and 130.
122. (1) The Supreme Court shall consist of a president of the Court (to
be styled "the Lord President of the Federal Court"), of the Chief Justices of 
the High Court and, until the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by order otherwise 
provides, of four other judges and such additional judges as may be appointed 
pursuant to Clause (1A).
122A. (1) Each of the High Courts shall consist of a Chief Justice and not 
less than four other judges; but the number of other judges shall not, until the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong by order otherwise provides, exceed -
(a) in the High Court in Malaya, twelve; and
(b) in the High Court in Borneo, eight
(c) (Repealed).
(2) Any person qualified for appointment as a judge of a High Court 
may sit as a judge of that court, if designated for the purpose (as occasion 
requires) in accordance with Article 122B.
128. (1) The Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court,
have jurisdiction to determine in accordance with any rules of court regulatng 
the exercise of such jurisdiction -
(a) any question whether a law made by Parliament or by the 
Legislative of a State is invalid on the ground that it makes provision with 
respect to a matter with respect to which Parliament or, as the case may be, 
the legislative of the State has now power to make laws; and
(b) disputes on any other question between States or 
between the Federation and any State.
(2) Without prejudice to any appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, where in any proceedings before another court a question arises as to 
the effect of any
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130. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may refer to the Supreme Court for its 
opinion any question as to the effect of any provision of this Constitution 
which has arisen or appears to him likely to arise, and the Supreme Court shall 
pronounce in open court its opinion on any question so referred to it.
PART XI - SPECIAL POWERS AGAINST SUBVERSION, ORGANISED 
VIOLENCE, AND ACTS AND CRIMES PREJUDICIAL TO THE PUBLIC 
AND EMERGENCY POWERS
149. (1) If an Act of Parliament recites that action has been taken or
threatened by any substantial body of persons, whether inside or outside the 
Federation -
(a) to cause, or to cause a substantial number of citizens to 
fear, organised violence against persons or property; or
(b) to excite disaffection against the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
or any government in the Federation; or
(c) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between 
different races or other classes of the population likely to cause violence; or
(d) to procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, 
of anything by law established; or
(e) which is prejudicial to the maintenance or the functioning 
of any supply or service to the public or any class of the public in the 
Federation or any part thereof; or
(f) which is prejudicial to public order in, or the security of 
the Federation or any part thereof,
any provision of that law designed to stop or prevent that action is valid 
notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of Article 5, 9, 
10 or 13, or would apart from this Article be outside the legislative power of 
Parliament; and Article 79 shall not apply to a Bill for such an Act or any 
amendment to such a Bill.
(2) A law containing such a recital as is mentioned in Clause (1) 
shall, if not sooner repealed, cease to have effect if resolutions are passed by 
both Houses of Parliament annulling such law, but without prejudice to 
anything Parliament to make a new law under this Article.
150. (1) If the Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that a grave emergency
exists whereby the security, or the economic life, or public order in the 
Federation or any part thereof is threatened, he may issue a Proclamation of 
Emergency making therein a declaration to that effect.
(2) A Proclamation of Emergency under Clause (1) may be issued 
before the actual occurrence of the event which threatens the security, or the 
economic life, or public order in the Federation or any part thereof if the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that there is imminent danger of the 
occurrence of such event.
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(2A) The power conferred on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by his 
Article shall include the power issue different Proclamations on different 
grounds or in different circumstances, whether or not there is a proclamation 
or Proclamations already issued by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong under Clause 
(1) and such Proclamation or Proclamations are in operation.
(2B) If at any time while a Proclamation of Emergency is in 
operation, except when both Houses of Parliament are sitting concurrently, the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong is satisfied that certain circumstances exist which 
render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such 
ordinances as circumstances appear to him to require
(2C) An ordinance promulgated under Clause (2B) shall have the 
same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, and shall continue in full force 
and effect as if it is an Act of Parliament until it is revoked or annulled under 
Clause (3) or until it lapses under Clause (7); and the power of the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong to promulgate ordinances under clause (2B) may be exercised 
in relation to any matter with respect to which Parliament has power to make 
laws, regardless of the legislative or other procedures required to be followed, 
or the proportion of the total votes required to be had, in either House of 
Parliament.
(3) A Proclamation of Emergency and any ordinance promulgated 
under Clause (2B) shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament and, if not 
sooner revoked, shall cease to have effect if resolutions are passed by both 
Houses annulling such Proclamation or ordinance, but without prejudice to 
anything previously done by virtue thereof or to the power of the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong to issue a new proclamation under Clause (1) or promulgate 
any ordinance under Clause (2b).
(4) While a Proclamation of Emergency is in force the executive 
authority of the Federation shall, notwithstanding anything in this constitution, 
extend to any matter within the legislative authority of a state and to the giving 
of directions to the Government of a State or to any officer or authority 
thereof.
(5) Subject to Clause (6A), while a Proclamation of Emergency is in 
force, Parliament may, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution make 
laws with respect to any matter, if it appears to Parliament that the law is 
required by reason of the emergency; and Article 79 shall not apply to a bill 
for such a law or an amendment to such a bill, nor shall any provision ofthis 
Constitution or of any written law which requires any consent or concurrrence 
to the passing of a law or any consultation with respect thereto or which 
restricts the coming into force of a law after it is passea or the presentation of 
a law or any consultation with respect thereto, or which restricts the coming 
into force of a law after it is passed or the presentation of a bill to the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong for his assent.
(6) Subject to Clause (6A), no provision of any ordinance 
promulgated under this Article, and no provision of any Act of Parliament 
which is passed while a Proclamation of Emergency is in force and which 
declares that the law appears to Parliament to be required by reason of the 
emergency, shall be invalid on the ground of inconsistency with any provision 
of this Constitution.
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(7) At the expiration of a period of six months beginning with the 
date on which a Proclamation of Emergency ceases to be in force, any 
ordinance promulgate in pursuance of the Proclamation and to the extent that 
it could not have been validly made but for this Article, any law made while 
the Proclamation was in force, shall cease to have effect except as to things 
done or omitted to be done before the expiration of that period.
(8) Notwithstanding anything in this constitution -
(a) the satisfaction of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong mentioned 
in Clause (1) and Clause (2B) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be 
challenged or called in qustion in any court on any ground; and
(b) no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain or determine 
any application, question or proceeding, in whatever form, on any ground, 
regarding the validity of -
(i) A Proclamation under Clause (1) or of a 
declaration made in such Proclamation to the effect stated in Clause (1);
(ii) the continued operation of such Proclamation;
(iii) any ordinance promulgated under Clause (2b);
or
(iv) the continuation in force of any such ordinance.
(9) For the purposes of this Article the Houses of Parliament shall 
be regarded as sitting only if the members of each House are respectivley 
assembled together and carrying out the business of the House.
151. (1) Where any law or ordinance made or promulgated in pursuance
of this Part provides for preventive detention -
(a) the authority on whose order any person is detained 
under that law or ordinance shall, as soon as may be, inform him of the 
grounds for his detention and, subject to Clause (3), the allegations of fact on 
which the order is based, and shall give him the opportunity of making 
representations against the order as soon as may be;
(b) no citizen shall continue to be detained under the law or 
ordinance unless an advisory board constituted as mentioned in Clause 2 has 
considered any representations made by him under paragraph (a) and made 
recommendations thereon to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong within three months 
of receiving such representations, or within such longer period as the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong may allow.
(2) An advisory board constituted for the purposes of this Article 
shall consist of a chairman, who shall be apointed by the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong and who shall be or have been, or be qualified to be a judge of the 
Supreme Court or a High Court, or shall before Malaysia Day have been a 
judge of the Supreme Court, and two other members, who shall be appointed 
by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.
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(3) This Article does not require any authority to disclose facts 
whose disclosure would in its opinion be against the national interest.
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CHAPTER III FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
10. Every person is entitled to freedom of thoughts, conscience and 
religion, including the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
cholice.
11. No person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.
12. (1) All persons are equal before the law and are entitled to the 
equal protection of the law.
(2) No citizen shall be discriminated against on the grounds of race, 
religion, language, caste, sex, political opinion, place of birth or any one of 
such grounds.
Provided that it shall be lawful to require a person to acquire within a 
reasonable time sufficient knowledge of any language as a qualification for any 
employment or office in the Public Judicial or Local Government Service or in 
the service of any public corporation, where such knowledge is reasonably 
necessary for the discharge of the duties of such employment or office.
Provided further that it shall be lawful to require a person to have a 
sufficient knowledge of any language as a qua ification for any such 
employment or office where no function of that employment or office can be 
discharged otherwise than with a knoweldge of that language.
(3) No person shall, on the grounds of race, religion, language, 
caste, sex or any one of such grounds, be subject to any disability, liability, 
restriction or condition with regard to access to shops, public restaurants, 
hotels, places of public entertainment and places of public worship of his own 
religion.
(4) Nothing in this Article shall prevent special provision being 
made, by law, subordinate legislation or executive action, for the advancement 
of women, children or disabled persons.
13. (1) No person shall be arrested except according to procedure
established by law. Any person arrested shall be informed or the reason for 
his arrest.
(2) Every person held in custody, detained or otherwise deprived of 
personal liberty shall be brought before the judge of the nearest competent 
court according to procedure established by law, and shall not be further held 
in custody, detained or deprived of personal liberty except upon and in terms 
of the order of such judge made in accordance with procedure established by 
law.
(3) Any person charged with an offence shall be entitled to be 
heard, in person or by an attorney-at-law, at a fair trial by a competent court, 
of the reason for his arrest.
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(4) No person shall be punished with death or imprisonment except 
by order of a competent court, made in accordance with procedure established 
by law. The arrest, holding in custody, detention or other deprivation of 
personal liberty of a person pending investigation or trial, shall not constitute 
punishment.
(5) Every person shall be presumed innocent until he is proved
guilty.
Provided that the burden of proving particular facts may, by law, be 
placed on an accused person.
(6) No person shall be held guilty of an offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not, at the time of such act or omission, constitute 
such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any offence more severe 
than the penalty in force at the time such offence was committed.
Nothing in this Article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any 
person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was 
criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the 
community of nations.
It shall not be a contravention of this Article to require the imposition 
of a minimum penalty for an offence provided that such penalty does not 
exceed the maximum penalty prescribed for such offence at the time such 
offence was committed.
(7) The arrest, holding in custody, detention or other deprivation of 
personal liberty of a person, by reason of a removal order or a deportation 
order made under the provisions of the Immigrants and Emigrants Act or the 
Indo-Ceylon Agreement (Implementation) Act, No. 14 of 1967, or such other 
law as may be enacted in substitution thereof, shall not be a contravention of 
this Article.
14. (1) Every citizen is entitled t o -
(a) the freedom of speech and expression including publication;
(b) the freedom of peaceful assembly;
(c) the freedom of association;
(d) the freedom to form and join a trade union;
(e) the freedom, either by himself or in association with others, and 
either in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching;
(f) the freedom by himself or in association with others to enjoy and 
promote his own culture and to use his own language;
(g) the freedom to engage by himself or in association with others in 
any lawml occupation, profession, trade, business or enterprise;
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(h) the freedom of movement and of choosing his residence within 
Sri Lanka; and
(i) the freedom to return to Sri Lanka.
(2) A person who, not being a citizen of any other country, has been 
permanently and legally resident in Sri Lanka immediately prior to the 
commencement of the Constitution and continues to be so resident shall be 
entitled, for a period of ten years from the commencement of the Constitution, 
to the rights declared and recognized by paragraph (1) of this Article.
15. (1) The exercise and operation of the fundamental rights declared
and recognized by Articles 13 (5) and 13 (6) shall be subject only to such 
restrictions as may be prescribed by law in the interests of national security. 
For the purposes of this paragraph "law" includes regulations made under the 
law for the time being relating to public security.
(2) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared 
and recognized by Article 14(l)(a) shall be subject to such restrictions as may 
be prescribed by law in the interests of racial and religious harmony or in 
relation to parliamentary privilege, contempt of court, defamation or 
incitement to an offence.
(3) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared 
and recognized by Article 14(1 )(b) shall be subject to such restrictions as may 
be prescribed by law in the interest of racial and religious harmony.
(4) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared 
and recognized by Article 14(1 )(c) shall be subject to such restrictions as may 
be prescribed by law in the interests of racial and religious harmony or 
national ecnomony.
(5) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared 
and recognized by Article 14(l)(g) shall be subject to such restrictions as may 
be prescribed by law in the interests of national economy or in relation to -
(a) the professional, technical, academic, financial and other 
qualifications necessary for practising any profession or carrying on any 
occupation, trade, business or enterprise, and the licensing and disciplinary 
control of the person entitled to such fundamental right;
(b) the carrying on by the State, a State agency or a public 
corporation of any trade, business, industry, service or enterprise whether to 
the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.
(6) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared 
and recognized by Article 14(l)(h) shall be subject to such restrictions as may 
be prescribed by law in the interests of national economy.
(7) The exercise and operation of all the fundamental rights 
declared and recognized by Articles 12, 13, (1), 13 (2) and 14 shall be subject 
to such restrictions as may be prescribed by law in the interests of national 
security, public order and the protection of public health or morality, or for the 
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of 
others, or of meeting the just requirements of the general welfare of a
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deomocratic society. For the purposes of this paragraph "law" includes 
regulations made under the law for the time being relating to public security.
(8) The exercise and operation of the fundamental right declared 
and recognized by Articles 12(1), 13 and 14 shall, in their application to the 
members of the Armed Forces, Police Force and other Forces charged with 
the maintenance of public order, be subject to such restrictions as may be 
prescribed by law in the interests of the proper discharge of their duties and 
the maintenance of discipline among them.
16. (1) All existing written law and unwritten law shall be valid and 
operative notwithstanding any inconsistency with the preceding provisions of 
this Chapter.
(2) The subjection of any person on the order of a competent court 
to any form of punishment recognized by any existing written law shall not be 
a contravention of the provisions of this Chapter.
17. Every person shall be entitled to apply to the Supreme Court, as 
provideD by Article 126, in respect of the infringement or imminent 
infringement, by executive or administrative action, of a fundamental right to 
which such person is entitled under the provisions of this Chapter.
CHAPTER VI - DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY AND 
FUNDAMENTAL DUTIES
27. (1) The Directive Principles of State Policy herein contained shall
guide Parliament, the President and the Cabinet of Ministers in the enactment 
of laws and the governance of Sri Lanka for the establishment of a just and 
free society.
(2) The State is pledged to establish in Sri Lanka a democratic 
socialist society, the objectives of which include -
(a) the promotion of the welfare of the People by securing and 
protecting as effectively as it may, a social order in which justice (social, 
economic and political) shall guide all the institutions of the national life;
(c) the realization by all citizens of an adequate standard of living 
for themselves and their families, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing, the continuous improvement of living conditions and the full 
enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities;
(d) the rapid development of the whole country by means of public 
and private economic activity and by laws prescribing such planning and 
controls as may be expedient for directing and co-ordinating such public and 
private economic activity towards social objectives and the public weal;
(e) the equitable distribution among all citizens of the material 
resources of the community and the social product, so as best to subserve the 
common good;
(f) the establishment of a just social order in which the means of 
production, distribution and exchange are not concentrated and centralised in
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the State, State agencies or in the hands of a privileged few, but are dispersed 
among, and owned by, all the People of Sri Lanka;
(g) raising the moral and cultural standards of the People, and 
ensuring the full development of human personality; and
(h) the complete eradication of illiteracy and the assurance to all 
persons of the right to universal and equal access to education at all levels.
(3) The State shall safeguard the independence, sovereignty, unity 
and the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka.
(4) The State shall strengthen and broaden the democratic structure 
of government and the democratic rights of the People by decentralising the 
administration and by affording all possible opportunities to the People to 
participate at every level in national life and in government.
(5) The State shall strengthen national unity by promoting co­
operation and mutual confidence among all sections of the People of Sri 
Lanka, including the racial, religious, linguistic and other groups, and shall 
take effective steps in the fields of teaching, education and information in 
order to eliminate discrimination and prejudice.
(6) The State shall ensure equality of opportunity to citizens, so that 
no citizen shall suffer any disability on the ground of race, religion, language, 
caste, sex, political opinion or occupation.
(7) The State shall eliminate economic and social privilege and 
disparity, and the exploitation of man by man or by the State.
(8) The State shall ensure that the operation of the economic 
system does not result in the concentration of wealth and the means of 
production to the common detriment.
(9) The State shall ensure social security and welfare.
(10) The State shall assist the development of the cultures and the 
languages of the People.
(11) The State shall create the necessary economic and social 
environment to enable people of all religious faiths to make a reality of their 
religious principles.
(12) The State shall recognize and protect the family as the basic unit 
of society.
(13) The State shall promote with special care the interests of 
children and youth, so as to ensure their full development, physical, mental, 
religious and social, and to protect them from exploitation and discrimination.
(14) The State shall protect, preserve and improve the environment 
for the benefit of the community.
(15) The State shall promote international peace, security and co­
operation, and the establishment of a just and equitable international
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economic and social order, and shall endeavour to foster respect for 
international law and treaty obligations in dealings among nations.
28. The exercise and enjoyment of rights and freedoms is inseparable from 
the performance of duties and obligations, and accordingly it is the duty of 
every person in Sri Lanka -
(a) to uphold and defend the constitution and the law;
(b) to further the national interest and to foster national unity;
(c) to work conscientiously in his chosen occupation;
(d) to preserve and protect public property, and to combat misuse 
and waste of public property;
(e) to respect the rights and freedoms of others; and
(f) to protect nature and conserve its riches.
29 The provisions of this Chapter do not confer or impose legal 
rights or obligations, and are not enforceable in any court or tribunal. No 
question of inconsistency with such provisions shall be raised in any court or 
tribunal.
CHAPTER XVI - THE SUPERIOR COURTS
118. The Supreme Court of the Republic of Sri Lanka shall be the highest 
and final superior court of record in the Republic and shall subject to the 
provisions of the constitution exercise -
(a) jurisdiction in respect of constitutional matters;
(b) jurisdiction for the protection of fundamental rights;
(c) final appellate jurisdiction;
(d) consultative jurisdiction;
(e) jurisdiction in election petitions;
(f) jurisdiction in respect of any breach of the privileges of 
Parliament; and
(g) jurisdiction in respect of such other matters which Parliament 
may be law vest or ordain.
119. (1) The Supreme Court shall consist of the Chief Justice and of not 
less than six and not more than ten other Judges who shall be appointed as 
provided in Article 107.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to act notwithstanding any 
vacancy in its membership, and no act or proceeding of the Court shall be, or
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shall be deemed to be, invalid by reason only of any such vacancy or any defect 
in the appointment of a Judge.
120 (1) The Supreme Court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine any question as to whether any Bill or any provision thereof is 
inconsistent with the Constitution.
Provided that -
(a) in the case of a Bill described in its long title as being for the 
amendment of any provision of the constitution, or for the repeal and 
replacement of the constitution, the only question which the Supreme Court 
may determine is whether such Bill requires approval by the People at a 
referendum by virtue of the provisions of Article 83;
(b) where the Cabinet of Ministers certifies that a Bill which is 
described in its long title as being for the amendment of any provisions of the 
Constitution, or for the repeal and replacement of the Constitution, is 
intended to be passed with the special majority required by Article 83 and 
submitted t the People by Referendum, the Supreme Court shall have and 
exercise no jurisdiction in respect of such Bill;
(c) where the Cabinet of Ministers certifies that a Bill which is not 
described in its long title as being for the amendment of any provision of the 
Constitution, or for the repeal and replacement of the Constitution, is 
intended to be passed with the special majority required by Article 84, the only 
question which the Supreme Court may determine is whether such Bill 
requires approval by the people at a Referendum by virtue of the provisions of 
Article 83 or whether such Bill is required to comply with paragraph (1) and 
(2) of Article 82; or
(d) where the Cabinet of Ministers certifies that any provision of 
any Bill which is not described in its long title as being for the amendment of 
any provision of the Constitution or for the repeal and replacement of the 
constitution is intended to be passed with the special majority by Article 84, 
the only question which the Supreme Court may determine is whether any 
other provision of such Bill requires the approval by the People at a 
Referendum by virtue of the provisions of Article 83 or whether such Bill is 
required to comply with the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 82.
121 (1) The jurisdiction of the Supreme court to ordinarily determine 
any such question as aforesaid may be invoked by the President by a written 
reference addressed to the Chief Justice, or by any citizen by a petition in 
writing addressed to the Supreme Court. Such reference shall be made, or 
such petition shall be filed, within one week of the Bill being placed on the 
Order Paper of the Parliament, and a copy thereof shall at the same time be 
delivered to the Speaker. In this paragraph "citizen" includes a body, whether 
incorporated or unincorporated, if not less than three-fourths of the members 
of such body are citizens.
(2) Where the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been so 
invoked no proceedings shall be had in Parliament in relation to such Bill until 
the determination of the Supreme Court has been made, or the expiration of a 
period of three weeks from the date of such reference or petition, whichever 
occurs first.
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(3) The Supreme Court shall make and communicate its 
determination to the president and to the Speaker within three weeks of the 
making of the reference or the filing of the petition, as the case may be.
122 (1) In the case of a bill which is, in the view of the Cabinet of 
Ministers, urgent in the national interest, and bears an endorsement to that 
effect under the hand of the Secretary to the Cabinet -
(a) the provisions of Article 78 (1) and of Article 121, shall subject 
to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this Article, have no application;
(b) the President shall by a written reference addressed to the Chief 
Justice, require the special determination of the Supreme Court as to whether 
the Bill or any provision thereof is inconsistent with the Constitution. A copy 
of such reference at the same time be delivered to the Speaker;
(c) the Supreme Court shall make its determination within twenty- 
four hours (or such longer period not exceeding three days as the President 
may specify) of the assembling of the court, and shall communicate its 
determination only to the President and the Speaker.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121 shall, mutatis 
mutandis, apply to such Bill.
123 (1) The determination of the Supreme Court shall be accompanied 
by the reasons thereof, and shall state whether the Bill or any provision 
thereof is inconsistent with the Constitution and if so, which provision or 
provisions of the Constitution.
(2) Where the Supreme Court determines that the Bill or any 
provision thereof is inconsistent with the Constitution, it shall also state -
(a) whether such Bill is required to comply with the provisions of 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 82; or
(b) whether such Bill or any provision thereof may only be passed by 
the special majority required under the provisions of paragraphs (2) of Article 
84; or
(c) whether such Bill or any provision thereof requires to be passed 
by the special majority required under the provisions of paragraph (2) of 
Article 84 and approved by the People at a Referendum by virtue of the 
provisions of Article 83,
and may specify the nature of the amendments which would make the Bill or 
such provision cease to be inconsistent.
(3) In the case of a Bill endorsed as provided in Article 122, if the 
Supreme court entertains a doubt whether the Bill or any provision thereof is 
inconsistent with the Constitution, it shall be deemed to have been determined 
that the Bill or such provision of the Bill is determined that the Bill or such 
provision of the Supreme Court shall comply with the provisions of paragraphs 
(1) and (2) of this Article.
(4) Where any Bill, or the provision of any Bill, has been 
determined, or is deemed to have been determined, to be inconsistent with the
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Constitution, such Bill or such provision shall not be passed except in the 
manner stated in the determination of the Supreme Court.
Provided that it shall be lawful for such Bill to be passed after such 
amendment as would make the Bill cease to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution.
124 Save as otherwise provided in Articles 120, 121 and 122, no court or 
tribunal created and established for the administration of justice, or other 
institution, person or body of persons shall in relation to any Bill, have power 
or jurisdiction to inquire into or pronounce upon, the constitutionality of such 
Bill or its due compliance with the legislative process, on any ground 
whatsoever.
125. (1) The Supreme Court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear and determine any question relating to the interpretation of the 
Constitution, and accordingly, whenever any such question arises in the course 
of any proceedings in any other court or tribunal or other institution 
empowered by law to administer justice or to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial 
functions, such question shall forthwith be referred to the Supreme Court for 
determination. The Supreme Court may direct that further proceedings be 
stayed pending the determination of such question.
(2) The Supreme Court shall determine such question within two 
months of the date of reference and make any such consequential order as the 
circumstances of the case may require.
126. (1) The Supreme Court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear and determine any question relating to the infringement or imminent 
infringement by executive or administrative action of any fundamental right or 
language right declared and recognized by Chapter III or Chapter IV.
(2) Where any person alleges that any such fundamental right or 
language right relating to such person has been infringed or is about to be 
infringed by executive or administrative action, he may himself or by an 
attorney-at-law on his behalf, within one month thereof, in accordance with 
such rules of court as may be in force, apply to the Supreme Court by way of 
petition in writing addressed to such Court praying for relief or redress of such 
infringement. Such application may be proceeded with only with leave to 
proceed first had been obtained from the Supreme Court, which leave may be 
granted or refused, as the case may be, by not less than two Judges.
(3) Where in the course of hearng in the Court of Appeal into an 
application for orders in the nature of a writ habeas corpus, certiorari, 
prohibition, procedendo, mandamus or quo warranto, it appears to such Court 
that there is prima facie evidence of an infringement or imminent 
infringement of the provisions of Chapter III or Chapter IV by a party to such 
application, such court shall forthwith refer such matter for determination by 
the Supreme Court.
(4) The Supreme Court shall have power to grant such relief or 
make such directions as it may deem just and equitable in the circumstance in 
respect of any petition or reference referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3) of 
this Article or refer the matter back to the Court of Appeal if in its opinion 
there is no infringement of a fundamental right or language right.
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(5) The Supreme Court shall hear and finally dispose of any petition 
or reference under this Article within two months of the filing of such petition 
or the making of such reference.
127. (1) The Supreme Court shall, subject to the Constitution, be the 
final court of civil and criminal appellate jurisdiction for and within the 
republic of Sri Lanka for the correction of all errors in fact or in law which 
shall be comitted by the Court of Appeal or any Court of First Instance, 
tribunal or other institution and the judgments and orders of the Supreme 
Court shall in all cases be final and conclusive in all such matters.
(2) The Supreme Court shall, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, have 
sole and exclusive cognizance by way of appeal from any order, judgment, 
decree, or sentence made by the Court of Appeal, where any appeal lies in law 
to the Supreme Court and it may affirm, reverse or vary any such order, 
judgement, decreee or sentence of the Court of Appeal and may issue 
directions to any Court of First Instance or order a new trial or further hearing 
in any proceedings as the justice of the case may require, and may also call for 
and admit fresh or additional evidence if the interests of justice so demands 
and may in such event, direct that such evidence be recorded by the Court of 
Appeal or any Court of First Instance.
128. (1) An Appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any final order, 
judgment, decree or sentence of the Court of Appeal in any matter of 
proceedings, whether civil or criminal, which involves a substantial question of 
law, if the Court of Appeal grants leave to appeal to the Supreme Court ex 
mero motu or at the instance of any agrieved party to such matter or 
proceedings.
(2) The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final or interlocutory order, judgment, 
decree, or sentence made by the Court of Appeal in any matter or 
proceedings, whether civil or criminal where the Court of Appeal has refused 
to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, or where in the opinion of the 
Supreme Court.
Provided that the Supreme Court shall grant leave to appeal in every 
matter or proceedings in which it is satisfied that the question to oe decided is 
of public or general importance.
(3) Any appeal from an order or judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
made or given in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 139, 140, 141 or 
143 to which the President, a Minister, a Deputy Minister or a public officer in 
his official capacity is a party, shall be heard and determined within two 
months of the date of filing thereof.
(4) An appeal shall lie directly to the Supreme Court on any matter 
and in the manner specifically provided for by any other law passed by 
Parliament.
129. (1) If at any time it appears to the President of the Republic that a 
question of law or fact has arisen or is likely to arise which is of such nature 
and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the 
Supreme Court upon it, he may refer that question to that Court for 
consideration and the Court may, after such hearing as it thinks fit, within the
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period specified in such reference or within such time as may be extended by 
the President, report to the President its opinion thereon.
(2) Where the Speaker refers to the Supreme Court for inquiry and 
report all or any of the allegation or allegations, as the case may be, contained 
in any such resolution as is referred to in Article 38 (2) (a), the Supreme Court 
shall in accordance with Article 38 (2) (d) inquire into such allegation or 
allegations and shall report its determination to the Speaker within two 
months of the date of reference.
(3) Such opinion, determination and report shall be expressed after 
consideration by at least five Judges of the Supreme Court, of whom, unless he 
otherwise directs, the Chief Justice shall be one.
(4) Every proceeding under paragraph (1) of the Article shall be 
held in private unless the Court for special reasons otherwise directs.
130. The Supreme Court shall have the power to hear and determine and 
make such orders as provided for by law on -
(a) any legal proceeding relating to the election of the President;
(b) any appeal from an order or judgment of the Court of Appeal in 
an election petition case.
Provided the hearing and determination of a proceeding relating to the 
election of the President shall be by at least five Judges of the Supreme Court 
of whom unless he otherwise directs, the Chief Justice shall be one.
131. The Supreme Court shall have according to law the power to take 
cognizance of and punish any person for the breach of the privileges of 
Parliament.
The Court of Appeal
140. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Court of Appeal shall 
have full power and authority to inspect and examine the records or any Court 
of First Instance or tribunal or other institution, and grant and issue, according 
to law, orders in the nature of writs of certiorari, prohibition, procedendo 
mandamus and quo warranto against the judge of any Court of First Instance 
or tribunal or other institution or any other person.
141. The Court of Appeal may grant and issue orders in the nature of writs 
of habeas corpus to bring up before such Court -
(a) the body of any person to be dealt with according to law; or
(b) the body of any person illegally or improperly detained in public 
or private custody,
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and to discharge or remand any person so brought up or otherwise deal with 
such person according to law:
Provided that it shall be lawful for the Court of Appeal to require the 
body of such person to be brought up before the most convenient Court of 
First Instance and to direct the judge of such court to inquire into and report 
upon the acts of the alleged imprisonment or detention and to make such 
provision such court shall seem right; and the Court of Appeal shall upon the 
receipt of such report, make order to discharge or remand the person so 
alleged to be imprisoned or detained or otherwise deal with such person 
according to law, and the Court of First Instance shall conform to, and carry 
into immediate effect, the order so pronounced or made by the Court of 
Appeal.
Provided further that if provision be made by law for the exercise by 
any court of jurisdiction in respect of the custody and control of minor 
children, then the Court of Apeal, if satisfied that any dispute regarding the 
custody of any such minor child may more properly be dealt with by such 
court, direct the parties to make application in that court in respect of the 
custody of such minor child.
142. The Court of Appeal may direct -
(i) that a prisoner detained in any prison be brought before a court- 
martial or any Commissioners acting under the authority of any Commission 
from the President of the Republic of trial or to be examined relating to any 
matters pending before any such court-martial or Commissioners respectively; 
or
(ii) that a prisoner detained in prison be removed from one custody 
to another for purposes of trial.
CHAPTER XVIII - PUBLIC SECURITY
155. (1) The Public Security Ordinance as amended and in force
immediately prior to the commencement of the Constitution shall be deemed 
to be a law enacted by Parliament.
(2) The power to make emergency regulations under the Public 
Security Ordinance or the law for the time being in force relating to public 
security shall include the power to make regulations having the legal effect of 
over-riding, amending or suspending the operation of the provisions of any 
law, except the provisions of the Constitution.
(3) The provisions of any law relating to public security, 
empowering the President to make emergency regulations which have the 
legal effect over-riding, amending or suspending the operation of the 
provisions of any law, shall not come into operation, except the making of a 
Proclamation under such law, bringing such provisions into operation.
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(4) Upon the making of such proclamation, the occasion thereof 
shall, subject to the other provisions of this Article, be forthwith 
communicated to Parliament, and, accordingly -
(i) if such Proclamation is issued after the dissolution of Parliament 
such Proclamation shall operate as a summoning of Parliament to meet on the 
tenth day after such proclamation, unless the Proclamation appoints an earlier 
date for the meeting which shall not be less than three days from the date of 
the Proclamation; and the Parliament so summoned shall be kept in session 
until the expiry or revocation of such or any further Proclamation or until the 
conclusion of the General Election whichever event occurs earlier and shall 
thereupon stand dissolved;
(ii) if Parliament is at the date of the making of such Proclamation, 
separated by any such adjournment or prorogation as will not expire within ten 
days, a Proclamation shall be issued for the meeting of Parliament within ten 
days.
(5) Where the provison of any law relating to public security have 
been brought into operation by the making of a Proclamation under such law, 
such Proclamation shall, subject to the succeeding provisions of this Article, be 
in operation for a period of one month from the date of the making thereof, 
but without prejudice to the earlier revocation of such Proclamation or to the 
making of a further Proclamation at or before the end of that period.
(6) Where such provisions as are referred to in paragraph (3) of this 
Article, of any law relating to public security, have been brought into 
operation by the making of a Proclamation under such law, such Proclamation 
shall expire after a period of fourteen days from the date on which such 
provisions shall have come into operation, unless such Proclamation is 
approved by a resolution of Parliament.
Provided that if -
(a) Parliament stands dissolved at the date of the making of such 
Proclamation; or
(b) Parliament is at such date separated by any such adjournment or 
prorogation, as is referred to in paragraph (4) (ii) of this Article; or
(c) Parliament does not meet when summoned to meet as provided 
in paragraphs (4) (i) and (4) (ii) of this Article
then such Proclamation shall expire at the end of ten days after the date on 
which Parliament shall next meet and sit, unless approved by a resolution at 
such meeting of Parliament.
(7) Upon the revocation of a Proclamation referred to in paragraph 
(6) of this Article within a period of fourteen days from the date on which the 
provisions of any law relating to public security shall have come into operation 
or upon the expiry of such a Proclamation in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (6), no Proclamation made within thirty days next ensuring shall 
come into operation until the making thereof shall have been approved by a 
resolution of Parliament.
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(8) Where such provisions as are referred to in paragraph (6) of this 
Article, of any law relating to public security, shall have been in operation for 
a period of ninety consecutive days or a period of ninety days in the aggregate 
during six conscentive calendar months, no Proclamation bringing such 
provisions of any law into operation, shall, if make it any time during the 
succeeding six calendar months, be in operation for more than days from the 
date on which such provision are brought into operation by such Proclamation, 
unless such Proclamation is approved by a resolution of Parliament passed by 
at least two-thirds of the whole number of Members of Parliament (including 
those not present) voting in favour of such resolution.
Provided that if -
(a) Parliament stands dissolved at the date of the making of such 
Proclamation; or
(b) Parliament is, at such date, separated by any such adjournment 
or prorogation, as is referred to in paragraph (4) (ii) of this Article; or
(c) Parliament does not meet when summoned to meet as provided 
by paragraph (4) (i) of this Article
then such Proclamation shall expire at the end of ten days after the date on 
which Parliament shall next meet and sit unless approved by Parliament by a 
resolution passed by at least two-thirds of the whole number of Members of 
Parliament (including those not present) voting in favour of such resolution.
(9) Upon the revocation of a Proclamation referred to in paragraph 
(8) of this Article within a period of ten days from the date on which the 
provisions of any law relating to public security shall have come into operation 
or upon the expiry of such a Proclamation in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (8) of this Article, no Proclamation made within ninety days next 
ensuing shall come into operation until the making thereof shall have been 
approved by a resolution of Parliament passed by at least two-thirds of the 
whole number of Members of Parliament (including those not present voting 
in favour of such resolution.
(10) If Parliament does not approve any Proclamation bringing such 
provisions as are referred to in paragraph (3) of this Article into operation, 
such Proclamation shall, immediately upon such disapproval, cease to be valid 
and of any force in law but without prejudice to anything lawfully done 
thereunder.
(11) If the making of a Proclamation cannot be communicated to and 
approved by Parliament by reason of the fact that Parliament does not meet 
when summoned, nothing in paragraph (6), (7), (8) or (9) of this Article, shall 
affect the validity or operation of sucn Proclamation.
Provided that in such event, Parliament shall against be summoned to 
meet as early as possible thereafter.
APPENDIX III
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PART II - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY
8. (1) The principles of absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah, 
nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice, 
together with the principles derived from them as set out in this Part, shall 
constitute the fundamental principles of state policy.
(1 A) Absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah shall be the basis 
of all actions.
(2) The principles set out in this Part shall be fundamental to the 
governance of Bangladesh, shall be applied by the State in the making of laws, 
shall be a guide to the interpretation of the Constitution and of the other laws 
of Bangladesh, and shall form the basis of the work of the state and of its 
citizens, but shall not be judicially enforceable.
9. The State shall encourage Local Government institutions composed of 
representatives of the areas concerned and in such institutions special 
representation shall be given, as far as possible, to peasants, workers and 
women.
10. Steps shall be taken to ensure participation of women in all spheres of 
national life.
11. The Republic shall be a democracy in which fundamental human rights 
and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of the human person shall 
be guaranteed.
12. (Omitted).
13. The people shall own or control the instruments and means of 
production and distribution, and with this end in view ownership shall assume 
the following forms -
(a) state ownership, that is ownership by the State on behalf of the 
people through the creation of an efficient and dynamic nationalised public 
sector embracing the key sectors of the economy;
(b) co-operative ownership by co-operatives on behalf of their 
members within such limits as may be prescribed by law; and
(c) private ownership, that is ownership by individuals within such 
limits as may be prescribed by law.
14. It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the State to emancipate the 
toiling masses - the peasants and workers - and backward sections of the 
people from all forms of exploitation.
15. It shall be a fundamental responsibility of the State to attain, through 
planned economic growth, a constant increase of productive forces and a
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steady improvement in the material and cultural standard of living of the 
people with a view to securing to its citizens -
(a) the provision of the basic necessities of life, including food, 
clothing, shelter, education and medical care;
(b) the right to work, that is the right to guaranteed employment at 
a reasonable wage having regard to the quantity and quality of work;
(c) the right to reasonable rest, recreation and leisure; and
(d) the right to social security, that is to say to public assistance in 
cases of undeserved want arising from unemployment, illness or disablement, 
or suffered by widows or orphans or in old age, or in other such cases.
16. The State shall adopt effective measures to bring about a radical 
transformation in the rural areas through the promotion of an agricultural 
revolution, the provision of rural electrification, the development of cottage 
and other industries, and the improvement of education, communications and 
public health, in those areas, so as progressively to remove the disparity in the 
standards of living between the urban and the rural areas.
17. The State shall adopt effective measures for the purpose of -
(a) establishing a uniform, mass-oriented and universal system of 
education and extending free and compulsory education to all children to such 
stage as may be determined by law;
(b) relating education to the needs of society and producing 
properly trained and motivated citizens to serve those needs;
(c) removing illiteracy within such time as may be determined by
law.
18. (1) The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and 
the improvement of public health as among its primary duties, and in 
particular shall adopt effective measures to prevent the consumption, except 
tor medical purposes or for such other purposes as may be prescribed by law, 
of alcoholic and other intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to 
health.
(2) The State shall adopt effective measures to prevent prostitution 
and gambling.
19. (1) The State shall endeavour to ensure equality of opportunity to 
all citizens.
(2) The State shall adopt effective measures to remove social and 
economic inequality between man and man and to ensure the equitable 
distribution of wealth among citizens, and of opportunities in order to attain a 
uniform level of economic development throughout the Republic.
20. (1) Work is a right, a duty and a matter of honour for every citizen 
who is capable of working, and everyone shall be paid for his work on the basis 
of the principle "from each according to his abilities to each according to his 
work".
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(2) The State shall endeavour to create conditions in which, as a 
general principle, persons shall not be able to enjoy unearned incomes, and in 
which human labour in every form, intellectual and physical, shall become a 
fuller expression of creative endeavour and of the human personality.
21. (1) It is the duty of every citizen to observe the Constitution and the 
laws, to maintain discipline, to perform public duties and to protect public 
property.
(2) Every person in the service of the Republic has a duty to strive 
at all times to serve the people.
22. The State shall ensure the separation of the judiciary from the 
executive organs of the State.
23. The State shall adopt measures to conserve the cultural traditions and 
heritage of the people, and so to foster and improve the national language, 
literature and the arts that all sections of the people are afforded the 
opportunity to contribute towards and to participate in the enrichment of the 
national culture.
24. The State shall adopt measures for the protection against 
disfigurement, damage or removal of all monuments, objects or places of 
special artistic or historic importance or interest.
25. (1) The State shall base its international relations on the principles 
of respect for national sovereignty and equality, non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other countries, peaceful settlement of international 
disputes and respect for international law and the principles enunciated in the 
United Nations Charter, and on the basis of those principles shall -
(a) strive for the renunciation of the use of force in international 
relations and for general and complete disarmament;
(b) uphold the right of every people freely to determine and build 
up its own social, economic and political system by ways and means of its own 
free choice; and
(c) support oppressed peoples throughout the world waging a just 
struggle against imperialism, colonialism or racialism.
(2) The State shall endeavoure to consolidate, preserve and 
strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic 
solidarity.
PART III - FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
26. (1) All existing law inconsistent with the provisions of this Part shall,
to the extent of such inconsistency, become void on the commencement of this 
Constitution.
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(2) The State shall not make any law inconsistent with any 
provisions of this Part, and any law so made shall, to the extent of such 
inconsistency, be void.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall apply to any amendment of this 
constitution made under Article 142.
27. All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of 
law.
28. (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizens on grounds 
only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
(2) Women shall have equal rights with men in all spheres of the 
State and of public life.
(3) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or 
place of birth be subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition 
with regard to access to any place of public entertainment or resort, admission 
to any educational institution.
(4) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making 
special provision in favour of women or children or for the advancement of 
any backward section of citizens.
29. (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in respect 
of employment or office in the service of the Republic.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or 
place of birth, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any 
employment or office in the service of the Republic.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from -
(a) making special provision in favour of any backward section of 
citizens for the purpose of securing their adequate representation in the 
service of the Republic;
(b) giving effect to any law which makes provision for reserving 
appointments relating to any religious or denominational institution to persons 
of that religion or denomination;
(c) reserving for members of one sex class of employment or office 
on the ground that is considered by its nature to be unsuited to members of 
the opposite sex.
30. (1) No title, honour or decoration shall be conferred by the State.
(2) No citizen shall, without the prior approval of the President, 
accept any title, honour, award or decoration from any foreign State.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making 
awards for gallantry or from conferring academic distinctions.
31. To enjoy the protection of the law, and to be treated in accordance with 
law, and only in accordance with law, is the inalienable right of every citizen,
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wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time being within 
Bangladesh, and in particular no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, 
reputation or property of any person shall be taken except in accordance with 
law.
32. No person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty save in 
accordance with law.
33. (1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without 
being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he 
be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his 
choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be 
brought before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of 
such arrest, excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of 
arrest to the court of the magistrate, and no such person shall be detained in 
custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.
(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply to any person -
(a) who for the time being is an enemy alien; or
(b) who is arrested or detained under any law providing for 
preventive detention.
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the 
detention of a person for a period exceeding six months unless an Advisory 
Board consisting of three persons, of whom two shall be persons who are, or 
have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of the Supreme Court 
and other shall be a person who is a senior officer in the service of the 
Republic, has, after affording him an opportunity of being heard in person, 
reported before the expiration of the said period of six months that there is in 
its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention.
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made 
under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the 
order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on 
which the order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity 
of making a representation against the order.
Provided that the authority making any such order may refuse to 
disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interests 
to disclose.
(6) Parliament may be law prescribe the procedure to be followed 
by an Advisory Board in any inquiry under clause (4)].
34. (1) All forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention
of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.
(2) Nothing in this article shall apply to compulsory labour -
(a) by persons undergoing lawful punishment for a criminal offence;
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(b) required by any law for public purposes.
35. (1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation 
of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an 
offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than, or different from, that 
which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the 
commission of the offence.
(2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same 
offence more than once.
(3) Every person accused of a criminal offence shall have the right 
to a speedy and public trial by an independent and impartial court or tribunal 
established by law.
(4) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a 
witness against himself.
(5) No person shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment or treatment.
(6) Nothing in clause (3) or clause (5) shall affect the operation of 
any existing law which prescribes any punishment or procedure for trial.
36. Subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public 
interest, every citizen shall have the right to move freely throughout 
Bangladesh, to reside and settle in any place therein and to leave and re-enter 
Bangladesh.
37. Every citizen shall have the right to assemble and to particpate in 
public meetings and processions peacefully and without arms, subject to any 
reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of public order or 
public health.
38. Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or union, subject 
to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of morality or 
public order.
39. (1) Freedom of thought and conscience is guaranteed.
(2) Subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the 
interests of the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states, 
public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, 
defamation or incitement to an offence -
(a) the right to every citizen to freedom of speech and expression; 
and
(b) freedom of the press, are guaranteed.
40. Subject to any restrictions imposed by law, every citizen possessing such 
qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by law in relation to his profession, 
occupation, trade or business shall have the right to enter upon any lawful 
profession or occupation, and to conduct any lawful trade or business.
41. (1) Subject to law, public order and morality -
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(a) every citizen has the right to process, practise or prorogate any 
religion;
(b) every religious community or denomination has the right to 
establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions.
(2) No person attending any educational institution shall be 
required to receive religious instruction, or to take part in or to attend any 
religious ceremony or worship, if that instruction, ceremony or worship relates 
to a religion other than his own.
42. (1) Subject to any restrictions imposed by law, every citizen shall 
have the right to acquire, hold transfer or otherwise dispose of property, and 
no property shall be compulsory acquired, nationalised or requisitioned save 
by authority of law.
(2) A law made under clause (1) shall provide for the acquisition, 
nationalization requisition with compensation and shall either fix the amount 
of compensation or specify the principles on which, and the manner in which, 
the compensation is to be assessed and paid; but no such law shall be called in 
question in any court on the ground that any provision in respect of such 
compensation is not adequate.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of any law 
made before the commencement of the Proclamations (Amendment) Order 
1977 (Proclamations Order Nol I of 1977), in so far as it relates to the 
acquisition, nationalization or acquisiton of any property without 
compensation.
43. Every citizen shall have the right, subject to any reasonable restrictions 
imposed by law in the interests of the security of the State, public order, public 
morality or public health -
(a) to be secured in his home against entry, search and seizure; and
(b) to the privacy of his correspondence and other means of 
communication.
44. (1) The right move the High Court Division in accordance with 
clause (1) of Article 102, for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this 
Part is guaranteed.
(2) Without prejudice to the powers of the High Court Division 
under Article 102, Parliament may by law empower any other court, within the 
local limits of its jurisdiction, to exercise all or any of those powers.]
45. Nothing in this Part shall apply to any provision of a disciplinary law 
relating to members of a disciplined force, being a provision limited to the 
purpose of ensuring the proper discharge of their duties or the maintenance of 
discipline in that force.
46. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Part, 
Parliament may be law make provision for indemnifying any person in the 
service of the Republic or any other person in respect of any act done by him 
in connection with the national liberation struggle or the maintenance or
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restoration of order in any in Bangladesh or validate any sentence passed, 
punishment inflicted, forfeiture ordered, or other act done in any such area.
47. (1) No law providing for any of the following matters shall be
deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or 
abridges, any of the rights guaranteed by this Part -
(a) the compulsory acquisition, nationalization or requisition of any 
property, or the control or management thereof whether temporarily or 
permanently;
(b) the compulsory amalgamation of bodies carrying on commercial 
or other undertakings;
(c) the extinction, modification, restriction or regulation of rights of 
directors, managers, agents and officers of any such bodies, or of the voting 
rights of persons owning shares or stock (in whatever form) therein;
(d) the extinction, modification, restriction or regulation of rights to 
search of or win minerals or mineral oil;
(e) the carrying on by the Government or by a corporation owned, 
controlled or managed by the Government of any trade, business, industry or 
service to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons; or
(f) the extinction, modification, restriction or regulation of any right 
to property, any right in respect of a profession, occupation, trade or business 
or the rights of employers or employees in any statutory public authority or in 
any commercial or industrial undertaking
if Parliament in such law (including, in the case of existing law, by 
amendment) expressly declares that such provision is made to give effect to 
any of the fundamental principles of state policy set out in Part II of this 
Constitution.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution the laws 
specified in the First Schedule (including any amendment of any such law) 
shall continue to have full force and effect, and no provision of any such law, 
nor anything done or omitted to be done under the authority of such law, shall 
be deemed void or unlawful on the ground of inconsistency with, or 
repugnance to, any provision of this Constitution.
Provided that nothing in this Article shall prevent amendment, 
modification or repeal of any such law.
CHAPTER III ORDINANCE MAKING POWER
93. (1) At any time when Parliament stands dissolved or is not in
session], if the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render 
immediate action necessary, he may make and promulgate such Ordinances as 
the circumstances appear to him to require, and any Ordinance so made shall, 
as from its promulgation have the like force of law as an Act of Parliament.
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Provided tha no Ordinance under this Clause shall make any provision
(1) which could not lawfully be made under this Constitution by Act 
of Parliament;
(ii) for altering or repealing any provision of this Constitution; or
(iii) continuing in force any provision of an Ordinance previously made.
(2) An Ordinance made under Clause (1) shall be laid before 
Parliament at its first meeting following the promulgation of the Ordinance 
and shall, unless it is earlier repealed, cease to have effect at the expiration of 
thirty days after it is so laid or, if a resolution disapproving of the Ordinance is 
passed by Parliament before such expiration, upon the passing of the 
resolution.
(3) At any time when Parliament stands dissolved the President 
may, if he is satisfied that circumstances exist which render such action 
necessary, make and promulgate an Ordinance authorising expenditure from 
the Consolidated Fund, whether the expenditure is charged by the 
Constitution upon that fund or not, and any Ordinance so made shall, as from 
its promulgation, have the like force of law as an Act of Parliament.
(4) Every Ordinance promulgated under clause (3) shall be laid 
before Parliament as soon as may be, and the provisions of Articles 87, 89 and 
90 shall, with necessary adaptations, be complied with in respect thereof with 
thirty days of the reconstitution of Parliament.
PART VI THE JUDICIARY 
CHAPTER I THE SUPREME COURT
94. (1) There shall be a Supreme Court of Bangladesh (to be known as
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh) comprising the Appellate Division and the 
High Court Division.
(2) The Supreme Court shall consist of the Chief Justice, to be 
known as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, and such number of other Judges as 
the President may deem it necessary to appoint to each Division.
(3) The Chief Justice, and the Judges appointed to the Appellate 
Division, shall sit only in that division, and the other Judges shall sit only in the 
High Court Division.
(4) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Chief Justice 
and the other Judges shall be independent in the exercise of their judicial 
functions.
101. The High Court Division shall have such original, appellate and other 
jurisdiction, powers and functions as are or may be conferred on it by this 
Costitution or any other law.
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102. (1) The High Court Division on the application of any person
aggrieved, may give such directions or orders to any person or authority, 
including any person or authority, including any person performing any 
function in connection with the affairs of the Republic, as may be appropriate 
for the enforcement for any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of 
this Constitution.
(2) The High Court Division may, if satisfied that no other equally 
efficacious remedy is provided by law -
(a) on the application of any person agrrieved, make an order -
(i) directing a person performing any functions in 
connection with the affairs of the Republic or of a local authority to refrain 
from doing that which he is not permitted by law to do or to do that which he 
is required by law to do; or
(ii) declaring that any act done or preceding taken by a 
person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Republic or 
of a local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of 
no legal effect; or
(b) on the application of any person, make an order -
(i) directing that person in custody be brought before it so 
that it may satisfy itself that he is not being held in custody without lawful 
authority or in an unlawful manner; or
(ii) requiring a person holding or purporting to hold a public 
office to show under what authority he claims to hold that office.
(3) NoUvithstanding anything contained in the foregoing clauses, the 
High Court Division shall have no power under this Article to pass any interim 
or other order in relation to any law to which Article 47 applies.
(4) Where on an application made under Clause (1) or sub-clause 
(a) of Clause (2), an interim order is prayed for and such interim order is 
likely to have the effect of -
(a) prejudicing or interfering with any measure designed to 
implement programme, or any development programme, or any development 
work; or
(b) being otherwise harmful to the public interest, the High 
Court Division shall not make an interim order unless the Attorney General 
has been given reasonable notice of the application and he (or an advocate 
authorised by him in that behalf) has been given an opportunity of being 
heard, and the High Court Division is satisfied that the interim order would 
not have the effect referred to in sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b).
(5) In this Article, unless the context otherwise requires, "person" 
includes a statutory public authority and any court or tribunal, other than a 
court or tribunal established under a law relating to the defence services of 
Bangladesh or any disciplined force or a tribunal to which Article 117 applies.
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103. (1) The Appellate Division shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine appeals from judgments, decrees, orders or sentences of the High 
Court Division.
(2) An appeal to the Appellate Division form a judgment, decree, 
order or sentence oi the High Court Division shall lie as of right where the 
High Court Division -
(a) certifies that the case involves a substantial question of 
law as to the interpretation of this constitution; or
(b) has sentenced a person to death or to transportation for
life; or
(c) has imposed punishment on a person for contempt of
that Division;
and in such other cases as may be provided for by Act of Parliament.
(3) An appeal to the Appellate Division from a judgment, decree, 
order or sentence of the High Court Division in a case to which Clause (2) 
does not apply shall lie only if the Appellate Division grants leave to appeal.
(4) Parliament may be law declare that the provisions of this Article 
shall apply in relation to any other court or tribunal as they apply in relation to 
the High Court Division.
104. The Appellate Division shall have power to issue such directions 
orders, decrees or writs as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any 
cause or matter pending before it, including orders for the purpose of securing 
the attendance of any person or the discovery or production of any document.
105. The Appellate Division shall have power, subject to the provisions of 
any Act of Parliament and of any rules made by that Division to review any 
judgment pronounced or order made by it.
106. If at any time it appears to the President that a question of law has 
arisen, or is likely to arise, which is of such a nature and of such public 
importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court 
upon it, he may refer the question to the Appellate Division for consideration 
and the Division may after such hearing as it thinks fit, report its opinion 
thereon to the President.
PART IXA - EMERGENCY PROVISIONS
141A. (1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists in 
which the security or economic life of Bangladesh, or any part thereof, is 
threatened by war or external aggression or interal disturbance, he may issue a 
Proclamation of Emergency.
(2) A Proclamation of Emergency -
(a) may be revoked by a subsequent Proclamation;
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(b) shall be laid before Parliament;
(c) shall cease to operate at the expiration of one hundred 
and twenty days, unless before the expiration of that period it has been 
approved by a resolution of Parliament.
Provided that if any such Proclamation is issued at a time when 
Parliament stands dissolved or the dissolution of Parliament takes place during 
the period of one hundred and twenty days referred to in sub-clause (c), the 
Proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of thirty days from the 
date on which Parliament first meets after its reconstitution, unless before the 
expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the 
Proclamation has been passed by Parliament.
(3) A Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the security of 
Bangladesh, or any part thereof, is threatened by war or external aggression or 
by internal disturbance may be made before the actual occurrence of war or 
any such aggression or disturbance if the President is satisfied that there is 
imminent danger thereof.
14IB Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, nothing in 
Articles 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 42 shall restrict the power of the State to make 
any law or to take any executive action which the State would, but for the 
provisions contained in Part III of this Constitution, be competent to make or 
to take, but any law so made shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to 
have effect as soon as the Proclamation ceases or operate, except as respects 
things done or omitted to be done before the law so ceases to have effect.
141C (1) While a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the 
President may, by order, declare that the right to move any court for the 
enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part III of this Constitution as 
may be specified in the order, and all proceedings pending in any court for the 
enforcement of the right so specified, shall remain suspended for the period 
during which the Proclamation is in force or for such shorter period as may be 
specified in the order.
(2) An order made under this Article may extend to the whole of 
Bangladesh or any part thereof.
(3) Every order made under this Article shall, as soon as may be, be 
laid before Parliament.]
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